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Abstract 
 
In 1889, a group of British returned migrants from China gathered for a formal dinner 
in London, resolving that the gathering would become a recurring function, and also 
that steps should be taken to establish an association representing their interests. This 
thesis examines the history of the body subsequently founded, the China Association, 
investigating its records alongside contemporary newspapers, periodicals and 
directories, as well as the papers of a number of individual members. In doing so, the 
thesis traces the establishment, objectives and activities of the CA over a period of 65 
years. To understand how the CA operated, the thesis first focuses on the Association’s 
membership, examining the 111 founding members alongside later officers and key 
individuals. The study then investigates the three principle aims of the Association, 
which were to provide: (1) a political voice for British interests in China through the 
creation of links with the British government; (2) a platform of sociability for returnees 
through a variety of events; and finally (3) charity to deserving causes as well as 
providing philanthropic backing to collections including those for education. While 
disparate on the surface, these aims were drawn together by the underlying desire of 
the Association—and central aim of its leaders—to improve the state of British trade 
and businesses in China. 
This study offers the first comprehensive examination of a return migrant 
association, identifying it as a structure that served to facilitate the strengthening of 
trade, networks and sociability, whilst also serving as a political lobbying group.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On 4 March 1889, 130 gentlemen resident in Britain, but all with connections to East 
Asia, sat down to dine at the Thatched House Club in London. After time spent in 
reminiscence and an ‘excellent’ repast, conversation turned to a more serious matter. 
As the chair of the evening, Sir Alfred Dent, explained: 
The real object … of their gathering together was to see if something could 
not be done towards founding a permanent institution (Hear, hear). He 
would suggest that they should take the matter into practical consideration 
on a more convenient occasion than the present. It might, however, be 
thought desirable to select without delay a provisional committee to draft 
a constitution of what he thought might be called “the China Association.” 
(Hear, hear, and applause)1 
 
After all, Dent went on to remind those gathered, the Straits Association was now 
‘recognised by the Colonial Office, and he believed by the authorities in Singapore’, 
returnees from Japan had now ‘started [their] annual dinner’ and ‘lately Ceylon had 
started its association.’2  All of these, Dent stressed, added to the wealth of colonial 
institutions that already existed to support India—‘its own council’—and Australia, 
Canada and the Cape Colony which ‘each had their own special organisations’ and 
‘behind them, again, the all-powerful colonial institute.’3 For British interests in 
China, there was nothing comparable, and Dent was clear in his belief that a ‘China 
Association’ would ‘become a powerful and representative institution, useful alike to 
the trading and resident community, as well as to the Foreign Office and British 
officers abroad.’4 
Considering the number of associations and institutions Alfred Dent was able 
to draw upon on to illustrate the potential of the proposed China Association [CA], it 
                                                          
1 The Inaugural China Dinner: Proposed China Association, 4 March 1889, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committees, April 1889 – March 1897, CHAS/MCP/1, China Association 
Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
2 The Straits Association, originally the Straits Settlements Association, was founded in 1868 to ensure 
the interests of the Straits Settlement were appropriately represented in London. See C.M. Turnbull, A 
History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p.49 and pp.163-4. For a 
discussion of some of its early political undertakings see Anthony Webster, ‘The Development of 
British Commercial and Political Networks in the Straits Settlements 1800 to 1868: The Rise of a 
Colonial and Regional Economic Identity?’, Modern Asian Studies, 45, 4 (July, 2011), pp.899-929. 
3 The Inaugural China Dinner: Proposed China Association, 4 March 1889, CHAS/MCP/1. 
4 Dent was, he made clear, referring to ‘Shanghai and the Treaty Ports’ and not to ‘Hongkong, which 
as [the guests] knew had its own governor and its own legislative council’, although the CA would later 
concern itself with the colony. The Inaugural China Dinner: Proposed China Association, 4 March 
1889, CHAS/MCP/1. 
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is clear that the CA was not formed in a vacuum, nor entirely out of a sense of 
proactivism. It was, in many ways, simply a reaction to an environment in which 
associations that brought together returnees from abroad became an increasingly 
common feature in an already burgeoning associational world. 
In that sense the foundation of the CA was a rather typical event, repeated 
across Britain and her dominions, for as recent scholarship has convincingly argued, 
the British became a nation of joiners. From early roots in the seventeenth century, 
Britain developed into an ‘associational world’ where personal identity, but also civil 
society and wider political and societal developments, were shaped by the clubs, 
societies and associations that people chose to set up or join.5 These associations came 
in a variety of forms, with outlets for returnees from formal and informal Empire 
gaining popularity from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. The uses and operational 
scope of these voluntary associations were wide. Many enabled the creation of social 
capital, playing a key role in the development of trust to allow the creation of linkages 
and networks. As urbanization accelerated the development of associations in the 
nineteenth century, many also played a central role in developing new social 
hierarchies, and even power oligarchies.6 Sometimes lines blurred as associations 
moved out of the voluntary sector and begin to seek governmental support for their 
aims, becoming what might be better referred to as pressure—or organized interest—
groups. This blurring of lines, and the potential for tension and disagreements within 
associations that emerged as a result, is an important theme in this thesis. Although 
the zenith of this associational world has potentially passed, Britain remains a nation 
of joiners, and the CA continues to exist to the present day.7  
                                                          
5 The most comprehensive work on the development of British associational culture, and which coined 
this term, is Peter Clark’s, British Clubs and Societies 1580-1800: the origins of an associational world 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). A good introduction to similar developments is offered in 
Graeme Morton, Boudien de Vries and R.J. Morris (eds.), Civil Society, Associations and Urban 
Places: Class, Nation and Culture in Nineteenth-century Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 
6 R.J. Morris, ‘Voluntary Societies and British Urban Elites, 1750-1850: An Analysis’, The Historical 
Journal, 26, 1 (1983), pp.101-2. 
7 Peter Clark concludes his work by noting considerable growth in a number of voluntary sectors post 
World War Two, the most notable recent growth being the booming membership of the national trust 
and RSPB. See Clark, British Clubs and Societies 1580-1800, pp.470-91. Robert D. Putnam argues for 
the declining associationalism of the USA in his article ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social 
Capital’, Journal of Democracy, 6, 1 (1995), pp.65-78 and later work Bowling Alone: The collapse and 
revival of American community (New York: Touchstone, 2001), in which he argues, conversely to 
Clark, that the growth of large environmental based groups does not represent associationalism as such, 
as they often simply grant honorific membership in exchange for a joining fee, offering little chance to 
meet and create social capital. See, specifically, chapter nine.  
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Yet while voluntary associations emerged as a cornerstone of British life, they 
were by no means confined to Britain, and spread around the world in the cultural 
baggage of those who left the British Isles. The highest proportional rate of this 
outmigration occurred between 1646 and 1670, with the seventeenth century seeing 
approximately 1 million people emigrate from the British and Irish Isles, the vast 
majority of them English.8 It is from this point onwards that we can identify the spread 
of associations abroad, chiefly including ethnic associations designed to help migrants 
in distress.9 Migration figures for the eighteenth century are more confused, and have 
been called ‘a quagmire’, but it is clear that there was less emigration from the British 
Isles than in the previous century.10 A final boom came between 1815 and 1930. 
Numbers grew rapidly, and about 18.7 million people left the UK (11.4 million of 
these from Great Britain).11 The further proliferation and spread of associations 
throughout North America and Australasia in particular was tied to these patterns of 
migration. The sheer scale of these movements of people, however, can sometimes 
hide more than it reveals, as the viewing of these movements under an umbrella term—
migration—is overly simplistic for there were many types of migrants. The most 
important distinction for this thesis is that between temporary sojourners and 
permanent settlers—a distinction explored in more detail below. Beyond this, the very 
scale of migration ensured that a ‘staggering array of social types’ were involved. 
Families, skilled and unskilled labourers, domestic servants, artisans, miners, 
agriculturalists, technicians, professionals, missionaries, soldiers, teachers and doctors 
are just a few individual classifications of the people who were involved.12 
Motivations, too, were numerous—unique to the individual, constantly altering, and 
impossible to comprehensively list. Some migrated of their own free will, seeking a 
better life and standard of living in the colonies or elsewhere. Others had little choice, 
and migrated due to economic pressure, or else were coerced and removed from their 
                                                          
8 James Horn, ‘British Diaspora: Emigration from Britain, 1650-1815’ in P.J. Marshall (ed.), The 
Oxford History of the British Empire Vol II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p.30. 
9 For example the Scots’ Charitable Society of Boston, which was first set up in 1657. For details see 
Bueltmann, Clubbing Together: Ethnicity, Civility and Formal Sociability in the Scottish Diaspora to 
1930 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), pp.69-71. 
10 Eric Richards, Britannia’s Children: Emigration from England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland Since 
1600 (London: Hambledon and London, 2004), pp.4-6. 
11 Marjory Harper and David Constantine, Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series: 
Migration and Empire (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010), p.2. 
12 Richards, Britannia’s Children, pp.297-8. 
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land, while others, as convicts, were transported against their will.13 Specifics of 
migration to China and the types of migrants most prominent in East Asia are also 
discussed and defined below. 
What was a constant, however, was that when travelling across the world, these 
British migrants brought associational structures with them. Recent works have 
shown—to choose but a few examples—how ethnic societies helped migrants find 
their feet in a difficult new world, providing charitable help, or offering social 
gatherings with a flavour of home.14 Geographical societies, most prominently the 
Royal Geographical Society, helped to map new frontiers, providing both practical 
information valuable for Imperial strategy and the knowledge and understanding to 
allow British commercial aims, and its subjects overseas, to flourish.15 Freemasonry 
proved exceptionally adaptable to an imperial setting, developing—although it was by 
no means alone in doing so—business networks, and even co-opting native interests 
into the associational landscape.16 At other times business interests grouped together 
to set up Chambers of Commerce which spread to colonial America and beyond, with 
13 chambers ‘abroad’ by 1913, and seven existing, at varying times, in China.17 
Together, all of these groups formed part of the basis for networks that criss-crossed 
the globe and were an important mechanism that kept formal and informal Empire 
together.  
These networks were essential if British interests were to prosper over large 
transnational distances. And like associational structures, they quickly spread 
                                                          
13 For a brief discussion on some of the motivations prominent throughout the eighteenth century see 
Horn, ‘British Diaspora: Emigration from Britain, 1650-1815’, pp.35-51. For some of the reasons 
behind mid nineteenth century booms in numbers of emigrants see Richards, Britannia’s Children, 
pp.152-73. 
14 Scots were particularly prominent in doing so. See, for example, Bueltmann, Clubbing Together or 
Angela McCarthy, ‘Scottish Migrant Ethnic identities in the British Empire since the 19th century’ in 
John M. Mackenzie and T.M. Devine (eds.), Scotland and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p.5. 
15 An overview of how these societies, and scientific exploration in general, proved useful to British 
interests is Robert A. Stafford, ‘Scientific Exploration and Empire’ in Andrew Porter, (ed.), The Oxford 
History of the British Empire Vol III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
16 See Jessica Harland-Jacobs, ‘All in the Family: Freemasonry and the British Empire in the mid-19th 
c.’, The Journal of British Studies, 42, 4, (2003) and ‘“Hands across the Sea”: The Masonic Network, 
British Imperialism, and the North Atlantic World’, Geographical Review, 89, 2 (1999) for the 
influence of freemasonry within the British Empire. 
17 Robert J. Bennet, Local Business Voice: The History of Chambers of Commerce in Britain, Ireland, 
and Revolutionary America 1760-2011 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.11. Unfortunately, 
Bennet’s work does not study the Chambers of Commerce that existed in China beyond noting their 
existence. This thesis notes, however, a selection of occasions when they came into contact with (and 
later created formalised links with) the CA. 
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throughout the British World. Magee and Thompson have stressed quite how heavily 
the British World relied on networks underpinned by social capital and the resultant 
sharing of information in guiding migration, the development of markets for British 
goods, and British investment overseas.18 In Asia such networks quickly came to 
encompass business interests, such as those of the Straits Settlements, which created 
a ‘network of commercial and political connections’ with ‘peers, politicians and 
government officials in Britain’ to ensure their needs were represented at home, which 
would culminate in the creation of the Straits Association which Alfred Dent and the 
CA hoped to emulate.19 Others in different locales were ‘acutely aware that 
marginalisation from imperial discursive networks’ would see a decrease in political 
and material support. To counter such difficulties they ‘strove continually to fashion 
circuits of communication with vital metropolitan interests’ to make their voices heard 
back in the home country.20 Be it through a formal association, or an informal network, 
the passage of information and the creation of linkages was a key mechanism linking 
metropole and periphery. 
Nor was the spread of these associations and networks confined to formal 
Empire. Complex trade networks, reliant on credit and therefore trust, were operative 
in China from the earliest days of British involvement, notably those behind the tea 
trade.21 These and other associations were founded and run by individuals and groups 
from within civil society; they could aid the state but were not state-run, and therefore 
wherever there was a British presence the associational world followed. China could 
boast, for example, Scottish ethnic societies in no fewer than twelve locations in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century.22 Shanghai alone played host at the time of the 
foundation of the CA in 1889 to 31 clubs and institutions (although a small number 
catered specifically for nationalities other than the British) and a further 11 masonic 
                                                          
18 Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and Globalisation: Networks of people, goods 
and capital in the British World, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
19 Webster, ‘The Development of British Commercial and Political Networks in the Straits Settlements’, 
pp.899-901.     
20Alan Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth Century South Africa and Britain 
(London: Routledge, 2001), pp.6-7. 
21 Natasha Glaisyer, ‘Networking: Trade and Exchange in the Eighteenth-Century British Empire’, The 
Historical Journal, 46, 2 (June 2004), p.464. 
22 Bueltmann, Clubbing Together, p.190. Of course, it must be noted that two of these (Hongkong and 
Weihaiwei) were actually part of the British Empire. 
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lodges.23 Hongkong could, for the same year, claim to be home to 26 ‘Clubs, Societies, 
Institutions &c.’ and 11 masonic lodges of its own.24 Adding nuance to these numbers, 
recent work has shown considerable formation of sub-identities for British residents 
in China, with clubs and associations becoming discriminatory in their selection of 
members, rather than simply catering to the whole of the British community. Class 
certainly played a role, emphasised by elite colonial clubs such as the Shanghai Club, 
and saw associational life in East Asia split also along these lines as well as ethnicity 
and other factors. 25  
In light of the numbers of clubs and associations available it comes as no 
surprise that many of those who became members of the CA after their return to Britain 
were, or had been, also members of China-based associations. As much is revealed 
clearly from even a superficial analysis of the CA’s original membership which, as is 
discussed in detail in chapter two, offers the greatest scope for investigation. First 
secretary (and later president) R.S. Gundry was an ‘inveterate committee man’ and a 
high ranking Mason, while founder and chairman William Keswick had been 
chairman of the Chamber of Commerce for both Shanghai and Hongkong, and a 
trustee of the Hongkong Sailors Home.26 A glance at the Hongkong directory for 1882 
which documents Keswick holding some of these roles—to choose but one example 
of location and date—reveals five more founding members of the CA serving in roles 
in various clubs and societies. Atwell Coxon was the president of the Hongkong 
Cricket Club and a committee member of the Choral Society, Amateur Dramatic Club 
and the Hongkong Club, alongside which he still found time to act as the Consul for 
Belgium. Thomas Jackson was a treasurer for Hongkong Public School, chairman of 
the Victoria Recreation Club, a member of the committee of the Chamber of 
Commerce, and finally a trustee for St. John’s Cathedral. A. McIver was a director of 
                                                          
23 The Chronicle & Directory for China, Corea, Japan, The Philippines, Chochin-China, Annam, 
Tonquin, Siam, Borneo, Straits Settlements, Malay States, &c., (with which is incorporated “the China 
directory”) for the year 1889 (Daily Press Office, Hongkong, 1889), pp.425-8. 
24 Ibid., pp.286-9. 
25 See Robert Bickers, ‘Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community 
in Shanghai’ Past and Present, 159 (May, 1998), pp.183-4; Bueltmann, Clubbing Together, pp.174-9; 
Benjamin B. Cohen, In the Club: Associational Life in Colonial South Asia (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2015), specifically pp.68-71 for the Shanghai Club, though the work as a whole offers 
a wider study of their role in creating and maintaining networks. 
26 For a short biography of Gundry see Paul French, Through the Looking Glass: China’s Foreign 
Journalists from the Opium Wars to Mao (Hongkong: Hongkong University Press, 2009), pp.56-7. For 
William Keswick’s involvement in these bodies see “Obituary.” Times (London, England), 11 March 
1912, p.11 and The Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan and the Philippines for 1882 (with which 
is incorporated the “China Directory” (Hongkong: Daily Press Office, 1882), p.222. 
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the Sailor’s Home. Meanwhile, N.J. Ede was a committee member for the Humane 
Society, and a trustee of Union Church. Finally, A.P. McEwen was a member of the 
City Hall committee, the Chamber of Commerce Committee, the Diocesan Home and 
Orphanage Committee and a trustee of St. John’s Cathedral.27 To find six of the CA’s 
original 111 members serving as officers of voluntary associations and bodies in a 
single location at the same time, while only offering a snapshot, is suggestive of the 
deep reach and spread of associationalism. For the CA this meant that it could easily 
draw upon men with previous experience of leading voluntary associations in East 
Asia. We can only speculate how many CA members we would find as members of 
these clubs, societies and associations, were full membership lists available. But it is 
clear regardless that by the time the CA was established British associational life in 
China was well-developed and extensive. As the men engaged in the plethora of clubs 
and societies returned home to Britain, the CA found a pool of recruits with knowledge 
and experience of East Asia on whom to draw for support, some of whom may well 
have met and developed connections through the flourishing associational scene in the 
region. 
Despite the recent work outlined here having shed more light on the operations 
and scope of many associations, and while patterns of outmigration are broadly 
known, the same cannot be said about returnees. Return migration generally is an 
understudied field—a result primarily of difficulties surrounding the source base that 
does not lend itself well to establishing details on movements that are rarely adequately 
captured in official records, or lost in a ‘statistical soup.’28 This problem is not specific 
to returnees from China or Asia, but is amplified by the transitory nature of many of 
the movements from locations there. Marjory Harper has also noted that more work is 
needed on the reintegration of returnees in home societies, their motives, and the 
‘mechanisms by which they maintained links with the various places where they had 
alighted.’29 The study of the CA can go some way towards opening up new routes into 
better understanding these deficits, offering a way into the life of returnees, shedding 
light on who they were and what they did after their return.  
                                                          
27 For all of these men see The Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan and the Philippines for 1882, 
pp.217-25. 
28 A brief introduction to such problems can be found in Dudley Baines, Emigration from Europe 1815-
1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.12-13. The term ‘statistical soup’ is drawn 
from the Introduction to Marjory Harper (ed.), Emigrant Homecomings: The return movement of 
Emigrants, 1600-2000 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p.8. 
29 Marjory Harper (ed.), Emigrant Homecomings, introduction pp.2-8. 
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Some recent work has been valuable in this respect. Elizabeth Buettner and 
Kathleen Burke note, for example, that British Empire returnees were likely to 
socialize together, in clubs or through the creation of entire communities, while 
research on other national groups has revealed that Polish and Italian returnees 
grouped together either on a formal or informal basis.30 Moreover, scholarship 
exploring the development of pressure groups suggests that the East India Company’s 
activities in London can be viewed as that of a political interest group comprised of 
returnees. References to groups such as the Planters Association, a group of planters 
who had returned from the Caribbean in order to exert political influence to improve 
their business prospects provide another example, suggesting the Empire and British 
overseas interests were key in shaping the organisation of returnees.31 Placed within 
this wider context, this thesis offers a new way of investigating return movements and 
provides the first comprehensive overview of how a return migrant association was 
set up and how it functioned.32 
In this way, too, the CA offers an avenue into understanding the reasons and 
motivations behind the return of a select group of migrants. Numerous motivations 
behind returns are possible, including ‘success;… failure; homesickness; a call to 
return;… rejection of life overseas’ and even beyond this a desire of second generation 
migrants to visit their native land, or even a return to found benevolent schemes to 
help other returnees (such as Scottish returnees who founded hospitals for returned 
soldiers) before again migrating.33 Others were forced to return, their settlement 
                                                          
30 Harper and Constantine, Migration and Empire, p.330; Elizabeth Buettner, ‘“We Don’t Grow Coffee 
and Bananas in Clapham Junction You Know!”: Imperial Britons Back Home’ in R. Bickers (ed.), 
Settlers and Expatriates: Britons Over the Seas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.315; 
Kathleen Burke, ‘Canada in Britain: Returned Migrants and the Canada Club’ in Marjory Harper (ed.), 
Emigrant Homecomings: The return movement of Emigrants, 1600-2000 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005); Adam Walaszek (Piotr Mizia, translator), ‘“How Could it all appear so Rosy”': 
Re-emigrants from the United States in Poland, 1891-1924’, Polish American Studies, 49, 2 (1992), 
pp.49-54; Dino Cinel, The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, 1870–1929 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.115-119. 
31 Graham Wootton, Pressure Groups in Britain, 1720-1970: an essay in interpretation with original 
documents (London:  A. Laine, 1975), pp.18-27; Tilman W. Nechtman, Nabobs: Empire and Identity in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.18. 
32 A short overview of a body which shared some functions with the CA—the Canada Club—is, 
however, available, see Burke, ‘Canada in Britain.’ 
33 Mark Wyman, ‘Emigrants returning: the evolution of a tradition’, in Marjory Harper (ed.), Emigrant 
Homecomings: The return movement of Emigrants, 1600-2000 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2005), p.21; Steve Murdoch, ‘Children of the Diaspora: the ‘homecoming’ of the second-
generation Scot in the seventeenth century’ in Marjory Harper (ed.), Emigrant Homecomings: The 
return movement of Emigrants, 1600-2000 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), pp.59-
60. 
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abroad made untenable by wider events.34 Assessing the careers the members of the 
CA had pursued whilst in East Asia, the lives they led, and how this affected their 
membership and interaction with the Association will be discussed in this thesis. 
The CA was chosen as the basis for this study for several reasons. First is a 
practical consideration relating to the size and depth of the CA archival collection 
(discussed in detail below). A second consideration was that the CA was itself a 
sizeable organisation, offering a route to study a number of return migrants in a single 
setting. Beyond the immediate benefit to better understanding the CA and return 
migration, and especially return migrant associations, a third aim of the thesis is to 
offer insight into the development of Sino-British relations by exposing the varied 
attempts of the CA, a hitherto understudied actor in this context, to influence relations 
between the two nations. Sino-British relations is a field of study which continues to 
grow in importance as China itself gains prominence on the world stage. Indeed, China 
remains acutely aware of the role Britain and other foreign powers played in its own 
development, and remembers it in the starkly unfavourable light as a century of 
‘national humiliation’ characterised by unequal treaties, foreign exploitation, and the 
partial removal of its own sovereignty.35  When the CA assumed the mantle of a group 
representative of the combined British interests in China, it made considerable efforts 
to facilitate a number of connections between Britain and China. These would manifest 
not only as efforts to influence British and Chinese government policy—both large 
scale, and by offering feedback more regularly on small commercial matters—but also 
in the creation of links between the two nations through a range of more diverse 
projects. Though assessing the success of the CA is sometimes difficult, it was 
nonetheless an active body, and an intermediary worthy of study, and understanding 
how it operated enhances not only our understanding of the CA as an association, but 
also its wider role. To investigate the CA as fully as possible in respect of the above 
aims, the thesis adopts a longitudinal approach. This permits extended consideration 
of developments over time, covering the period from the Association’s establishment 
until the mid-1950s. The study is connected to a wider ESRC-funded project which 
focused upon networking and social associations in Asia in a longitudinal context.36 
                                                          
34 Murdoch, ‘Children of the Diaspora: the ‘homecoming’ of the second-generation Scot’, pp.69-70. 
35 Robert Bickers, The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914 (London: 
Penguin, 2012), pp.392-7. 
36 Project details: ES/K008161/1, ‘European, Ethnic and Expatriate: A Longitudinal Comparison of 
German and British Social Networking and Associational Formations in Modern-day Asia’. 
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Definitions and approaches 
In order to study the CA it is important to understand that, as an association, it did not 
only include individual members, but rather also those who represented particular 
firms and business interests.  At this point we are not concerned with their individual 
or corporate identities, nor their specific actions and day to day patterns of life in China 
or Britain—these are explored throughout the thesis. Instead it is important to offer 
definitions and approaches to further refine our understanding of these men and firms 
in a wider context. 
Turning first to the individuals who made up the CA, we know that the vast 
majority of members had resided, at some point, in China or East Asia. We can safely 
say, therefore, that these men were either migrants or return migrants, assuming a 
conventional definition that migrants are those intending to spend 12 months or more 
abroad.37 But this terminology is not necessarily helpful. Although all migrations have 
shared aspects, in the most basic sense that all relate to some form of movement, 
beyond this a wealth of different facets and developments can colour the experience. 
Particularly pertinent for our study, focused on returnees, are the distinctions between 
migrants who expected to return to Britain and those who intended to remain abroad. 
Robert Bickers has defined the British economic presence in China as one split along 
these lines, although factors beyond transitory status are also involved, and categorised 
these distinct groups as expatriates and settlers.38 When we look at the wider usage of 
these terms, however, it is clear that further scrutiny is needed to arrive at a definition 
that is workable for the purpose of this thesis. 
Indeed, the term expatriate is one which has developed to hold multiple 
meanings, and has become a ‘malleable and unstable term’.39 Traditionally, it was 
used to refer to those who were forced from their home country.40 At its most 
foundational level in modern usage the term simply refers to ‘a person who lives 
outside their native country.’41 One common usage in Britain today is to describe those 
who have retired to another country, with the term conjuring images of communities 
of British retirees in Spain. As recent commentary has emphasised, this is a misleading 
                                                          
37 Harper and Constantine, Migration and Empire, p.1. 
38 Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism 1900-1949 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999), pp.69-71. 
39 Sarah Kunz, ‘Privileged Mobilities: Locating the Expatriate in Migration Scholarship’, Geography 
Compass, 10, 3 (2016), p.90. 
40 Oxford Dictionary of English, Third Edition (Online Edition: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
41 Ibid. 
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conception, one driven, it appears, largely by the negative associations made with the 
term migrant.42 These are not the people with whom this thesis deals, although they 
do share some characteristics with the expatriates who formed the CA, notably their 
lack of language knowledge (be it through a conscious decision, or simply a lack of 
effort) and subsequent failure to embrace the culture of their host country, with the 
latter a trait long recognised as the ‘legendary exclusivity of British expatriate society,’ 
though this, at least for retirees, seems to have little effect on the enjoyment they find 
at their new destination.43  
Another prominent usage of the term—and one relevant to this study—is to 
describe migrants who venture abroad for economic or business reasons, to work. Yet 
while relevant, this too is a problematic classification. Many migrants are what we 
might call economic migrants, who travel to undertake a host of different jobs. Indeed, 
the Oxford English Dictionary defines a migrant in its most basic term as someone 
who has moved ‘to find work.’44 Several factors are key in separating expatriates from 
this wider classification. First, more than other migrants it is their intention to only 
sojourn at their destination, before returning home to their native country. They make 
this decision prior to departure. This is linked intrinsically to a second factor that 
defines them: a relatively high socio-economic status. After all, in order to sojourn, 
they must hold a means of return. While some would have hoped to generate those 
means during their time abroad, this fact highlights that that expatriates, for the most 
part, are of this higher status, often employed by multinational firms, and are 
specialised professionals such as engineers, or involved in finance and mercantilism.45 
Inherent in these factors, too, is the greater mobility available to these expatriates, 
especially in comparison to other migrants. Some existing literature has 
                                                          
42 See for example Mawuna Remarque Koutonin, ‘Why are white people expats when the rest of us are 
immigrants?’, Guardian, 13 March 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2015/mar/13/white-people-expats-immigrants-migration (last accessed 22 
August 2017). 
43 James Whidden, ‘Expatriates in Cosmopolitan Egypt, 1864-1956’ in Robert Bickers (ed.), Oxford 
History of the British Empire Companion Series: Settlers and Expatriates: Brtions over the Seas 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.61-2; Anthony M. Warnes, Russell King, Allan M. 
Williams and Guy Patterson ‘The Well-being of British expatriate retirees in Southern Europe’, Ageing 
and Society, 19, 6 (1999), p.725. 
44 Oxford Dictionary of English, Third Edition. 
45 John Darwin, ‘Orphans of Empire’ in R. Bickers (ed.), Settlers and Expatriates: Britons Over the 
Seas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.335. For a more recent look at some of Hongkong’s 
Expatriate population, see A.M. Findlay, F.L.N. Li, A.J. Jowett and R. Skeldon ‘Skilled International 
Migration and the Global City: A Study of Expatriates in Hongkong’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers 21, 1 (1996), pp.49-61. 
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conceptualised them as ‘hyper-mobile managerial elites holding key positions of 
power in the global economy’.46 The resultant effects of this on the strength of links 
formed to the host nation is discussed below. It is perhaps worth noting here that those 
who intended to simply sojourn abroad in order to earn a substantial fund of money 
have alternately been termed as simply ‘sojourners’ or ‘plutocrats,’ again highlighting 
the problems with terminology that are extant.47 In a strictly British context, it has 
even been noted that the term is used in combination with ‘colonial officer’ or 
‘Imperial careerists’.48 For this study, however, the term expatriate will be used.  
The above factors helped define how expatriate life proceeded, both in China 
and elsewhere. The expatriates’ status as sojourners ensured that they, traditionally, 
held themselves consciously separate from the local population for fear of ‘going 
native’—although as we shall see, changes to this attitude would come to define the 
later expatriate experience in China.49 But racial demarcation lines were by no means 
the only ones as expatriates, too, separated themselves, where possible, from the wider 
British migrant population for fear of damaging their reputation. Even marrying a 
British migrant of the wrong social class could damage career prospects for an aspiring 
expatriate hoping to climb the career ladder.50 Demarcation even reached inside their 
own sphere, as expatriates were themselves separated to a point—the ‘Taipans’, or 
heads of firms, clustering at one end of the bar in the Shanghai Club, with the new 
recruits gathered at the other.51 It was, ultimately, the expatriates’ relatively high 
employment status that ensured the possibility to enforce such separations. To this end 
they created a distinct social sphere in which they could exist; this sphere was 
characterized by the high levels of associationalism already noted.52   High socio-
economic status and sojourner lifestyle also brought with it a greater chance to attempt 
to influence British imperial and foreign policy from the metropole upon their return, 
                                                          
46 Kunz, ‘Privileged Mobilities’, p.92. 
47 Sojourners is perhaps the more common term of the two. Eric Richards uses the term ‘Plutocrats’ to 
describe those who intended to sojourn and make ‘their pile’ of money in Australia. See Eric Richards 
‘Running home from Australia: intercontinental mobility and migrant expectations in the nineteenth 
century’ in Marjory Harper (ed.), Emigrant Homecomings: The return movement of Emigrants, 1600-
2000 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p.84. 
48 Kunz, ‘Privileged Mobilities’, p.91. 
49 Whidden, ‘Expatriates in Cosmopolitan Egypt’, pp.61-2.  
50 Robert Bickers, ‘Shanghailanders and Others: British Communities in China, 1843-1957’ in Robert 
Bickers, (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire Companion Series: Settlers and Expatriates: 
Britons over the Seas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.295. 
51 Nicholas R. Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution 
of the 1920s (New Hampshire: Middlebury College Press, 1991), p.71. 
52 Bueltmann, Clubbing Together, pp.174-9. 
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at least for those who remained in employment of the multi-national firms who had 
dispatched them overseas to begin with.53 It was a combination of these factors that 
would see these men form together under the banner of the CA, and would see them 
come to dominate the committee of its London branch and headquarters. But the 
extension of the CA to East Asia with the development of a branch structure ensured 
that membership of the overall body became wider, opening opportunities for ‘settler’ 
interests to have their say.  
These settlers are, perhaps, more straightforward to define, as their very name 
outlines the key aspect of their migration—that they settle in their new country of 
residence. This was the most common course of action for British migrants to locations 
around the Empire, and though numbers were vastly smaller, China was no 
exception.54 But the term, much as that of expatriate, leaves room for divergent 
definitions. This is the case not least because it tends to conjure images of imperial 
frontiers, vast swathes of land, isolated farmsteads and ultimately the violent 
displacement of the indigenous population. But this was not so for China. Nor was the 
other potential settler experience—of existing and living under the host country’s 
jurisdiction—the reality that would meet settlers in Asia. Those who settled in China 
would have to adapt to a reality that was not entirely part of the British imperial world, 
but at the same time seemed as such. 
This, for these British settlers, was a consequence of a combination of 
numerous institutions. On a diplomatic level, all British subjects held extraterritoriality 
until 1943. Prior to this date they were subject not to the laws of China, but to the 
jurisdiction of the British Supreme Court for China, based in Shanghai, the city which 
in itself became the second most prominent institution that represented the Chinese 
experience for British settlers. Through its Municipal Council, the role of which is 
discussed in more detail later, these settlers were granted the rights to own property, 
utilities, and gained the protection of a police force and small volunteer militia 
contingent. These types of institutions (alongside other British Municipal Councils 
and treaty port authorities) produced what came to feel like small enclaves of the 
                                                          
53 For a discussion of the influence multinational firms held over policy in China see P.J. Cain and A.G. 
Hopkins, British Imperialism: 1688-2000 (2nd Edition, London: Routledge, 2013), pp.360-80 and 
pp.593-616. 
54 Harper and Constantine, Migration and Empire, p.306 notes that at most 40 per cent of migrants 
returned, the rest ending their lives outside of Britain. Bickers, Britain in China, p.67 notes their 
numerical dominance in China, and this work attempts to refine this and provide approximate figures 
in chapter one. 
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British Empire. Within them, life would proceed much as in any imperial frontier—
with the caveat that it was largely limited to these locales, British business interests 
rarely progressing beyond them, and struggling to expand markets ‘up country’.55 This 
was the treaty port world, in which these settlers would settle, and in which expatriates 
would sojourn.56  
But who were these settlers? What lives did they lead before their move to 
China, and why did they choose this destination? Like expatriates, economic forces 
were often at play. But China did not offer the economic benefits that we more readily 
associate with settlers. There was no offer of land as was the case in imperial frontier 
locations such as the Canadian prairies.57 Instead, there were jobs, most within 
Shanghai itself. There were small businesses to run as shop owners, or posts in 
administrative roles for the Shanghai Municipal Council. Employment in the 
municipal police was readily available and the body was often staffed by British army 
veterans, who left their regiments when these were dispatched to China. Others 
worked in lower level posts for expatriate-led firms. Many had not chosen China 
specifically, they had simply chosen a location that was part of a global job market in 
a global economy. When they arrived in China, they either found the lifestyle palatable 
enough to remain, or a return prohibitively expensive. These settlers were the people 
on whom much of the day-to-day work in the settlement rested. Those in Shanghai 
termed themselves ‘Shanghailanders’ and set about raising families in the treaty port 
enclaves where they found employment.58 These were the British settlers in China. 
Lower class migrants, who moved for economic reasons, some of whom did not intend 
(or at least, had no guaranteed means) to return to Britain. They depended on 
extraterritoriality as granted by treaty and upon the Shanghai Municipal Council for 
their very existence, and, as we shall see, developed an identity that would staunchly 
defend these institutions. 
It must be remembered, finally, that the British enclaves and institutions in 
China did not survive until the end of the time period covered by this thesis. Many of 
these settlers were evicted by circumstances beyond their control, and beyond their 
                                                          
55 Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘Britain in China, 1842-1914’ in Andrew Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of 
the British Empire: Vol. III The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.161 
56 Bickers, Britain in China, pp.67-114 offers the best study of treaty ports and life in them.  
57 Harper and Constantine, Migration and Empire, p.16. 
58 For all of the above, see Bickers, Britain in China, pp.69-75; Bickers, ‘Shanghailanders: The 
Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai’. 
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ability to defend themselves from—the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the rise of the 
People’s Republic of China [PRC]—leaving the CA to deal with a new group of 
returnees, unwilling ones, who had been forced back to their home country. Chapter 
four of the thesis explores the CA’s response to this. 
The British business presence in China, not unlike individual migrants, also 
had to deal with particular problems inherently linked to the type of individual 
businesses, and their methods of operation. Many firms were tied, geographically, to 
a single location. They could not easily transfer their business from that location, 
especially if they relied on local trade networks, or were producing goods, and were 
therefore vulnerable to changes in the Chinese market.59  These firms would become, 
like settler interests, defensive of proposed changes to extraterritoriality, and surface 
in this study most prominently in the CA’s Shanghai branch. They only appear, 
however, sporadically throughout the thesis, and little information is available 
regarding them—the only one to play any role of note in later discussion is the 
Shanghai-based manufacturer and importer Ilbert & Co. 
  Of much greater importance to this study are those firms who could place men 
actively in their employment on the CA’s London committees. Logistically, this meant 
the firms were required to have a London headquarters, or London office. For an 
import/export firm tied to a single location in China, this was, of course, a business 
structure that could be employed, and was a common structure found in British trade 
in Asia, with returnees founding ‘sister’ firms in Britain to do business with their 
Eastern counterparts.60 However much more common within the CA’s upper echelons 
were representatives of businesses that had developed to become true ‘multinationals’. 
Trade itself was no longer their sole preserve, and many held interests that 
encompassed finance and shipping alongside import/export services. Attempting to 
rank these firms operating in China in terms of importance is, ultimately, not a task 
for this thesis, but a brief introduction to those that feature most prominently in this 
study is provided in Appendix B.61 
                                                          
59 Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p.45. 
60 Webster, ‘The Development of British Commercial and Political Networks in the Straits Settlements 
1800 to 1868’, pp.917. 
61 Others have made some attempt to do so, grading these firms in numerous ways. Jardine Matheson, 
Swires and Dodwells are ranked by estimated size of capital employed in Geoffrey Jones, Merchants 
to Multinationals, British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p.54. The largest Far Eastern mercantile houses are ranked by group 
capital available for investment in Carol Matheson Connel, A Business in Risk: Jardine Matheson and 
the Hongkong Trading Industry (Westport: Praeger, 2004), p.3l. Carrol Matheson Connel also 
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These are the firms that would lead the CA’s political and commercial 
activities. Pre-1925, before British efforts to normalise diplomacy in China, they are 
sometimes referred to as ‘concessionaires’—particularly the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation [HSBC] and Jardine Matheson—as they sought to develop 
railway or mining concessions granted to Britain via treaties, or sought to provide 
loans to the Chinese government to develop itself, whilst neglecting treaty port 
interests.62 After 1925 their aims changed. Although loans to the Chinese government 
were still a primary interest they began to move consciously towards co-operation with 
Chinese partners seeking to ameliorate the damage the British presence caused by 
stirring Chinese nationalism, particularly spurred by a massacre of protestors by 
British led police in Shanghai in the same year.63 This was done in concert with the 
British government, and saw the CA co-opted into the process to play a supporting 
role. They will be referred to predominantly throughout this thesis as multinationals, 
and it was partially this multinational structure that gave them the flexibility to adapt 
in line with British government policy towards China.  
Overall, the British presence in China is, for this thesis, best defined in 
economic terms. On the one hand, big business ‘multinational’ interests dispatched 
expatriate employees, skilled professionals in their own fields, to sojourn in China and 
develop the respective company’s presence there. If business patterns changed, these 
expatriates could be redeployed to another geographical location, and with them, the 
company’s capital. On the other hand, individual settler migrants moved to China, 
hopeful of putting down roots and living a better life than that available in Britain. 
They founded small businesses and fostered an identity that was defensive of their 
extraterritorial rights, for without these, they faced losing their entire livelihoods. The 
                                                          
reproduces shipping figures for the Yangtze river and group and partner capital for the pre-1914 period, 
see Carrol Matheson Connel, The applicability of resource-based theory to the interpretation of strategic 
management in Jardine Matheson: uncertainty, relationships and capabilities (unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of Glasgow, 2001), p.70 and 88. None are conclusive, an often are little more than snapshots, 
but all attest that Jardine Matheson, the Swire Group, and Dodwells were leaders in the East Asian 
trade. 
62 Pelcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1948), p.294. 
Many of the names used to refer to firms in this thesis are anachronistic, or have been simplified for 
use. The HSBC, for example, was generally known as the ‘Hongkong Bank’ until 1990, especially in 
Hongkong itself. For the HSBC naming conventions, see David Kynaston, The Lion Wakes: A modern 
history of HSBC (London: Profile Books, 2015), p.14. Other examples of simplification appear 
throughout the text. For a short history of the major firms who appear in the work, and their structures 
and naming conventions, see Appendix B. 
63 Hung-Ting Ku, ‘Urban Mass Movement: The May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai’, Modern Asian 
Studies, 30, 2 (1979), pp.199-203. For a discussion of the wider impact of the massacre, see Bickers, 
Britain in China, chapter four. 
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two could, of course, see crossover. A particularly successful Shanghai settler could 
establish a successful business, and return to London to serve on the CA. Alternately, 
someone who intended to sojourn could see success and choose to settle.64 Ultimately, 
as Bruce Elliot has eloquently noted ‘the certainty of non-return was only established 
by death.’65  The potential of men who returned whilst maintaining a settler outlook 
to influence the CA is discussed in chapter two. But ultimately, this thesis explores an 
association that became, soon after its creation, one that may even be defined as a 
‘returned expatriate’ rather than simply a return migrant association. 
 
A question of sources 
That expatriates play a considerably greater role in this thesis than settlers is not simply 
due to their greater propensity to return to Britain. It is also because of the unfortunate 
fact that the branch records of the CA are not available, either destroyed or 
inaccessible, as many China based records are, or were perhaps never kept in any 
detail. This, unfortunately, means that much of daily work of the CA branches, 
interaction with consuls who formed the front line of communication between Britain 
and China as the ‘judges and governors’ of British subjects, for example,  is lost. Lost 
too is much of the potential communication between the CA and the British minister 
in China, who they outlined at their formation as their second most desired point of 
political contact, but this is simply an unavoidable problem of source availability.66 
Beyond this, and as with any study, illustrative examples have been chosen from the 
available sources to offer case studies throughout the thesis, and it is to these sources 
we must next turn, to explain any further omissions; why certain areas and time periods 
have been prioritised; and, finally, how this study has been structured. 
This thesis primarily draws upon the manuscript records of the CA itself. These 
are, naturally, the richest sources available to provide insight into the CA’s operations 
and activities. Focusing on them is also, however, an immediate reflection of the fact 
that the CA desired to avoid the public eye in many of its endeavours, and as a result 
                                                          
64 Richards, ‘Running home from Australia’, p.99 notes, for example, William Campbell, who became 
a ‘colonial half-millionaire’ in Australia and chose to stay having previously intended to sojourn in the 
country for at most ten years. 
65 Bruce S. Elliot, ‘“Settling Down:” masculinity, class and the rite of return in a transnational 
community’ in Marjory Harper (ed.), Emigrant Homecomings: The return movement of Emigrants, 
1600-2000 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p.154. 
66 S.L. Endicott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933-1937 (Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 1975), p.5. 
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available manuscript sources often provide the only route into the Association. These 
records are held at the School of Oriental and African Studies [SOAS], London, and 
comprise an extensive 143 files and volumes.67 The files most referenced for the thesis 
are the minute books of the Association and its Annual Reports, although frequent 
reference is also made to files containing correspondence, circulars, and records of the 
Association’s School of Chinese. 
Of particular relevance, not least due to their significant scope, are the annual 
reports of the Association. A contemporary of the CA noted in 1894, only five years 
into the Association’s life, that ‘[the] China Association [annual reports] are of quite 
an impossible size, resulting, I have no doubt, in large numbers … going into the 
waste-paper basket.’68 Despite this criticism, reports remained substantial. They grew 
from some 60 pages in that year to a maximum of 146 pages in 1911-12, when the 
report included a 16-page report on the CA’s activities, 86 pages of correspondence 
and trade information, and finally a 44-page supplement containing a report of the 
AGM, annual dinner, details on the Association’s School of Chinese, as well as a 
summary of the most important edicts issued in the previous year in China. The reason 
for this length was never outlined, though the role of secretary of the Association 
having been held by former journalists and authors provides perhaps one possible 
explanation.69 Another, of course, may have been to help assure members that the 
Association was an active one, to which it was worth contributing their subscription 
fee.70 Such may certainly have been a factor considering the CA drew subscriptions 
from a wide range of corporate members, and the length of the annual report may, too, 
have been to ensure they were kept well-informed about the wider state of the British 
trade with China. The reports eventually settled at a 50 to 100 page average, although 
this was significantly lower during the First World War, and towards the end of the 
period under consideration as British business retreated from China in the face of the 
rise of the PRC government. One notable change in publication occurred around 1908, 
when the CA began to reprint less confidential correspondence in the annual reports. 
                                                          
67 A catalogue of the files—which as of 2016 has been updated to include greater detail previously only 
available in the index at the SOAS library reading room—is available online at 
http://archives.soas.ac.uk/CalmView/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=CHAS&pos=1 (last 
accessed 18 October 2017). 
68 “The Size of Pamphlets” North China Herald (Shanghai, China), 24 December 1898, p.23. 
69 Two secretaries, Richard Simpson Gundry and Edward Manico Gull authored a number of works on 
China. 
70 Morris Davis, ‘Some Neglected Aspects of British Pressure Groups’, Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, 7, 1 (1963), p.46 notes that this occurs within some voluntary groups. 
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Although the Association only made a final decision to stop quoting confidential 
information completely in 1930, this accounts for the availability of CA 
correspondence with government departments and others in some cases, and for its 
absence in others.71 It must be noted here that to make this research possible a copy of 
these reports was used, rather than those which are publically available at SOAS. 
These copies were obtained from microform academic publishers, Wakefield, and 
comprise an entire set of reports from 1889-1968.72 Readers will be directed to the 
appropriate SOAS files where annual reports are referenced, alongside the date of the 
specific report. The use of these copies, while the only practical route to examine them 
in their totality due to copy restrictions at SOAS, does bring with it one problem for 
anyone wishing to follow up references as the SOAS material is incomplete for some 
reports—SOAS certainly does not include a copy of the report for 1966-7, although 
this is only referenced to on two occasions in this thesis. 
Of the other CA records, the minute books are the next most heavily used. 
These contain records of meetings until 1945, and from this date onwards, circulars of 
information sent to members in advance of committee meetings. These provide an 
immensely valuable resource because they offer a view into the inner workings of the 
Association, as well as some of the thoughts of its high ranking committee members. 
As is the case with all records of associations, these are sometimes lost in the 
technicalities of reports and minutes, but do come out in CA records at times. In fact, 
for the CA minutes are, in many ways, much more interesting—and certainly less 
sanitised—than the picture presented in the annual reports.  
Remaining files include the CA’s records of its School of Chinese; these were 
drawn upon heavily for the discussion of the School’s establishment and purpose. An 
annual report for the school is also available as part of some CA annual reports. 
Alongside this, circulars and bulletins distributed to members have been used provide 
a fuller history of the CA, as they often cover areas in which the CA took an interest, 
but were not deemed important enough for mention in the annual reports, offer greater 
supplementary information, or insight into organisational particulars. 
                                                          
71 Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committee, December 1929 – September 1937, 
CHAS/MCP/7, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
72 See https://microform.digital/map/full-
catalogue.php?browse=search&filter=&term=R96623&limit=all&value=&p=&ref=R96623 (last 
accessed 24 October 2017). 
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The CA collection at SOAS, it must be noted, continues to grow as the still 
extant CA continues to operate. More material was made available in 2016, including 
annual reports as recent as 2000, and the unpublished hand list offering guidance to 
the CA archive has, as of the same date, been migrated to the online catalogue of 
SOAS. Unfortunately, due to the chronological limits of the thesis and funding and 
time constraints, these have not been investigated, but it is clear that therein lies further 
potential for research. It is hoped that this thesis will go some way towards 
encouraging that. In particular, not least, because of the light it may well shed on 
significant watershed moments in Sino-British relations, such as the handover of 
Hongkong in 1997.  
There are a number of inherent limitations to the records of the CA—an issue 
less specific to the CA itself, but rather the fact that it is an association.  Concerns 
include issues of subjectivity and representativeness, as with any history of an 
association that focuses heavily on a selection of a groups of people, in this case 
returned expatriates—rather than the group as a whole. For the CA a mitigating factor 
is the relative smallness of the returning population from China. Another problem can 
be the occasional inward-looking nature of associations, and what this can mean for 
qualitative records. As noted above, for example, associations that seek funding from 
their members—as the CA did—have been noted, on occasion, to overstate their 
achievements and activity in annual reports to present a positive image to these 
funders. This is, of course, alleviated somewhat by the investigation of the private 
papers of the CA. But these, too, have limitations: they often are one-way records, and 
hence do not always permit consideration of exchanges and discussions in their fullest.   
The limitations noted above underscore why it is so important not to view the 
records of an association in isolation. Alongside the CA’s archive, other collections 
have thus been used where possible to fill gaps, to provide divergent and diverse 
perspectives, and to offer greater depth. The CA collection itself, for example, has no 
copy of the Association’s original rules and regulations. These were instead drawn 
from a draft copy retained in the papers of longstanding chairman and founder William 
Keswick, held in the Jardine Matheson Archives at Cambridge University. Insight into 
the inner workings and occasional struggles behind the scenes of the Association, 
naturally not included in the Association’s official publication, has also been explored 
further through private papers of members, including those of longstanding secretary 
and president R.S. Gundry, committee member J.O.P. Bland, and HSBC head Charles 
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Stewart Addis.73 The understanding of the relationship of the CA with some of its 
corporate members has been supplemented through the investigation of the 
correspondence retained by the Swire Group with the Association.  
More difficult is the question of how to assess the relationship of the CA with 
the British government, and its departments and representatives. In some cases, these 
relationships are evidenced through the papers of the CA, for example when they were 
presented with confidential information, allowed input into government plans, or even 
praised directly by government representatives at social functions. Unfortunately, 
Foreign Office documents which could shed light on this matter from a government 
perspective are either largely disappointing, or not yet catalogued in sufficient detail 
to locate those relevant to the CA within the scope of the research time available for 
this study. A search using the National Archives ‘Discovery’ search engine for “China 
Association”, for example, only produces 95 results, of which the overwhelming 
majority are simply copies, often of correspondence or bulletins containing 
information remitted from East Asia, sent to the Foreign Office by the CA. A 
substantial further amount relate to unlinked East India and China Associations of an 
earlier date. Less than five are of substantial interest, and have been consulted for what 
information they hold.74 The most prudent action in the face of the lack of such 
information is to largely withhold conclusions upon the success of the CA’s lobbying 
of government, instead focusing on the methods the CA used and the relationships and 
networks they created. 
A further notable omission from the CA collection, as previously mentioned, 
are any large collections of papers from the Association’s various Far Eastern 
branches. Indeed, all that are available are committee papers from Hongkong for the 
1961 to 1973 period, and papers of the linked British Residents’ Association of 
Shanghai from 1947 to 1952. The Hongkong papers are beyond the chronological 
limits of this thesis, and the British Residents’ Association papers comprise only a 
single file. The practical considerations of this, combined with the original intention 
to focus upon returnees rather than those still in China, is that the branches of the 
                                                          
73 Gundry’s roles and those of J.O.P. Bland have been drawn from the CA’s annual reports. Addis was 
a CA member, however he rejected a 1914 invitation to serve on the committee as ‘the demands upon 
my time are already so great.’ See Circular to the General Committee, no.186, 17 December 1914, 
Circulars Vol. XII, 185-200, November 1914 – January 1915, CHAS/MCP/20 China Association 
Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
74 See http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ (last accessed 14 September 2018). 
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Association are only considered from a limited perspective, for example when they 
had occasion to request something of, or came in sustained contact with, the London 
headquarters. Efforts to ascertain the views of the branches at key occasions have, of 
course, been made, either through the use of above mentioned personal papers, or 
contemporary newspapers, most prominently The North China Herald. 
Despite conscious efforts by the CA to not court public attention, it was 
inevitable that their undertakings were to appear in public sources from time to time. 
Alongside The North China Herald a number of other newspapers and periodicals 
have been investigated, located throughout Britain and in a few cases, East Asia. Many 
of these sources are available predominantly for the nineteenth century, and as such 
are used most when referring to the Association’s earliest activities. These newspapers 
are grouped together under a number of subscription collections this thesis could draw 
on. Of particular importance are those available via Gale online primary sources, 
which provides online access to the British Library newspapers collection, nineteenth 
century periodicals collection, and The Times Online archive.75 To begin with, a 
general exact phrase search for the “China Association” was undertaken. Further 
details extracted from this search, and based on pointers unearthed in the material, 
were then used to search for individuals and occurrences of particular importance. This 
most general search of these archives produced 732 results within the timeframe of 
the study. Both The Guardian and The Observer were searched in the same way, 
through the ProQuest Historical Newspapers collection, but produced only few results. 
Additional material, usually in connection with specific cases or individuals, was 
found in both these collections and other global newspaper collections digitised by the 
national libraries of Singapore, New Zealand and Australia. It is notable that with the 
CA based in London, and due to the circles in which its members operated, that of the 
newspapers examined, The Times proved the most useful for this study.  
Finally, a collection of China and Singapore directories, almanacs, Hong lists 
and land renter lists are used in chapter two to build a picture of the employment 
background of the original membership of the CA. Many of these were records 
sourced online, and an increasing number continue to be made available through 
online repositories that will offer future scholars even further scope for detailed 
                                                          
75 See http://gdc.galegroup.com/gdc/artemis/whatsInside (last accessed 27 October 2017). 
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study.76 These directories are an invaluable resource for tracking individuals 
throughout their career in East Asia.  
 
Scope, methods, and structure 
It is these sources that ultimately do much to define the scope of this thesis. But while 
that is the case the first question to pose is within what framework they are best 
analysed. In the absence of an established immediate field of study—that of a British 
return expatriate association—within which to situate this work, the closest guide to 
look to is that of associational culture. As we have seen, however, within that are 
various subfields. Is the CA likely to most closely resemble an ethnic society? A trade 
association? A chamber of commerce? A simple dining club?  In the absence of a 
ready answer, this study was therefore, from its inception, one which was intended to 
be defined in scope by the activities of the CA itself, producing the most representative 
overview possible of their major aims and activities.  
But the thesis, too, has its scope defined by the wider history of British 
involvement in China, Sino-British relations, and worldwide events. Although annual 
reports and some documents are available until a later date, 1955 was chosen as the 
end date to enable a longitudinal perspective while keeping the thesis manageable and 
within established political periodizations. This ensures a substantial five-year period 
in which to study the CA and its members’ reactions to the rise of the PRC, and the 
troubles they faced because of this. Particular attention is also given throughout the 
thesis to the key date of 30 May 1925. When, on that day, the Shanghai Municipal 
Police opened fire upon, and killed, a number of Chinese protestors, British interests 
in China underwent a period of upheaval leading to what was termed the ‘Sino-British 
Rapprochement.’77 This served as a major turning point, too, for the CA as it strove to 
re-align itself to fit this new government policy. International wars and famines were 
the events most responsible for the CA’s charitable efforts, although efforts have been 
made to ensure efforts linked to individuals and less well known collections are all 
included and compared in the thesis. It is perhaps worthy of note here that, for the CA, 
                                                          
76 A consistently updated list can be found as part of the University of Bristol Chinese Maritime 
Customs project, available online at http://www.bris.ac.uk/history/customs/ancestors/directories.html 
(last accessed 29 October 2018). For Singapore see the national library of Singapore, available online 
at http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/printheritage (last accessed 29 October 2018). 
77 Edmund S.K. Fung, ‘The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-31’ Modern Asian Studies, 17, 1 (1983), 
pp.79-105. For the event itself, and the immediate reaction in Shanghai see Clifford, Spoilt Children of 
Empire, specifically chapters five through nine. 
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revolution and civil war in China were rarely on the agenda, beyond their local effects. 
Their interests were mostly confined to the British treaty ports and it was upon these 
areas that they focused, rather than large scale events over which they could not hope 
to wield influence. Indeed, although British investment in China represented the 
greatest percentage of foreign investment in the country it remained, throughout the 
period under study, largely confined to treaty port enclaves, other than a few of the 
more enterprising firms such as British American Tobacco [BAT], Asiatic Petroleum 
and Standard Oil.78 It is apt here to note, too, that the CA did concern itself with 
political matters relating to Japan, and remained open as a social meeting point to men 
who had returned from the wider Far East. With a wealth of material available to 
produce this thesis, however, a decision was taken to focus almost completely on their 
efforts related to China, both to present the greatest possible depth in that area, and to 
keep a clear narrative. 
In terms of structure, the thesis has been separated into four further chapters. 
The first will comprise a literature review, looking in greater detail at some of the 
issues raised in this introduction, key historiographical themes, and also a more 
detailed exploration of the British presence in China and how it operated, and how 
residents lived. Greater attention will be paid, too, to the operations and structures of 
voluntary associations, outlining the key types and structures that the CA may have 
drawn inspiration from, and acted in a similar fashion to.  
The second chapter investigates the original membership of the CA, drawing 
together a range of sources to appraise the first 111 members of the Association as 
well as the Association’s structure. A brief employment history has been produced for 
all of the founding members for whom it was possible to do so (over 95 per cent) 
investigating which company (or companies) they worked for in China, their career 
progression, their locations of employment, the time they spent in China, and whether 
they remained active in the China trade on their return. This allows us to draw 
important conclusions on which firms and businesses held influence over the direction 
of the CA, which is reinforced by investigations into the original committees of the 
CA and the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the CA over a 65-year period. Those who 
                                                          
78 As much as 86 percent of British investment in China was confined to the two locales of Shanghai 
and Hongkong alone, as of 1929, with the remaining 14 percent split between other treaty ports and the 
rest of China. See Chi-Ming Hou, The Evolution of International Business 1800-1945 Volume VIII: 
Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1965, reprinted 2000), pp.17-18. See also Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, p.44. 
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were excluded from membership of the CA will also be investigated, in order to 
appraise the CA against the typical norms of membership for voluntary associations 
in this period. A final survey considers the branch structure of the CA and its uses, 
before exploring the question whether branches representative of ‘settler’ interests 
could really hold any influence over the London committee, and whether this 
committee was, ultimately, an oligarchy that really represented only a few firms while 
presenting itself as the representative voice of, at its zenith, over 1,000 members. 
This analysis of the Association’s structure and membership paves the way for 
the following two chapters, which are defined largely in relation to the aims and 
objects of the Association. These main objects saw the CA rest on three foundational 
pillars—two of these are investigated in chapter three: first that it was to provide a 
social space for returnees to meet and second that it was to provide a political voice 
for the commercial community in East Asia. Focus on these aims enables examination, 
firstly, of the social function of the CA, and the role it played in alleviating a ‘difficult 
return’ for members by establishing platforms of sociability. Secondly, the chapter 
then explores how these two disparate aims in fact became interlinked to a large extent, 
and how social gatherings were given a political purpose with something akin to public 
diplomacy being undertaken. How these gatherings changed over time to ensure they 
fit a wider British government led effort of building social relations with prominent 
Chinese will also be examined. Finally, the chapter focuses on some of the more 
traditional political undertakings of the CA, examining how it acted to build contacts 
within British government departments to attempt to allow it an input into the direction 
of British policy. Although ascertaining the overall success of the CA is beyond this 
work this examination will nonetheless show how the CA and other insider interests 
were at least included in policy discussion, and afforded the opportunity to provide 
feedback on matters affecting the commercial environment. It will further demonstrate 
how they later realigned themselves in the period after 1925 to support the 
government’s positions in order to retain this important channel of communication. 
Day to day undertakings of the CA, such as contacting the Foreign Office and other 
government departments to discuss small matters of commercial importance are 
largely absent from the study. This is partially due to constraints on the size of this 
work and the frequency with which this occurred, but also reflective of the fact that 
earlier work by Pelcovits does so in considerable detail.  
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Chapter four then considers the third of the CA’s foundational aims: to collect 
for, and dispense, charity in any way the Association’s committee saw fit. 
Investigation of a series of individual appeals will outline the mechanisms behind the 
Association’s charity, before a series of wider appeals linked to famine in China and 
both the First and Second World Wars are considered, followed by appeals linked to 
educational schemes. Alongside all of these schemes, ideas of strategic corporate 
philanthropy are explored, as much of the financial backing was drawn from the 
member firms of the CA. Finally, an educational scheme that the CA facilitated with 
a view to teach the Chinese language in London for commercial recruits before their 
departure to China is examined, exploring the motivations behind it, whether it was 
successful, and to show how it would later play a key role in the foundation of SOAS, 
London.  
Ultimately, this study has a number of central aims. At the most basic level it 
offers a history of the CA, providing an overview of the operation of a returned 
expatriate association, in order to contribute to the growing bodies of in the fields of 
both associational culture and return migration. By utilising the nexus point of the CA, 
the thesis offers a novel method for identifying a substantial group of return migrants, 
often difficult to locate, and investigate to what extent they retained links to their host 
country following their return to Britain. In doing so, the thesis will also shed new 
light on the networks that underpinned British links to China in the period under 
consideration, and investigate how they operated, through the organisational structure 
of the CA, to undertake aims as disparate as applying political pressure and providing 
for sociability, charity and benevolence, and education. It will further demonstrate that 
although the CA developed into a wide-ranging Association it was the influence of 
specific business interests, and their representatives who remained actively linked to 
China, that would underpin these wider activities and ensure that they promoted, in 
almost all cases, the British economic presence in China.  
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CHAPTER 1 
A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
When the American Asiatic Association was established in 1898 to promote trade and 
represent commercial interests of US citizens in Asia, it did not fail to make reference 
to what inspired its inception: the British China Association. For they believed the CA 
had ‘proved itself a power in all matters effecting the commercial relations of England 
in the Far East,’ thereby showing the importance of watching over interests, building 
networks and lobbying for interests of the mercantile community. This was the case 
not least because of the ‘intimate and mutually advantageous’ connection between the 
CA and the British Foreign Office.1 Yet while thus recognised for its important role by 
contemporaries following its establishment in 1889, growing to over 1,000 members 
at its zenith, and boasting branches in different cities in Asia, the CA has received little 
scholarly interest. The only available substantial study of the group, Nathan Albert 
Pelcovits’ work Old China Hands and the Foreign Office, was completed in 1948. 
Although Pelcovits’ study is immensely detailed in exploring the day to day small 
scale political efforts of the Association, it ultimately presents a limited view of the 
CA, both temporally and in respect of its aims, objects, and overall reach and 
development.2 
Building on Pelcovits’ work, this thesis seeks to offer a novel way of thinking 
about the CA, reconciling some of it seemingly disparate aims in order to present a 
comprehensive examination of the Association. In order to do so, however, it is of 
great importance to first review the broader range of existing work concerned with 
related subjects. This review will take the form of four sections, and will also clarify 
definitions and historical frameworks which will be referenced later in this study. First, 
the overarching themes of British policy in China will be investigated through the lens 
of metropole and periphery interests and their development over time. This connects 
directly to the second section, which expands on the initial definitions relating to the 
British presence in China, examining in more detail the scholarship on firms and 
                                                          
1 Quotes from American Asiatic Association, Constitution, History, List of Members (New York: 1898), 
p.20. 
2 The CA appear briefly in a number of China related works otherwise. Other than Pelcovits, the most 
notable are a series of references to their undertakings in the 1922-27 period in Phoebe Chow, British 
Opinion and Policy towards China, 1922-1927 (unpublished PhD Thesis, The London School of 
Economic and Political Science, 2011). 
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individuals. Following this, the review will consider the global development and 
proliferation of associational culture—of which the CA became part—in order to 
understand in which ways the CA might fit into this wider matrix of associations. 
Finally, it is also critical to understand the CA’s role as a pressure / interest group, and 
to clarify what mechanisms and avenues were available to the CA with which it could 
aim to impart political pressure. In combination, these four sections will provide the 
background against which the remainder of the thesis is positioned.    
 
Britain in China: Metropole and periphery interests and their development 
While the scope of this study is defined by the CA’s period of operation and 
availability of source material, its history must be placed in the wider context of British 
involvement in China. A longitudinal contextualisation, from the time of the East India 
Company monopoly to 1955, the end of the period under consideration, is important 
to set the scene for the CA’s establishment and shed light on wider political 
developments that encouraged its foundation and development. In particular, this 
section looks at British policy towards China in four phases: policy before the 
founding of the CA; policy during the early years of the CA’s existence; policy after 
1925 in the face of growing Chinese nationalism; and finally policy following the 
upheaval of the Sino-Japanese and Second World War.  
It was during the first of these phases that the China trade was of greatest 
importance to Britain as a whole. By the late eighteenth century some 20 to 25 million 
pounds of tea were imported from China per annum, and through levies placed on the 
East India Company, which held a monopoly over trade with China, this came to 
provide between six and seven per cent of the total revenue of the British government.3 
Other figures suggest an even greater importance by the 1830’s, with around ten per 
cent of government revenues the result of the tea trade, or £3.3 million per annum.4 
Though profitable, problems arose as British merchants found the Chinese unwilling 
to import British goods at the level the British had hoped to export, and further insisted 
                                                          
3 P.J. Marshall, ‘Britain Without America – A Second Empire?’ in P.J. Marshall (ed.), The Oxford History 
of the British Empire, Volume II, The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
p.582. 
4 Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-1842 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1951), p.3. 
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upon payment in silver for tea, thereby causing a major drain on British reserves.5 
British embassies sent under Lord Macartney and Lord Amherst to negotiate the 
opening of China to further British trade both ended in failure, gaining no concessions 
from the imperial Chinese government as it preferred to retain the greatest distance 
possible from the British, whom they viewed as barbarians.6 A solution—albeit one 
with tragic consequences—was eventually found in the importation of opium to China. 
Smuggled into China, opium from India was sold illegally, and British silver stocks 
were recovered.7 This enabled the trade to settle into a rhythm largely agreeable to 
British government interests.8 But the price of this for the Chinese Empire this was 
high: the growing popularity of opium resulted in a significant deficit, as much as $38 
million between 1828 and 1836.9 Longer term the wider consequences of increased 
opium consumption would bring with it, too, a huge human cost.10  
Although the balance of payments was now agreeable to the British 
government, British traders were far from happy at China’s continued isolation, which 
saw trading of other goods restricted in volume, and in location to Canton.11 The 
British idea of ‘world bettering’, importing free trade ideals—and as a result 
improving British economic prospects—could hardly claim to have been achieved 
with China largely retaining its isolationist trade stance.12 Despite this, British leaders 
remained pragmatic. The income generated from the opium trade was too large to risk 
and through the 1830s the preferred British government policy was one of peaceful 
negotiation.13 This position was compounded because India, as the producer of the 
                                                          
5 Frederick Wakeman Jr., ‘The Canton Trade and the Opium War’ in John K. Fairbank (ed.), The 
Cambridge History of China Volume 10: Late Ch’ing 1800-1911, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), pp.161-173.  
6 See Marshall, ‘Britain Without America – A Second Empire?’, p.582; Bickers, The Scramble for 
China, p.21. 
7 See Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early 
Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp.41-64, or Harry G. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and 
Evangelicals: England’s 1840-42 War with China and its Aftermath (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), p.36.  
8 Marshall, ‘Britain Without America – A Second Empire?’, p.582. 
9 Frederick Wakeman Jr., ‘The Canton Trade and the Opium War’, p.173. 
10For a detailed collection of essays on the later history of the drug in China see Timothy Brook and 
Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (eds.), Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000). 
11 Frederick Wakeman Jr., ‘The Canton Trade and the Opium War’, p.173. 
12Martin Lynn, ‘British Policy, Trade and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century’ in Andrew 
Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol III: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p.110. 
13 Glenn Melancon, ‘Peaceful Intentions: The First British Trade Commission in China, 1833-5’, 
Historical Research, 73, 180 (2000), pp.33-47. 
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drug, had come to depend greatly on the profitability of the opium trade. With much 
of India’s purchasing power for British-made goods, therefore, reliant upon the China 
trade and, by extension, opium, little was to be gained and much was to be lost by 
tampering with the status quo.14 
1833, however, had provided an opportunity for those far away from London 
and government control to take matters into their own hands. With the government 
depriving the East India Company of its remaining trade monopoly with China, British 
interests in China quickly displayed, even at this early date, the independence from 
the British metropole that would come to be a central characteristic of the British 
presence in China.15 Lord Napier, essentially now in control of the British trade with 
his new role of superintendent replacing the old hierarchies imposed by the East India 
Company, came to believe the whole of China could be opened to trade by a single 
show of British force.16 Napier sailed to Canton in a British warship and attempted to 
engage in direct negotiations over trade with the Chinese authorities, accusing the 
Chinese official there of ‘ignorance and incompetence’.17 The Viceroy responded by 
simply closing all trade, and refused to allow Napier to leave. Napier called for two 
British frigates to break the imposed blockade, but their efforts met with failure. 
Napier was only allowed to leave with Chinese permission, only granted once he had 
ordered the British warships to withdraw. Taken ill with stress, he died, however, soon 
after his arrival at Macao. Thus ended the event that would come to be known as the 
‘Napier Fizzle.’18 Although some voices from Canton called for war in retaliation this 
was not to be as other voices proved moderating. Palmerston remained of his previous 
opinion, and, in any case, China continued to occupy ‘surprisingly little space’ in his 
correspondence.19 
The state of the trade was not to remain static for long, however, thanks to a 
Chinese official similarly overzealous to Napier. Increasingly unhappy with both the 
economic and social damage of the opium trade, the Chinese Empire made efforts to 
halt it. Commissioner Lin was sent to Canton, and chose to simply destroy the British 
                                                          
14 See Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840-1842, pp.53-64, or Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals, 
pp.36-7. 
15 See for instance H.V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 
1756-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.258. 
16 Bickers, The Scramble for China, pp.45-8. 
17 Gao Hao, ‘Prelude to the Opium War? British reactions to the ‘Napier Fizzle’ and attitudes towards 
China in the mind eighteen-thirties’ Historical Research, 87, 237 (2014), p.494. 
18 Bickers, The Scramble for China, pp.45-8. 
19 Hao, ‘Prelude to the Opium War?’; Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals, p.28. 
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opium stocks, valued at around £2m (worth £135m at 2009 prices).20 British private 
enterprise was outraged, sought war, and was ultimately successful. Government 
opinion was influenced by returnees—discussed later—who had experienced the 
Napier fizzle and the First Opium War was fought from 1839 to 1842.21 Palmerston 
noted after the conflict, in 1845, that ‘a greater benefit to British manufacturers could 
hardly be conceived’ than the gains that were made on the back of the peace treaty 
signed to end the War, the Treaty of Nanking, in 1842.22 The treaty, which included 
the opening of five treaty ports, while also granting extraterritoriality and other 
benefits for British subjects in China, was certainly a critical watershed in terms of the 
expansion of the British presence in China.23  
Further gains and concessions followed the Second Opium War (1856-60). 
British trade with China grew considerably, both in terms of imports and exports, with 
new areas of the Yangtze opened to British interests.24 Furthermore, from the middle 
of the nineteenth century, China began to engage to a greater level with the western 
powers.25 China accepted, following its defeat in the Second Opium War, that it could 
not simply exclude foreigners, and a process of modernizing relations and institutions 
to ensure the survival of the Qing dynasty began. This included the foundation of the 
Zongli Yamen (a ‘proto-foreign office’), engagement with international law, imperial 
audiences for foreign diplomats (without the need to kotow) and diplomatic missions 
abroad, all by 1876.26  
Regardless, this left much to be achieved in the next period under 
consideration, from the foundation of the CA to 1925. In the late 1880s, when the CA 
was established, much of China still remained closed to British enterprise, with 
investment and British residents constrained to treaty ports and Hongkong. British 
merchants and businesses were quick to remind all who would listen of this. It was as 
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a result of this that early CA aims, discussed by Pelcovits, and so largely not revisited 
in this thesis, focused on opening waterways that remained closed to British 
steamships; sought to alter the Chinese position that railway development was 
prohibited; and lobbied to expand trade inland where it continued to be severely 
restricted or banned altogether, even to the point of pressing for the establishment a 
British ‘protectorate’ in the Yangtze region.27 The key event in this period, against 
which these aims were set, was the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5). Following a 
Japanese victory, a ‘scramble for China’ began, in which competing foreign powers 
strove to gain concessions. Not all of these aims mentioned above were realistic, 
however, particularly those which hoped for territorial gains. Overall, the British 
government’s official response was characterised by efforts to provide finance to 
China in order to maintain the integrity of the country alongside maintaining British 
predominance in the China market by peaceful means.28 
Cain and Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ argument posits that key in 
achieving this was an alliance between the British government and financial and 
service interests that drove imperial policy—including that in China—from the 
metropole.29 In this period to 1925 both Cain and Hopkins and E.W. Edwards have 
shown that by providing large loans through the HSBC the British government sought 
to both capitalise upon, whilst simultaneously ensuring the stability of, the weak 
Chinese state following the Sino-Japanese War.30 Although the Qing dynasty fell in 
1911, this did not mean the end of the Chinese state, or this policy, and further financial 
backing was made to the provisional government under Yuan Shikai, alongside which 
agreement saw the management of Chinese Customs revenue placed under an 
international consortium to guarantee loan repayments.31  
Providing finance also brought with it other potential sources of revenue. As 
China sought extra revenue to secure these loans, a range of concessions was given 
out to foreign nations, to develop railways, or to undertake mining. Large British-led 
multinationals with involvement in China—such as Jardine Matheson—were co-opted 
into this wider metropole based alliance of the British government and the HSBC to 
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provide their expertise.32  In times when British influence waned, international co-
operation and consortiums were sought through which to provide investment in China, 
again led by the HSBC, a method which proved successful until the First World War.33 
In all cases, the main aim was to protect the integrity of Britain’s major creditor, the 
Chinese government. More aggressive schemes to improve trade—including the 
suggestion of a British controlled territory, a ‘Yangtze Protectorate’, in which 
manufacturers could operate—would not be pursued for fear of undermining China’s 
territorial sovereignty.34  
While this was the policy Britain pursued from the metropole, it does not 
present a full picture. A second perspective, and one which does not preclude Cain and 
Hopkins’ work, is that of a settler dominated ‘informal empire’ shaping British actions 
in China. Robert Bickers has argued convincingly that, with China located at the 
periphery of Empire and never formal imperial territory, the British government had 
actually lost control of many of the British subjects there. As such, the government 
left them to their own devices and simply ignored calls for unrealistic expansion, only 
altering this position and imposing effective control over British interests in China 
after 1925.35 What we see here was settler control, and it began with the foundation of 
a British settlement in Shanghai following the Opium War of 1842.36  Further impetus 
was gained in 1854, when, in response to the threat of the Taiping rebellion outside of 
the city, and the threat of a growing number of unruly inhabitants within it, British 
residents in Shanghai formed the Shanghai Municipal Council, the Shanghai Volunteer 
Contingent and the Shanghai Municipal Police to defend their interests.37 With the end 
of the threat, and the withdrawal of troops, the Shanghai Municipal Council became 
the primary vehicle for the implementation of settler policy, as its reach and the 
populace resident underneath it continued to grow.38 With it came its own rule of law, 
supported by the ever-growing Shanghai Municipal Police Force, its ranks bolstered 
by marines who chose to settle following participation in various conflicts in China.39 
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34 Pelcovits, Old China Hands, pp.220-262. 
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With the Foreign Office focused upon its own metropole-based methods of providing 
finance, it allowed, through its own inactivity, the drift of control to the periphery 
where power was not simply in the hands of expatriates and big business, but rather 
the result was a ‘private enterprise empire’, with power held by settlers in control of 
property and land, and with it influence over bodies formed to manage settlements 
built on the basis of concessions, including the Shanghai Municipal Council.40 
Ultimately, these metropole and periphery aims existed concurrently. 
Metropole policy was dictated by the British government, in concurrence with large 
financial interests such as HSBC and large British firms, such as Jardine Matheson.41 
They sought to profit from lending credit to China, and aimed to ensure China’s 
stability to repay it. Periphery policy, shaped and led by settler interests and the 
Shanghai Municipal Council, was expansionist and sought to create an area in which 
British manufacturing might develop and small import/export firms could flourish. 
The two existed alongside one another for some time, though often uneasily. This was 
the world into which the CA was born. It would be forced—as a representative body 
of the British presence in China—to consider and represent the needs of both of these 
groups, certainly in its early life. But the two were often difficult to reconcile and were 
prone to clash in this period, including a major dispute within the CA in 1905, which 
saw a struggle for control over the body to decide whether it would represent the 
interests of the Metropole, Periphery, or both. Such metropole—periphery disputes 
were not confined to China, of course. South Africa, for example, saw the competing 
aims of the Colonial Office, who hoped to expend minimal outlay to produce order 
there and the wider scope of settler aims come into conflict. Unlike in China, however, 
these differing perspectives never ‘worked from irreconcilably different positions.’ 42 
It is to this fracturing of the relations between metropole and periphery interests in 
China that we must now turn. 
The next period of British government policy towards China was defined by 
two events: those of 30 May 1925 and of the beginning of the Chinese Civil War in 
1927. The events of 30 May 1925 saw a protesting Chinese crowd fired upon by 
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Shanghai Municipal Police, causing a number of deaths.43 In response the Chinese 
population in Shanghai called a general strike, and by 10 June some 130,000 workers 
had withdrawn their labour, closing some 107 foreign owned factories.44 Although the 
strike was an inconvenience, it was of little importance compared to the impetus 
granted to the wider growth of Chinese nationalism and boycotts of foreign goods that 
followed, both immediately in 1925, and later in 1928, 1931 and beyond.45 This forced 
Metropole interests to finally make an effort to reign in settler power that had 
developed in Shanghai and that was increasingly coming into conflict with developing 
Chinese nationalism. To help achieve control over settler power, the British 
government undertook a wide ranging effort to normalise diplomatic relations with 
China. This involved reforming its own diplomatic corps and restricting the power of 
settlers and the Shanghai Municipal Council. Alongside this an alliance was formed 
between the British government and several major multinational firms, including 
Swires and Jardine Matheson. Concurrent with British government efforts, these firms 
were to begin building consciously equal relationships with Chinese business partners. 
It was hoped the invitation of these men into British social circles, as well as other 
moves, such as improvement of Chinese language skills and the removal of Pidgin 
English as a means of communication, would  stress equality between British and 
Chinese.46 Other relations were also to be normalised too. BAT, for instance, had 
always paid a substantial taxes in China, often beyond its requirement and when the 
national government increased taxes further, BAT acquiesced. By 1935 the firm was 
the single largest tax payer in China and found its payments rewarded when it was 
granted freedom to operate outside of treaty port confines by the Chinese 
government.47 The Anglo-Dutch firm Unilever, too, moved from efforts to avoid 
taxation to paying its fair share by 1936, by which point it was even considering paying 
extra taxes voluntarily.48  
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On a wider stage, the Civil War saw the British government back the 
Nationalist government in the South of China, in the hope of turning them away from 
Bolshevism, with the control of tariff autonomy returned to the Chinese Nationalist 
government from Foreign control to help improve relations and increase the power of 
the Nationalist government.49 Further credit was extended to the Chinese Nationalists, 
and the British Foreign Office and HSBC even undertook to reorganise the Chinese 
currency in the 1930s, hoping to draw it into the new ‘sterling area’ established when 
Britain left the Gold Standard, a plan heavily influenced by CA member Charles 
Stewart Addis.50 By the 1930s, many British businessmen and merchants considered 
trade prospects to be good. While it is worth noting that, for example, importers of 
Manchester piece goods had struggled as a result of the return of tariff autonomy to 
China, larger firms who had engaged in co-operation with Chinese interests found this 
proving beneficial.51 Ultimately, it was hoped that moves such as these would pave 
the way for British interests to exist without the protection they were currently 
afforded by, and allow for the surrender of, extraterritoriality and the ‘unequal treaties’ 
won through earlier conflict. The CA, as we shall see, had a role to play in these wider 
changes. 
The final aspect of government policy relevant to the study of the CA is the 
major change that occurred in the run up to, and following, the Second World War. 
The British presence in China, by 1937, was in a poor state. Metropole policy made 
efforts to help China through the Second Sino-Japanese war (1937-45), but financial 
backing was no longer as substantial as it had once been due to Britain’s own costs of 
re-armament programmes and a sterling crisis.52 With Shanghai under Japanese 
control from 1941, periphery interests could do little, though the British there 
continued to live life in as normal of a fashion as possible.53 By the time the Second 
World War was over, the British presence in China was unrecognisable from that that 
had existed before. Extraterritoriality—gained following the First Opium War—had 
been surrendered. British interests were now to survive by promising ‘equitable 
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treatment’ to their recent Chinese allies as the Board of Trade hoped concurrently to 
establish technological centres, to aid Chinese development of their own railways, 
telephone systems and utilities in order to retain a foothold for commercial 
operations.54 With these substantial changes, all sources pointed to a continuation of 
the China trade in the immediate post-war years, and expatriate ‘China hands’ viewed 
the period as simply an interregnum, after which British business in China would 
continue, albeit in a different form than before.55 However, such views proved fanciful. 
By 1947, Britain began to discourage movement to China, following the realisation 
that any further investment would help to modernise the country, spur further 
development of nationalism, and potentially cause a complete closure of British trade 
involvement and investment.56 
Worse news quickly followed, and with the Kuomintang steadily, though 
unexpectedly, losing the war against the Chinese Communist Party, the British were 
forced to rapidly change their tactics to preserve what could be saved of British 
investment in China. With the Foreign Office accepting that £81 million of bank loans 
were likely to be lost, focus turned instead to protecting £300 million of British 
commercial property after the communist victory. Attempts to establish friendly 
relations to do so showed promise, but ultimately failed to come to fruition.57 British 
business in China, at least to the casual observer, was destroyed, with companies 
further forced to pay huge retroactive taxes and fees against the (rarely materialising) 
promise of liquidation being allowed by the PRC. Jardine Matheson, for example, paid 
up to £140,000 in a single year, before drawing a line and simply writing off £30m of 
assets.58 Assets based in the British territory of Hongkong, however, remained under 
these firm’s control—many larger firms had made conscious efforts at relocation to 
colony from treaty ports such as Shanghai since 1925—and with them, the still active 
CA continued to exist.59 
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This, then, was the world in which the CA came to be established and operated. 
It was a world in which, overall, the British government was consistently reluctant to 
take too involved or too aggressive a position—even in the early days of British 
contact with China, when the tea trade was very profitable, this was the case. China 
was never subject to full British imperial expansion, and (largely) retained its 
territorial sovereignty, with British influence instead coming in the twin forms of 
metropole-based finance and periphery-based settlers. It was within the space that 
existed here that the CA operated—at the interstices, as it were, of the metropole and 
the periphery, and of the political and the civic. Throughout each of the stages British 
policy passed through from 1889 to 1955, the CA was actively involved in discussing 
policy, seeking—if not always successfully—to shape it to meet its own aims and ends.  
 
The British in China: individuals and firms 
While understanding British policy towards China, and metropole-periphery 
connections, is important to remember that, at the heart of all lay the agency of 
individuals and firms. It was this that shaped not only that policy, but also the actions 
of the CA. It is, critical, therefore, that we understand who these agents—British 
residents and interests in China—were. Bickers offers a framework that helps us 
classify them and this thesis takes this framework as a basis as it provides a concise 
structure with which to divide the disparate British presence in China into what we 
might call measurable groups; the framework is also the most comprehensively 
developed for the location under study. For Bickers, the British population in China 
was comprised of four distinct groups: two of these, expatriates and settlers, are most 
relevant for this study, as they are, in essence, the communities that contain those we 
are most interested in—merchants, traders, and businessmen. Bickers notes the main 
distinction between the two and the key foundation of their identities as the strength 
of their links to China—Expatriates were simply sojourning, whilst settlers were 
founding livelihoods and families intrinsically tied to China.60 Their day to day 
existence is explored here; alongside these were the government officials who 
supported these groups and represented the official British presence, whilst 
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missionaries are a distinct presence of their own.61 Through these distinctions, Bickers 
seeks to explain the conflict which arose between British residents in China—a factor 
pertinent for this study, as the disagreements between expatriate and settler groups did, 
at times, spill over into the operations of the CA.   
Accurate population statistics for these expatriate and settler groups are not 
readily available, and are difficult to define to any degree of accuracy. Bickers has 
noted that settlers were predominant numerically, but goes no further than this.62 
Directories of foreign residents in China provide the greatest opportunity for further 
insight, but are limited by the fact they do not record nationalities of individuals—as 
a glance at these directories shows, many British firms employed staff of other 
nationalities. In the brief calculations undertaken below, those with Portuguese, 
German or Chinese names have therefore been excluded (alongside others). 
Furthermore ascertaining which firms were able to dispatch men from Britain as 
expatriates, and which were purely China based is a similarly imprecise undertaking. 
This, ultimately is best done using wider knowledge of these firms combined with 
indicators in directories such as business members listed in London (suggesting a sister 
firm in Britain) or, in other cases, London branches. Where uncertainty occurred, 
individuals have been counted as expatriates, to ensure this calculation gives the 
largest possible percentage for their presence in China. Although the figures shown in 
table 1.1 are only a rough guide, they nonetheless present a guideline of between five 
and ten percent of the British populace as one formed by sojourners involved in 
finance, shipping or trade. This thesis is largely the story of these expatriates and the 
trade with China that they led, the trade which was, ultimately, the cause for the 
foundation of the CA. Nathan A. Pelcovits has noted, and later analysis confirms, that 
the CA was dominated by these men. They were, as defined in the introduction to this 
work, transitory, residents in China for only a period of time. But their sojourn in China 
was unique to the country, coloured by the location and subject to different nuances to 
the wider, generalised expatriate experience already noted. 
In China these men were often found in the employ of a few key big businesses. 
For the China expatriate, multinational firms including Jardine Matheson and Swires,  
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Table 1.1: Commercial expatriates as a percentage of British population, Shanghai 
and Hongkong.63 
 
 
 
alongside banks such as the HSBC, dispatched these men to postings wherever 
necessary in Asia. A lavish lifestyle was available to this select group, especially in 
Shanghai, where ‘even the junior members of large British firms could afford a life 
style far beyond that available to their contemporaries back in England’—able to keep 
a pony and belong to ‘two or three’ clubs—and this elite consciously separated 
themselves from the rest of the British residents in China, as in other outposts of the 
formal and informal British Empire.64 For these men, loyalty to their respective 
company was key, and friendship and business networks would be formed even on the 
journey to China, with new recruits travelling together, first class, in the hope of 
forging relationships that would last until they had risen to seniority in the business. 
Many, too, were strong associationalists, and members of a plethora of clubs and 
societies that ranged from elite clubs, such as the Shanghai Club—home,  as Noel 
Coward quipped, and testament to the decadence available in the city, to a bar so long 
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British Population  Expatriates Percentage of British 
Population 
     
Shanghai     
1890 1,574  126 8.00% 
 1900 2,691  147 5.46% 
1910 4,779  246 5.55% 
Hongkong     
1891 1,448  146 10.30% 
1901 3,007  163 5.42% 
1911 3,761  209 5.56% 
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‘one could see the curvature of the earth in it’—to ethnic associations.65 Final career 
progression for the most successful would see these men become either partners or 
stockholders in a large firm, or running their own, smaller, business.66 Terms of service 
with companies could run into decades, although often punctuated by home leave, and 
ultimately a return to Britain was more likely for the members of this group compared 
to others.67 The return, as we shall see, could be for retirement, but was, for some, 
marked by continued employment at the London end of a China-linked business. With 
often a strong record of associational membership—many sojourners in Asia viewed 
associations as critical to their lives because it gave them a home from home and 
served as an important network hub, this goes some way towards explaining why 
expatriate returnees, as we will see, form a substantial percentage of the CA’s 
membership.68 
It was the settler population, however, that formed the greatest percentage of 
the British inhabitants in China at any given time. They were employed in treaty port 
service industries, ensuring the smooth operation of expatriate big business, or else 
were land speculators and small business owners—400 businesses existed in Shanghai 
alone in the 1890’s, but only a few were more than local affairs.69 China had become 
their chosen destination not through any great will, but simply through the 
mechanisms of the imperial job market.70 But with return transit fares prohibitive and 
entire livelihoods based in China and difficult to be uprooted, many settled and raised 
future generations of their families in the British enclaves dotted throughout China, 
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bar see Clifford, Spoilt Children of Empire, pp.39-40, or Josephine McDermott, ‘Another round: 
Shanghai reopens 110ft bar fabled for colonial decadence’, The Telegraph, 4 October 2010 (available 
online at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8036306/Another-round-Shanghai-
reopens-110ft-bar-fabled-for-colonial-decadence.html, last accessed 28 November 2018). 
66 For numerous examples of this career progression amongst the membership of the CA see appendix 
A. To give but one example, Jardine Matheson & Co. had 40 partners overall in the period 1832-1906, 
and the London end of the business, Matheson & Co., operated with five or six partners at any given 
time. See Maggie Keswick, (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade: A Celebration of 150 years of Jardine, 
Matheson & Co. (London: Octopus books ltd, 1982), p.264. A discussion of how careers progressed 
for men in firms in Singapore (a number of which were involved with the CA) can be found in Chang 
Hai Ding ‘Sino-British Mercantile Relations in Singapore’s Entrepot Trade 1870-1915’ in Jerome 
Ch’en and Nicholas Tarling (eds.), Studies in the Social History of China & South East Asia: Essays in 
Memory of Victor Purcell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
67 Bickers, Britain in China, p.71. 
68 See for example Cohen, In the Club. 
69 Bickers, Britain in China, pp. 69-70; Osterhammel, ‘British Business in China, 1860’s-1950’s’  in  
Davenport Hines and Jones (eds.), British Business in Asia since 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p.192. 
70 Bickers, Britain in China, p.73. 
 
 
42 
 
their very lives dependent on the continuation of extraterritoriality and unequal 
treaties.71 As a result, the group is often typified by its active political positioning—
aggressive or defensive as required—that this precarious position created, 
exemplified, for instance, by the creation of the Shanghai International Settlement and 
Municipal Council which governed China’s largest modern city on a questionable 
legal basis.72 Indeed, these British settlers in China caused a near constant headache 
to the Foreign Office with their deviations from official imperial policy to pursue their 
own goals.73 Their deep-rooted livelihoods largely precluded a return to Britain, 
however those that did experience economic success could, for example, sell their 
business and make their way home.74 Although this is often difficult to assess in the 
absence of records that could shed light on this, this seems to have been the case for 
several CA members.75 They are largely absent from the CA’s London leadership, 
however, as they were no longer economically dependent on China and seem to have, 
therefore, cared little for the CA’s political activities. 
With the settler presence largely based in Shanghai (Hongkong, the other 
centre of British population in China, retained a highly transitory populace, and 
Darwin has gone as far as to suggest wider China was home to the ‘expatriates’ and 
Shanghai the home to the ‘settlers’) it was no coincidence that the Shanghai branch of 
the CA was notable for its reputation as somewhat of a firebrand when compared to 
the often sedate methods employed by the London headquarters.76 This would appear 
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74 Bickers, Shanghailanders and Others, p.297 discusses the potential for movement between the 
categories of British migrants in China. 
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infrequently, although over a sustained period of time, as a series of disputes between 
the metropole expatriate and periphery settler based interests that came to co-exist 
within the CA, often over the Association’s methods and aims.77 For these reasons, 
then, although it is clear the CA was an expatriate-led organisation, we must be willing 
to consider, too, its interactions with the settler population of Shanghai, and to do so, 
build an understanding of their motivations. 
Furthermore, while expatriates and settlers were distinct groups in China they 
nonetheless shared enough common ground and interests to both figure prominently 
in the history of the CA. It was not until 1925 that the two would become easily 
separable entities. Until that year the groups were intrinsically linked was by their 
interdependence: expatriates in China could not succeed without the acquiescence, and 
ultimately some support, of the settler community. Settlers provided the manpower to 
run expatriate business interests. Concurrently, settlers had to retain some support of 
the expatriates who sat on the Shanghai Municipal Council.78 But of course there is a 
much more fundamental reason for this interdependence: the simple fact that the 
British presence in China never totalled more than a tiny percentage of the total 
population. In Shanghai, a major British enclave, Britons made up only 1.16 per cent; 
the same holds true for Hongkong.79 As a result, the two groups could not afford to 
become overly fragmented and dissonant for fear of being overwhelmed by any anti-
British feeling that developed in China. 
Interdependent in this way the two also shared, at least at the first half of the 
time period this study covers, notable defining characteristics in line with the current 
overarching image that exists for both—one which presents both groups as 
unequivocally snobbish, myopic and racist.80 This emerged as a conscious effort to 
maintain racial separation from the host population, and an identity of racial 
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superiority, as a defence mechanism with the British government unlikely to sanction 
military support.81 Spurred by both works of fiction focusing on the yellow peril, and 
non-fiction stressing negative Chinese ‘characteristics’ read before departure to China, 
efforts to retain distance only strengthened on arrival.82 Children were to be sent home 
for education, where funds allowed, or at least to a school for the British. Mixed 
marriage was heavily frowned upon, and expatriates could even lose their employment 
as a consequence of this. Concubinage, extant in the early days of the British presence 
in China, was now unthinkable, at least in public. Some firms even frowned upon 
relationships with women of other western nationalities. J.H. Scott, later to be C.A. 
Chairman and head of the Swire Group wrote scathingly to an employee ‘You are 
ruining your chances with regards advancement in our firm—“American women and 
Nips!” We will not tolerate these vices, they lead a man into trouble, destroy his 
efficiency and he sets a bad example to others.’83 Food was to be British, Chinese 
clothes were not to be worn, and language skills were to be kept at a bare minimum.84 
Communication with the Chinese could always be conducted through an interpreter, 
or in demeaning Pidgin English, and business was conducted through a comprador 
rather than direct channels.85 
Of course, whilst this projection of detached superiority was often regarded as 
enough to stop local Chinese from actively attacking the British in times of peace, in 
times of war a more direct defence was required. In Shanghai, this took the form of 
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the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, a force drawn from among the British residents of 
Shanghai. With the British a tiny fraction of the population of Shanghai, the corps 
stood ever ready to defend British interests, led by the regiment of light horse drawn 
exclusively from the elite British expatriates in the city.86  
Naturally, these ideas could come home with returnees from China, and have 
a profound effect on the undertakings of the CA, particularly early in its existence.  As 
these ideas of superiority and distance influenced British interests, calls made of the 
government became increasingly aggressive. Pelcovits’ work outlines how the CA in 
London, early in its life, came to believe that the intransigence of the Chinese 
government to open itself completely to trade was simply due to Chinese 
backwardness.87 Other calls were made for British territorial gains, in the form of a 
Yangtze protectorate mentioned above, though this was later realised to have been 
unrealistic. At the periphery, as discussed above, Shanghai settlers pushed for constant 
expansion. 
Conscious of the drawbacks of supporting such a stance, one discussed 
throughout this work, this was not a view which the CA espoused for long. It quickly 
became a moderate voice, to the dismay of Shanghai. Indeed, it was the elite expatriate 
community that was the first to soften the view of racial superiority after 1925. A 
gradual process was undertaken to embrace a Foreign Office shift in policy to co-
operation with the Chinese government. This was aided by the publication of a 
handbook by the Department for Overseas Trade entitled China: Notes on Some 
Aspects of Life in China for the Information of Business Visitors, which was designed 
to offer new recruits a more balanced view of China.88 With Swires at the forefront, 
personal links with Chinese businesses were also fostered. Isolation was no longer 
allowed, and contact was encouraged to occur across racial boundaries, much to the 
disgust of the Shanghai settler classes.89 The CA contributed, in its own way, to these 
efforts, re-aligning their view to fit official policy, as we shall see throughout this 
thesis. Consequently, greater understanding of the CA will add depth to the 
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overarching debate on the British presence in China. 
To complete this short overview of the British in China in the period under 
consideration, we must briefly return to the final two groups outlined: missionaries 
and government officials. The Christian mission presence in China began as early as 
the sixteenth century, although early efforts saw little success.  Deterred, in many 
cases, by the isolation of the Qing Empire that we have already noted, it was not until 
China was opened to trade that the mission presence could spread effectively beyond 
the edges of China, with greater freedom to follow with the signing of the Treaty of 
Tientsin in 1858.90 Though this thesis focuses on expatriates and, to a lesser extent, 
settlers, these groups—and the CA—did come into contact with missionaries. Largely, 
we find these interactions were not positive. Big business interests and expatriates and 
missionaries, particularly, found a considerable dislike for one another in China. 
Missionaries, on the one hand, were shocked by the behaviour exhibited by the other 
sectors of the British presence, especially in the perceived decadent lifestyle available 
in Shanghai.91 For their part, the British business presence found the efforts of 
missions an annoyance as the introduction of Christianity eroded established 
hierarchies and power structures, leaving Chinese elites who lost status to develop 
some of the earliest anti-foreign sentiment that emerged in China.92 Where the two 
found some overlap was in the pursuit of the development of Western knowledge and 
education in China. Both, as will be discussed later in this work, had reasons for 
supporting the development of technical knowledge in China. But, as we shall see, the 
relationships between the CA and missionaries would come to mirror those of the 
wider business community. Clerical or missionary guests rarely attended CA 
functions, although the Bishop of Korea, Peking, Hongkong and North China were 
notable exceptions, if still a small number of representatives for 65 years of social 
gatherings.93 In the absence of such guests, much amusement was gained on occasion 
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by the chairman’s inability to competently say grace. When J.H. Scott did so in 1908, 
the assertion that he had fulfilled his task in a ‘devout and earnest way’ was met with 
‘loud laughter.’94 Although a wide-reaching body in terms of its membership and aims, 
the CA was certainly not religious, except in the loosest terms. Members, of course, 
could be more or less religious on a personal level, but this was not on display within 
the Association itself. 
The final group, government officials, we have already investigated, in a way. 
As the presence of the British government on the ground in China, they were largely 
defined by their support for the official British policy discussed above. Although in 
the early days of British involvement in China these men retained substantial 
individual freedom to implement policy, this was largely eroded by the time the CA 
was in operation—or at least, soon after, with the British response to the Boxer 
uprising one of the last occurrences of this.95 Later they would play a key role in 
altering the shape of British interests in China by reforming their presence after 1925 
to stress equality with Chinese partners and interests.96 With Britain the only nation to 
ensure full consular coverage in every port open to trade in China this diplomatic corps 
became a substantial body.97 Other works have noted, as a wider pattern, that 
government employees are predisposed to higher levels of involvement within the 
voluntary sector.98 With a significant body of men to drawn upon, potentially 
predisposed to engagement with voluntary associations, this thesis will also consider 
the role these men could play within the CA upon their return to Britain following their 
retirement—alongside, of course, the way the CA might seek to influence them whilst 
they remained actively in the employment of government. 
While these groups came to found the British individual presence in China, 
they did not always act simply as individuals. Also of importance is providing a solid 
conceptualisation of the institutions these individuals operated within; namely, firms, 
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companies and corporations. As already noted in the introduction to this work, British 
commercial interests largely mirrored two sectors of the individual populace—
expatriates and settlers. Expatriate interests, like expatriates themselves, held strong 
links to the metropole, and alongside this, to the British centre of expatriate population 
in East Asia, Hongkong. These are the firms that are noted above as having been co-
opted into British government plans and efforts to radically overhaul the British 
presence in China after 1925, as explored in Cain and Hopkins work British 
Imperialism and Bickers Britain in China.  Many were multinational trading firms. 
The largest of these followed the patterns of British multinational development 
outlined by Geoffrey Jones in his work Merchants to Multinationals, moving from 
beginnings as purely traders and merchants to later diversify into finance, shipping 
and direct investment in businesses in China and Worldwide.99 Key members of this 
group who appear in this thesis are Jardine Matheson, the Swire Group, and Dodwell 
& Co., who were all involved in China for much of the time period covered by this 
work. Later multinationals to enter China, who played a key role in the re-organisation 
of the British presence, were Imperial Chemical Industries [ICI], Asiatic Petroleum, 
BAT, and Unilever.100 Alongside these are those who provided finance to the Chinese 
government as part of wider British policies. Predominant here is the HSBC, although 
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China was also notable. Finally, the P&O 
line represented a major shipping interest and one of the largest firms active in China. 
Accepting that earlier works have established the outcomes of their co-operation with 
the British government, this thesis will investigate some of the mechanisms that 
underpinned this co-operation and fostered the development of connections between 
the two. 
Settler interests are more difficult to define, beyond the level already explored 
in the introduction to this work. They were, at their largest, import/export firms, small 
manufacturers, or both. This was certainly the case for Ilbert and Co., who will feature 
later in this thesis. The difficulty of defining such firms is highlighted by work by 
Isabella Jackson, who defines Ilbert and Co. as an expatriate interest, a problematic 
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conclusion as they were tied purely to the business networks of a single location, 
Shanghai, and therefore reliant upon its status as provided by unequal treaties.101 
Individuals who left these firms could return to Britain if successful, and as noted, 
found either ‘sister’ firms to their Eastern counterparts and continue trading, or, more 
simply, bring with them their allegiance to Shanghai and its settler community and 
hope to lobby for its development in the metropole.102 How both these types of firms—
true multinationals and those which were, in essence, tied to Shanghai—co-existed 
within the CA will be explored in this thesis.103  
It is apt to note here that while the firms linked into the CA were indeed 
competitors, many had experience of co-operation prior to the foundation of the CA 
due to the particularities of East Asian trade. The HSBC had been founded with capital 
provided by all of the major British firms trading in East Asia at the time, with the 
exception of Jardine Matheson, although by 1877 the two were linked when William 
Keswick took a seat on the board of the bank.104 Furthermore, as the largest firms had 
diversified their interests efforts were made to limit risk, and as such newly founded 
interests were often joint efforts, creating ‘intra- and interfirm networks’.105 Prominent 
examples of co-operation include Jardine Matheson and Dent & Co. founding the 
Canton Insurance Company as a joint enterprise, and alternating leadership on a yearly 
basis.106 The spread of capital could be much more diverse than simply through two 
partners, however. When Jardine Matheson formed the China Coast Steam Navigation 
Company it retained 64 per cent of the original shares, with 16 per cent taken by other 
foreign merchants, and 20 per cent by Chinese interests.107 Informal co-operation, 
without the investment of capital, was also prominent. The most striking examples 
were a series of shipping conferences, organised to regulate rates, numbers of sailings, 
ports served and goods carried on both homeward and outward ‘trunk’ lines between 
Britain and East Asia and onwards, under further ‘branch’ agreements, to the final 
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destination of goods. With the first conference established by John Swire in 1879, 
stable agreements followed by 1893, after which the ‘China Conference’ became a 
permanent feature of international trade.’108 As Jones notes, ‘competition was often 
followed by collusion, even as natural suspicions, distrust, and disagreements 
persisted.’109 From 1889, the CA offered these companies an entirely different route 
to co-operation in London, opening up networks and access across a broad range of 
stakeholders.  
 
The China Association’s place in an associational world 
In order for us to understand the CA as an organization, it is not enough, however, to 
contextualise the background of those involved and the reasons for their links with 
China. We must also consider the CA as an association. Even a cursory glance at its 
records reveals a multi-faceted body with a wide range of objects, aims and goals. 
Given the timing of its establishment, the late 1880s, it was formed not in isolation, 
but has roots that lie at the very heart of a much wider British club scene. The Thatched 
House Club, the venue of the CA’s founding dinner, was noted by Pelcovits as the 
favourite gathering spot of the ‘Old China Hands’, providing a more informal point of 
social contact for some CA members alongside the CA’s formal gatherings, and 
possibly even the meeting point which introduced several of the founding members, 
had they not previously made acquaintances in East Asia.110 Certainly, as of 1908 
Walford’s County Families recorded ten members of the club, of which five had 
resided in East Asia.111 But the Thatched House Club is of wider significance still as 
the venue for meetings of such diverse associations as the Dilettanti Society, the Royal 
Astronomical Club, the Royal London Yacht Club and Johnson’s Club amongst at least 
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22 others, as well as nine masonic lodges. Indeed, it was described by a contemporary 
as ‘for many years the head-quarters of the annual dinners or other convivial meetings 
of the leading clubs and literary and scientific associations.’112 Whether it had been 
the home of an earlier ‘China Club’ which was ‘frequented chiefly by merchants and 
bankers’ but for which unfortunately, no further detail is available, we cannot 
ascertain.113 But what is sure is that not only did the CA undertake a range of activities 
common to a plethora of voluntary associations, it was founded at one of the centres 
of British associational life, and in a city, London, that had boasted a thriving 
associational scene for a considerable time. 
In order to understand voluntary associations and their wider role, it is 
important to examine their history and evolution, particularly how they came to be, in 
essence, a long-standing linchpin of British life and society. While in a wider historical 
sense clubs and societies of a similar make to that under discussion can be traced back 
as far as Greco-Roman times and to the medieval period in Italy, these were not the 
progenitors of the British associational world, and had little influence upon its 
formation.114 Instead, the formative years of British associational culture are best 
traced to sixteenth and seventeenth-century England, when an increase in the 
popularity of drinking, feasting and games, with the churchyard, marketplace and 
street as public locations for activities, led to a wave of increasing public and private 
sociability. Kinship, neighbourhood and community bonds grew, and laid foundations 
for the growth and spread of associations that was to come.115 By the later eighteenth 
century, clubs and societies had grown to form a key part of life throughout the English 
speaking world.116 And while a decline has often been noted in American 
associationalism in the twentieth century, Peter Clark argues that Britain has remained 
a nation of joiners to the present day, noting the continued increases in membership to 
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such societies as the RSPB and the National Trust into the 1990s.117 
Urbanization was a key factor in this eighteenth-century boom in 
associationalism. Improved living standards and a ‘consumer revolution’ of urban 
middle and upper classes, combined with the gentry seeking a fashionable existence 
centred on the London season, produced a pool of potential members from which the 
flourishing new associations could draw.118 As other scholars have convincingly 
argued, by the time the CA was established, the ‘gentlemanly order’ had incorporated 
the types of men who were the backbone of the Association.119 Additionally, 
urbanization produced greater numbers of migrants—internally within the British and 
Irish Isles, as well as overseas-bound migrants—who often chose associations as a 
way of forging new social links and networks.120 Changes to the urban landscape also 
meant that taverns, inns and coffee houses became larger, and more suited to hosting 
meetings of associations, clubs and societies.121 Indeed, turning once again to the 
Thatched House Club, we find that it had begun life as early as 1711 as a hotel named 
the Thatched House Tavern. A ‘large room for public meetings’ was added by the time 
of Pitt the Younger, and the Tavern relocated or redeveloped further in 1814, 1843, 
1865 and 1873 adopting its new moniker as the Thatched House Club on the last of 
these occasions.122 
Morris as well as Gramm and Putnam also place urbanization at the core of 
developments as a major mechanism behind the growth of associations. However, for 
these authors the main cause of change was the disruption of social order this brought. 
They argue that the growth of associations was the result of the need of new urban 
elites to ensure their position at the top of this new social hierarchy.123 To do so 
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associations were formed that, despite a pretence of acting as a subscriber democracy, 
were controlled by a small number of elites via the creation of an oligarchy with a 
great deal of power resting in the hands of the few who were at the centre of the 
association.124 The CA, certainly, would come to display at least oligarchic tendencies 
in its selection of leaders and its overall direction.125 Such control would hold 
particular importance to an association formed ostensibly to represent the political 
aims of a wide group, as a disunited front would be a major disadvantage when 
negotiating with government.126 
Freemasonry, one of the most successful examples of British associational life, 
proves especially apposite when seeking further motivations for the creation of 
associations in the formal and informal British Empire. For Freemasons, catering for 
returnees from Empire was a key feature of their organization, and one undeniably 
linked to political aims. A series of lodges were set up purely to receive Masons 
visiting from Empire locations in order that brethren could find, socialise and network 
with men of similar backgrounds whilst in Britain. Beginning with the aptly named 
Empire Lodge in London in 1885, Empress Lodge was founded in the same year to 
receive India based brethren, and 1906 and 1911 saw the founding of the Anglo-
Colonial Lodge and Canada Lodge respectively. A clear example of political 
networking can be seen by focusing on Empire Lodge, which, in 1897, hosted 300 
brethren from throughout Empire for the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations, 
including the premiers of five colonial governments.127 Another association, the 
Victoria League, provided hospitality for imperial ‘visitors’ through activities such as 
tea and garden parties, Polo, and other social events. Providing, in the summer of 1902 
alone, hospitality to some 4,000 visitors, Eliza Riedi argues that such sociability was 
inevitably for political ends, to ensure proper treatment which would strengthen 
colonial ties.128   
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Beyond this, networking provided a host of wider functions, not least the 
creation of business links.129 The Canada Club in London, for example, provided a 
meeting point for prominent Canadians and Britons to meet throughout the nineteenth 
century, and proved advantageous for securing city investment for schemes in 
Canada.130 Business networking has been also been noted as a key characteristic of 
ethnic associations and kinship networks which as immigrants, members of the CA 
may well have had some experience of, or involvement with, during their time in 
China. Such developments have been noted to be especially prominent in East Asia, 
where business networks were intertwined with these more informal networks of 
Ethnic Associations of Scots to a greater extent than anywhere else.131 Indeed, at least 
29 Scottish ethnic associations alone existed in East Asia.132 These bodies supported 
migrants who, like the expatriates considered here, were often highly transient and 
thus faced similar pressures of dislocation and uprootedness by providing professional 
connections, and business opportunities, but also support, friendship and shared 
culture.133 Alongside this they promoted national identities, and retaining 
‘Britishness’—within which could easily bound, as discussed earlier in this chapter, a 
sense of racial superiority—was a key aim.134 Besides this, separate national identities 
continued to flourish, promoted by such ethnic associations as Burns clubs, 
Caledonian societies and St Andrews societies, to use Scottish examples.135  
Ethnic associations also allowed migrants a chance to ‘[utilize] patronage or to 
generate social capital to help them adjust to their new circumstances’.136 Social 
capital is a concept of substantial interest when investigating voluntary associations. 
The process involves building networks to transform ‘individuals from self-seeking 
and egocentric calculators…into members of a community with shared interests, 
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shared assumptions about social relations, and a sense of the common good. Trust and 
reciprocity are crucial aspects.’137 It has been argued that the required levels of trust 
to see social capital develop—in order that the trust can continue to exist when part of 
the ‘community’ do not receive immediate reciprocity for its actions—can only come 
from certain tightly knit groups, such as a ‘minority’ community.138 This, certainly, 
was a condition met by the membership of the CA, the majority of whom had lived 
and worked in the small British enclaves of the China Coast communities and shared 
a socio-economic background. The creation of social capital, then, offered the CA 
significant potential to create trust and co-operation between otherwise competing 
China firms, and to better the China trade as a whole through informal networking. 
Beyond this internal network, the CA also held potential to build social capital between 
its members and important contacts outside of their tightly-knit inner circle. Such 
social capital is termed ‘bridging’ social capital, and scholars note its importance in 
connecting business interests run by immigrants to wider networks.139 For the CA, as 
we will see, dinners were particularly important tools in this respect, providing 
platforms through which networking was enabled. The invitation of British 
government employees to all social functions, as well as the gathering together of 
business rivals and competitors on these occasions, were critical.  
How exactly these formal dinners served as networking and political tools, and 
through what mechanism links were encouraged by them, is a burgeoning field of 
investigation. On a basic level, it has been noted that ‘it is common knowledge that in 
many, but not all, cultural contexts business deals get done over meals’, although there 
has been ‘little research’ done on this.140 Others have suggested that as ‘Sharing food 
is the basic form of human commensality… It follows that it should also be the oldest 
diplomatic practice.’141 In a modern setting, the value of the social event in creating 
personal relations at senior levels of business, paving the way for ‘inter-organizational 
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relationships’ is noted, for example, as occurring at sporting events, lunches, or 
dinners.142 These events, it has been argued, create an important ‘liminal space’, 
between the formality of a work setting and the informality of a social occasion.143 In 
this way, these occasions, situated between the spheres of work and social life, 
introduce a potentially valuable and unique space for networking. 
Other theories stress the worth of the performative aspect of such gatherings, 
by assessing the ability of toasts, speeches and other occurrences at particularly formal 
dinners to bind attendees together, under what can be referred to by the broader term 
of ‘rituals’ which build links to facilitate deals, alongside the dinners serving as an 
meeting place for the making of the deals themselves. Though, again, few studies have 
focused specifically upon this some literature that does exist looks at formal dinners 
at Oxbridge colleges. 144 This work has shown how these rituals—the complex nature 
and formality of the dinners themselves—are key in creating homogenous identities 
and viewpoints. In the case of Oxbridge colleges, this emerges as a shared viewpoint 
of the British class system.145 Indeed, rituals of this performative nature have the 
potential to hold considerable power, either to manipulate relationships, or promote 
‘ideological positions.’146 Alongside this, and remaining within the confines of 
Oxbridge, these formal dinners offer a chance to allow the face to face meeting 
necessary for the creation of networks, as they provide ‘space for politicking, 
relationship-building, and information exchange’ amongst those present.147 For the 
CA, formal dinners and other social gatherings would offer the chance to express their 
own ideological viewpoints, and to create their own networks. They were a prominent 
tool for the CA, and one to which we will turn in some depth in chapter 3.  
Similarly, ritual at Scottish ethnic society dinners was a powerful tool for 
reinforcing identities. Burns nights, particularly, came to be a point of shared memory 
amongst Scots who had left their homeland, including those in New Zealand. And 
though not a political site per se, much like Oxbridge dinners they came to serve as a 
facilitating space for this. Attendance of colonial elites ensured dinners became an 
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‘important networking hub’¸ at which shared interests were reinforced through toasts 
to shipping interests, or to ‘agricultural and pastoral interests’ of the local area. 
Criticism of government was also voiced, with politicians ‘frequently among the 
guests.’148 St. Andrew’s dinners held in India during the time of the British Raj became 
‘rituals of solidarity, filled with symbolic practices meant to unite those attending by 
invoking a common Scottish identity.’149 Attended by those of a high socio-economic 
status, these dinners saw officials and commercial men as prominent attendees. 
Although relations between the two groups were often tense due to wider 
disagreements—dinners in Bengal and Calcutta, for example, served as the main 
opportunity to confront leading political figures about policy, with the exchanging of 
views through toasts and responding speeches—the gatherings nonetheless offered a 
chance to remember what they held in common, although they could, inevitably, 
reinforce rather than heal divisions.150 Furthermore, networks in Burns Associations 
were not always limited to Scots, or even those of Scots descent, perhaps to ensure 
they were not restrictive in the breadth of connections they could found. The 
Sunderland Burns Association, rather closer to home than those discussed above, 
originally admitted ‘all lovers of Burns irrespective of their nationality’ to their 
dinners, before restricting membership to scots only, before finally opening 
membership to anyone who was an ‘admirer’ of the Bard.151 These studies demonstrate 
how toasts, speeches, and rituals are not simply empty rhetoric. They hold power, and 
in their own way were important tools for shaping the views of those within a 
community or association, and even those from outside. 
On a transnational scale, too, associational dinners were valuable tools for 
networking and practicing politics. Numerous associations, for example, sought to 
wield influence over Anglo-American relations in the first half of the twentieth 
century.152 One such body—the International Magna Charta Day Association—aimed 
to grow ‘anglo-saxon bonds’ in order to strengthen the Anglo-Saxon relationship, by, 
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as its name suggested, pushing for international recognition of Magna Charta Day.153 
Its methods were varied but included gaining support from important individuals by 
becoming ‘a forum for fine dinners and considered lectures’ where members who 
operated in ‘high society and had the ear of politicians, diplomats and officials’ could 
meet at a ‘capital society event.’ Attendees would similarly include military 
representatives, and guests from ‘embassies and legations.’154 Once again, this 
provides testament to the value Associations found in the format of formal dinner for 
achieving their goals by providing a valuable networking space—in this case, one 
which could reach beyond of the bounds of a single nation. 
As we shall see later, CA dinners varied from the restrictive (admitting only 
British guests) to the open (welcoming Asian guests), and this raises further questions 
about the political utility of social functions in espousing ideas that are to be carried 
beyond the host nation. Increasingly prominent in politics is the idea of ‘public 
diplomacy.’ Though the term refers to efforts by a government to influence the people 
of another state in order to achieve its strategic goals, ideas behind it can translate into 
the Associational sphere.155 And while public diplomacy has many means of 
communication in the modern era, including radio, print, and now the internet and 
even twitter, earlier efforts to conduct public diplomacy would require a less 
technological approach.156 One method to do so was for a government attempting to 
persuade ‘individuals within the target audience who are themselves influential in the 
wider community’ in order to see their ideas later spread throughout their target 
audience of the wider populace.157 Certainly, this was something the CA pursued in 
their social gatherings, a number of which specifically played host to foreign 
dignitaries and saw discussion of political matters, both in formal speeches and 
informal discussion. Though not public diplomacy per se as it was not the act of the 
British government, this is still a useful lens through which to view social gatherings, 
                                                          
153 Donald M. MacRaild, Sylvia Ellis and Stephen Bowman, ‘Interdependence day and Magna Charta: 
James Hamilton’s public diplomacy in the Anglo-World, 1907-1940s’, Journal of Transatlantic 
Studies, 12, 2 (2014), p.143. 
154 Ibid., pp.146-8. 
155 For an introduction to public diplomacy see Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the 
Past (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009), or Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public 
Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
156 Cull, Public Diplomacy, p.14. For the use of Twitter in modern public diplomacy see Melissa D. 
Dodd and Steve J. Collins, ‘Public relations message strategies and public diplomacy 2.0: An empirical 
analysis using Central-Eastern European and Western Embassy Twitter Accounts’, Public Relations 
Review, 43 (2017), pp.417-25. 
157 Cull, Public Diplomacy, p.12. 
 
 
59 
 
again emphasising their potential political power. Combined, the above theories are 
important, particularly within the study of the CA, as they demonstrate that formal 
dinners were not simply matters of performance for the sake of performance. 
But another reason for hosting these gatherings and for sociability beyond 
networking, politics, and the simple enjoyment of the occasion has been suggested: 
the concept of a difficult return to the homeland, something applicable to many 
different groups of migrants. Using Italian returnees from America in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an example helps shed some light on this 
important yet understudied issue. Finding a place in the social order upon return was, 
for example, no straightforward undertaking. Those who failed to achieve economic 
success were, naturally, stigmatised on return, and often forced to relocate to a 
different town than their hometown. But return movements could also be complicated 
for those who had been successful abroad. Some envied the achievements of these 
returnees, and the reluctance of those who had remained in Italy to contribute to 
schemes devised by the returnees to better their local areas—often using money earned 
in abroad—only heightened tensions. As such, the returnees often chose not to 
socialise with those who had remained at home, viewing them as backwards and 
uncultured.158 Similar examples can be found, too, for Polish returnees from America, 
many of whom began communicating with each other through a publication known as 
the Ameryka Echo because they lacked a coherent social group.159 They found 
themselves stigmatised in society, often due to disagreements with the Polish church, 
a common experience for many other groups of returnees.160  
Closer to our geographic area of interest, work on eighteenth-century returnees 
to Britain from India highlights similar adjustment problems. Of course, for those who 
had made great fortunes and occupied an elite position, wealth could bring huge 
estates, lavish lifestyles and political power, best epitomized by the returned nabobs 
from India.161 Even for this elite, though, the return brought problems. Nabobs were 
widely disliked, seen as ‘effeminized’, reliant on ‘sycophantic servants’ and tainted by 
                                                          
158 Cinel, The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, pp.115-119. 
159 Walaszek, ‘How Could it all appear so Rosy’, pp.49-54. 
160 For the Polish example, see Walaszek ‘How Could it all appear so Rosy’, pp.49-54. Other, numerous 
examples include the stigmatisation of both Irish and Swedish migrants by the Church, with the 
revolutionary ideas they brought back them from America perceived as a threat to the social order. See 
Mark Wyman, Round-Trip to America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930 (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.163 and p.171 respectively. 
161 The Best Examples of this were returned planters from the West Indies, or 'Nabobs' returned from 
India. Their lavish lifestyle is discussed in Harper and Constantine, Migration and Empire, p.327.  
 
 
60 
 
an image of wealth attained through corruption.162 Others were faced with the 
profound realisation that they simply could not adapt to a world which had changed 
greatly in their absence, and nor could they adapt to a lower social standing than they 
had experienced as part of an elite British minority in some colonies. No longer 
elevated above their social station by supposed racial superiority, a return to London 
or elsewhere in the UK could quickly create a feeling of being lost. Others struggled 
when they found they could only afford a single live-in servant in Britain, as opposed 
to the large numbers they had become used to in their colonial lifestyle.163 Often 
returnees found that those back in Britain cared little for the colonies, and knew little 
about them.164 Of particular importance with respect to the study of the CA is the fact 
that many of these return migrants often sought solace in socialising with like-minded 
returnees. This could cause at its most extreme in small enclave communities of 
repatriates, with notable examples including Cheltenham Spa, Bedford, seaside resort 
towns, and in London the area of Bayswater.165 Others socialised more sporadically, 
through reunion dinners and membership in overseas oriented clubs and societies, 
early examples including the ‘New England’ Dining Club or the aforementioned 
Canada Club.166 It is within this context that the foundation of the CA must also be 
seen.  
The idea of social mixing, that is the fact that many associations recruited from 
a disparate social spheres, provides important further context. As has been noted, the 
CA represented both expatriates and settlers to some extent, and certainly the two 
groups did overlap. In order to fully understand the CA, then, an analysis must be 
undertaken to clarify to what extent each group was involved, in which locations, and 
whether they held converging or disparate aims, especially in terms of presenting a 
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united political front. As Clark has noted, if the aims of disparate groups within 
associations were not fully resolved this could lead to increased conflict and even 
‘confusion and disorder’ within an association.167 
Turning to the functions of voluntary associations that existed beyond 
sociability and networking, there are several which the CA identified as areas in which 
they could operate effectively in their original objects. Two, however, came to see 
especially longstanding commitment and must therefore be investigated in some 
depth: charity and benevolence, and philanthropy, the latter specifically in education. 
Both, as we shall see throughout this thesis, came to occupy a substantial amount of 
the CA’s time and resources for extended periods, and would eventually provide some 
of the CA’s most notable successes and legacies. At a domestic level, the CA entered 
into a world where the necessity of charity and benevolence was clearly evident. 
Figures from 1899, contemporary to the CA, show that the while the national cost of 
poor relief provided by the government was £11.2 million, charities in London alone 
received £6 million.168 On a worldwide stage ethnic associations too played a key role 
in administering relief for fellow migrants in distress, undertaking philanthropic 
endeavours to support civil society at a time when poor relief systems were sparse.169 
This could cater for those many miles from home, or even those relatively near, with 
the Sunderland Burns Association keeping an active benevolent fund, despite its 
relatively close proximity to Scotland.170 The CA, to some extent, emulated such 
organisations, as well as associations such as the Straits Association, who had already 
seen success.171 The fact that it was fashionable to be philanthropic is important, as a 
patrician sense of responsibility developed, ‘where acts of charity were utilized to 
benefit’ wider groups.172 
For the CA, however, the importance of charity and benevolence was 
compounded by a series of other factors. The Association’s position as a hub and 
provider of a transnational network ensured it would take a prominent position in 
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dealing with two types of appeals. The first of these were those appeals which 
originated in China, and were for large-scale humanitarian relief. Many of these 
centred around relief for flood and famines. China was seen, by the time of the CA, as 
a ‘land of famine’ and although it has been argued that this was an undeserved 
reputation it was enough to draw foreign groups into providing aid.173 When famine 
did occur in the period under consideration the ability of the Chinese state to prove 
relief was compromised by the upheaval of the fall of the Qing Empire and the rise of 
warlordism, and the resultant damage to infrastructure.174 Though the successes of 
foreign charitable aid in alleviating these problems during the first half of the twentieth 
century have been debated, it is accepted foreign aid played a role and due to its 
connections the CA became involved in a number of such appeals. Similarly, the 
connection the CA held to Britain and the patriotic identity this instilled in the group 
would see it undertake charitable work during both World Wars, contributing to the 
war effort very much in line with a broader trend.175 
Beyond organised collective efforts, the CA also received individual appeals. 
The life of an expatriate could potentially be dangerous, and trade with East Asia was 
subject to cycles of boom and bust. Involvement in East Asia as an expatriate could, 
therefore, easily leave returnees destitute, or, worse, dead, with unsupported 
dependents at home.176 We must remain aware, however, that, identifying the 
mechanisms behind charitable giving is an imprecise undertaking. Motivations can 
range from the emotional to the practical, and even to the political.177 As the CA often 
drew a significant amount of its charitable donations from the support of its member 
firms, we must be prepared to view several of their benevolent schemes through the 
lens of corporate philanthropy.178 
Strategic corporate philanthropy is not a recent concept. Articles focusing on 
the modern usage of such schemes have traced it as far back as at least 1870s America, 
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when the nation’s largest railroads attempted to alleviate a shortage of crew members 
by donations to urban YMCAs.179 In the later twentieth century, however, many 
American companies moved away from such donations, fearing they could be seen as 
‘self-dealing’ and chose instead to make donations to unlinked causes.180 Many 
American firms, too, faced the question of whether giving charitable donations was 
the correct course of action when their main responsibility was to maximise profit for 
shareholders.181 For a considerable number of the British firms who supported the CA, 
this was less of an issue. British firms in East Asia were more likely to be family 
controlled, with ownership in the hands of a small number of partners rather than a 
joint-stock company, and were therefore able to operate in this area with greater 
freedom. Jardine Matheson, for example, only became a private limited company in 
1906, and a public limited company in 1963.182 Dodwells and Swires became PLC’s 
in 1899 and 1914, respectively.183 Their donations, as we shall see, were often not 
purely altruistic. They attempted to solve specific problems related to East Asian trade, 
often related to improving corporate image, although we must remember a business 
motivation behind giving does not necessarily have to mean an absence of benevolent 
intentions, nor does it devalue the support it gives to those in need.184 
Why these firms would give under the banner of the CA rather than as 
individual firms also requires consideration, and, as we shall see, in some cases they 
did not. However, one suggested motivation for giving via an independent third party 
is to counter the ‘free rider’ problem inherent in corporate philanthropy. In its most 
basic form, the free rider problem arises when a single corporate body donates to a 
scheme of some kind to gain a tangible benefit, and in doing so also creates a similar 
benefit for competitors, which they then exploit despite having had no input into the 
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original scheme.185 In the case of the CA, for example, a large donation from a single 
company to a charitable scheme in China would potentially boost the image of the 
entire British trade. This problem could be countered by the CA’s role as a third party, 
which operated with a transparency common to voluntary associations—publishing 
lists of donors, for example—allowing firms to be sure that competitors were giving 
equally to schemes the CA chose to support. 
It was these potential benefits which would also see the CA become a body 
through which a number of educational schemes were operated. Management 
materials focusing on corporate philanthropy have noted that giving to educational 
schemes can be a cost effective method of developing a required skillset amongst 
employees or even society more widely, whilst also improving the image of a 
company.186 In such cases, the free rider problem becomes exacerbated further as an 
employee trained under such a scheme would have valuable skills. Were they to then 
be employed by a rival company, this would damage relations and, effectively, mean 
a wasted investment. Consequently, undertaking such schemes via a third party, such 
as the CA, offers a chance for competitors to fund the scheme equally, and for all to 
benefit.187 This would ensure that any co-operation built by the firms who backed the 
CA would not be damaged in the event of such a scheme being undertaken. More 
immediately, co-operation also ensures that the cost of schemes is shared, and even 
allows for firms to undertake larger, more visible and effective schemes than they 
could operating alone.188  
Beyond this, education and charitable efforts which extended in reach to the 
Chinese population held the aforementioned potential benefit of improving the image 
of British firms in China, and even potentially improving relations between Britain 
and China as nations. Examples are readily available of the U.S. government seeking 
educational exchanges or supporting philanthropic or charitable endeavours to do so, 
and are often referred to in terms of ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘cultural diplomacy’, 
deploying cultural affairs to pursue foreign policy objectives.189  Pertinent here, too, 
is that the British government would deploy similar methods in China in the later years 
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covered in this study.190 That the use of such methods to achieve these aims could 
expand beyond the government and see them become tools of voluntary associations 
which held links and consciously sought to work with government is something 
investigated later in this work. These factors combined to ensure the CA would hold a 
prominent role in leading the development of several educational schemes. The form 
these schemes took and the individual motivations behind them will be discussed in 
greater depth later in the thesis. 
A final development in the history of voluntary associations worth noting is 
that, towards the end of the period studied by both Morris and Clark, voluntary 
associations increasingly began to seek government support for their activities, either 
through funding or policy formation.191 Indeed, this was perhaps not surprising as 
voluntary associations, most notably benefit and mutual aid societies, had, for some 
time, been performing a quasi-governmental role in the relief of the poor and sick.192 
Further than this, the exertion of political pressure has also been noted as one of the 
key driving mechanisms behind the development of associations, as they often sought 
to increase in size to maximise their political influence.193 Voluntary associations 
founded specifically to deal with immigrants have too, specifically, been noted to be 
political on occasion, where the political opportunity structure of the host nation would 
allow this.194 This clear change saw lines between pure political pressure groups and 
previously apolitical voluntary associations become increasingly blurred. It is to this 
impartation of political pressure and its implications for this study that we must now 
turn. 
 
Political pressure groups and their involvement in China 
The CA itself was ostensibly formed to take up the role of lobbying the British 
government with regards to its policy on China. This being so, several questions must 
be considered. First, what are the specific nuances of the development and impact of 
these groups in the British political system? Secondly, why and when did returned 
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expatriates become involved with such groups? Thirdly, were there specific groups 
who, as the forerunners of the CA, influenced the way in which the Association would 
act? Finally, are there any specific methodological considerations which must be made 
when studying such groups? 
Turning, first, to definition, Jeremy J. Richardson notes that at least 20 terms 
can be found to describe organizations pressing governments to act. As such, 
Richardson offers a useful working definition as ‘any group which articulates demands 
that the political authorities in the political system or subsystem should make an 
authoritative allocation’ yet without seeking to occupy the position of authority 
(government) themselves.195 The CA, as a body independent of government which 
sought to influence policy, fits comfortably. Such groups, Richardson further argues, 
are very important to the political process as politics itself is not a level playing field, 
and these groups will press for decisions that will harm some whilst benefiting others. 
Indeed, Richardson suggests that ‘in practice, public policy in all societies is decided 
as a result of complex and often unpredictable interplay between governmental 
institutions, non-governmental institutions... and conventional membership groups.’ 
Ultimately, government policy is achieved by negotiation and compromise with 
groups outside of the formal sphere of government, groups such as the CA.196 
Richardson also argues that the importance of such groups is understated. Indeed, the 
‘co-optation of groups into the policy process’ is seen by some as of much greater 
importance to the outcome of policy formation that the formal election process.197 
Certainly, when considered against the available historical examples discussed later, it 
is clear that in imperial policy formation, at least, political pressure groups had the 
potential to be influential, not least in affecting the China trade.  
Key in appraising how the CA attempted to emulate these successes is the 
awareness that for these groups there are numerous methods of applying pressure to 
government, and also many points to which it can be applied, including MPs, 
Parliament as a whole, or government departments and ministries, amongst others, and 
that little headway will be made in understanding an association’s attempts to exert 
influence without first establishing what pressure point it has chosen.198 Recent work, 
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though focusing on a later period than that under consideration here, has placed much 
importance upon the ideas of political pressure groups—also referred to as ‘organized 
interests’—choosing points of contact consciously. Two categories are prominent; 
those that are termed ‘insider’ interests successfully open channels of communication 
with government, and those who struggle to form links within government are termed 
‘outsider’ interests. 
In exchange for the support they can provide to government, often in the form 
of technical expertise, insider interests can be co-opted into the policy creation process 
as part of a ‘policy community.’ Often, strong links will be built with civil servants or 
a particular government department rather than with MPs or government-appointed 
ministers, who are only serving a temporary term.199 Efforts will also be made to 
ensure that the membership of the association acting as a link between the government 
and the interests will contain a large percentage of the sector (be this firms or 
individuals) that they represent.200 Such insider interests are typically also ‘moderate’ 
and ‘responsible’, and do not criticise the government in public, instead helping to 
formulate policy using their own expertise and a process of negotiation.201  
Outsider interests, conversely, are not given the chance to be co-opted into the 
policy development process. They do not operate from such a strong base as insiders, 
and so are left to seek channels of influence outside of the inner workings of 
government. This, typically, leads to the use of the media to push campaigns, or 
through connections to backbench MP’s.202 How the CA fits against this framework 
of insider/outsider interests will be considered in chapter three of this thesis, and will 
show that such distinctions were certainly well-developed, if albeit not given such 
terminology, in the lifetime of the CA.  
In terms of the origins of pressure groups, scholars agree that Britain was the 
earliest example of the pluralistic system of government required for these groups to 
flourish, though several time-scales have been suggested.203 For Richardson, such a 
system began in the eighteenth century, and was well established by the Victorian era 
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with policy since early Victorian times only been regarded as ‘good’ when it proves 
acceptable to such interest groups. Furthermore, Richardson notes, such policies often 
become entrenched and unlikely to witness any form of change, even following a 
change of government.204 Morris argues for a slightly later date, with the mid-
nineteenth century representing a key turning point for domestic voluntary 
associations as they began to pursue pressure politics as a method of achieving 
influence.205 However, the most comprehensive historical study of such groups 
suggests a much earlier date, with Graham Wootton dating the origin to Elizabethan 
times—though he begins his study in 1720—and as inseparable from the world of the 
British Empire.206 
Alongside the importance of Empire, the involvement of migrants was key in 
such groups. This was seen most prominently with the East India Company, which 
exerted political pressure to maintain its trade monopoly. By the first decade of the 
eighteenth century, the Company was large enough to be providing short term credit 
to the British government itself in exchange for favourable policy formation.207 The 
earliest grouping of returned expatriates who sought political influence, and very much 
akin to the CA’s aims, was The Planters Club. An association of absentee planters 
from the West Indies, the Club used its members’ new found lifestyles as country 
gentlemen to enter Parliament and support their interests. By 1743 the Club could 
boast the successful defeat of a bill designed to increase the duty on imported sugar, 
and in 1763 saw their views clearly represented in the Peace of Paris.208 Turning 
eastwards once again, Wootton notes returnees from India soon adopted similar 
methods. Despite the East India Company’s wider struggles, and general public dislike 
for these returnees themselves, Wootton notes they managed to move quickly into 
Parliament, increasing the seats they held from 6 in 1762 to 36 by 1784. Using this 
influence returned expatriates from India proved the worth of the political pressure 
group and saw the East India Company monopoly over eastern trade extended well 
beyond its useful lifespan.209 Members of the Canada Club would also lobby 
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politically, and though this was undertaken individually the club itself likely provided 
the network through which members organised themselves.210 A handful of individual 
returnees from Australia would also attempt to gain political power, such as Henniker 
Heaton who gained the moniker of ‘the member for Australia’ in the commons.211 Yet 
while these groups are indicative, they were not the same as the CA. Many sought 
parliamentary means to gain influence and this was, as we shall see, a method the CA 
preferred to avoid. What these groups do, however, is highlight a clear trajectory of 
returnees attempting to gain influence to support a trade in which they held a continued 
interest. Equally as important, too, are other groups, including those not necessarily 
comprised of return migrants, who attempted to influence the China trade as 
forerunners of the CA. 
The first pressure groups interested in China began to appear in 1812, with the 
East India Company charter which granted it a monopoly over the trade due to expire 
at the beginning of March 1814. A ‘Glasgow East India Association’ came together 
with other local groups across Britain, including prominent Liverpool interests, to 
prepare a petition opposing the renewal of the charter and present it to parliament. 
Alongside this, the group lobbied actively in London. Although they were ultimately 
unsuccessful and the East India Company charter was renewed, they nonetheless won 
a victory in allowing the import trade from Asia to pass through British outports, rather 
than simply London as had been the previous arrangement.212 Other scholars have 
noted the use of repeated petitions and combination between provincial interests in the 
years that followed this defeat. This was undertaken via the formation of bodies such 
as the Liverpool East India Association and the East India Trade Committee of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce, which continued to press for the removal of the 
East India Company monopoly.213 This marked the start of a continued drive by private 
interests to influence British policy in China, and also the beginning of the formation 
of more permanent lobbying associations and bodies, a development Webster has 
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noted as the point of ‘radical change in the political landscape of Asian commerce’.214 
Still, outside of these permanent groups, others continued to lobby on an ad-
hoc basis. Indeed, it has been argued that the First Opium War was in fact conducted 
largely against the aims of the British government, which saw negotiated diplomatic 
relations with China as a preferable stance. British interests in Canton had developed, 
in the 1830’s, into two distinct groups, the ‘warlike’ and ‘pacific’ parties, with the 
former calling for war in order to expand the China trade, and the latter preferring 
peace.215 Only when influenced by the machinations of William Jardine of Jardine 
Matheson, part of the ‘warlike’ party and now returned to London and conducting a 
vigorous publishing and publicity campaign was war accepted as the route forward.216 
Once the war had begun, Jardine offered advice to Palmerston privately, in the form 
of charts and local knowledge, in order to aid the war effort.217 Jardine was certainly 
no stranger to encouraging tension between the British government and the Chinese 
Empire. While Lord Napier was superintendent of the trade in Canton, the two dined 
together, saw each other frequently, and even ‘gradually came to think alike’. 
Eventually Jardine brought Napier to ‘his side of the policy debate’ and in doing so he 
contributed significantly to causing the ‘Napier Fizzle.’218  
Later nineteenth century efforts saw a variety of methods employed. These 
included an unsuccessful attempt by a combination of the Shanghai and Hongkong 
Chambers of Commerce, twinned with Jardine Matheson, to oppose transit duty 
changes.219 Other developments in the China trade which were opposed by the 
mercantile community saw efforts to unite the home chambers of commerce to create 
a combined opposition.220 A key victory for the community came with the non-
ratification of the Alcock Convention. In opposition to ratification a group was formed 
consisting of 34 Members of Parliament, several ‘city magnates’ and ‘influential 
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merchants’ led by Hugh Matheson and Charles Magniac who visited Lord Clarendon 
in order to press their view. Successful in swaying press and public opinion, the group 
achieved their goal, though they failed to alter the overall stance of the Foreign 
Office.221 Again, this demonstrates the continuation a solid history of combinations of 
business interests attempting to influence Sino-British pressure politics, which 
mirrored those that appeared throughout Asia.222 
This, then, is the history of the groups which provided a basis for the political 
activities of the CA. A succession of organisations and individuals acted with varying 
success to influence British policy in China. Various methods were used, including 
gaining seats in Parliament, co-opting MP’s into associations with a broad base, or 
even bypassing MP’s and passing concerns directly to government departments. As 
pursued by early China returnees, public opinion could be brought to bear on 
government, while others attempted to unite the Board of Trade and Chambers of 
Commerce behind their cause. Uniting both the voices from the periphery of Empire 
and those of the domestic chambers was important, and may hint at a reason for the 
establishment of the branch organisation system of the CA itself.223 
While these foundations and links offered the CA and similar bodies potential 
to gain influence it is important, however, to be very clear about approaches and 
methodology when studying pressure, or interest, groups. First, annual reports of 
associations can be prone to overstating achievements to members. Secondly, 
negotiations with government often go unrecorded due to confidentiality; a similar 
point can also be made for the hidden political pressure exerted informally at social 
events or through private networks. Finally, documents can be hard to acquire. This 
especially so when businesses are involved, which exacerbates the linked problem of 
determining the level of influence businesses hold in associations.224   
Also worthy of consideration is the role of MPs, if they are present in a political 
pressure group. Wootton argues that, when present, MPs should not be considered as 
forming the groups, but instead as tools of the pressure group.225 Such a view, however, 
must be nuanced to an extent. Thomas Sutherland or William Keswick, for example, 
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were both CA founders and active members, with continuing business interests in East 
Asia, whilst concurrently MP’s. All of these problems must be held in mind whilst 
studying such bodies, and attempts made to alleviate them where possible. 226 
 
Conclusion 
The CA did not exist in a vacuum, and nor could its development have occurred in 
one. It followed a well-trodden path of political pressure groups and voluntary 
associations, long-rooted historically both in the formal and informal British Empire, 
and more specifically the context of Sino-British relations. As part of a matrix of a 
growing number of British associations concerned with Asia, it embraced a wide range 
of activities that reflected the aims of British residents in China and those of the firms 
for which many of them worked. Likewise, the CA was not alone connecting 
metropole to periphery through returnees, operating alongside such groups as the 
Straits Association. Members of such associations could be linked by political or 
business aims, but also by personal connections. Formal social gatherings therefore 
became an important networking tool, with sociability also offering a potential way to 
deal with the difficult return and loss in status experienced by many returnees. 
Sociability was even further a means to retain a unified identity and establish a united 
political front. The CA’s more diverse activities, such as charitable collections and 
education schemes, similarly offered the potential to play multiple roles, supporting 
those in need whilst also offering strategic benefits for member firms. Deeper 
investigation will grant a greater level of understanding of how such disparate goals 
could co-exist within a single Association, clarifying the reasons for its existence and 
the roles it undertook, while concurrently contributing to burgeoning fields of study 
on return migrants and expatriates. 
Against a background of competing and disparate groups seeking to direct 
British policy in China, too, a study of the CA will offer insight. Association policy 
was, ultimately, directed from the metropole, but divisions were visible at time where 
interests clashed with periphery interest of expatriates and settlers. This was, as will 
be examined, the result of diverse membership representing finance, services, trade 
and settler interests, and therefore numerous potential origins of policy formation. As 
a meeting point for all of these groups, the CA offers a fascinating lens into group 
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dynamics and the mechanics behind holding and retaining influence within voluntary 
bodies, as well as how such groups interacted with each other, especially in light of 
the importance of informal networking often noted in such groups. Indeed, this also 
offers an opportunity to appraise the theory espoused that such groups, ostensibly 
subscriber democracies, were prone to becoming oligarchic, and dominated by the 
elites at the head of these groups. In particular, it will give a chance to ascertain how 
an oligarchy could be created and controlled, and ultimately how it was utilised. 
Detailed scrutiny of the CA’s membership, and ascertaining who held positions of 
power in the Association, is, therefore, crucial. 
Once this is ascertained, of course, it will leave a key question to be answered, 
alongside the investigations into sociability, charity and benevolence. Simply: to what 
end was this power used? As we have seen earlier, British policy and identity in China 
in the period under consideration underwent considerable change, from one of seeking 
concessions and maintaining racial boundaries to one of co-operation with Chinese 
interests and partners, and the removal of extraterritoriality and unequal treaties. How, 
we must ask, did the CA support—or oppose—such changes, and ultimately, were they 
a successful Association in doing so? In order to this, we must first turn, however, to 
an analysis of the establishment and membership of the CA. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CHINA ASSOCIATION: FOUNDATION, MEMBERSHIP 
AND ORGANISATION 
 
In April 1889 a group of returned expatriates from China, known collectively by the 
moniker of ‘Old China Hands’ met for a social gathering at the Thatched House Club 
in London. Although talk was originally of nostalgic memories of time spent in China 
and East Asia, discussion soon turned to political matters and the state of the China 
trade. Discontent with the current direction of both, leading China merchant Sir Alfred 
Dent had proposed, as we saw at the beginning of the thesis, to form an organisation 
to address these matters.1 With the suggestion meeting with ‘very general approval’ 
Dent wrote to those who had expressed interest to secure ‘definite promises of 
support’, either from individuals or firms they represented. The entrance fee and 
annual subscription were both proposed to be set at one guinea, though this would be 
confirmed upon the first meeting of a general committee.2 
This was swiftly followed on 11 April 1889 by ‘a meeting of Gentlemen 
interested in the China trade’ convened at the offices of the P&O Company. At the 
invitation of Alfred Dent, Sir Thomas Wade, former British diplomat and Sinologist, 
proposed the formation of the CA, seconded by David Mclean, manager of the London 
branch of the HSBC.3 Further resolutions passed at the meeting catered for the election 
of a general committee, given the power to elect an executive committee and officers 
as required for the first year of the Association’s existence, as well as to draft the rules, 
objects and regulations of the CA. Membership was granted to all those who had 
replied to Alfred Dent’s letter of the previous month, and the general committee were 
given the power to elect new members by invitation. In his closing remarks, Dent 
outlined what he saw as the primary goal of the Association—to ‘maintain British 
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interests and British trade’ in China, in co-operation with two key official bodies, the 
Foreign Office and HM Minister in Peking.4   
 
The objects of the Association 
Although they viewed this relationship as vitally important the CA was not to be 
overly defined by it, and the objects put in place by the first General Committee were 
guidelines, worded to ensure they would not restrict the CA in the future. Overall, 
there were three key aims: (1) to give a political voice to the East Asian mercantile 
community; (2) to provide a social network for men who had spent time in Asia after 
their return; (3) to give charity to causes connected to East Asia. Underpinning all of 
these was Dent’s fundamental goal to improve the state of British trade with East 
Asia.5  
The first of these aims was for the CA to become a representative voice for the 
British mercantile community in East Asia through which this community could 
express its opinion regarding the current state of ‘social, political and commercial 
relations with the Chinese.’ This was intended to be accomplished through building 
strong relations with government departments, predominantly the Foreign Office and 
legation in Peking, but also through other political connections. Chapter three focuses 
on the nuances of this relationship, the methods used to strengthen it, as well as the 
CA’s rejection of other methods, such as influencing the wider public and public 
criticism of government.6 
Alongside these political contacts, chapter three also examines sociability and 
the maintenance and promotion of social networks as the second of the CA’s critical 
pillars. Sociability is a key facet of voluntary associations and this was to be promoted 
by holding ‘periodical assemblages…with a view to the promotion and cultivation of 
friendly feelings amongst Members of the Association.’ The benefit of this was 
twofold. First, it allowed the maintenance of relationships forged in East Asia, which 
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were often key to some returnees who struggled with readjusting to life in Britain. 
However, the wording of the object also suggests that through such gatherings the CA 
aimed to strengthen itself, and the overall China mercantile community, by the 
‘cultivation’ of ‘friendly feelings’—and perhaps ultimately too, the cultivation of 
commercial cooperation—between men who were often rivals in business. 
Cooperation would be of utmost importance if the Association was to produce a 
coherent voice and viewpoint to take into negotiations with government as a pressure 
group. Beyond this, invitations to social events would be extended to political figures, 
widening this social network, and accounting for the CA’s social and political 
functions sitting side by side in chapter three of the thesis. 
Like many other voluntary associations the CA was also committed to 
charitable work. They set out, as their third major object, to ‘undertake, superintend, 
administer and contribute to any charitable or benevolent fund’ which would benefit 
‘deserving persons’ who were connected in some way to East Asia. Further aims were 
to contribute to or assist ‘any [wider] charitable or benevolent institution or 
undertaking.’7 This resulted in the CA’s involvement in diverse benevolent 
endeavours, both abroad and at home, important examples of which are investigated 
in chapter four. 
What the objects finally made clear at the outset was that the CA was formed 
to be a body for the promotion of British business in East Asia: ‘Trade, commerce, 
shipping and manufactures’ of the United Kingdom, and also of ‘India and the 
Colonies’ with ‘China, Hongkong and Japan’ were to be ‘promoted and protected.’8 
To ensure the Association’s scope was not limited, the CA hoped to do ‘all such things 
as may be conducive’ to improve the fortunes of ‘trade, commerce or manufactures’ 
in East Asia. Many of the Association’s activities discussed throughout the thesis, 
including charitable manoeuvres, social and political undertakings, are best viewed 
through this wider lens of the promotion of trade. A number of targeted schemes 
undertaken for this purpose—focusing on education—are grouped together and 
discussed alongside charitable efforts in chapter four.  It was also for such purposes 
                                                          
7 See, for example, The St. Georges Society discussed in Gillian I. Lietch, ‘The Importance of Being 
English: English Ethnic Culture in Montreal, c.1800-1864’ in Tanja Bueltmann, David Gleeson and 
Don MacRaild, (eds.), Locating the English Diaspora, 1500-2010 (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 2012), pp. 113-115. An Earlier London based example saw poor relief undertaken by raising 
funds through feasts, as discussed in Clark, British Clubs and Societies 1580-1800, p.50.  
8 Hongkong and Japan were added to this copy of the regulations by hand, suggesting they may have 
been only considered slightly after the foundation of the body. 
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that the CA set out to collect ‘statistics and other information’ relating to trade, 
commerce, shipping and manufactures, an endeavour that resulted in the CA collecting 
a sizeable library of periodicals, government papers, books and other material related 
to East Asia, which was accessible to members at the Association’s offices.9 To 
circulate this material had been the Association’s original intention, however this was 
struck out by hand in Keswick’s copy of the regulations, suggesting a change of heart 
when these objects were first reviewed, although later circulars and bulletins to 
committee members did serve to transmit key information to the men serving on these 
bodies in advance of meetings. 
Overall, these were wide ranging goals for the CA to set itself. Yet it readily 
engaged with these challenges, allowing the Association the potential to engage in an 
almost unlimited number of areas. And, indeed, it would commit itself to a diverse 
range of projects and develop a matching range of interests and commitments. 
Through all of these it sought to bolster its main goal: to benefit the British mercantile 
community linked to East Asia.  
 
Individual membership 
In order to understand the operations of the CA fully, we need to know more about its 
membership. The motivations for the Association to act must, after all, have originated 
from within this membership, and it is only through a detailed study that we can 
ascertain exactly where influence to direct the Association lay. Pelcovits has described 
the CA as being led by ‘representatives of the larger China Houses’, the ‘spokesmen 
for vested interests in Commerce, shipping, utilities and banking in the Far East.’ 
Alongside these were Members of Parliament from the ‘China Bloc’ and ‘retired 
colonial and military officials.’10 This fits relatively well the analysis presented below, 
and also against membership patterns of East Asian Voluntary Associations, 
establishing that these men were inclined to join such bodies.11 However, by exploiting 
a much more diverse source base it is possible to make further investigation into not 
only the leaders, but also the ordinary members of the CA. By understanding their 
                                                          
9 By 1946 the Associations library had become so large that the CA was forced to dispose of several of 
its collections. Material of unique nature was to be given to libraries, with members informed where 
these materials could, in future, be consulted. Circular to the Executive and General Committee, 21 
January 1946, Minutes and Circulars of the General Committee and Executive Committee, 1946, 
CHAS/MCP/46, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
10 Pelcovits, Old China Hands, p.159. 
11 Bueltmann, Clubbing Together, p.174. 
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experiences of China and how well-linked they remained to East Asia we can gain a 
much more nuanced understanding of the inner workings and aims of the CA, 
outlining who held power within the body, and the varied benefits members sought by 
joining the Association. 
Forms of individual membership comprised of ordinary, honorary and 
corresponding membership. Ordinary members were to be ‘either connected with 
China, or interested in this Association in a manner sufficiently close to satisfy the 
General committee of the Association.’ Past residence in China was not a specific 
requirement—a fact that ensured that London based employees of firms with interests 
in China could join—though a large percentage of members had, at some point, resided 
in China. Honorary membership was to be granted to ‘those who have distinguished 
themselves in connection with China.’ Finally, corresponding members were to be 
‘Gentlemen’, chosen by the Association and resident in the United Kingdom or 
abroad, who were willing to provide the Association with ‘information or otherwise.’ 
Only ordinary members were to pay subscriptions—at a rate of £1.1.0 per year—and 
their membership would be terminated if they fell one year into arrears. Honorary and 
corresponding members saw this fee waived, potentially due to the gravitas they could 
lend the Association and the valuable role they could play in creating an information 
network, respectively.12 Alongside this, membership was offered to firms as corporate 
entities from 1897 and yearly subscriptions from firms (of varying sizes) quickly 
became the CA’s major source of funding. Overall, three areas offer scope for 
investigation; the Association’s wider membership, the men who served as officers 
and on the CA’s committees, and finally, the firms who backed the Association 
financially. 
Of the surviving membership lists of the CA, the list of the founding members 
presents the most accessible route into the Association.13 By making use of directories 
which listed foreign residents in China and the wider Far East, alongside other sources 
such as lists of land renters in Shanghai, almanacs, newspapers and secondary texts it 
is possible to trace these men as they progressed through their careers and lives in 
                                                          
12 Corresponding membership was not unique to the CA. Indeed, Some Associations consisted purely 
of corresponding members and acted as information exchanges. These included continental and 
antiquarian societies, amongst others. See Clark, British Clubs and Societies, pp.47-49. 
13 Later membership lists are harder to analyse as the sources of data for establishing biographies of 
members, largely China Coast directories, are available in greater numbers for the 19th century, as 
opposed to the early 20th century. 
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China.14 The information recovered from these sources has been compiled into an 
alphabetical list which can be found in appendix A of this work. It must be stressed 
that these sources have their limitations. Names are, on occasion, misspelled, or 
potentially omitted from directories. Some members must be omitted from 
calculations relating to the length of time members spent in China as their entire career 
is not recorded, having resided in a place not included in most directories. As such, 
their inclusion would unfairly weight the data. Alongside this, men were sometimes 
recorded as absent (on leave in Britain) despite having returned permanently from East 
Asia; these men’s careers are regarded as having ended the final time they left China, 
not the final time they are recorded in the directories. As there are some significant 
gaps in the years for which directories are available, it is also possible these men led 
longer careers in China, or even achieved a higher posting within the companies they 
worked for than those recorded here. It is also critical to note that the data used is the 
highest provable level of employment these men held before, or at the time of, the 
establishment of the CA. It does not account for later career developments, for 
example those of O.E. and H.G. Hayter, who held relatively lowly positions in their 
early China careers for HM government and Wilkinson and Co., respectively. At some 
point they began their own mercantile firm which continued until 1910. However, as 
with others, we cannot ascertain this had begun before the founding of the C.A., and 
so this is omitted from the analysis of their careers. It does, however, prove that they 
retained business links to China throughout this period, and so is included in later 
analysis of whether men were still actively linked to the East Asian trade or not. In 
that sense such information is not lost to the analysis. One final consideration is that 
these men sometimes held roles for more than one company. To choose but one 
example, Edward Ford Duncanson was, at the time of the CA’s foundation, active 
within the China trade as the head and leading partner of Gibb, Livingstone & Co. 
Concurrently, he was also a director on the HSBC advisory board in London, and 
director for the P&O (filling the vacancy reserved for a man with personal experience 
                                                          
14 For the Sources used to create this data see the section of the bibliography titled ‘Directories and 
Foreign Resident Lists.’ Most are available online, either hosted at, or linked to, from the University of 
Bristol Chinese Maritime Customs Project, available at 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/history/customs/ancestors/directories.html (last accessed 29 October 2018) or 
the national library of Singapore, available online at http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/printheritage (last 
accessed 29 October 2018). 
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of the opium trade).15 For analysis, these men are considered as members of the 
company in which they held capital (where it is possible to ascertain this) as opposed 
to those for which they were directors. Despite such caveats, and in their full 
recognition, it is possible to establish useful short biographies for 105 of the original 
111 members of the CA. By doing so, it becomes possible to classify these members 
into smaller groups and draw important conclusions that affect our understanding of 
the CA as a whole.  
Overall, 98 per cent of the members of the CA who are able to be traced can 
be placed into four distinct employment groups. Merchants involved in trading (with 
the caveat that a number of these trading firms had evolved to encompass other 
interests such as shipping); those involved in financial services or pure shipping firms; 
men who had been, or remained in, the employ of HM government; and, finally, a 
number who offered skilled services which were necessary for these other groups to 
function in East Asia. These subgroups, ultimately, conform neatly with the types of 
employment we would expect to find from expatriates sojourning in a country, always 
intending to return to Britain, be it later in their careers or to retire.16 
 
Merchants 
Numerically, the most prominent group amongst the CA’s membership were 
merchants. Of the 105 members for whom it is possible to produce more detailed 
biographies, 69 had a predominantly mercantile background. It is important to note 
here that the term merchant has, in this case, a wide definition, ranging from men who 
were, for example, clerks at a small Shanghai importers, to those who headed 
multinational firms which involved themselves in activities from trading through to 
shipping, mining and the construction of railways.  
Despite such wide ranging definitions, only two sub-categories are listed in the 
directories. Nine members never rose above the rank of ‘Clerk’ and statistically had a 
much shorter career in China than the average member of the Association, leaving 
before they progressed higher up the company hierarchy. Such a short stay, and low 
position in a company, also potentially accounts for their relative scarcity within the 
CA. They may no longer have held commercial links to China, and were also perhaps 
                                                          
15 Freda, Harcourt, ‘Black Gold: P&O and the Opium Trade, 1847-1914’, International Journal of 
Maritime History, 6, 1 (1994), pp.26-7. For his further employment, see appendix A. 
16 Bickers, Britain in China, p.70. See also Darwin, ‘Orphans of Empire’, pp.332-5. 
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less strongly integrated into to the elite social networks that, ultimately, lay behind the 
formation of the CA.  The rank of clerk was also one which held myriad meanings 
which could encompass a broad range of occupations. It was a starting point for both 
those who never rose above a book keeper and those who were learning the ropes of 
the family business, essentially partners in waiting.  
Unfortunately, above this early career role the directories make no distinction 
other than that of merchant. This was a catch-all term referring to anyone above the 
rank of clerk, all the way through to the head of a major firm. Indeed, William 
Keswick, having returned to London to run the British component of Jardine 
Matheson, was nonetheless referred to as a merchant in the China Directories. As such, 
these members have been divided in the most useful way possible; those for who there 
is evidence of further progression—either through wider sources or through running 
an eponymous company—and those for whom no further evidence is available. When 
split along these lines, we find 19 men fulfilled the role of merchant, and 41 who led 
or were partners in firms. Amongst these firms the most notable were Jardine 
Matheson and Swires, the two largest British trading firms operating in China.17 These 
merchants formed the bulk of the membership of the CA. They had sojourned in East 
Asia for a lengthy period of time, potentially forging strong social links, and upon their 
return many maintained active commercial links to it. As we shall see, the elite of these 
men returned to run the either London end of established firms or firms established in 
their own name. Whilst doing so, they remained active and important members of the 
CA. Census records for Hongkong show that, in 1901, Clerks outnumbered merchants 
by a ratio of 2.5:1, so to find this ratio reversed to a figure of 0.14:1 in the CA only 
reinforces that the body drew from the elite of the China Coast mercantile 
community.18 
 
Financial services and shipping 
After merchants, the next most numerous group is comprised of those who provided 
key services—finance and shipping—in East Asia and multinationally, facilitating the 
operations of the kinds of merchants and companies previously discussed by providing 
a source of currency and the ships necessary to carry goods either to and from Europe, 
                                                          
17 Jones, Merchants to Multinationals, p.54. 
18 Census of the British Empire, 1901, pp.136-7. 
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or between ports in East Asia. Overall, this group encompassed 16 of the original 105 
members of the CA.  
Eleven of these men were bankers, of whom eight rose to be at least branch 
managers for various institutions. The HSBC was particularly predominant, 
represented by its London Branch manager David Mclean, and, joining whilst on leave 
in Britain, General Manager Thomas Jackson and Shanghai Branch manager Ewen 
Cameron.19 These three men represented three quarters of the bank’s leading 
management at the time, underlining the promise they saw in the Association for 
improving commercial prospects for the HSBC in China. The inclusion of John 
Howard Gwyther, London manager and later chairman of the Chartered Bank, ensured 
that the CA could claim to represent the two major financial providers in East Asia.20 
Three of the original members had backgrounds in shipping. Outstanding 
amongst these was Thomas Sutherland, managing director and Chairman of P&O in 
London, who only relinquished control of the company upon his retirement in 1914.21 
In this capacity Sutherland, as many other prominent members of the CA, retained an 
active interest in China. He was joined in the CA by F.D. Barnes, the P&O’s senior 
managing director.22 
Finally, we find those who fall under the classification of insurers. Only two 
of the CA’s founders were involved primarily in insurance. The most prominent of 
                                                          
19 “Sir Ewen Cameron.” Times (London, England), 11 December 1908, p.11; For Mclean see Shizuya 
Nishimura, Toshio Suzuki and Ranald C. Michie, (eds.), The Origins of International Banking in Asia 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.107 footnote 2; and Frank H. H. King, ‘McLean, David 
(1833–1908)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
(http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/52386, last accessed 13 October 2017). 
20 Frances Bostock, ‘Gwyther, John Howard (1835–1921)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/48882, last accessed 22 
August 2016); Compton MacKenzie, Realms of Silver: One Hundred Years of Banking in the East 
(1954, Reprinted Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p.155. 
21 Alongside this Sutherland had helped found, and served as vice-chairman of the HSBC in 1865, was 
a director of the Suez Canal Company and also served as MP for Greenock. See Freda Harcourt, 
‘Sutherland, Sir Thomas (1834–1922)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004; (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36373, last accessed 13 October 2017) and also 
Robert Henry Mair, Debrett’s House of Commons, and the Judicial Bench, 1886 (London: Dean and 
Son, 1886), p.146. 
22 Harcourt, ‘Black Gold: P&O and the Opium Trade, 1847-1914’, p.66. 
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these was Nathaniel J. Ede, who led the development of the Union Insurance Society 
of Canton.23 
 
Local service providers 
The presence of the next group, those who provided local services in East Asia is, at 
first glance, perhaps somewhat of a surprise. When defining the groups into which the 
British inhabitants in China could be split those who provided local services have been 
considered socioeconomically closer to settlers.24 Undeniably for many this is correct. 
However, the men under consideration here provided highly skilled services which 
would have brought them into contact with the expatriates described above on a 
regular basis, and left them with the transferable skills necessary to relocate back to 
Britain and find employment, if they wished. Still, their relative scarcity among the 
CA membership is indicative that these men were not quite of the same background 
and status as other members. 
Indeed, only nine founding members fitted into this group. Two were doctors, 
perhaps well known to other CA members due to the potential dangers of the Chinese 
climate and thus included due to social links, although one, Dr. George Thin, held 
indeterminate links to the HSBC.25 Contemporary texts certainly show doctors as 
positions of some authority in the community, with their advice on healthy living in 
Hongkong and Shanghai reprinted in guidebooks. One of those present was certainly 
well known through his position as Shanghai’s municipal medical officer, and had 
                                                          
23 Nathaniel J. Ede had acceded to the post of secretary of that body in 1871, and the assets of the society 
were $345,000 shortly afterward, in 1874. By 1892 Ede had seen these grown to $2,000,000, and by 
1900—shortly after his 1897 retirement—they reached $3,000,000. Union Insurance Society of Canton, 
A Brief Historical Record of the Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd. (1952); Bangyan Fen and 
Meijiao Rao, Enriching Lives: a history of insurance in Hongkong, 1841-2010 (Hongkong: Hongkong 
University Press, 2011), pp.22-3. 
24 Bickers, Britain in China, pp.69-70. 
25 See Correspondence of David McLean, Transcripts Volume 3, 16 July 1875 - 23 May 1889, MS 
380401/02/03, SOAS Library, University of London, p.337. 
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conducted an inquiry into the state of hospitals in the city.26 Three were architects or 
engineers including William Kidner, who had designed buildings for two major Far 
Eastern banks in Shanghai and J.W. Hart who served as the chief engineer of the 
Shanghai Waterworks Co., a concern established by a number of British merchants as 
a commercial enterprise.27 Solicitors and barristers also made up a third identifiable 
subgroup amongst these men, potentially having represented either the Eastern or 
London ends of businesses in legal disputes. All helped to support the larger British 
business presence in East Asia and as the above examples attest, many had come into 
contact with the elite expatriate business network in some manner. 
 
Current and former government employees 
Finally, we find nine men who had served, in some way, the British government in 
East Asia. As noted below the role of president was filled on several occasions by 
political men who lent their gravitas to the Association, and two of these were among 
the original membership. The Association’s first president, the Rt. Hon. Sir George 
Bowen had served as recently as 1885 as the Governor of Hongkong.28 Following him 
in the role was Sir Thomas Wade. Previously Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy 
Extraordinary in Peking, he had helped to negotiate both the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 
and the Chefoo Convention in 1876 and was the CA’s founding member who had been 
longest resident in China, spending 39 years in the country.29 Of particular interest 
alongside Bowen and Wade are C.M. Ford and N.J. Hannen, who joined the 
Association whilst in the active employment of HM government. Although doing so 
                                                          
26 Mortality in Hongkong, for example, was recorded at 5.35 per cent per year amongst the foreign 
residents of the colony for the 8 years between 1858 and 1865, excluding the naval and military 
population, and was considered to be an artificially low percentage as a number of invalids left the 
colony before death, or in order to recover, see Dennys, The Treaty Ports of China and Japan, p.36. 
Contemporary advice from a surgeon ‘long resident in Shanghai’ reprinted in the same guidebook 
attributed the general poor health of the foreign inhabitants in that city to overindulgence in alcohol and 
rich food alongside the poor quality of produce and water. The advice of the surgeon, alongside other 
medical men in the city, however, of partaking of ‘mutton chop, fresh eggs, curry and bread-and-butter, 
with coffee and tea, or claret and water’ for breakfast,’ rigidly abstaining from all kinds of vegetables 
and fruit during the summer and autumn months’, and ‘drinking two glasses of claret’ with dinner, or 
alternatively drinking a total of ‘3 to 5 or 6 glasses of port or sherry’ alongside beer throughout the rest 
of the day does, perhaps, not stand up to standards of modern healthcare, see pp.395-399.  
27 Hou, The Evolution of International Business 1800-1945 Volume VIII, p.89. 
28 R.B. Joyce, ‘Bowen, Sir George Ferguson (1821-1899)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 3, 
Melbourne University press, 1969. Available online at http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/bowen-sir-
george-ferguson-3032 (last accessed 22 August 2016). 
29 Hans J. van de Ven, ‘Wade, Sir Thomas Francis (1818–1895)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, January 2008 
(http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28382, last accessed 22 August 2016). 
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may seem to have been something of a conflict of interest it certainly would have 
offered opportunities for the CA to build strong links with government representatives 
in China, as envisioned by Alfred Dent. Hannen, it seems, did not retain his 
membership for any period of time, however he retained substantial links to the CA 
which form part of an investigation into the methods of gaining political influence the 
Association sought in chapter three. These men would also provide a valuable 
knowledge base, bringing a different perspective of the inner workings of government, 
and with it potentially a better knowledge of how to effectively apply political 
pressure. 
 
 
A case of outsiders? The original membership, women, Eurasians and other 
nationalities 
It must be noted that, when viewed together, outside of these fairly homogenised 
categories there stand two men. One, William Endicott, is listed in directories as 
commander of the receiving ship Ann Welsh, located on the Woosung bar at Shanghai. 
Often a term for a vessel which housed new naval recruits, in China it held a different 
meaning—a hulk to receive opium shipments. Endicott, an American, fulfilled this 
role as an opium agent for several firms, although he dealt most prominently with 
Augustine, Heard & Co., before retiring to London, and is therefore notable as the 
rules of the CA only allowed for British subjects to become members.30 His renting of 
land in Shanghai in 1864 is indicative of at least some wealth and status as a result of 
this, and fitting into the CA’s socioeconomic demographic it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that, when vetting a little over one hundred members in a short space of time, 
the problem of his nationality was missed by the CA’s secretary. 
Indeed, that secretary, R.S. Gundry, was the second of these men He had 
served as the editor of the North China Daily News newspaper for 12 years, and 
alongside this authored a number of books on China, including A Retrospect of 
political & commercial affairs in China & Japan, during the five years 1873 to 1877. 
                                                          
30 His employment has been drawn from China directories and Stephen Chapman Lockwood, Augustine 
Heard and Company, 1858-1862: American merchants in China (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), pp.28-30. For his retirement and nationality see John Heard, an account of his life and the 
history of Augustine Heard and Co, (1891), p.64 and p.182 (available online at 
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:43514398$1i last accessed 6 November 2018) and the 
entry for his brother, J.B. Endicott, at Old Hong Kong, available online at 
https://gwulo.com/node/32346 (last accessed 6 November 2018). 
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As editor of the North China Daily News, he brought the Supreme Court and Consular 
Gazette under the banner of the paper and in doing so increased readership and gained 
for himself a position of some authority. This background saw him invited by Alfred 
Dent to become the first honorary secretary of the CA and play a major role in the 
Association’s foundation. Acting in this role and producing the Association’s annual 
reports, while drawing no salary, he quickly became an influential figure. He had a 
wealth of experience related to voluntary associations, one author describing him as 
an ‘inveterate committee man’, serving on ‘numerous boards’ and he was, reportedly, 
only a single year from becoming the Grand Master of the China based Masonic lodge  
of the British Empire upon his return to Britain. 31 This background, unique amongst 
the Association, saw him undertake a great deal of work and for the Association’s 
formative years he was arguably its most important member. Indeed, such was his 
importance that when he threatened retirement if the CA refused to publish material 
of a confidential nature Sir Thomas Sutherland was dispatched to speak to Gundry, 
and the current CA chairman wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to see 
if such publication might be allowed.32 He held considerable influence, and although 
not deeply investigated in this thesis he was viewed as a particularly vocal member of 
the Association, willing to be more publically critical of the British government than 
many other early influential members.33 Following his retirement as secretary he 
returned to serve as president.34  
While this offers a brief overview of the individuals in the CA, it is worthwhile 
to mention some groups which are absent, if perhaps expectedly so. None were 
women, although honorary membership was, in theory, open to ‘any individual’ who 
had ‘distinguished themselves in connection with China’ in the eyes of the 
Association.35 However, women were scarce on the China Coast, with male to female 
                                                          
31 Additional information on Gundry has been drawn from French, Through the Looking Glass, pp.56-
7.  
32 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 24 July 1900, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2, China Association Collection, 
SOAS Library, University of London. ; Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 2 August 1900, 
Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2; 
Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 14 August 1900, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2. 
33 Pelcovits, Old China Hands, pp.292-4. 
34 Gundry held this role from 1905-1908, see Annual Reports, 1903-07, CHAS/A/04, China Association 
Collection, SOAS Library, University of London and Annual Reports, 1906-10, CHAS/A/05. 
35 The China Association (established 1889) Objects, rules and regulations Jardine Matheson Archive, 
Papers of the China Association, MS JM/L6/4. 
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population ratios 6:1 in Shanghai in 1870, although this had reduced to 1.7:1 for 
Shanghai by 1895, and a similar 1.77:1 for Hongkong in 1901. 36 They were even less 
likely to be prominent in the commercial realm from which the CA drew its 
membership, with only four women holding senior enough positions to sign 
correspondence for companies in Shanghai as late as 1928.37  Wider trends saw women 
typically excluded from voluntary associations, too, to the extent that for some the 
exclusion of women was such a solidified practice that it went ‘without explicit written 
declaration’ in the groups objects and literature.38 
This seems to have been the case for the CA, who were taken by some surprise 
when in 1900 Far Eastern travel writer and trailblazing female member of the Royal 
Geographical Society Isabella Bird Bishop wrote to enquire ‘whether women were 
admitted as members of the association.’39 Bishop was certainly well qualified for 
honorary membership, having authored a number of works on China, Japan, and 
Korea, amongst others.40 Faced with a request from such a prominent individual the 
General Committee, somewhat reluctantly, ‘decided that, although Mrs Bishop’s 
personal membership would be welcome, it would not be judicious to admit the 
principle [of admitting female members]’.41  
The matter would resurface sporadically throughout the CA’s life, and due to 
the inherent turnover of members and committees received different responses. In 
1913 the committee decided not to admit female members of the British Association 
                                                          
36 For the Shanghai ratios see Bickers, The Scramble for China, p.311. The Hongkong ratios are 
calculated from the Census of the British Empire, 1901, p.134. 
37 Bickers, Britain in China, pp.88-89.  
38 See Clark, British Clubs and Societies, p.202 for this in general. For their specific exclusion without 
declaration see Aaron Sullivan ‘That Charity which begins at Home’: Ethnic Societies and Benevolence 
in Eighteenth Century Philadelphia’ The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and  Biography, 134, 4, 
(2010), p.322; or R.J. Morris ‘Introduction: Civil Society, Associations and Urban Places: Class, Nation 
and Culture in Nineteenth-century Europe’ in Graeme Morton, Boudien de Vries and R.J. Morris (eds.), 
Civil Society, Associations and Urban Places: Class, Nation and Culture in Nineteenth-century Europe 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p.13 which notes that even in ‘rich associational cultures’ such as France 
and Britain ‘Women were excluded by rule or social practice.’ 
39 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 17 January 1900, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2; Morag Bell and Cheryl McEwan 
‘The Admission of Women Fellows to the Royal Geographical Society, 1892-1914; the controversy 
and the outcome’ The Geographical Journal, 162, 3 (1996), pp. 295-312. 
40 Isabella Bird Bishop authored works included A Lady’s Life in the Rocky Mountains (G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1886), Unbeaten Tracks in Japan (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1881), Korea and her Neighbours 
(Fleming H. Revell, 1898) and The Yangtze Valley and Beyond: An account of journeys in China, chiefly 
in the province of Sze Chuan and among the Man-tze of the Somo territory (John Murray, London, 
1899). For a general biography see James Huntley Grayson ‘Travelling for Her Health: The 
Extraordinary Life of Isabella Bird Bishop’ Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, 
58 (1983), pp.35-52. 
41 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 17 January 1900. 
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of Japan—an affiliated body—to CA membership as the ‘rules do not provide for such 
a contingency; and that without the express wish of a great majority of members 
women will therefore not be permitted to join.’42 When reconsidered in 1947, as a 
proposed means for increasing the size and influence of the Association, the committee 
decided that the rules—in contrast to the interpretation given in 1913—already 
allowed membership to be extended to women, as ‘British subjects… connected with 
China, Hongkong or Japan.’43 Despite this, no evidence suggests that any women 
became members during the period under consideration in this thesis—there is even 
no record of Isabella Bird Bishop following up her enquiry. None, certainly, ever 
served on committees, nor were Women permitted to attend dinners although they 
were allowed to attend the Association’s later receptions and soirees as guests. 
With branches—discussed in greater detail below—located throughout East 
Asia, in international settlements and treaty ports, the question of admission of 
Eurasian members was also one of some importance to committees.  Although the 
Eurasian population and community could often be viewed by contemporaries with 
suspicion and many of its members regarded as lower class and a threat to the 
maintenance of racial boundaries and separation, there were notable exceptions to this 
view.44 Some were prominent businessmen with strong ties to expatriate interests, 
most notably Robert Hotung who was a director of ‘eighteen leading companies on 
the China Coast’, several of which he was chairman and leading shareholder.45 It was 
their service in the First World War, however, that saw the Shanghai branch enquire 
of London whether Eurasians might be permitted to join the CA.46 As the rules of the 
CA made no specific provision regarding Eurasian members the London committee 
chose to leave the decision ‘to the discretion of Branch committees’ although they 
insisted that each case was to be ‘judged strictly on its merits’ to ensure that applicants 
were of sound quality, and that all applicants ‘must be recognised by the competent 
                                                          
42 H.C. Wilcox, Secretary to British Association of Japan, 16 December, 1913, Circulars Vol. X, 148-
163, May 1913 - January 1914, CHAS/MCP/18 China Association Collection, SOAS Library, 
University of London. 
43 Bulletin to All Members, 20 May 1947, Minutes and Circulars of the General Committee and 
Executive Committee, 1947, CHAS/MCP/47, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University 
of London; Bulletin to All Members, 21 May 1947, Minutes and Circulars of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, 1947, CHAS/MCP/47.  
44 Bickers, Britain in China, p.71.  
45 For Robert Ho-Tung see Yen-p’ing Hao, ‘The Compradors’, pp.89-95.  
46 Circular to the General Committee, no. 209, 22 November 1915, Circulars Vol. XIII, 201-215, 
January 1915 – March 1916, CHAS/MCP/21 China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University 
of London. 
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British authorities as British subjects’ (underlining in original text).47 The final 
decision made in Shanghai in 1917, with the committee agreeing that ‘if he is 
otherwise well recommended’ a Eurasian applicant would not be rejected upon racial 
grounds.48 In this decision, the CA chose a position cognate with the stance of British 
authorities in China which did not discriminate, officially, on race provided the subject 
held British nationality.49 
In appraisal, however, it is important to stress that these examples serve as little 
more than footnotes to the history of the membership of the CA. More than anything, 
they highlight that during the period under consideration, the CA conformed to the 
standards of membership that would be expected. Predominantly, the Association 
consisted of white male members, drawn from a well-off socio-economic background. 
Although Eurasian members were admitted to branches at the periphery it must also 
be remembered that membership of a branch did not necessarily guarantee 
membership of the London head association or committee should a member return to 
Britain. There is no record surviving that suggests Eurasians were granted membership 
of the London branch before 1955—although there is similarly no record surviving of 
an application, and consequently none of a rejection, from a Eurasian within the 
archives, suggesting that a simple lack of Eurasians within Britain who fitted the 
socioeconomic background of the CA may have been a factor in this matter.50 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 14 December 1915, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, January 1911 – April 1922, CHAS/MCP/5, China Association 
Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
48 Circular to the General Committee, no. 243, 4 August 1917, Circulars Vol. XV, 231-244, November 
1916 – September 1917, CHAS/MCP/23 China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of 
London. 
49 Bickers, Britain in China, p.72. 
50 Work has begun to be undertaken into Eurasian populations in America and Asia, see for example 
Emma Teng, Eurasian: Mixed Identities in the United States, China, and Hong Kong, 1842–1943 
(Oakland, University of California Press, 2013).  Eurasians who ‘returned’ to Britain, or who were born 
in Britain are hard to trace, and a difficult group to quantify numerically. They were, however, largely 
of a much lower socioeconomic standing than the average CA member, holding roles as junior clerks, 
or in the police or prisons department, although many still retained a desire to return home, See Stephen 
Frederick Fisher, Eurasians in Hong Kong: a sociological study of a marginal group (unpublished MPhil 
Thesis, Hongkong University, 1975), pp.102-105. A significant community also developed in 
Liverpool, often children of Chinese seamen linked to the Alfred Holt line. Many of these men gave 
their lives working dangerous shipping routes in the Second World War, and many who survived were 
forcibly deported afterwards. For some insight, see a project headed by Yvonne Foley, the child of one 
such seaman, available online at http://www.halfandhalf.org.uk/index.htm (last accessed 8 May 2018). 
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Conclusion 
This analysis of the CA’s membership reinforces the view that this was an elite 
Association. Ultimately, we cannot be sure how many of these men were true 
expatriates in the sense of our earlier definition; that is, sojourners employed and 
dispatched by multinational firms. What we can say, however, is that the vast majority 
had experienced considerable economic success, even if, for some, this was as part of 
a China based or purely China-British trading firm. In this way, they entered into 
expatriate circles, and became, in many ways, indistinguishable from these true 
expatriates anyway.  
Their joining together may well have been stimulated by the fact that the social 
circles in which these men operated were, in essence, the same in East Asia, with these 
men socialising as part of the ‘expatriate’ group in China who consciously developed 
their own distinct social sphere—and a highly successful settler could pass into this 
group. Government officials were also, although to a lesser extent, drawn into this 
social sphere. As early as 1842 the new superintendent of trade, and later Governor of 
Hongkong, Henry Pottinger had been dined by the China Coast ‘Commercial 
Community’, with the evening organised by James Matheson of Jardine Matheson.51 
Many British civil servants, too, were drawn from a relatively high social strata and 
this would perhaps account for their inclusion in the CA’s social sphere.52 On a wider 
level many British government officials—at least those stationed in treaty ports, as 
opposed to the Peking legation—would have been a key focal point of the British 
community as its representative in any disputes that arose with the Chinese authorities. 
These groups were also to some extent dependent on one another for their very 
existence. Without financial services, merchants could not function as effectively, and 
without merchants there would have been less—or perhaps no—need for these 
financial services. Shipping provided for the necessary transit of goods to make the 
entire enterprise profitable, and this would even develop into formal connections and 
                                                          
51 Ward Fay, ‘The Opening of China’, p.74. 
52 T.G Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.7-17 outlines the forms this took for the Foreign Office. 
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conferences.53 Many were also potentially connected, as has been discussed, through 
their business interests and wider business networks and may have developed 
relationships through these of a business or personal nature. To choose one striking 
example, four of the five members of the HSBC London Committee in 1890—Albert 
Deacon, E.F. Duncanson, David McLean and William Keswick—were founding 
members of the CA.54 By joining together under the combined banner of the CA they 
gained the opportunity to work together and present a single combined voice to speak 
for the trade as a whole. 
When considered as a combined entity, it is clear that the CA’s membership 
granted it the potential to become an influential political and commercial body. In its 
efforts to represent the East Asian trade, its individual membership encapsulated such 
key firms as the HSBC, Chartered Bank, Jardine Matheson, the Swire Group, and the 
P&O Steam Navigation Co., alongside many smaller, though still sizeable interests. 
By uniting top managers from these competitors under a single banner—alongside the 
elite of settler interests who had become returnees—the CA could lay some claim to 
provide a coherent, voice for the British mercantile community in China, as well as an 
exceptional knowledge of Chinese politics through past and present members of HM 
government in China. It was upon this basis that the Association undertook its political 
manoeuvres and lobbying that are discussed later in this thesis. 
 
Officers and committees 
Whilst knowledge of the membership of the CA offers us insights into its makeup, it 
is equally important that the structure of the Association is investigated so we can 
understand how the Association operated. It is a feature of voluntary associations that 
power can become concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or representatives 
of narrow interests—this, rather than simply weight of numbers, will determine where 
true influence within the CA rested.  To understand this fully, an examination must be 
made of how the CA operated in practice. In many ways the CA was fairly typical of 
                                                          
53 J.H. Scott, Son of the Chair of Scott’s shipbuilders became a partner of Swires in the 1870s. See 
Elizabeth A Hook, A Guide to the Papers of John Swire and Sons Limited (London: School of Oriental 
and African Studies, 1977), introduction. The connection, however, was deeper than this. Scotts had 
originally built ships for Holts, who operated the Ocean Steamship Co. Both Swires and Scotts would 
take shares in the Ocean Steamship Co., and Swires acted as their Far Eastern agents. They would later, 
too, invest in Swires China Navigation Company, the relationship lasting until 1970s. See Jones, 
Merchants to Multinationals, p.242; Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the 
Nineteenth to the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.156. 
54 “Charities &c.” Times (London, England), 26 July. 1890, p.3. 
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the structure of other, similar voluntary associations. A group of four (later five) 
officers presided over an executive and general committee, and below these came the 
larger body of membership, often largely uninvolved with the political side of the 
group.55 However, as with any group this structure was nuanced and unique in specific 
ways.  
 
The officers 
Originally, the officers of the CA consisted of a chairman, vice-chairman, hon. 
secretary and hon. treasurer, with the role of president added three years later.56 
Elections for the roles were held at the AGM of the Association, though were rarely 
contested with nominees seemingly settled upon well in advance.57 Of the officers of 
the Association, the most prestigious role, if not the most powerful, was that of 
president.58 Those presidents who remained involved in the China trade, or who had 
an exceptional knowledge of China, were often active on committees, for example ex-
diplomat Sir John Jordan.59 Others were less active, but the role always served to give 
the CA a well-known and prestigious leader. Such holders of the role included the Rt. 
Hon. Sir George Bowen, ex-Governor of Hongkong, Horace James Seymour, ex-
British ambassador to China, Captain Lord Ailwyn of the Royal Navy and Lieutenant 
                                                          
55 Clark, British Clubs and Societies, pp.253-257. 
56 For purposes of analysis of these roles, for the first three years of the CA the vice-chairman will be 
considered the chairman—when the roles were re-organised original vice-chairman William Keswick 
became chairman, and held the role until 1905. Before this reorganisation the role of chairman was 
rotated; it was, in essence, therefore actually the later role of president. The role of vice-chairman did 
not exist until this reorganisation. 
57 Indeed, nominees by 1947-8 were chosen by a small circle of members, with the job of proposing 
officers then delegated to a member who would make the proposal according to a ‘programme’ prepared 
in advance, having been ‘cast for the part.’ See G.E. Mitchell to John. R. Masson, 3 June 1948, China 
Association Bulletins and Circulars, JSS/11/5/2/1/, John Swire & Sons Ltd. Archive, SOAS Library, 
University of London. 
58 The names of men who filled these roles are drawn from the Annual Reports of the China Association, 
1889-1962, available as Annual Reports, CHAS/A/01 - 12, China Association Collection, SOAS 
Library, University of London.  
59 John Jordan contributed regularly until his untimely death at a committee meeting of the CA. See E. 
W. E. W. Edwards, ‘Jordan, Sir John Newell (1852–1925)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34242, last accessed 22 
August 2016). 
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General Sir George Macdonogh, head of the Federation of British industries [FBI].60 
Ailwyn and Macdonogh also potentially represented the strong link felt by those who 
had served in China to the British military. The role saw consistent turnover, with 
many serving only a single term of office. Although investigation is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, these short tenures were potentially due to other commitments these 
prominent men would have had, or simply a lack of interest.  
Below the rank of President came the chairman and vice chairman. As the 
heads of the Association’s committees, these roles were almost always filled by 
partners, directors, or prominent members of firms still actively involved in the China 
trade. These chairs directed the Association, leading discussion at committee meetings 
and calling upon contacts at the Foreign Office when required. The holders of the roles 
offer a great deal of insight into the firms who led the CA. As figures 2.1 and 2.2 
demonstrate, the roles saw no turnover and were held by Jardine Matheson and Dent 
Bros. representatives until 1905, when changes were spurred by complaints from the 
Shanghai branch of the Association.61 Representatives of Ilbert and Co., were given 
the chairmanship after this date, to better represent Shanghai interests—although as 
we shall see, they felt their power was limited by the oligarchic control exercised over 
the rest of the committee by Jardine Matheson and the HSBC. As Figure 2.3 shows 
Jardine Matheson oligarchy was certainly extant. They held almost continuous 
influence over at least one of the chairs through representatives of Jardine Matheson, 
Matheson and Co. or the British and Chinese Corporation [BCC] (a joint Jardine 
Matheson and HSBC interest). It could further be argued that the Pekin syndicate’s 
three years holding the chairmanship might fall under the Jardine Matheson sphere of 
influence, the Pekin syndicate and the BCC holding a joint interest in the Chinese 
                                                          
60 For further detail on George Bowen, see R.B. Joyce, ‘Bowen, Sir George Ferguson (1821-1899)’, 
Australian Dictionary of Biography. For Horace James Seymour see ‘Seymour, Sir Horace James’, 
Who Was Who, A & C Black, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing plc, 1920–2016; online edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2014 ; online edn, April 2014 
(http://www.ukwhoswho.com/view/article/oupww/whowaswho/U159469, last accessed 22 August 
2016). Little information is available for Lord Ailwyn. However, a certain link for China can be drawn 
from his participation in a parliamentary mission to China in 1942, mentioned in Hansard, available 
online at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1942/sep/10/parliamentary-mission-to-china (last 
accessed 22 August 2016). For sir George Macdonogh see Ian F. W. Beckett, ‘Macdonogh, Sir George 
Mark Watson (1865–1942)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; 
(http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/38446, last accessed 22 August 2016). 
61 Dent Bros. holding of this chair was due to CA founder Alfred Dents position in the company. It was 
probably due to his role as founder that he held the chair, rather than any great level of influence of the 
company within the CA. 
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Central Railways.62 The level of influence Jardine Matheson held within the CA is 
clear, and becomes evident throughout this thesis, although they were by no means the 
sole leaders of direction within the Association. 
Indeed, rotation of roles did exist to some extent. Nine separate firms held the 
Vice-Chairmanship as well as serving and former MP’s and the CA’s own secretary. 
That these MPs only held the role for four years highlights the CA’s preference for co-
operation with British government departments, rather than applying political pressure 
through parliament. The CA’s secretary fulfilling this role from 1946 to 1952 is 
symptomatic of decreased interest in the CA, and the struggles of the China trade more 
generally. Rotation may also have served to represent various interests more fairly—
or at least give the appearance of doing so.  
The selection of chairmen was certainly a considered manoeuvre, and as well 
as representing firms fairly was also linked to the overall aims of the CA. When the 
CA attempted to align with British government policy after 1925, and encourage co-
operation with Chinese interests to attempt to defuse the threat of Chinese nationalism, 
noted proponents of this were chosen to serve in the role. S.F. Mayers had sought 
Japanese involvement with a BCC scheme as early as 1912/13, showing, if not co-
operation with Chinese interests, at least a willingness to co-opt Asian partners into 
British led schemes. Brigadier Woodroffe of the Pekin Syndicate was noted as the 
‘most flamboyant advocate’ of the policy of ‘accommodation and co-operation’ with 
China during his time working for the company.63 With G.W. Swire, another 
proponent of co-operation with Chinese interests, these men held the chairmanship for 
the majority of the 1931-42 period, and espoused the benefits of co-operation when 
required.64 In 1946 it was agreed to grant the chairman remuneration of £800 per 
annum, alongside a £200 per annum entertaining bonus, although this seems to have 
altered the patterns of firms holding the roles little, if at all.65 
 
                                                          
62 Frank H.H. King ‘Extra-Regional Banks and Investments in China’ in Rondo Cameron and V.I. 
Bovykin (eds.), International Banking 1870-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.393. 
63 Osterhammel, ‘Imperialism in Transition’, pp.283-4. 
64 Bickers, Britain in China, pp.178-84.  
65 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 17 June 1946, Minutes and Circulars of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, 1946, CHAS/MCP/46. 
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Figure 2.1: Firms holding the China Association chairmanship 
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Figure 2.2: Background of the China Association vice-chairmanship 
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Figure 2.3: Dates holding chairmanship and vice-chairmanship, select firms66  
 
                                                          
66 For each firm the top row represents the chairmanship, while the vice-chairmanship is the lower. 
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Figure 2.3 also demonstrates that the Swire group’s control of these chairs was 
concentrated towards the end of the period under consideration. This aligns with the 
Swire group becoming the CA’s largest funder in this period, and is symptomatic of 
increased Swire involvement and control within the CA, although they remained a 
much smaller firm than Jardine Matheson overall, suggesting it was due to this 
funding—or perhaps due to G.W. Swires’ views matching those of the British 
government closely in this period—that accounted for this.67 Although few 
representatives of banking interests are recorded, it is important to note here that many 
of the men who served as chairman and vice chairman did have links to these 
institutions. William Keswick, David Landale, and Stanley Dodwell all served as 
directors or committee members of the HSBC.68 Similarly, Alfred Dent had served as 
a director for the Chartered Bank.69 Such Cross-directorships were common in East 
Asia during this period, and providing a formal structure through which these firms 
could co-operate under a combined name was a potential benefit of the CA.70 
Besides these roles, the CA had two further officers. Of these, the role of Hon. 
Treasurer was largely restricted to ensuring finances of the Association were not 
overstretched. More specialised jobs such as auditing of the Association’s finances 
were handled by an external professional, or a qualified member of the CA.71 
Investment of surplus funds was undertaken by the General Committee as a whole, 
and the finances of the group were held by their official bankers, the HSBC. On rare 
occasions, the treasurer was required to press firms for funds to support the 
Association.72  
The role of Hon. Secretary offered its holder more scope for shaping the CA’s 
activities and focus, and was a potentially powerful one to hold in the Association as 
                                                          
67 Jones, Merchants to Multinationals, p.119. 
68 For Keswick see “Charities & C.” Times (London, England), 26 July. 1890, p.3. For Landale and 
Dodwell see “The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.” Times (London, England) 28 
October 1913, p.15.  
69 Philip K. Law, ‘Dent family (per. c.1820–1927)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/53862, last accessed 13 October 
2017). 
70 Jones, Merchants to Multinationals, specifically chapter six. 
71 In 1896, for example, the accounts of the Association were audited by executive committee member 
E. Iveson. See the Associations annual report for 1896-7, p.xiv, available at Annual Reports, 1889 - 98, 
CHAS/A/01, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
72 This occurred, for example, in 1899. Potentially, this was undertaken by the treasurer as at the time 
the role was filled by founder Alfred Dent, a man well known to other heads of firms involved in the 
East Asian trade. See Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 23 February 1898, Minutes of 
the General Committee and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2. 
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we have noted with R.S. Gundry, who was a loud voice within the Association, and 
later became its president. Typically, however, the Secretary was responsible for 
overseeing the day to day business of the CA, running the office, responding to 
correspondence and preparing the annual reports. Later duties of Secretary E.M. Gull 
included an Association-funded trip to China to report upon the state of the trade.73 
The role was originally unpaid, however later secretaries received payment and, as 
discussed later, a pension scheme.74 
 
The general, executive and sub-committees 
Below these officers came the men who held seats on the Executive and General 
Committees of the Association. Of these two committees, the executive was smaller, 
and was intended to meet more often, and at shorter notice, should this be required. 
Most decisions were, however, taken at the wider meetings of the general committee. 
Indeed, the rules and regulations of the Association granted the general committee 
wide reaching powers. They were to approve the applications of new members, fill 
mid-term vacancies on the body at their own discretion, and elect the executive 
committee from their own ranks. They were to schedule the AGM of the Association, 
and also were able to create bye-laws for the Association, however changes to the rules 
and regulations required a Special General Meeting to be called. The General 
Committee were further to control the direction and scope of the Association’s 
charitable efforts. Finally they were to organise any dinners or other social functions 
as they desired and invite to these official guests, who attended free of charge, to 
ensure these occasions served a political as well as social function.75 Alongside the 
officers, these men held the greatest scope to direct the CA’s aims and objectives. 
As such it is important to assess the makeup of these committees, and to do so 
we may turn again to the background of the members who formed the first iteration of 
                                                          
73 Minutes of meetings of the General Committee, 12 and 26 June 1934, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, December 1929 – September 1937, CHAS/MCP/7. 
74 Only original secretary R.S. Gundry performed this role for free. His replacement received an 
‘honorarium and salary’—for the post remained that of honorary secretary—of £438.1s.8d. See the 
annual report for 1902-3, p.ix, available at Annual Reports, 1898-03, CHAS/A/03, China Association 
Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
75 All of this information is drawn from The China Association (established 1889) Objects, rules and 
regulations, Jardine Matheson Archive, Papers of the China Association, MS JM/L6/4. 
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the bodies.76 The positions these men held are noted in Table 2.1 with short 
biographies again available in Appendix A.  
These men marked the elite of the returned expatriates from China. They had 
served their companies, or the British government, at the highest levels. And many of 
those with business interests still retained these, operating as heads of mercantile, 
shipping, and banking firms despite their return to Britain. It was this background of 
influence and technical expertise—and the firms they represented—that would help 
shape the political ambitions and methods, as well as the relationship of the CA with 
the British government. As with the overall membership and officers, certain interests 
were predominant, and these match the earlier noted patterns. Only three firms had 
more than a single representative on the general committee; two each for the HSBC, 
the P&O, and Jardine Matheson. What might be termed settler interests are almost 
entirely unrepresented, beyond Thomas Hanbury’s considerable land ownership, and 
a small number of firms of a lesser size.  
It is perhaps notable—though it can only remain speculation—that it was in 
1890 that Jardine Matheson and the HSBC agreed informally to co-operate over the 
provision of two major loans in China, in order that they would not impede one 
another’s business. Their strong involvement in the early CA may even have been 
linked to this co-operation, or an attempt to further strengthen their links.77  
When the executive committee is investigated similar patterns emerge. Of the 
nine committee men, five were partners in mercantile firms, one was the chief manager 
of the HSBC, one the managing director of the P&O. The final two members were an 
ex-Governor of Hongkong and the CA secretary. The most influential of these firms 
within the CA were, undoubtedly, those Cain and Hopkins have identified as 
‘Gentlemanly Capitalists’ hoping to direct British China policy from the metropole.78 
Over time this committee makeup changed as new business opportunities came to the 
fore in China and East Asia and others faded. Swire Group representatives served on 
committees from 1892, and Dodwells representatives from 1899. Later rule changes, 
                                                          
76 The makeup of the committee itself was drawn from the 1899 annual report, p.1, available at Annual 
Reports, 1889 - 98, CHAS/A/01, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
77 Edward Lefevour, ‘Challenge and Response’ in Maggie Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade: A 
Celebration of 150 years of Jardine, Matheson & Co. (London: Octopus books ltd., 1982), pp.190-1. 
78 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: 1688-2000.  
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Table 2.1: The 1889 general Committee of the China Association 
Source: Annual Report of the China Association, 1889 
 
                                                          
79 Hanbury continued to hold substantial land investments. In 1890, this ran to some 1,462 properties 
in Shanghai, administered by his chosen agents, Iveson & Co. For further detail see Alasdair Moore, 
La Mortola: in the footsteps of Thomas Hanbury (London: Cadogan Guides, 2004), specifically chapter 
nine. 
General Committee 
Member 
Current Relationship to 
China Further Information 
      
Grant, C.L. active commercial link Adamson, Bell & Co. 
Gwyther, J.H.   
Chartered Bank of India, Australia 
and China 
Ezekiel, S.   David Sassoon & Co. (signatory)  
Dent, Alfred   Dent Bros. 
Deacon, A.   E&A Deacon 
Pugh, W.   Evans, Pugh & Co. 
Kilby, E.F.   Flint Kilby & Co. 
Duncanson, E.F.   Gibb, Livingstone & Co. 
Holliday, J.   Holliday, Wise & Co. 
Jackson, T.   HSBC 
McLean, D.   HSBC 
Iveson, E.   Iveson & Co. 
Whittall, J.   J. Whittall and Co. 
Jardine, Sir Robert   Jardine Matheson 
Keswick, Wm.   Jardine Matheson 
Maitland, J.A.   Maitland & Co. 
Barnes, F.D.   P&O Line 
Sutherland, T.   P&O Line 
Strachan, W.M.   Strachan & Co. 
Hanbury, T.  Land investment 79 
      
Coxon, A. inactive commercial link - 
Lucas, C.   - 
Myburgh, P.A. (QC)   - 
      
Bowen, Sir George ex-government employee former Governor of Hongkong 
Hornby, Edmund   
former Chief Justice, British 
Supreme Court of China and Japan 
Wade, Sir Thos.   
former British Minister 
Plenipotentiary and Envoy 
Extraordinary 
      
Gundry, R.S. other China Association Secretary 
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discussed below, saw seats delegated to specific companies including BAT, ICI and 
Asiatic Petroleum amongst others. These were by this period not only the CA’s largest 
funders, but also those most closely aligned with its political direction. The retirement 
of G.W. Swire in 1947, to choose one example, saw Swire himself write to the CA 
suggesting Sir John Masson as his replacement and John Swire and Sons write 
officially to nominate Masson for election at the next AGM.80  
Alongside these two main committees, the Association also delegated specific 
tasks to numerous sub-committees. Unfortunately, as these acted with a degree of 
independence from the central committees records have not been retained. Some 
details can be gleaned when they returned to report findings to the General committee 
or are mentioned briefly by name. Typically, they sought to assess how specific sectors 
of the East Asian trade might be improved, such as reversing declining sales of China 
tea, dealing with difficulties arising over trade marks, or focusing upon the Japanese 
portion of the East Asian trade.81 There is no record of the CA ever concerning itself 
with the import of the eponymous China pottery, although the name of the Association 
seems to have confused, or at least been humorous to some, such as the person who 
wrote to Funny Folks, A Weekly Budget of Funny Pictures, Funny Notes, Funny Jokes 
and Funny Stories under the pseudonym ‘A. Potter’ to inform the readership that ‘No, 
the China Association isn’t a Blue-China one’ in 1893.82 
 
Return or retirement? Continuing mercantile links of China Association 
members 
In closing this discussion of the CA’s membership and committees, it is apposite to 
make one further investigation, notably, into the continued mercantile activity of 
members. As we have noted, there were many possible mechanisms which related to 
business activity that could underpin an individual’s return. Some returned to take 
roles in the London end of true multinationals. Others, to take roles in ‘sister’ firms 
providing a London base for Eastern trading firms. Some may have held more passive 
                                                          
80 G.E. Mitchell to Members of the General Committee, 9 May 1947, China Association Bulletins and 
Circulars, JSS/11/5/2/1/, John Swire & Sons Ltd. Archive. 
81 For the China Tea Subcommittee see Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 20 January 
1892, Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committees, April 1889 – March 1897, 
CHAS/MCP/1. For the Trade Marks subcommittee see Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 
16 May 1905, Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committee, June 1901 – November 
1906, CHAS/MCP/3, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
82 “Correspondence.” Funny Folks, A Weekly Budget of Funny Pictures, Funny Notes, Funny Jokes and 
Funny Stories (London, England), 4 March. 1893.  
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commercial interests, for example land in Shanghai, or investments on the Shanghai 
stock exchange. Finally, a complete severance from East Asia was possible, with 
capital removed from businesses and repatriated to Britain, and no continuing links 
held to East Asia. If they continued to hold active links to the trade, and specific firms, 
we can more safely say these men represented these interests, and that these interests 
were at play in the CA. First, we may turn to the original membership.  From this 
analysis we must discount a number of men who remained in China at the time of the 
Association’s inception, as they would have been unable to directly attempt to 
influence the London Committee. For a further six men, the records are inconclusive 
as for their continued activity in commerce, and these too are excluded. This leaves a 
total of 92 men. Of these, 38 held active positions with China-linked companies, while 
the remaining 54 did not—a ratio of 1:1.42.83 For the original general committee, as 
outlined in Table 2.1 this ratio was reversed, with active commercial men 
outnumbering inactive by 2.86:1. These active men predominantly, therefore, held 
positions of power within the CA and their employment history shows they 
represented some of the largest firms in the China trade.  
Critically, this manifested itself as a wider body of membership little interested 
in the political side of the Association, with only those actively involved in China 
linked companies regularly contributing to the Associations daily work and direction. 
This became a common theme, with secretaries complaining about compendious 
annual reports going largely unread, or skimmed at best, and low turnouts for AGM’s 
(and as we shall see below, Special General Meetings) compared to annual dinners—
even when the two followed one another on the same date.84 Suffice it to say at this 
point—a full appraisal is made in chapter 3—that many seem to have joined purely 
for the social functions the CA offered, relishing the chance to renew social ties and 
                                                          
83 This analysis includes ex-government employees. Although they would not have had commercial 
links while stationed in China, others did gain them (as directorships of firms) upon their retirement.  
84 Secretary R.S. Gundry noted that it was a ‘much smaller number that, he was sorry to say, usually 
put in an appearance at annual meetings’ than the annual dinner. He also believed that he was producing 
reports that ‘not one member of the Association in ten would take the trouble to read.’ See The China 
Association Annual General Meeting, 23 March 1898, Minutes of the General Committee and 
Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2; and The China Association Annual 
General Meeting, 17 April 1901, Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committee, April 
1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2. It seems, in some cases, it was the size of the annual reports that led 
to few members reading them. A letter to the North China Herald from G. James Morrison complained 
that ‘local reports, etc., become very interesting if bound up year by year, but some such as those of the 
China Association are of quite an impossible size, resulting, I have no doubt, in large numbers of the 
reports going into the waste-paper basket.’ See ‘The Size of Pamphlets’ The North China Herald. 
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appreciative of a space in which they could reminisce about China with like-minded 
individuals. This, too, ensured that large firms could retain oligarchic control of what 
was, in theory at least, a subscriber democracy. 
Briefly, it is therefore instructive here to use the data we have on these 
founding members to assess their time in China more generally. And although issues 
surrounding the transience of these men—not all were in the same location, nor were 
they in China at the same time—complicate the story, it is clear that the careers of 
these men in China were enough to form the basis for their interest in the CA’s social 
functions. As Figure 2.4 shows, the average identifiable length of the sojourn members 
had taken in East Asia was around 12 years.85 Turning to location, we find the chance 
for the creation of links to also have existed, with 51 of 92 members for whom this is 
possible to ascertain resident predominantly in Shanghai, and a further 24 in 
Hongkong, although due to their transitory lifestyle, they were not completely 
stationary.86 
 
Figure 2.4: Average length of time spent in China (original membership) 
 
 
 
                                                          
85 Due to limitations of the directories investigated, this is likely a considerable underestimate. 
86 Due to incomplete records data relating to both the time of sojourn in East Asia is calculated using 
fewer members than are in the overall study of original membership. Similarly, as some members 
resided for equal periods in two locations, they are discounted from any calculations regarding the 
geographical basis of the membership.   
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Corporate members 
Control and influence within the CA, however, were not purely restricted to 
individuals, in the same way that membership of the CA was not restricted only to the 
individual members investigated above. Soon after its foundation it was decided firms 
with an interest in the East Asian trade could also apply to join. Much as with 
individual members, these firms were to be proposed and seconded by extant 
members, and having joined would contribute a sum to the Association’s office 
expenses. This gave the firm the benefit of CA representation and access to 
information returned by other members from East Asia, as well as the library located 
in the CA offices comprising of periodicals and other works upon East Asia.  
Quickly, these firms became the major source of funding for the Association. 
Although a complete record is unnecessary as many firms gave small, occasional 
donations, a selection of firms who gave funds consistently, and on a larger scale, are 
shown in Table 2.2. This confirms, as suggested by the analysis of the backgrounds of 
the Association membership, that the body was predominantly backed by those 
involved in mercantile activities and financial services in East Asia. Indeed, names 
including the HSBC, Chartered Bank, P&O, Jardine Matheson and the Union 
Insurance Society of Canton are once again prominent, and their contributions 
continued throughout the period under study. Other firms who occupied these business 
sectors are evident throughout the table, including Dent Bros. (linked to founder 
Alfred Dent, after whose death donations reduced), Dodwells (of whom Stanley 
Dodwell served as CA chairman from 1928-30), D. Sassoons, E.D. Sassoons, the 
China Navigation Company and the North China Insurance Company. 
Of further interest are how certain firms contributions changed over time. The 
Swire Group’s contribution, for example, peaked towards the end of the period under 
consideration, and coincided with an increase of influence within the CA. ICI and the 
Asiatic Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Shell) match a later change in Far Eastern 
market, towards the importation (though not production) of chemicals, and mirror both 
holding a permanent seat on later General Committees.87 BAT, a hugely important and 
                                                          
87 See the annual reports of the CA from 1935-6 onwards, from when members of committees saw their 
names listed alongside the firms they directly represented. Osterhammel, ‘British Business in China, 
1860’s-1950’s’ pp.204-6 notes the growth of these business sectors.  
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powerful firm in the East Asian trade, and again a late entrant, is similarly 
represented.88  
It should be noted, however, that the table above does not give an entirely accurate 
picture of donations made by some of the larger firms. Due to the nature of British 
investment in China, many joint enterprises were founded with varying percentages 
of capital held by investing firms. The wider Jardine Matheson Group, for example, 
held stakes in The Canton Insurance Office, the Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., 
the BCC, and some twenty other firms beyond their own import and export interests—
many of whom made smaller donations to the CA.89 Untangling the structure of these 
British business groups in China is, unfortunately, a monumental task and one that has 
not yet been undertaken beyond single companies, and far beyond the scope of this 
thesis.90 Regardless, these donations substantially outweighed the contributions made 
to the Association’s funds by individual members and they seem, ultimately, to have 
allowed firms to buy influence within the CA to some extent. 
When considered alongside the membership of the CA, the link between the 
CA and particular firms and interests is cemented. Several large firms and financial 
institutions connected to East Asia provided the majority of financial backing to the 
Association, with the group’s membership and leadership also drawn directly from 
their ranks. It was these firms that combined to see the group become an active 
political pressure group. The effects of this, and the CA’s activities, are discussed in 
chapter three. What is particularly interesting is that many of the firms involved were 
competitors. That they continued to contribute to the CA, and held key positions in it 
on a somewhat rotating basis, suggests that, as expressed in the Association’s original 
objects, perhaps the social functions of the Association had done some good in 
persuading these men to work together for the benefit of the China trade overall. But 
it is perhaps also the fact that this was a small world—both one of transitory expatriates 
in an environment in which they were a clear minority, and one of the British trade 
with China more generally—that goes some way towards explaining these collective 
efforts. But this was not restricted to the London based membership, collaboration also 
found structural expression in the development of a transnational branch system.  
                                                          
88 Osterhammel, ‘Imperialism in Transition’, pp.282-3.  
89 Hao, The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China, p.23. 
90 Jones, Merchants to Multinationals, has been used throughout this thesis to provide guidance 
regarding these business groups, and is the best available study offering a comparative overview of key 
business groups Jardine Matheson, Swires, and Dodwells. 
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Table 2.2: Selected China Association member firms and financial contributions 
source: China Association Annual Reports 
*Data Unavailable for 1930 
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Asian branches 
Recent work on networks that underpinned the British world has stressed that, overall, 
greater success was found by networks that expanded their membership effectively, 
and on an international basis.91 For the CA, this was always the intention. Many of its 
individual members would have held contacts in East Asia already, especially those 
still active in business. However, to ensure this network was widened still further, the 
CA sought to incorporate voices from outside of their existing networks. Originally 
the Association envisioned they would do so by retaining a number of ‘corresponding 
Members’ to remit information from East Asia.92 The minutes of the Association, 
however, make no reference to such members having ever been elected or fulfilling 
such duties, although it may be speculated that a number of members elected at the 
Association’s foundation, despite being resident in China, acted in this role. 
With these corresponding members either non-existent, or at best limited in 
number, sources of information, their reliability and the identity of those making 
requests of the London Committee came to be a concern. In 1892 the Chairman of the 
CA notified the committee that, at this time, the chamber of commerce in Shanghai 
was chaired by an American national. Worried that a close relationship with the 
chamber could draw the CA into supporting American interests the CA moved to 
create branches open to only British subjects, to ensure they supported purely the 
needs of British interests.93 Although this by no means represented an end to co-
operation with chambers of commerce in East Asia, from this point onwards the 
branch structure became the key conduit through which information and cases which 
required the Association’s attentions flowed.  
Primarily, these branches were created as a formalised link between the 
London committee and interests at the periphery. Branches would return information, 
often of a confidential nature, to the London committee, which in turn would furnish 
branches with the latest information from London. Indeed, it has been noted that a key 
characteristic of ‘trans-national social networks’ is the way in which they can generate 
                                                          
91 Magee and Thompson, Empire and Globalisation: Networks of people, goods and capital in the 
British World, 1850-1914, p.52. 
92 The China Association (established 1889) Objects, rules and regulations, Jardine Matheson Archive, 
Papers of the China Association, MS JM/L6/4. 
93 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 20 January 1892, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committees, April 1889 – March 1897, CHAS/MCP/1. 
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and deploy accurate information quickly and effectively.94 In theory this formalised 
relationship also allowed a coherent single voice to speak for British communities and 
commercial interests, whose grievances or requests could then be passed on, via the 
London committee, to the relevant seats of power, be this the Foreign Office, Colonial 
Office, or MPs with whom the CA were affiliated. This section explores why these 
branches came to exist, how they operated within the Association’s wider framework 
and organisational structure, at which locations they existed, and also the potential for 
conflict that could emerge due to differing opinions in London and in East Asia.  
Following on from the chairman’s concerns in 1892, an appeal was circulated 
by the members of the committee to their contacts and correspondents in East Asia to 
encourage the formation of branches in May 1892. By November their efforts had 
been successful, and at a meeting led by the British Consul General and CA founding 
member Nicholas Hannen, an executive committee was formed to oversee the creation 
of a Shanghai branch.95 It is worthy of note, too, that the driving force behind the 
establishment of the Shanghai branch was John MacGregor, partner and Shanghai 
manager of Jardine Matheson, again emphasising the influence the company held in 
the CA—though as we shall see, metropole interests did not manage to easily control 
the will of Shanghai.96 Over the next 55 years a series of branches would be formed at 
major centres of British population in China and Japan, the periods of activity for 
which are detailed in Table 2.3. By 1914 the branches would represent as many as 942 
of the CA’s 1,243 members.97  
Whilst the establishment of these branches proved to be a key part of the 
Association’s structure it must be noted that they were liable to lapse into inactivity. 
In 1901, the Yokohama branch was regarded as having been revived after an abeyance 
of around five years.98 It was later reconstituted as a joint branch of the CA and the 
                                                          
94 Magee and Thompson, Empire and Globalisation: Networks of people, goods and capital in the 
British World, 1850-1914, p.52. 
95 Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee, 24 January 1893, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committees, April 1889 – March 1897, CHAS/MCP/1. 
96 “The Death of Mr John MacGregor” North China Herald (Shanghai, China), 10 November 1893, 
p.12; “The Shanghai Branch of the China Association” North China Herald (Shanghai, China), 02 
February 1894, p.10. 
97 A 1914 membership list is printed in the 1914-15 annual report, supplement, pp.85-95, available at 
Annual Reports, 1910-15, CHAS/A/06, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of 
London. It records a total of 1,243 members, of which 75.8 per cent —942 members—resided abroad. 
This does, however, include the British Association of Japan, which was a linked body rather than a 
standard CA branch. 
98 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 8 August 1901, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, June 1901 – November 1906, CHAS/MCP/3. 
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British Association of Japan. Potentially, this could have been simply an unavoidable 
by-product of the transient life many of these men led. The loss of an influential, 
driving member (or members) could prove a devastating blow for a branch, Hongkong 
finding in 1913 that the branch had entered a torpor when ‘both the chairman and the 
hon. Secretary had left the colony, at about the same time.’99 General turnover 
 
Table 2.3: Branches of the China Association 
source: annual reports of the China Association, 1889-1955. 
 
 
of members due to transient life was similarly problematic. Again turning to 
Hongkong, in which it has been estimated that the foreign population renewed almost 
completely every five years, the CA branch between 1898 and 1900 saw a lapse of 
two years between meetings.100 When a meeting was finally convened, it was found 
that twenty members were absent from the colony.101  Disruptive events, too, could 
cause upset. 1917 saw Hongkong once again temporarily cease activity due to the 
military commitments of the community, although the London committee were 
unworried by this forced disruption.102  The disruption of communities and 
communication that came with the Second World War, ultimately, saw the end of this 
branch structure. 
 
 
                                                          
99 “Untitled” North China Herald (Shanghai, China), 19 July 1913, p.36. Similar problems have been 
noted for Scottish Ethnic Societies in East Asia, see Bueltmann, Clubbing Together, p.173. 
100 Robert Bickers, ‘Shanghailanders and Others’, p.293. 
101 “Untitled” North China Herald (Shanghai, China), 10 October 1900, p.18. 
102 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 19 December 1917, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, January 1911 – April 1922, CHAS/MCP/5. 
Location of Branch Years Active 
    
Shanghai 1893-1942 
Hongkong 1893-1942 
Yokohama 
1893-1905, 1903-1942 (as British Association of 
Japan) 
Kobe 
1899-1902, 1910-1942 (as British Association of 
Japan) 
Tientsin 1907-1942 
Hankow 1912-1942 
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The Purpose and functions of the branches 
With these branches accounting for more than half of the Association’s membership 
by 1900—and as much as 75.8% by 1914—it is critical to understand their functions, 
although they are not the main focus of this thesis.103 As noted above, they were 
primarily created to return information from East Asia to London, with the intention 
that the London Committee would pass on concerns, or recommend actions, to the 
relevant government departments. In urgent cases, this information was returned first 
by telegram, with further detail provided by a following letter. In a time of limited 
worldwide communication, this allowed the CA to receive information quickly and 
reliably from East Asia and, where the London Committee felt appropriate, liaise with 
the British government rapidly. Further information related to the East Asian trade, as 
well as reproductions of important correspondence undertaken by branches, was 
included in annual reports produced by the branches which were often forwarded to 
the London Committee.104 Alongside this, a re-organisation of the London Committee 
was undertaken in 1927 at the suggestion of the Tientsin branch to create specific 
positions to be available to recently returned members from each branch, in order that 
they could furnish the Committee—who had potentially not been resident in East Asia 
for some time—with up to date information.105 This combination of methods provided 
the CA with a powerful information gathering apparatus.  
Such information could prove a valuable asset. Not only did it allow the 
London committee to be as up to date as possible with goings on in East Asia, it also—
in theory at least—enabled them to present their views as a coherent single voice, 
representing both the London end of business and the communities at the periphery to 
the British government. Furthermore, by representing 1,000 members at various 
locations, the Association’s political power increased. The branch system could 
further be valuable as a method to build a solid, trusted relationship with government 
departments as the CA became a source of information, through this network of 
contacts, for the Foreign Office itself. In this sense, the CA’s branch structure was a 
                                                          
103 For 1900 see The China Association Annual Dinner, 7 November 1900, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2. 
104 The first recorded example of annual reports being returned by a branch was from Shanghai, in 1899. 
See Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 24 July 1900, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2. 
105 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 10 November 1927, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, July 1922 – October 1929, CHAS/MCP/6, China Association 
Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
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key factor in allowing the CA to develop a relationship that would place it as an 
‘insider’ interest group. Worthy of note, too, is that the London Committee was not 
the sole recipient of this information. During the First World War, French firms in 
Shanghai wished to cease trading with German firms, and instead deal with their 
British counterparts. Applying originally to the British consul for a list of British firms, 
this request was then forwarded to the Shanghai branch who promptly provided this 
information to the French consul.106  
Ultimately, these factors combined to strengthen the position of the CA as a 
political pressure group. But while it should be noted that establishing the coherent 
voice this required was often achieved, it was not always simple to do so. Sometimes 
branches themselves would disagree, or fail to exchange information properly, and on 
numerous occasions branches would express views too aggressive for the London 
committee to back.107 In such cases, standard procedure was for the London committee 
to simply pass on the views of the branches to the relevant government department, 
whilst making no comment on the content.108 On a much rarer occasion, branches 
would even challenge the stance of the London Committee, as we shall see below. 
Overall, however, the CA branch system worked well in providing the united voice 
and flow of information necessary to make the group a coherent political pressure 
group. 
Whilst stressing that the branches did usually co-operate well with the London 
Committee, and that their main use to London was to produce an effective information 
gathering network, we must note they were not simply information-gathering 
subsidiaries. In fact, branches often acted as highly independent bodies, free from the 
                                                          
106 Circular to the General Committee no.189, 1 January 1915, Circulars Vol. XII, 185-200, November 
1914 – January 1915, CHAS/MCP/20. 
107 When touring East Asia to gather information for the London Committee in 1934, for example, 
secretary E.M. Gull found that the Shanghai and Hongkong branches did not communicate effectively. 
He took the opportunity to urge upon them to exchange copies of the minutes of meetings, whilst also 
agreeing that the London committee would, in the future, send any material to both branches rather than 
one or the other. See China Association (Hongkong Branch) minutes of a meeting of the General 
Committee, 15 March 1935, General Committee Papers, April 1935 – December 1935, CHAS/MCP/40, 
China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
108 For example, when a Butterfield and Swire’s steamer service was opposed by the Chinese 
government in 1900 as the ships being used were of a type not permitted by treaty (‘sea-going’ vessels 
were not permitted to traverse inland waters) Swires and the Shanghai branch wished for further claims 
to be made against the Chinese government. Despite JH Scott (of John Swire & Sons) agreeing with 
their views, the chairman and the rest of the committee ultimately decided the calls from Swires and 
the Shanghai branch were not fairly grounded—they believed the ships to be sea going and noted that 
they even ‘occasionally rode out typhoons’. They therefore passed on Shanghai’s telegram ‘without 
comment.’ See Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 10 May 1900, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2. 
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constraint of London and only earning a rebuke if they strayed far from the 
Association’s overall goals. In doing so branches often attempted to solve problems 
and flex their political muscles of their own accord. In a response to increasing piracy 
in 1906 around Hongkong the CA branch chairman was invited to a meeting with the 
Governor and Consul-General to discuss the creation of a foreign police force to be 
used to counter the problem.109 In 1924, once again worried about rising piracy, the 
Shanghai branch hosted a luncheon with senior Royal Navy members as the guests of 
honour at which they requested more be done to increase the security of the China 
Coast waters.110 Similarly, one new British minister in Peking, Claude MacDonald, 
having been dined before his departure in 1896 by the London branch of the CA, gave 
his first speech on arrival in China at a luncheon hosted by the CA Shanghai branch.111 
Such speeches could gain fairly wide prominence in newspapers, both in Britain and 
East Asia. When Lord Charles Beresford—the ‘plain—speaking sailor MP’—gave a 
particularly emphatic speech to the Shanghai branch it was reported on in The Times, 
The Dundee Courier, The Morning Post, Daily Gazette for Middlesbrough, The 
Hampshire/Portsmouth Telegraph, Bristol Mercury, Standard and Glasgow 
Herald.112 Similarly, some reports of annual meetings of the Hongkong and Shanghai 
branches were reprinted in the Far Eastern Review.113  
Dinners were also held by branches for social reasons, much in the same vein 
as the London branch, and proved highly congenial affairs.114 They also formed 
subcommittees to solve particular problems, with the most prominent the Shanghai 
                                                          
109 The National Archives, FO 371/183/46, John Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, 17 November 1916.  
110 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 6 February 1924, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, July 1922 – October 1929, CHAS/MCP/6. 
111 “Daily Notes” York Herald (York, England), 13 May 1896.  
112 It was The Hampshire/Portsmouth Telegraph that coined the Phrase ‘plain—speaking Sailor M.P.’ 
in their “Digest of the Week” Hampshire/Portsmouth Telegraph (Leeds, England), 26 November 1898. 
For the other newspapers see “Lord Charles Beresford on China” Times (London, England), 21 
November 1898, p.7. “Lord Charles Beresford” Dundee Courier (Dundee, Scotland), 21 November 
1898. “The Integrity of China” Morning Post (London, England), 21 November 1898. “The Powers 
and China” Standard (London, England), 21 November 1898. “Britain’s Interests in China” Daily 
Gazette for Middlesbrough (Middlesbrough, England), 21 November 1898. “The Imperial Pilgrim” 
Bristol Mercury (Bristol, England), 21 November 1898. “The Powers and China” Standard (London, 
England), 21 November 1898. “Third Edition” Glasgow Herald (Glasgow, Scotland), 21 November 
1898. Beresford’s own view from his trip to China, as well as the resolutions of a meeting he held with 
the CA Hongkong Branch are to be found in his, The Break-up of China: With an account of its present 
commerce, currency, waterways, armies, railways, politics and future prospects (New York and 
London: Harper & Brothers, 1899). 
113 “The China Association” The Far Eastern Review (Manila, Philippines), Vol IV, no. 12, 1908. “The 
Kowloon—Canton Railway” The Far Eastern Review (Manila, Philippines), Vol V, no. 10, 1909.  
114 The annual report of 1901, for example, available at Annual Reports, 1898-03, CHAS/A/03, contains 
records of dinners undertaken by several branches in this year.  
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branch World War One volunteer subcommittee, the efforts of which are detailed 
elsewhere in this thesis. Branches could also form or work with existing bodies 
independently of London in order to attempt to stimulate British trade with China and 
East Asia. For the Tientsin branch, this resulted in the creation of a separate ‘trade 
association’ which would be linked to the branch, though an independent body. 
Emphasising the independence branches could display, Tientsin refused to agree with 
the London Committee the content of correspondence sent to public bodies, fearing its 
independence would be compromised.115 Featuring much more prominently in CA 
records, however, was the merger undertaken by the Shanghai branch in 1926 (though 
first considered in 1923) with the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce to form a 
single amalgamated body.116 This not only emphasised the role branches could play 
independently, but also the steps taken by the CA to bring other groups under its 
influence and into its networks, further strengthening its claim to speak for numerous 
and wide ranging interests and groups in East Asia.  
At the most basic structural level, then, the London headquarters acted as a 
central focal point, with organisational matters undertaken by the committees there. 
Providing an active information network in China, whilst still acting independently, 
the Asian branches of the Association were in many ways self-contained, while 
adhering, overall, to the remit of the CA. Yet while this branch system was largely 
stable, useful and well-liked, it could cause problems. After all, the branches did not 
exist purely to remit information—the interests they represented wished, too, to hold 
a voice at the metropole, and relied upon London to provide this for them. This is best 
shown by a detailed investigation of the relationship between the Shanghai branch and 
London Committee, as problems emerged regarding the Association’s structure, 
methods and overall direction. Periphery based firms raised grievances through 
representatives, and individuals, too, who held prominent roles in within the Shanghai 
branch attempted to wield this power to further their own goals. At its heart, much of 
this dispute originated in the differing aims of expatriate companies based in London 
and Hongkong, and those settler companies based in Shanghai. But such disputes 
                                                          
115 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 12 October 1915, Minutes of the General 
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retained potential to draw firms who were usually co-operative into disagreement, 
threatening to disrupt the core base of the CA, as we shall see. 
 
Metropole-periphery conflict and oligarchy in the CA 
Even at its inception, the CA’s usefulness was questioned by the wider Shanghai 
community. The North China Herald thought its foundation unnecessary with ‘the 
existing machinery [for applying political pressure]… sufficient, if it is kept properly 
at work’, and complained that the best men would be unlikely to join, being too pre-
occupied with their own business.117 Despite this uneasy start, by 1893 the formation 
of a branch in Shanghai was praised in the same paper, with the assertion that ‘when 
the Association is known to comprise all, or a very large proportion of British residents 
concerned in Eastern commerce, it will acquire a political and commercial status of 
very considerable importance to all of us.’118 In essence, this view summed up the 
connection between the CA committees in London and Shanghai. If all interests were 
represented an interdependent relationship, productive for both sides, could overcome 
the tensions of Settler and Expatriate disputes. This was not be, however, and conflict 
over representation would surface repeatedly, and was never truly resolved. The first, 
and most public conflict occurred in the early twentieth century, and revolved 
ostensibly around the methods the CA employed to apply political pressure, although 
deeper disputes were certainly in play. 
The first indication of this conflict came in July 1900. In the pages of The North 
China Herald it was mentioned there was ‘friction’ between the Shanghai and London 
branches, with Shanghai ‘urging steps which the somewhat comatose home committee 
has regarded as being indecently vigorous.’119 A sudden call for increased action was 
no surprise. The Boxer uprising was in full swing by this time, with the London Daily 
Mail announcing in the same month—erroneously, and in ‘gruesome detail’—that 
hundreds of foreigners had been killed, bringing an end to the siege of the legation 
quarter in Peking.120 Suddenly, China was thrust to the forefront of public imagination, 
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and discussions were made regarding the extension of the CA’s methods, the 
association wondering if it could now hope to appeal to the wider British population.  
Some members, including influential secretary R.S. Gundry, supported the idea of a 
change.121 Acting with often displayed caution, however, the CA decided this was 
impractical, and instead these wishes culminated in the formation of the ‘China 
League’ a body which was to undertake the ‘steps’ that the CA would not. These were, 
specifically, to educate the wider public on Chinese questions through ‘popular 
addresses, pamphlets, etc.’ alongside which links would be forged to MPs. By 
combining these two methods, it was hoped that the British government might be 
persuaded to take a stronger position in diplomacy with China, especially in light of 
the current ongoing conflict, protecting existing treaty rights, and supporting a 
progressive Chinese government.122 The China League was to be a body open to a 
much wider membership than the CA, and this too contributed to the CA’s decision to 
stay separate from the body, fearing such expansion would alter the character of their 
annual dinners in a negative manner and render the committee less efficient due to 
increased size.123 1901 saw continued complaint, with the Shanghai and Hongkong 
branches accusing the CA of taking an overly cautious stance in various matters so as 
not to upset the Foreign Office.124 
By 1905, the situation had progressed. The Shanghai branch believed that since 
the signing of ‘the treaty of Shanghai’, and the increase of public interest in China in 
light of the ‘Manchurian question’, both the CA and the China League lacked impetus 
and clear aims.125 They therefore expressed the view that the aims of the two would 
be better served were they to re-amalgamate, with the CA taking up ‘the League’s 
policy of propagandism’ and requested that the London committee lay this proposal 
in front of the wider membership of the Association. Deciding that the CA was better 
served by continuing to act alone, the London Committee ignored this request. 
Although the Shanghai branch respected the committee’s decision, they 
became aggrieved when London refused to bring the question before the wider 
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membership. Such was the severity of the disagreement that while on leave in Britain 
two Shanghai committee members, John Otway Percy Bland and Charles John 
Dudgeon, took to discuss the matter with the London committee.126 In front of the 
General Committee they set out their grievances, namely the repeated ignorance of 
their proposals by London, as well as what they saw as an ineffective London 
committee more dedicated to its social arrangements than to applying political 
pressure. Alongside this Shanghai representative J.O.P Bland argued that, as a man 
currently and heavily involved in the China trade, London chairman William Keswick 
could not criticise the Foreign Office for fear of damaging his own firm’s (Jardine 
Matheson) prospects and should step down from the role. Were major changes not 
undertaken, they threatened, the Shanghai branch would be forced to split from the 
Association.127 
Pelcovits, in his earlier work on the CA, has framed this dispute as one based 
upon whether the CA would represent, in the future, purely metropole interests—large 
mercantile and shipping firms and banks—or those of the whole of the British 
community in China.128 Greater light is shed upon this matter—and the direction 
Shanghai wished London to pursue—by investigation into Shanghai’s representatives. 
Bland was the current secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, an expansionist 
imperialist and activist journalist, who believed the Shanghai Settlement and its 
council to be ‘the best British assets in the Yangtze Valley.’129 He was also unhappy 
that Keswick had recently pushed for French involvement in development of British 
Railway Concessions, an aim pursued through the joint HSBC and Jardine Matheson 
led BCC.130 Bland found an unexpected ally in Charles Addis of the HSBC, recently 
promoted to head of the London Branch and HSBC representative on the BCC board, 
who similarly disliked Keswick’s actions (as, too, did the Foreign Office). Seeing this 
temporary dispute of usual staunch CA allies Jardine Matheson and the HSBC, he may 
have been emboldened to push for the CA to remove Keswick, and seek leaders who 
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backed purely British schemes.131 These combined to give Bland three likely goals; 
protection of Shanghai based interests by Britain from Chinese interests, a more 
aggressive CA stance when dealing with the British government, and an end to co-
operation with other international interests.132 If Jardine Matheson domination within 
the CA could be broken by the removal of Keswick, and a more aggressive CA 
encouraged by a merger with the China League, Bland would have been pleased.  
Less clear are the motives of C.J. Dudgeon. As a founding member of the 
China league in 1900 he held the opinion that the CA should take a more forthright 
stance when applying political pressure.133  As head of Shanghai based firm Ilbert & 
Co.,  he too, as we shall see, wished to see greater representation of settler interests in 
the CA, with less control given to large, expatriate, multinational firms—although this 
was never stated publically in direct terms. 134 
Eventually, a Special General Meeting was called for 31 July 1905, at which 
the matter would be laid before the body of members. Although the record of the 
meeting is no longer held in the CA archives, Pelcovits notes that it failed to arouse 
much interest amongst the membership—attendance was at most around 18 per cent, 
and potentially lower—and the prevailing view of those that did attend backed the 
current direction of the CA in London and believed the personal attacks on William 
Keswick to be totally unjustified.135  
Ultimately, calling a SGM achieved little. However, London was not prepared 
to lose the Shanghai branch. The CA was, after all, a political pressure group, and the 
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132 J.O.P. Bland is a well known figure from the history of British interests in China. He began his career 
in the customs service, before becoming involved with the Shanghai Municipal Council and emerging 
as a defender of settler interests. He later undertook work for the BCC, under the leadership of William 
Keswick, the man he attacked in the episode recounted above. He is best remembered for his histories 
of China, written with Edmund Backhouse, which, ultimately, were discredited due to the use of forged 
documents. See Bickers, ‘Bland, John Otway Percy (1863–1945)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. 
133 “A China League” North China Herald. 
134 C.J. Dudgeon was head of the Shanghai firm Ilbert and co, see Arnold Wright, ed., Twentieth Century 
Impressions of Hong-Kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of China (London: Lloyd’s Greater 
Britain Publishing Company, Ltd., 1908), p.208. He had, notably, helped to negotiate the new 
commercial treaty following the Boxer Crisis, as Thomas Sutherland noted when speaking at the dinner 
of the CA in 1901. For a report of the function see Annual dinner, 11 November 1901, Minutes of the 
General Committee and Executive Committee, June 1901 – November 1906, CHAS/MCP/3. His 
official role in negotiations had been that of ‘assistant commissioner.’ See Edward Walford, Walford’s 
County Families of the United Kingdom, p.351. 
135 Pelcovits, Old China Hands, p.297 records that Fewer than 50 members attended. Extrapolating 
from the subscriptions the CA received for the year in absence of a membership list, the most accurate 
figure that can be given for membership of the London branch for the year is 267, giving a turnout of 
at most 18.73 per cent. 
 
 
119 
 
larger the size of the body, the greater the potential political influence. Faced with the 
continued threat of defection, the CA chose to make concessions. Chairman William 
Keswick resigned and was replaced, and the AGM took the decision to allow the 
matter to rest, with all pulling together for the good of the Association and its aims.136 
By 1907 The North China Herald could report that the CA had become more active 
in publically publishing reports and correspondence.137 In the end, this seems to have 
been enough to placate the branch alongside efforts to limit the terms of the Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman to ensure a wider selection of Association members’ views were 
heard—although Pelcovits also notes a re-organisation of the branch committee was 
encouraged by London to make it more compliant.138  
Although exact concessions agreed at the private meeting were not recorded, 
it is unlikely to be coincidental that only a few years later C.J. Dudgeon returned to 
London from China, and took up the post of chairman of the CA’s London committee. 
Although at the AGM it was noted he had retired from the trade and had therefore, 
supposedly, been elected due to the amount of time he could lend to leading the 
Association (one of Bland’s criticisms of Keswick) he still held his previous aims, as 
we shall see. Finally, it seemed, settler interests in Shanghai would gain the 
representation they sought from London, however this did not materialise. Even when 
holding the most powerful position in the CA, Dudgeon found his aims blocked. In 
1909 in a series of letters he lamented to Bland—who had since gained, and lost, 
employment working for the BCC—that he believed that the CA would still be best 
served by adopting ‘the policy of publicity pressure’ but could see ‘no possibility’ as 
to how to implement this.139 The CA did not have the money and regardless, he could 
not exercise a strong enough grasp over the Association’s direction anyway. He had, 
he told Bland, tried his utmost but was left to lament ‘Good God, my dear chap, what 
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is the use of attempting anything in the C.A. as long as the HSBC and JM and Co—
backed up by the FO in ‘things Chinese’—are the predominant partners’ (underlining 
in original text).140 
By this point the HSBC and Jardine Matheson (and the Foreign Office) once 
again found themselves co-operating to ensure British policy in China progressed 
smoothly. William Keswick may himself have felt rather aggrieved as British efforts 
moved towards international co-operation, as the HSBC and Charles Addis led an 
international consortium (including French interests) for the development of China.141 
The chance for Bland, Dudgeon and Shanghai to press their claims and split the CA’s 
key expatriate backers had passed. 
A final effort came early in 1910, when J.O.P. Bland attended the CA’s AGM 
and again put forward an amendment to urge ‘the adoption of greater activity and 
publicity by the Association.’ Although Dudgeon backed this from his position as 
chairman the amendment was rejected by the committee by ‘a small majority after 
considerable discussion.142 Fighting against the combined influence, it seems, that 
Jardine Matheson and the HSBC could muster amongst the committee, settler aims 
were once again blocked, and expatriate interests retained control. Adding insult to 
injury for Bland, the committee at the same meeting then elected William Keswick, 
the source of much of his original ire, to be president of the Association for the 
upcoming year.143 
That the two groups of settlers and expatriates continued to co-exist somewhat 
uneasily within the CA is shown in the diaries of HSBC head Charles Addis. He noted 
that while the speech he gave at the CA’s annual dinner of 1910 was largely ‘well 
received’, J.O.P Bland met his gaze ‘with a stony stare.’144  This must, of course, be 
placed in wider context of the dispute between the two—it was Addis who had given 
Bland employment with the BCC, and then removed him from his post.145 However 
that the two were present at the same social gathering underlines firstly that despite 
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their disagreements settler and expatriate interests had to at least make an effort to co-
operate within the CA, for the good of the British trade as a whole. Secondly, it hints 
at the importance of the CA’s social functions, with the two men both continuing to 
attend what was the only China dinner extant in Britain—this is discussed in much 
greater depth in chapter three. 
Indeed, further study in chapter three suggests that London did make some 
concessions in the years following 1905, and that Dudgeon’s feelings were perhaps an 
overreaction. The CA under Dudgeon’s leadership was certainly more aggressive 
when calling for Shanghai settlement extension. But it is clear that first, he did not 
achieve all he had hoped, and secondly, that normality resumed fairly quickly. Despite 
Frederick Anderson (also of Ilbert & Co., and previously chairman of the SMC) 
following Dudgeon as chairman by 1911 the role was held by George Jamieson.146 
Although he had been a founder of the China League, he was also a representative of 
the BCC, and potentially a candidate who would placate both sides. When the role 
then returned for seven years to F. Anderson in 1913, this was to ensure stability, and 
due to a lack of elections, during the war period. Immediately following this the role 
returned to Jardine Matheson and its subsidiaries. They would hold the chairmanship 
for 12 of the next 15 years, with multinational firm Dodwells serving in the short three-
year interregnum.147 
In the end, the settler revolt led from Shanghai in 1905 had failed for two 
reasons.  First, the CA London committee was in fact oligarchic. It represented the 
largest British interests in China, who chose co-operation with the Foreign Office over 
conflict. Outsiders such as Bland and Dudgeon could not challenge this alone, and 
would have required the support of a great deal of the wider membership. Secondly, 
for the large majority of members in London this oligarchy was not a problem. They 
did not attend AGM’s or SGM’s, did not vote for their officers and, simply, they did 
not care for politics.  As discussed in chapter three they in fact joined for the social 
gatherings that had, in 1905, been one of Shanghai’s grievances, and had little time 
for complaints regarding the direction and operation of the CA beyond these events.  
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1905, however, was not to be the only occasion on which these interests 
clashed within the CA. Methods continued to be questioned by Shanghai, with The 
North China Herald referring to the CA in London in 1918 as ‘a little too cautiously 
diplomatic’.148 Disputes resurfaced more prominently when British interests as a 
whole in China realigned in the aftermath of the of the events of 30 May 1925, and 
settler and expatriate groups once again clashed—though this time in private—
regarding the direction of the CA. 
By 1930, A.W. Burkill notified the London Committee that the branch was 
‘discouraged at the frequency with which their representations were over ruled’, yet 
the only suggestion to alleviate this was to pass Shanghai’s views to the Foreign Office 
‘though not necessarily with London’s support’, something commonly undertaken 
anyway both before and after this appeal.149  As the decade continued, matters did not 
improve. Soon after Shanghai came to believe that the London committee had, once 
again, become out of touch with the needs of the British community in China. With 
Chinese nationalism growing, and the British government moving to remove unequal 
treaties and extraterritoriality and normalise diplomacy, they called for changes to be 
made to the committee. They hoped for inclusion of a greater number of men recently 
retired from Shanghai, better able to represent their current interests and to oppose this 
change of policy. 
Unfortunately for the Shanghai branch they had misjudged to mood of the CA 
in London, who were in fact supportive of the government’s stance. Reminiscent of 
1905 the London committee all but ignored this request, and instead made superficial 
compromises to retain the support of settler interests, while continuing to offer the 
majority of the CA’s support to the government’s aims. The CA secretary contacted 
S.F. Mayers of the BCC privately, and the two agreed to undertake a reorganisation of 
the committee—on their own terms—in collaboration with the Swire Group. Agreeing 
that ‘the most important business organizations in China have their Head Offices in 
the United Kingdom or Hongkong’ they decided the CA should back these firms, who 
were ‘opposed to any policy liable to involve this country in trouble with China of the 
nature experienced in 1925-26’ instead of ‘local interests [who] regard themselves as 
being on the defensive, and are opposed to changes liable to weaken what may be 
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described as their residential status.’150 A decision was taken to bring more active men 
into the committee, but to ensure they represented these expatriate, multinational 
interests, who both aligned with British government policy and besides provided the 
CA with the majority of its funding. In order to ensure that settler interests were 
somewhat placated, they were to be backed in the matter of the ‘district court question’ 
as this was seen as a matter which was not particularly inflammatory.151 Once again, 
the major firms behind the CA were able to exercise control, and offered enough 
compromise to placate the Shanghai branch, and ensure a split in the Association was 
avoided. 
Control continued to rest with a combination of the Swire Group and Jardine 
Matheson interests 15 years later. When determining a response to the Shameen 
riots—a Chinese crowd having wrecked the British consulate, alongside Swires’ and 
Reuters’ offices—the secretary of the CA drafted a letter to be sent to the Foreign 
Office. This was then forwarded to W.J. Keswick of Matheson and Co. and Sir John 
R. Masson of Swires. Both offered comments and the CA secretary produced a 
‘composite edition’ to be sent to the British authorities.152 It seems that by this late 
date of 1948, these two interests—the Swire and Jardine Matheson Group—were on 
occasion even bypassing the committee structure of the CA. 
Ultimately, these disputes raise several key points about the CA which 
establish clearly that the Association was an oligarchic body, which represented the 
interests of ‘Gentlemanly Capitalists’ and expatriate firms. Periphery settler interests 
sought to influence the London committee to attain a voice at the metropole, but they 
failed. In this way, the wider transnational network that the CA embodied was closely 
controlled by the body’s Associational structure. For the wider membership in London 
this oligarchy was not a problem. In a sense, indeed, the London membership were, 
themselves, two disparate bodies of membership. Those still linked to China Politics 
and commerce, the gentlemanly capitalists who directed the Association, and those 
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who joined only for social functions. That the committee would claim publicly to 
represent the will of these men who paid no attention to politics seems not to have 
bothered them in the least. How this predisposition for big business interests to control 
the CA affected its political and commercial aims is investigated in the next chapter, 
as are the Association’s efforts to provide the social functions required to ensure that 
the wider, British-based, membership who cared little for China politics and 
commerce felt they were receiving value for their subscriptions. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide that background knowledge key to understanding 
the operations of the CA by examining its set-up and membership. We can see from 
both the background of the original individual membership, makeup of committees 
and from the donations provided by corporate members that the CA was an oligarchic 
body, which represented the interests of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ and expatriate firms. 
These interests could be challenged by periphery, or settler, interests through the wider 
network provided by the CA’s branch structure, but branches quickly found that the 
CA was a subscriber democracy in name alone, being reduced to, at best, superficial 
control and minor input on the direction of the Association. This predisposition for big 
business interests to control the CA affected a large proportion of the Association’s 
subsequent aims and objectives, and will be a subject throughout the remainder of the 
thesis.  
Ultimately, however, the CA needed to retain its periphery links if it was to be 
a body that appeared truly representative of the British community in China, and we 
shall see further benefits that the Association’s branch structure brought in the 
following chapters. To this end, the headquarters and branches settled their 
differences—at least to the extent required to co-exist in the CA. Beyond this 
distinction of metropole and periphery however, the CA saw a further split between 
those who had returned from East Asia and retired and those who had returned to 
active employment and filled the Association’s committees. These men were also 
required by the Association if it was to generate an appearance of a widely 
representative body, and, with little interest in politics, symptomatic, as we shall see, 
of a wider loss of links to networks involving East Asia, the Association had to offer 
them a reason to continue their membership. This came in the form of social functions, 
and these too are discussed in the following chapter.  
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In that sense the CA was successful in generating an image of a body that was 
inclusive of the whole of the British presence resident in China—excluding, of course, 
the Women and Eurasians that we would not expect to be present in the membership 
due to wider trends.  But this was indeed only an image. In reality the London 
committee was controlled for the whole of the period under study by the interests of a 
narrow consortium of multinational firms from the realms of trading, finance and 
shipping.  The following two chapters will discuss the CA’s three main objects; 
sociability, political involvement, and charity and benevolence, and show how these 
were all exploited for the promotion of expatriate, multinational business based in 
London or Hongkong.  
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICS, SOCIABILITY, AND NETWORKS 
 
‘The peculiarity of the China Association is, though we work very hard, as our reports 
will testify, I think we also all love a dinner.’1 This was how, at a 1906 dinner given 
in honour of Duke Tsai Tze, CA founder Alfred Dent outlined the Association’s 
commitment to holding social gatherings, whilst also pursuing its other objects 
through ‘hard work’. The need for Dent to make such a statement only a year after the 
Shanghai branch had insisted ‘the social side of our Association’s work [should] be 
subordinated to the active promotion’ of British interests in China as part of its 
complaints that led to its 1905 revolt, is perhaps understandable.2 Dent was offering 
an olive branch to Shanghai, to ensure the Association could once again function 
smoothly. 
To view the social gatherings of the Association as something that occurred in 
isolation from its other aims, as both Dent and the representative of the Shanghai 
branch had, however, would be to ignore their wider potential importance. Dent’s 
statement was in itself political, if only dealing with the limited scope of the internal 
politics of the Association. Indeed, these two objects of the CA were often co-
dependent, with social events a political tool for the Association—albeit one that can 
be hard to discern as such given much of the focus were conversations hidden from 
the record. Still, it is critical to explore social events as key opportunities to exert 
political influence and allow networking. Before this can be investigated, however, it 
is necessary to first outline the form these social gatherings took, and how they 
changed throughout the period under consideration. This chapter will then focus upon 
the social benefits of these gatherings, and then how they were exploited for political 
means. Finally, it will look at some of the other methods the CA utilised to attempt to 
attain its political goals.  
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2 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 12 July 1905, Minutes of the General Committee and 
Executive Committee, June 1901 – November 1906, CHAS/MCP/3. 
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The China Association’s social gatherings 
The social functions hosted by the CA can be divided into four categories. Originally, 
the Association sought to host annual formal dinners, to which members and guests 
were invited. Alongside this, a second type of formal dinner was inaugurated in 1896 
to host a prominent individual connected to East Asia who would attend as a guest of 
honour. Later, the Association added to these events a more informal reception open 
to a wider range of members, guests and ladies, and finally, towards the end of the 
period covered here, small luncheons were held to allow members of the committee 
to meet with prominent individuals connected to East Asia. These dinners, receptions 
and luncheons had their own specific nuances and history, and are discussed 
individually. 
 
Formal Dinners 
Of the CA’s social events, the longest running—though not necessarily the best 
attended—were the series of formal dinners held at least once a year from the 
Association’s inception in 1889 to 1913, when they were interrupted by the First 
World War, to then be held again from 1919 to 1938, except in the years of 1931 and 
1937.3 They were then again interrupted by war, with only one further dinner held, in 
1952, in the period under consideration. These dinners consisted, as noted, of two 
types of events: annual dinners and dinners held in honour of men with prominent 
links to Asia. Both followed, however, the same structure and, in form, were almost 
indistinguishable, and are thus grouped together for analysis. 
Attendance at these events was a source of pride for the CA and from its first 
annual dinner held in 1890, which saw 96 guests attend, numbers grew rapidly with 
between 220 and 278 guests at the annual dinners between 1899 and 1912. Although 
numbers were recorded with less frequency after the First World War, the popularity 
                                                          
3 The CA seem to have had little enthusiasm for a dinner in 1937. Although a room was reserved at 
Grosvenor house and a date fixed by September, the Association was behind schedule with all other 
preparations. The committee was split as to whether it was ‘desirable’ to hold a dinner ‘in the 
circumstances occasioned by the conflict between China and Japan’ and ultimately no function was 
held. Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 22 September 1937, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, December 1929 – September 1937, CHAS/MCP/7. Whether 
dinners was held for the other years mentioned has been ascertained using the Associations annual 
reports. 
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of this function remained consistent, with attendance never dropping below 180.4 
Lower attendance was recorded at dinners given to prominent individuals, the reasons 
for which are discussed later. 
The format of the dinners saw the evening divided into two distinct parts. The 
first included a series of toasts given and speeches made, similar to other formal 
dinners. Though a standard of formal dinners, such toasts nonetheless served to 
reinforce the identity of Associations and gatherings, and even display particular 
loyalties.5 For the CA they began with the ‘loyal toasts’ to the current monarch and 
royal family, followed by toasts to the armed forces—a group to whom China residents 
felt a particular affinity—and if present, to the guest of honour. These toasts were 
responded to by those best qualified for the purpose—often an admiral for the armed 
forces, for example, and on one occasion by HRH Prince George for the royal 
family—with the responder usually giving a speech outlining his views on the current 
status of China, its politics and development, and the current position of the British 
government.6 A toast of ‘prosperity to the China Association’ came next, responded 
to by a prominent member of the body who would outline the Association’s activities 
                                                          
4 These numbers are drawn from various locations within the China Association collection, SOAS. In 
some cases, minute books of the Association contain dinner reports cut from the London and China 
Telegraph which mention attendance, in other dinner attendance figures are raised in the minutes, or 
simply recorded by the Association. Other numbers are drawn from the annual reports of the 
Association, which later also carried reproductions of press coverage of the dinners. Although 
attendance numbers never dropped below 180, worries of the Committee regarding attendance surfaced 
in 1935, as attendance had reduced from earlier functions. Several suggestions as to why this was were 
considered, including that ‘older members were dropping out and the younger men were not interested.’ 
When compared to the popularity of the more informal Association receptions which started around 
this time, discussed below, it seems plausible that this reduction was indeed linked to changing tastes 
in social function amongst the members of the Association. See Minutes of a meeting of the General 
Committee, 10 December 1935, Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committee, 
December 1929 – September 1937, CHAS/MCP/7.  
5 For a discussion of this occurring amongst early 19th C. radicals and loyalists see James Epstein, 
‘Radical Dining, Toasting and Symbolic Expression in Early Nineteenth-Century Lancashire: Rituals 
of Solidarity’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 20, 2 (Summer 1988), 
pp.271-91. 
6 HRH Prince George’s attendance at the 1929 dinner marked the only occasion on which the China 
Association entertained royalty. He responded to the toast for the royal family, before proposing the 
toast to the China Association. His own connection to China, he admitted, was only two years spent 
serving on HMS Hawkins in Chinese waters between 1925 and 1927. However, as he himself remarked, 
the dinner also provided him a useful opportunity to fulfil a ‘desire to become better acquainted with 
the origin and distribution of trade which goes to enrich the Empire, and to make the acquaintance of 
men who shoulder heavy responsibilities, which in good and evil times, are necessary to keep our ship 
of commerce afloat.’ See the annual report for 1929-30, appendix, available at Annual Reports, 1928-
34, CHAS/A/09, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
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and views on key matters from the previous year.7 Finally, toasts were made to the 
other guests attending and to the officers of the Association.  
Although the speeches remained largely serious in content there was scope for 
deviation to make the evening more humanised. A sense of community was certainly 
displayed—and likely reinforced by the sharing of memory—when remembrance was 
paid to recently deceased friends from East Asia. ‘Corney’ Thorne and ‘Bob’ Little 
were fondly remembered, through the use of these distinctly informal terms in 1906.8 
The following year saw the speaker reminisce of ‘Johnny Dodd, pioneer of the tea 
trade in Formosa, and joint hero… in rescuing the wrecked crew of the Adéle at 
Kelung’, ‘John Walter… with whom I remember crossing from Nagasaki to Shanghai 
more than 40 years ago’, and, retaining his formal title, ‘Sir Thomas Hanbury, with 
whom I remember walking to Honkew to select a site for a school which now bears 
his name.’9 The ability of the speaker to draw on so many nicknames and recall 
personal reminiscences for so many of these men attests to the closeness of many of 
the British community in East Asia in the nineteenth century.  
Perhaps also indicative of a sense of community, the humour that often found 
its way into speeches and was usually self-deprecating of the British presence in 
China, and critically aware of some of their own weaknesses. Former Consul Byron 
Brenan on two separate occasions lamented the lack of British knowledge of the 
                                                          
7 Focusing again upon the 1929 dinner, Stanley H. Dodwell responded to the toast proposed by HRH 
Prince George. Having praised the prince for his willingness to attend, Dodwell then covered a wide 
range of topics. He assured members that the Association continued to promote trade and keep links to 
East Asia, through ‘vast numbers of telegrams’, ‘committee meetings’ and ‘personal interviews’, 
alongside its social events. He then gave his opinion of the current political situation in China: That the 
Nationalist government were attempting to unify the country, but meeting significant resistance, which 
He lamented disrupted trade for ‘us poor merchants.’ Furthermore, he criticised that the lack of foresight 
of manufacturers—who built machines that would last ten years, but would be out of date 
technologically in five—making the job of distributors such as himself difficult. He closed the economic 
section of his speech on an optimistic note, however: He believed a country the size of China, with 
‘400,000,000 industrious people’ could not fail to be ‘one of the best, if not the best, prospects for the 
solution of our unemployment and post war problems.’ He ended on a political note, encouraging 
members of the Foreign Office (of which there were several present) to go themselves to China, and 
experience the state of British trade first hand. See the annual report for 1929-30, appendix, available 
at Annual Reports, 1928-34, CHAS/A/09. 
8 See the annual report for 1906-07, appendix p.56, available at Annual Reports, 1906-10, CHAS/A/05. 
‘Corney’ Thorne was, presumably, Cornelius, head of Thorne. Brothers & Co. of Shanghai. See Richard 
J. Smith, Robert Hart and China’s Early Modernization: His Journals, 1863-1866 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), p.433, note 76. Robert ‘Bob’ Little was editor for the North China 
Daily News and Herald, served as chairman of the SMC for which he oversaw the construction of a 
new waterworks, and led an electric lighting company in Shanghai. A prominent member of Shanghai 
society, he was also known as ‘Uncle Bob’, and ‘famous for knowing everyone and never having a 
harsh word said about him’, see French, Through the Looking Glass, p.58. 
9 Annual report for 1907-08, appendix p.97, available at Annual Reports, 1906-10, CHAS/A/05. 
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Chinese language by repeating a story of a CA member forced to draw on a wall to 
order breakfast—he drew, and received, a chicken, despite in actual fact wanting an 
egg.10 The assembled guests were similarly amused at their own expense when told in 
1908, that had Japanese customs been followed on the evening, attendance to the 
dinner would have seen ‘the warriors come first, the agriculturalists second, and down 
away below stairs I think, some-where out by the back door… the merchants and 
traders.’11 Guests from outside of the CA also saw jokes made at their expense, with 
the Vice-Governor of the Bank of Japan referred to as the man ‘who is going to take 
away six-millions of our hard earned money. (laughter.)’12 
Laughter and enjoyment on these occasions, was, of course, stimulated by the 
quality of the food and drinks (namely alcohol) available. Food, at the Association’s 
dinner of 1905, consisted of a seven course meal, with numerous options available for 
each. Beverages began with a dry sherry, followed by Liebfraumilch, Charles 
Heidseck 1893, Moët and Chandon 1898, Liqueurs, Château Talbot 1890, and finally, 
Martinez’s port. It was this alcoholic consumption, perhaps, which saw “for he’s a 
jolly good fellow’ being cordially given with the accompanying three cheers and a 
vigorous tiger” to the final speaker of the evening.13  
It is worthwhile to briefly note here that there was little about these dinners, in 
terms of décor or menu choices, to demonstrate the links of the Association to China 
in the way that a contemporary Burns dinner, for example, would have displayed 
Scottish symbols, or served a Scottish menu. With the British inhabitants in East Asia 
always conscious of the need for separation from the Chinese population few would 
have engaged with Chinese culture, or eaten Chinese food.14 As such, the CA 
gatherings saw the rooms used decorated in a typical British style, and saw western 
                                                          
10 Byron Brenan told this story in 1901 and again in 1922. For the full recollection, see chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
11 Annual report for 1908-09, appendix p.153, available at Annual Reports, 1906-10, CHAS/A/05. 
12 Annual report for 1904-05, appendix p.101, available at Annual Reports, 1903-07, CHAS/A/04. The 
speaker was likely referring to the ongoing ‘House Tax’ dispute, in which Japan sought to impose taxes 
on foreign owned buildings placed upon land which, under unequal treaties, had been ceded in 
perpetuity to Western nations. The disagreement centred upon whether it was only the land which had 
been ceded, and could therefore not be taxed, and whether this tax exempt status applied also to 
buildings upon it. See Douglas Howland, ‘The Japan House Tax Case, 1899-1905: Leases in Perpetuity 
and the Myth of International Equality’, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht, 75 (2015), pp.413-434. 
13 The dinner menu is to be found in Invitations, Programmes, menus and guest lists for meetings, 
dinners and other functions, PP MS 14/011/303, Papers of Sir Charles Stewart Addis, SOAS Library, 
University of London. The response given to the final speaker is recorded in the annual report of the 
Association for 1905, available at Annual Reports, 1903-07, CHAS/A/04. 
14 Bickers, 'Shanghailanders and Others’, p.280. 
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food served. This was true even when Chinese dignitaries were dined, as the journalist 
writing anonymously as ‘the party on the spot’ for Fun noted rather crassly after 
attending an 1896 dinner given to Li Hongzhang 
Though dining with Li Hung Chang 
(And several swells beside) 
Is (using most high-class slang) 
A “function” to fill with pride. 
My Spirits began to droop, 
And set me to heaving sighs, 
When they offered no bird’s nest soup, 
And proffered no puppy-dog pies.15 
Instead, another aspect of their shared experience of China was invoked by speakers 
to remind them of the ties they had forged with one another. Frequent references were 
made to the famous hospitality of the East, which was seen as ‘a legacy… from the 
old princely houses...and we who have lived for many years so very far from our own 
country have always done what we could to keep the lamp of good fellowship and 
welcome to our visitors burning brightly.’16 On the one night a year when they 
gathered as a whole, the CA gained the opportunity to strengthen ties between its 
members, for business reasons or otherwise, by reminding members of these shared 
experiences and values, emphasising that although they were no longer a small British 
presence in a foreign land, shared hospitality and goodwill were still vital for the 
continuing China trade. 
Following the conclusion of the formal part of the evening, members 
proceeded to an adjoining room for a more informal social gathering. At the London 
dinners this conversation seems to have focussed strongly upon reminiscence of lives 
and time in China, and will be discussed briefly below in order to discuss the role it 
could play in alleviating the pressures of a ‘difficult return’ to Britain for these men. 
Also discussed below is how this period of the evening could also prove valuable in 
allowing the creation of networks for business or political reasons, though with 
conversations naturally not recorded, this cannot be proved conclusively. Beyond this, 
a record of the Yokohama dinner of 1901 offers some flavour of the entertainment the 
                                                          
15 “Fun Week by Week.” Fun (London, England), 18 August 1896.  
16 Annual report for 1908, p.153, available at Annual Reports, 1906-10, CHAS/A/05. 
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Association members could create for themselves.17 On this occasion, members Mr. 
Brady and Dr. Wheeler sung ‘the grass widower’ and ‘the farmer’s boy’, before the 
evening closed with the Chairman singing ‘that well known nautical ditty’, ‘With a 
Yo, Heave oh’, although the lack of a Piano at the venue was much lamented.18  
 
Receptions 
The idea of a reception was first brought to the attention of the committee in 1925 and 
was proposed to be held on an evening, sometime during the spring. The motivation 
was the ‘desire of quite a number of members’ for a function ‘to which ladies might 
be invited’, with members perhaps feeling the Association’s current policy of 
excluding women from the annual dinner was stunting its potential for social 
gatherings.19 With only one committee member opposing such a function a sub-
committee was created to examine its viability. By the following year the 
Association’s reception had been inaugurated, held at the Hotel Victoria and was 
‘largely attended.’20 From this point onwards, the reception was hosted consistently, 
except when disrupted by wider events, most notably the Second World War, 
following which it became the CA’s primary social function.21 
In contrast to the Association’s annual and official dinners these receptions 
were distinctly informal. A sit-down supper was considered, but rejected in favour of 
                                                          
17 Turning again to the 1929 annual dinner, HRH Prince George noted that he was ‘Glad to feel that I 
am present on an occasion when friends meet—(applause)—who may have been separated for years, 
and that this dinner is an occasion when all can indulge in interesting talk and probably in reminiscences, 
to some of which I should certainly rather listen than to the formal speeches which remain the custom 
at a reunion. (Laughter and applause).’ See the annual report for 1929-30, appendix, available at Annual 
Reports, 1928-34, CHAS/A/09. 
18 Annual report for 1901-02, Appendix p.65, available at Annual Reports, 1898-03, CHAS/A/03. 
19 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 17 February 1925, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, July 1922 – October 1929, CHAS/MCP/6. Other Associations 
undertook similar events to allow female participation, for example the (considerably earlier) St. 
Georges society of Montreal, which in 1848 organised a ‘charity ball’ to which men, women and 
families could attend. This was done specifically to alleviate the financial difficulties of the Society, 
however, and there is no evidence to suggest this was the case for the CA. Both, however, were 
organised specifically so as not to impede in any way on the all male formal dinners of the bodies, 
showing perhaps how little had changed regarding gender attitudes—at least those related to formal 
dinners—in the intervening 77 years. See Lietch, ‘The Importance of Being English’, p.115. 
20 Annual report for 1926-27, p.xxi, available at Annual Reports, 1924-28, CHAS/A/08. 
21 The reception is recorded as having been held from 1925 until 1939. Post World War Two the 
reception was reinstated in 1948, and continued until the end of the period under consideration, 1955, 
excepting 1951. The annual dinner of the Association was only held once in this post war period, in 
1952, and attracted 200 attendees in comparison to the 400 attracted by the reception in the same year. 
See the annual report for 1952, p.4, available at Annual Reports, 1942-53, CHAS/A/10A, China 
Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
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a buffet ‘less elaborate in character’ in 1930.22 A circular sent to members advertised 
tickets at 12s.6d each which included buffet refreshments and red or white wine, with 
dancing to take place between 9pm and midnight.’23 Expenditure reports also attest to 
a spending of £17.6s.0d on a ‘band and toastmaster’ by 1936. 24  Following the Second 
World War, the function was revived and was held at the earlier time of 6pm-8pm. 
The ticket price of 10s included sherry, soft drinks, wine and ‘small chow’, with other 
refreshments available for cash, while dress remained informal.25 
In terms of popularity, these receptions were a successful undertaking. 
Reflecting on the first reception held the committee noted that although few members 
had actually applied for tickets, when their guests—friends and ladies—were added, 
the total attendance was considered large.26 With the receptions that followed making 
no substantial losses for the Association the committee was happy to continue them.27 
Other receptions were either ‘largely attended’ in 1927, attended by a ‘large number 
of members and their guests’ in 1928, saw attendance ‘well up to average’ in 1934, 
and attracted 218 guests in 1937.28 A drop in attendance was noted in 1939, perhaps 
due to the Sino-Japanese war, and plans were made to alter the function to an afternoon 
cocktail party in 1940, although in light of the Second World War, both these plans 
and the reception were eventually abandoned. 29 
                                                          
22 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 16 April 1930, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, December 1929 – September 1937, CHAS/MCP/7. 
23 H.C. Wilcox, Joint Secretary, to all members of the China Association, 20 May 1930, General 
Committee Papers, February 1930 – July 1931, CHAS/MCP/36, China Association Collection, SOAS 
Library, University of London. 
24 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 17 June 1936, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, December 1929 – September 1937, CHAS/MCP/7. 
25 G.E. Mitchell, Secretary and Vice-chairman, to all members of the China Association, 20 March, 
1953, Minutes and Circulars of the General Committee and Executive Committee, 1953, 
CHAS/MCP/50C, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
26 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 29 January 1931, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, December 1929 – September 1937, CHAS/MCP/7. 
27 Ibid. 
28 For the 1937 reception see Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 15 July 1937, Minutes 
of the General Committee and Executive Committee, December 1929 – September 1937, 
CHAS/MCP/7. All other mentions of the solid attendance of the function are drawn from the annual 
reports of the Association, see Annual Reports, 1924-28, CHAS/A/08 and Annual Reports, 1928-34, 
CHAS/A/09. 
29 See Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 10 April 1940, Minutes of the General 
Committee, November 1937 - December 1945, & Minutes of the Executive Committee, March 1943 - 
December 1945, CHAS/MCP/8, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London; 
and E.M. Gull, secretary, to the General Committee, 29 April 1940, General Committee Circulars, June 
1939 - November 1940, CHAS/MCP/43, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of 
London. 
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With the Association’s annual dinner only hosted once after the Second World 
War, the reception took on a much more prominent role, becoming the only social 
gathering open to the wider CA membership, wives, and friends. Upon its resumption 
in 1948 applications for tickets immediately outnumbered the police regulations for 
the venue of an ‘absolute limit of 400 people.’30 Further receptions in 1952, 1953, 
1954 and 1955 again saw the attendance reach this maximum limit. 31 In all likelihood 
this represented the simple growth in numbers of returnees that occurred in this period. 
There were 6,000 Britons in Shanghai in 1937, 4,500 in 1948, and only 1,850 by 1950. 
By January 1951 there were 1,311, and by October of the same year only 697.32 
Though they would move all around the world seeking new employment, this cannot 
have failed to boost numbers of returnees in Britain considerably.33 Perhaps the growth 
of this function though, too, represents a slight change in the character of the CA’s 
wider membership, and of the British returnee community. Those settlers forced to 
return to Britain following their displacement by the Sino-Japanese War, Second 
World War and subsequent rise of the PRC government would, after all, have forfeited 
any property or small investments in China on their return and therefore have had no 
need for the parts of formal dinners which always served some political function.34 
Those who retained active commercial links to China needed a replacement social 
gathering for these formal dinners in which to pursue politics, however, and this took 
the form of luncheons. 
 
Luncheons 
The final type of social events to be considered were the efforts of the CA to entertain 
prominent men connected to East Asia by providing a luncheon or small dinner 
gathering which they, and Association committee members, would attend. Although 
one luncheon was held in 1925 it was not typical of the later CA events, which only 
                                                          
30 G.E. Mitchell, Secretary and Vice-chairman, to all members of the China Association, 25 April 1949, 
Minutes and Circulars of the General Committee and Executive Committee, 1949, CHAS/MCP/49, 
China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
31 See the annual reports for these years, available at Annual Reports, 1942-53, CHAS/A/10A and 
Annual Reports, CHAS/A/11, 1953-57. 
32 Bickers, Britain in China, pp.236-242. 
33 Bickers, Britain in China, Chapter six contains numerous examples of the careers they sought in other 
imperial settings, with varying success. 
34 Bickers, Britain in China, pp.234-8. 
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became regular during the Second World War.35 Indeed, between 1939 and 1947 these 
were the only ‘entertainments’ of any kind hosted by the CA.36 Between these dates 
the Chinese Ambassador was entertained three times by an Association committee, 
with other luncheons given to Dr Yulin Hsi and a Chinese ‘Goodwill Mission’ in 1943, 
the Governor of Hongkong in 1945, and again in 1947, and a trade mission to China 
in 1946.37 Unable to host these men at large scale gatherings as they had in the past 
due to the ongoing war hostilities, these luncheons became a valuable political channel 
for the Association to express its views. 
As such, in 1946, a decision was made to split the Association’s entertainment 
into two distinct types. Aware of the importance of opportunities to meet and network 
with prominent individuals, and thus far still unable to restore the formal dinners of 
the Association in post-war Britain, the small luncheons were to be held for political 
means, with the Association’s receptions providing a social gathering.38 Between 1948 
and 1955, a further 21 events were hosted to entertain prominent British and Chinese 
officials and some insight into the form the political discussion took at these gatherings 
is given below. Guests to the 1947 function, hosted at the Savoy Hotel, included the 
Chinese ambassador alongside representatives of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, 
Board of Trade, Treasury and Ministry of Transport.39 
 
Encouraging sociability and countering the ‘difficult return’ 
Before examining in detail the political potential of the CA’s gatherings, however, let 
us first turn to the important social role they played. Recent scholarship has made 
much of the concept of a ‘difficult return’ for those coming back to Britain from 
imperial frontiers. Ideas of a loss of status and importance, combined with a lack of 
                                                          
35 The 1925 luncheon, held at the hotel Victoria, was to lunch the British delegates to an upcoming tariff 
conference. Unlike the small affairs that were later luncheons, some 132 members and guests attended 
alongside the five delegates, with the major speech given by the secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, 
Sir Austen Chamberlain. See the annual report for 1925-6, appendix pp.6-14, available at Annual 
Reports, 1924-28, CHAS/A/08. Sir Austen Chamberlains speech is also available in Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, Peace in our Time: Addresses on Europe and the Empire (Glasgow: The University Press, 
1928), pp.243-54. 
36 Information drawn from the annual reports of the China Association, 1939 - 1947, available at Annual 
Reports, 1935-42, CHAS/A/10, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London 
and Annual Reports, 1942-53, CHAS/A/10A. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Circular to the General Committee, 27 November 1946, Minutes and Circulars of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, 1946, CHAS/MCP/46. 
39 G.E. Mitchell to members of the General Committee, 24 January 1947, China Association Bulletins 
and Circulars, JSS/11/5/2/1/, John Swire & Sons Ltd. Archive. 
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interest from those back in Britain for tales of imperial frontiers, often left returnees 
finding it difficult to readjust to life at home. Friendships were most easily found 
amongst those who had shared similar overseas experiences.40 Against this 
background, the CA’s social functions had the potential to form a major part of the 
social calendar for what was, in Britain, a proportionally small number of returnees 
from Asia.41 And indeed, as the points below attest, we find that this was the case. 
Many members attended for purely social, rather than political reasons—further 
evidence that the CA may itself be best regarded as containing two types of members: 
the active men with current links to China who formed the committees, and those who 
no longer held direct links to China, and joined simply for social reasons.  
That the social components of these dinners should in no way be second to 
their potential political importance is shown by the early efforts undertaken by the 
Association to ensure that as many members as possible could attend. Originally, the 
annual dinners were held in February or March.42 However, this proved problematic 
for members who ‘were in the habit of going abroad for the winter’, and one member 
even tendered his resignation as a result, the dinner having been the only reason he 
subscribed to the CA in the first place.43 Such problems may seem somewhat insincere, 
but they held a serious grounding. Referring to the change the North China Herald 
praised the move, with ‘the physical delicacy—which, however, they effectually 
conceal from the ordinary observer—of all old China hands making it dangerous for 
them to be in London in the winter.’ To accommodate such concerns the Association 
decided to alter the date of the annual dinner to the Autumn in 1896—though not 
without first holding a dinner in the winter of 1895, too, such was the ‘addiction to 
conviviality’ of the old China hands which the reporter perceptively noted ‘the 
hypothetical breakdown of their constitutions may possibly be partly due’.44 
                                                          
40 Buettner, '“We Don’t Grow Coffee and Bananas in Clapham Junction You Know”’, pp. 302-328. 
41 Determining how many returnees came back to Britain from China is a difficult task, beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, the total number of British residents in China (excluding Hongkong) was 
10,140 by 1910, peaking at 15,247 in 1925, see Bickers, Britain in China, p.13. The 1931 census for 
Hongkong records some 6,636 ‘Europeans’ who were British subjects, see Frank Welsh, A History of 
Hongkong (London: Harper Collins, Revised Edition, 1997), p.437. Overall, the total British population 
on the China Coast and Hongkong seems to have little exceeded 20,000 at any one time in the period 
under consideration.  
42 For example, see The Dinner, 5 March 1890, Minutes of the General Committee and Executive 
Committees, April 1889 – March 1897, CHAS/MCP/1. 
43 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 13 December 1894, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committees, April 1889 – March 1897, CHAS/MCP/1. 
44 “The China Dinner” North China Herald (Shanghai, China), 20 December 1895, pp.10-11. 
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Regardless of the reasons behind it, physical infirmity caused by time spent in East 
Asia could, too, add to a ‘difficult return.’ 
 While we have seen from our investigation into the original membership that 
some members of the CA returned to Britain with considerable wealth, this was not 
true for the wider majority of membership as it expanded beyond the original key 
founding members. Great importance was therefore placed by the CA committees in 
ensuring that those men only interested in the Association for social reasons were not 
forced out of the body for financial reasons. By 1900, the annual dinner of the 
Association was losing around £60 per year, due to both the number of official guests 
invited and other rising costs. A suggestion to increase ticket prices for the average 
member was, however, quickly rejected. It was agreed that many of the CA members 
‘were not wealthy’ and that they made no use of the commercial and political side of 
the Association, with their attendance to the dinner the only benefit they gained from 
their yearly subscription.45  
Similarly, a motion by the committee to hold no annual dinner in 1907—having 
held an official dinner in May of that year—was met with great opposition from R.S. 
Gundry. Objecting to the proposal he noted that 
The ordinary member didn’t care about official dinners and didn’t come 
to them. He [the ordinary member] looked on them as official manoeuvres 
that didn’t concern him. The proof was that only 66 members came to the 
dinner we gave the Chinese Commissioner, last year, and only 71 to the 
[Sir Frederick] Lugard dinner; whereas 155 members attended the annual 
dinner in the autumn. The ordinary member who lived all over the country 
reserved himself for the annual Dinners, which he would expect this year 
as usual in November.46 
 
On reflection, the committee agreed with Gundry’s view, and the dinner was 
reinstated. Furthermore, in response to the ‘growing discontent prevalent among a 
considerable section of members’ the length of speeches, and number of toasts, were 
to be limited at the reinstated function. After all, as the Chairman noted, ‘the average 
member… came to the dinner to meet old friends and not to listen to the eloquence of 
the speakers.’47 As 1905 had already seen the toast list, and related speeches to the 
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imperial forces and the crown, omitted ‘in order to allow more time for social 
intercourse after the dinner’, a format which continued into 1906, when the London 
and China Telegraph reported ‘there was the usual toast list, which was not too long 
to permit of that social reunion afterwards which has always been a feature of the 
China Dinner’, allowing a ‘prolonged’ informal gathering afterwards, a further 
shortening of the official section of the dinner only emphasises the importance of this 
aim.48 Inclusivity was certainly one key aim when organizing the CA’s social 
functions. Again, we may speculate that this was to ensure retention of a large 
membership, an attribute which can contribute substantially to the power of a political 
pressure group—even if this wider membership cared little for politics itself.  
Ultimately, for many members, meeting old friends was the most important 
aspect of their membership to the CA, and their attendance at social functions. This 
would be less possible during the formal dinner, where members could only converse 
with those sat in their close proximity. However, as Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, patterns 
do emerge from the seating plan of an 1890 dinner that suggest seating was arranged 
for social, as well as political, purposes. Though perhaps speculative, they show 
members seated in groups linked to both their main location of residence during their 
sojourn in East Asia, and also to the time period they spent there. The larger side tables 
seem to have been populated by Shanghai and Hongkong residents who arrived in East 
Asia at similar times, with each of the smaller side tables accounting to a large extent 
for the Association’s membership with links to Foochow and Yokohama. The centre 
table was populated overwhelmingly by those with Shanghai links, whereas those with 
Hongkong links are clustered at the head of the table. Guests were also seated at the 
head of the centre table, surrounded by key Association members, this being also 
indicative of the fact that the most influential Association members—and the 
companies they represented—were often domiciled in Hongkong.49 
  Greater potential for sociability existed, however, following the termination of 
formal proceedings. Attendees would, at this point, retire to an adjoining room to 
renew old acquaintances. The North China Herald’s London sources reported in 1895  
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Figure 3.1: Main location of residence in East Asia (1889 dinner attendees) 
source: China Directories etc. available online at 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/history/customs/ancestors/directories.html (last accessed 29 
October 2018) 
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Figure 3.2:  Earliest known date of residence in East Asia (1889 dinner 
attendees) 
source: China Directories etc. available online at 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/history/customs/ancestors/directories.html (last accessed 29 
October 2018) 
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that ‘The dinner was an excellent one, but the great interest of the evening was meeting 
such a number of old friends, many personally known to one, many by reputation 
only.’ This only truly occurred when, following the speeches  
All adjourned for the indispensable whisky and soda, and the mutual 
exchange of almost forgotten recollections. It was amusing—and very 
interesting—to meet the men one had not seen for ten, fifteen, twenty, or 
even more years, and see how gradually recognition awoke, and 
reminiscences were plunged into, to the mutual delight of recogniser and 
recognised. The drawback was that these interviews were necessarily so 
brief; one wanted to talk for an hour with every old friend found again 
instead of three or four minutes which was all that was possible. Still, it 
was a delightful evening and no China hand who is at home at the time 
should miss the annual China Dinner. 50 
 
Several striking points are raised by this account. First, the sheer reported delight 
of men reintroduced to social contacts which had lapsed following their return. 
Secondly, that the dinner itself was not simply a chance to renew contacts, but even to 
forge them, making personal relations between men previously known ‘by reputation 
only’, a great success for the CA, especially if these men were still active in business. 
Finally, the importance of the occasion is shown by the reporter’s chosen 
nomenclature. That the article itself was headlined ‘The China Dinner’, makes it clear 
that there was no comparable function extant in Britain at the time. It was a truly 
unique occasion, with unique potential. Former consul Byron Brenan stated his belief 
in 1904 that ‘the Association has justified its existence by giving an opportunity to all 
those who have been in the Far East of meeting once a year… I am sure we all look 
forward to these evening, and as we cast our eyes up and down these tables we look 
for old familiar faces.’51 
It is apt here to make note of another potentially valuable—though ultimately 
limited—avenue for socialising that existed in London, originating with the creation 
of the China Society in 1907.52 The Society, by 1913, was hosting monthly lectures 
on Chinese topics.53 However, it seems to have held little attraction for most returnees, 
and particularly mercantile men, and where membership crossover did exist with the 
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CA this was in the form of ex-government employees, often scholars of China.54 
Monthly lectures, in reality, would offer little social value to those who resided some 
distance outside of London and for whom travelling was a considerable effort. It was 
noted, for example, that CA members travelled ‘not only from all parts of England, 
but some even from Ireland and the North of Scotland’ to attend the CA’s social 
functions.55 While a useful setting for some returnees to socialise in, the China Society 
was not so for the majority of those involved in the CA. Similarly, the Thatched House 
Club at which the CA was founded may well have provided an informal meeting space, 
but predominantly for those who still retained employment in the city of London. As 
we have already seen, this was not the case for the majority of the members of the CA, 
and it should be further noted those who did were perhaps less likely to be struggling 
with a ‘difficult return’ as they continued to work—in lucrative posts—for companies 
which employed substantial numbers of men who held shared experiences of life in 
China. 
Indeed, the importance of the CA dinner as a unique event in the social 
calendar had certainly not diminished by the time of the First World War. With the 
dinner cancelled due to hostilities one member wrote to implore the committee to hold 
a ‘private and informal gathering under the Association’s auspices at which members 
could meet their friends’, a request ultimately denied so as not to contradict the 
committees decision to cancel the annual dinner.56 It was only in the mid-1930s that 
another China linked dinner seems to have appeared on the London calendar, hosted 
under the auspices of the China Society. This was a development of the society from 
its earlier focus on being an educational body and the dinner seems to have been a 
small affair. Hosted in 1935 and 1937, by 1939 the society were ‘anxious’ that the 
dinner should be a success and appealed to the CA for help, hoping that ten members 
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of the CA committee might bolster the attendance for that year, outlining the 
separation in membership between the two groups previously noted.57  
Later in the period under consideration, as previously mentioned, receptions 
became the major social gatherings of the CA. It is clear from a lengthy report placed 
in The North China Herald that these occasions were similarly essential social 
gatherings for Far Eastern returnees.58 The article, entitled ‘China Association Soiree: 
Enthusiastic Annual Gathering Held in London’ nonetheless began by lamenting that 
the evening started slowly, and somewhat awkwardly. Largely, the writer attributed 
this to the particular circumstances of social life in East Asia, noting that 
In the Far East there are very few entertainments that do not take place in 
clubs we belong to or know intimately, or in the pre-arrangement of which 
we or some of our friends have not taken a direct share. Here we were on 
strange ground, we had just paid for our tickets and the hotel folk were 
responsible that we got our money’s worth… Like Bostock’s lions, turned 
out of their travelling cage into the leafy jungle of Whipsnade, we had to 
sniff every corner of our domain before settling down to play.59 
 
The analogy of Bostock’s lions, once deciphered, is powerful and apposite, though 
perhaps unintentionally so. The lions—removed from their natural habitat—had been 
part of a famous travelling menagerie—Bostock and Wombwell’s—until 1932, the 
same year this article appeared in the North China Herald. In that year, the 
menagerie’s collection was sold to London Zoo, and formed part of its new collection, 
housed in Whipsnade. Though it is unclear whether it was used intentionally to do so, 
the analogy illustrates the plight of many returnees, one of dislocation and travel 
before an eventual return to what resembled home—the ‘leafy jungle’ of Whipsnade 
zoo, for the zoo was to showcase ‘animals in natural conditions’—only to find 
themselves uncomfortable.60 Certainly, the writer seems to have intentionally made 
readers aware that when removed from the comfortable, smaller communities of East 
Asia, and the clubs, societies and venues to which they had become accustomed, and 
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even familiar with the inner workings of—their own small cage in the travelling 
menagerie—they found it a struggle to adjust to the sprawling expanse of London and 
dining in strange hotels. 
Yet as the same article attests, there were even more factors at play ensuring the 
return to Britain was difficult for those from East Asia. Shanghai had quickly 
developed a reputation as something of an unsavoury city with a barely hidden darker 
side of crime and immoral nightlife. Gail Hershatter has noted that ‘stories of women 
kidnapped by traffickers and sold as prostitutes abounded in early-twentieth-century 
Shanghai’, with ‘both foreigners and Chinese’ taking up the topic in their literature.61 
Boxing matches held on the rooftop of ‘The Carlton’ were particularly vicious, and so 
bloody as to draw the wrath of the Shanghai Municipal Council.62 Violence which was 
not of the sporting kind was well reported too, on the ‘1920-30s bar streets such as the 
Trenches and Blood Alley, which were notorious for their international cast of bar 
hostesses, their rowdy male customers, and their violent brawls’ alongside a Chinese 
populace who had contracted ‘dance madness’ in the city, as part of a cabaret scene 
intrinsically linked to violent gangs.63 Whether many of these accusations were true 
or not, often stemming from the pen of visiting authors and journalists who lambasted 
the city, the writer of the article was nonetheless keenly aware of the reputation, and 
felt he was being unfairly judged throughout the occasion by invited guests who had 
never been to East Asia. He was, he said 
Sorry for the dancing partners whom some of the young girls had brought 
along. But I daresay their rather constrained appearance was that they were 
secretly sorry for us. There are still people in England who look at you 
rather doubtfully on hearing that you have lived in China. I don’t know 
what the above mentioned dancing partners thought we had done, or might 
do at any moment, but they were plainly nervous.64 
 
Whether this slight was true, or simply the imagination of the writer, it is clear that 
adjusting to social life in Britain was proving difficult, even in company comprised 
overwhelmingly of returnees from China. 
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In the end, it was only the company of these fellow returnees which cheered the 
writer. While he may have struggled to cope with the strange world of London, and 
been bitter at the suspicions of some guests, he rejoiced in insisting that 
The bond of fellowship forged by life in the Far East is the most familiar 
of truisms, and people who have spent the best years of their life in 
loathing each other in Shanghai, when they meet again in the lonely 
crowds of London foam like a jug of shandygaff on a hot day. There were 
those who left China forty years ago and others who first went there barely 
forty months ago, but we all met on common ground.65 
 
It was, the writer was left to lament, unfortunate that ‘we China folk [will], to some 
extent always [be] aliens in our own country to the end of our days.’ It was perhaps 
only in half-jest that he wondered if the CA might not organise classes at which 
members might learn how to pronounce ‘extraterritoriality’ or ‘some really snappy 
slogans, such as “up with silver, down with diplomacy”’ to foster a kind of ‘China 
class-consciousness’ with which they could defend against the accusations of the 
aforementioned guests who believed their life in China had been full of misdeeds.66 
Regardless of whether these slights were real, such returnees as the writer certainly 
felt them.  
The difficult return from China, then, was in some ways reminiscent of that 
described by other authors. Readjusting to the metropole, and life in Britain in general, 
proved difficult. A loss of social status was common with other groups of returnees, 
often linked to their movement from small enclave communities to the larger cities of 
Britain, and into the reporter’s ‘lonely crowds of London.’ Similarly, many of these 
returnees—though the elite of the British presence in China—were not wealthy by 
British standards on their return (one can only imagine the difficulty faced by men 
who returned too poor to even join the CA). But for those from China it was also 
unique. It was defined by the reputation they had acquired by their relationship to the 
city of Shanghai, and the supposedly immoral British lifestyle in China. Their small 
numbers also meant that opportunities for socialising were rare. They were thankful, 
therefore, for the CA reception, and Dinners before it, which had at least offered one 
night a year where they could meet with their kind, albeit in sometimes uncomfortable 
locations, and enjoy conversation and reminiscence as part of a large group with whom 
they held common ground. As C.S. Addis of the HSBC had remarked, The CA was 
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‘never more agreeably occupied… than in promoting… the good fellowship of its 
members; in linking the present with the past, the East with the West; in awakening 
afresh the memories of old but undying friendships; and in dispensing to its guests the 
traditional hospitality of the East.’67 
 
Politics at dinner 
 
Official guests - building links with government as an ‘insider’ interest group 
Whilst the committee ensured the social functions of the CA did not become 
overwhelmingly political affairs they always served at least some political purpose. 
And although the prominence of politics at these functions varied, depending on the 
format of the function and date, several attempts by the CA to exploit these gatherings 
for political ends are clear. The most overt political element of the CA dinners was the 
invitation of ‘official guests’ who were entertained at no cost to themselves. These 
guests were selected by the General Committee and were to consist of ‘any men of 
distinction who are connected with or interested in China.’68 Although a complete list 
of these guests cannot be reproduced due to constraints of space several who attended 
either the CA’s annual dinners, or dinners given to prominent individuals, are worthy 
of note as their positions help to identify the government departments and other groups 
the CA thought worthy of attempting to build relationships with.  
First, the Foreign Office was regarded by the CA as the key government 
department with which to establish contacts. To this end, Foreign Office 
representatives were invited as official guests to every dinner the CA held. Specific 
names were not always recorded or mentioned—the Association were respectful of 
the wishes of some Foreign Offices employees and other guests not to name them, as 
reports of dinners were reproduced in the press. Despite this—and the caveat this 
introduces that the attendees discussed below are by no means a comprehensive 
selection—some are recognisable, and a brief investigation into their careers 
highlights not only the importance and influence of these men that the CA was 
bringing into personal contact with its membership, but also the sustained period over 
which this was undertaken.  
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Of the earliest Foreign Office attendees to CA functions, three are notable. 
First, we find Francis L. Bertie, later to become Viscount Bertie of Thame. Bertie is 
identified by other works as the CA’s primary early contact within the Foreign Office, 
and attended a dinner of 1896, when the CA hosted Chinese dignitary Li Hongzhang. 
Bertie had been promoted to Chief Clerk in charge of the Eastern Department at the 
Foreign Office in 1889, the year of the CA’s foundation, before becoming an under-
secretary of state in 1893 in which role he superintended the American and Asiatic 
department. By the turn of the century he was purely concerned with the Far Eastern, 
or China, department.69 T.G. Otte, in his work on China, has noted Bertie wielded 
‘considerable influence within the Foreign Office’ and found his superior Lord 
Salisbury ‘receptive to his ideas.’70 Bertie’s main contemporary with whom he helped 
to shape policy related to East Asia in the Foreign Office—Thomas Sanderson—was 
also a guest of the CA, and is discussed later. Finally, attending the same 1896 dinner 
as Bertie we find George Nathaniel Curzon. Later to become Viceroy of India, Curzon 
was, as of 1896, under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office, an MP, and, with his 
superior Salisbury a member of the House of Lords, the government’s ‘chief foreign 
policy spokesman in the commons.’71 Curzon, speaking candidly, praised the CA as 
‘a happy and potent link between the Far East and West’ and an Association which 
had ‘earned the confidence of the governments of both Great Britain and of China.’ 
He further insisted that ‘They regarded (in the Foreign Office) the views of that 
Association [the CA] with respect, and they not infrequently invited it to aid them.’72 
As time progressed and the staff of relevant Foreign Office departments 
changed, the CA ensured that invitations saw contemporaries invited to social 
occasions to help maintain this relationship. At a 1906 dinner given to Duke T’sai Tze 
both Sir Eric Barrington and Lord Fitzmaurice represented the Foreign Office. 
Barrington was, by this time, a veteran of 38 years in the Foreign Office and had 
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previously been private secretary to Foreign Secretaries Lord Iddesleigh, Lord 
Salisbury, and Lord Lansdowne, but had in 1905 risen to the position of under-
secretary of state for Foreign Affairs.73 Lord Fitzmaurice was, at the time, the 
parliamentary under-secretary of state for Foreign Affairs and attended the dinner in 
this capacity.74 A dinner in 1911 saw Max Muller attend when serving in the 
department as something of a career interregnum, between a role as counsellor at the 
legation in Peking and a post in the diplomatic service in Budapest.75 Sir John Tilley 
attended a CA dinner of 1920, following his promotion to under-secretary in 1919.76 
Also attending a 1920 function, as well as those in 1926 and 1928 was Sir Victor 
Wellesley. Wellesley was a guest of considerable influence, and, serving as head of 
the Far Eastern department of the Foreign Office had dealt with such events as the end 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Washington treaty of 1922, the British reaction to 
revolution in China, the dispatch of the Shanghai Defence Force and the Manchurian 
crisis.77 Finally, Sir John Pratt, a 25 year veteran of the consular service in China who 
had returned to Britain in 1925 to take up a post as adviser to the Foreign Office on 
Far Eastern Affairs, attended a CA dinner in this capacity in 1933.78 Pratt, certainly, 
was a potential ally for the CA as it looked to support Foreign Office policy and limit 
its support of settlers in China in this period, believing the settler presence to be ‘low-
white danger’ to the new British stance after 1925.79 
This brief survey offers us a view of consistent effort, over a considerable 
period, to bring these men into contact with the CA’s membership. All of these men 
were active, and many held considerable importance in the Foreign Office when 
attending dinners where they were made aware of the CA’s views and aims.  
Alongside the Foreign Office, invitations were also extended to Colonial 
Office officials for all CA dinners, primarily due to the importance of Hongkong to 
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the CA. Those who accepted included Sir Montagu Ommaney, who attended dinners 
in 1905 and 1906 whilst serving as Permanent under-secretary of the Colonial Office.80 
Sir John Anderson attended a dinner in 1912 whilst fulfilling the same role.81 George 
Fiddes was a repeat CA guest, attending functions in 1907, 1908 and 1920 whilst 
serving as head of the Far Eastern Department of the Colonial Office and later 
permanent under-secretary of State.82 Leopold Amery gave a long speech outlining his 
views on the state of Hongkong in his role as colonial secretary at a dinner in 1925.83 
Finally, Oliver Lyttelton attended the CA’s dinner of 1952 while serving as Secretary 
of State for the Colonies.84 
When viewing the guests invited from these departments, one striking feature 
is the prominence of under-secretaries. This seems to have been a conscious decision 
by the CA to maximise the potential of its invitations, as these men are relatively high 
ranking, but more importantly, permanent government officials. Anyone of a higher 
standing who was linked to the Foreign Office or Colonial Office would be serving a 
limited term reliant on the length of time their party stayed in office—as we see above, 
invitations to Parliamentary under-secretaries were much rarer. In this way, the CA 
moved to build links that were longstanding, and, arguably, of greater influence within 
government.85  T.G. Otte has argued that within the Foreign Office, certainly, that 
‘they [the permanent staff of the Foreign Office] exercised considerable influence’ 
alongside more prominent Foreign Secretaries.86 Inviting representatives of political 
parties would also have risked creating the image that the CA was aligned with a 
particular party, something which can prove damaging to the influence of a political 
pressure group—although as noted below, when this was required the CA did pursue 
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such aims.87 Both the type of men the CA sought to invite—and those they chose not 
to—are reminiscent of the points of contact formed prominently by ‘insider’ interest 
groups. 
The final group which received invites to all CA dinners were representatives 
of the British armed forces. Though representatives of the Army were not always 
present, the links the British community in East Asia had with the Royal Navy saw 
efforts to ensure a high ranking naval officer was in attendance, though they were often 
retirees. Sir Henry Keppel was the earliest invited, and was greeted by ‘cheers that 
lasted several minutes’ upon responding to a toast at the CA dinner of 1890. He had 
served in both Opium Wars, been commander-in-chief in China from 1866 to 1869 
and spent many years of service on the China Station.88 Although he seems not to have 
attended, 1905 saw Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Moor invited, as Sir Cecil Clementi 
Smith ‘had reason to know [He] would be appointed to succeed Admiral Curzon-
Howe on the China Station.’89 Later guest Admiral Borrett had forged links with 
China, too, both early in his career when mentioned in dispatches for his actions during 
the Boxer Uprising as a torpedo lieutenant, and later as Rear-Admiral on the China 
Station.90 A 1911 dinner saw two admirals—Sir Edward Seymour and Sir Wilmot 
Fawkes—attend. Of the two Seymour was best known, commanding a multi-national 
force which failed to relieve the legation at Peking during the Boxer Uprising some 
months before the eventual relief provided by the larger eight nation alliance.91 Fawkes 
had served on the China Station during the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, when it was 
suggested he had warned the Chinese of impending Japanese attack, despite Britain’s 
official neutrality.92 Though many of the representatives of the armed forces present 
had retired, their invitation nonetheless outlines the strong links the British community 
in China felt to them. Although the days of gunboat diplomacy had reached their zenith 
before the time of the CA the British presence in China remained precarious, and the 
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88 L. G. C. Laughton, ‘Keppel, Sir Henry (1809–1904)’, rev. Andrew Lambert, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34297, 
last accessed 19 December 2016). 
89 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 14 September 1905, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, June 1901 – November 1906, CHAS/MCP/3. 
90 "Admiral G. H. Borrett." Times (London, England) 11 June 1952, p.8. 
91 H. W. Richmond, ‘Seymour, Sir Edward Hobart (1840–1929)’, rev. Andrew Lambert, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; 
(http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36032, last accessed 19 December 2016). 
92 "Admiral Sir Wilmot Fawkes." Times (London, England) 31 May 1926 p.19.  
 
 
151 
 
gunboats continued to be deployed, though less effectively, throughout the period of 
this study.93 At least feeling they held strong links to the military may well have been 
a useful comfort. 
Alongside the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and armed forces 
representatives of other government departments were invited when they were on 
leave from East Asia or when wider circumstances made the invitations opportune. A 
dinner in 1907 to Frederick Lugard and the annual dinner in 1910 saw Claude 
MacDonald, Consul General for the Empire of Japan, and John Jordan, Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China, attend respectively whilst on 
leave from Asia. The annual dinner of 1928 also saw the Secretary of State for War 
attend, allowing the CA to express gratitude for the recent dispatch of the Shanghai 
Defence Force. Other official guests included representatives of the Treasury, the 
Overseas Trade Department, Board of Trade and the India Office as well as the 
Cabinet Minister for War, the Master of Rolls and Admiral Von Truppel, a 
representative of the German CA.94 On occasion, too, MPs would be invited if they 
held an interest in China, though, as will be explored later, the CA cared little for 
representation in the Houses of Parliament. Finally of note are those who attended not 
as CA guests, but as guests of individual members. The 1904 dinner, for example, saw 
both the Consul-General of the United States and the Vice-Governor of the Bank of 
Japan attend in this capacity.95  
Why then, did the CA invite these men to their dinners, despite, as already 
noted, this contributing to the loss of around £60 per dinner by 1900? Wider 
scholarship discussed previously in this work has shown that occasions such as formal 
dinners have been recognised for their value as a space between the formal work 
environment and the informal social environment, allowing informal discussion to 
take place over business deals, or political discussion to take place. It is important to 
note that on most occasions to what extent their invitation to these events built links 
cannot often be accurately determined. Informal conversation and discussion certainly 
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existed at these gatherings, but to what extent it proved useful remains hidden by the 
unrecorded nature of this part of the evening.  
However, some examples offer hints of where these occasions allowed 
members of the CA to create personal relations, for business or political purposes, with 
these guests. When the departing minister to China Sir Claude Macdonald was hosted 
in 1896, for example, it was noted how all present had been grateful of the chance to 
meet him.96 He was then, as previously mentioned, dined by the CA Shanghai branch 
upon his arrival in China, and, testament to the value of these occasions, recommended 
in 1898 to prime minister Lord Salisbury that the CA might be ‘invited to take up the 
work’ of surveying the upper Yangtze to ascertain if it was navigable by steamship, 
backed by government funding.97  
Alongside this, the dinners allowed the CA to place their views on the current 
state of China and related political questions in front of these men, and do so in a more 
public, though not completely open, sphere. This, most commonly, occurred in the 
speech given each year by a prominent member which focused upon the condition of 
China as a whole, and of British trade with the nation. But it could, too, be tailored 
more specifically as it was in 1908, when Mr Gershom Stewart appealed directly to 
guests from the Treasury and Board of Trade to oppose an increased income tax on 
money earned in foreign countries that had been suggested as part of a recent budget 
discussion.98 With few examples existing of the attendance of guests from the 
Treasury, it seems unlikely their invitation to a dinner held soon after the new tax was 
proposed was a coincidence. Similarly, the chance to espouse the views of the CA on 
the current state of the Foreign Office was one taken on occasion. Using the attendance 
of HRH Prince George at the dinner and his recent time spent in China as an example, 
in 1929 chairman Stanley H. Dodwell did not miss the opportunity to suggest that if a 
Prince could travel to China, and other Royal family members all around the globe, 
then perhaps the time had come that leading diplomats of the Foreign Office might 
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finally visit China in person, instead of relying on information provided by others.99 
In this way, the dinners mirror documented examples of St. Andrew’s dinners held in 
India, where through the medium of toasts and responding speeches, views on 
important political and economic issues were exchanged.100 
 
Protesting over China policy in a public sphere: the combination of Chief Judge and 
Consul General 
A long running political effort is also revealed by an investigation of a series of dinners 
held in the 1890s at which the CA focused upon attempting to reverse, and alleviate 
the problems caused by, the merging of the posts of Chief Judge and Consul General 
in Shanghai by the British Foreign Office. The British Supreme Court in Shanghai had 
been established in 1865 and the role of chief judge filled by Sir Edmund Hornby, 
later a member of the CA who would be involved in the CA’s efforts to separate the 
two posts. The Court’s foundation pleased both Qing authorities, as British subjects 
were no longer tried away from their jurisdiction in Hongkong and also British 
residents who found the rulings of the Hongkong court ‘out of touch with realities on 
the ground’.101 The court dealt with disputes between British and Chinese subjects in 
the Shanghai International Settlement, as well as those between British subjects, with 
cases involving Chinese and the subjects of other powers left to the Shanghai Mixed 
Court.102  
In March 1891, the CA in London received an urgent communication from the 
wider British community in Shanghai. It was then that it had become apparent that the 
posts of Chief Judge and British Consul General in the city were to be merged. This 
was a proposal to which the community objected strongly and, following a meeting of 
British residents, a telegram was dispatched to a London contact, requesting that the 
contact encourage the ‘Foreign Office [to] stay action’ and seek the ‘Support [of the] 
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China Association and leading Chambers [of] Commerce’ in the matter. The CA, 
following a meeting of the executive committee, in turn dispatched a letter to Lord 
Salisbury at the Foreign Office. Outlining their view that the two posts could feasibly, 
due to British residents living under conditions of extraterritoriality, become 
‘antagonistic’ towards one another in a dispute, to have them held by a single 
individual would be impractical. A petition signed by 526 members of the Shanghai 
community followed, and was forwarded to the Foreign Office alongside the CA’s 
own objections to the amalgamation in May of the same year.103  
Unfortunately, these protests fell upon deaf ears. A reply to the CA informed 
them that ‘Lord Salisbury thinks that the new arrangement, which was adopted after 
discussion of several alternative schemes, and was framed with the assistance of very 
competent advisers, must in any case be given a fair trial.’ However, they were 
prepared to grant the CA the consideration the ‘[s]hould any real inconvenience be 
caused to the public service by the amalgamation of the two offices, the question can 
be reconsidered hereafter.’104 From this point the CA did not record itself taking any 
further formal action in its minutes or reports, finding only consolation ‘that the action 
of the Association has been cordially appreciated by the communities affected.’105 
However, although official representations to the Foreign Office had ceased, the CA 
still retained channels through which it could attempt to influence the situation—
notably, through their dinners. It was no coincidence, then, that the 1892 annual dinner 
saw the CA extend an invitation to Lord James Hannen, brother of Nicholas J. Hannen, 
current holder of the combined post of Chief Judge and Consul in Shanghai. 
It is important to recognise that the holder of the posts, Nicholas J. Hannen, 
has previously been referred to in this thesis. Indeed, he had been a founding member 
of the CA and had also chaired the meeting at which the Association’s Shanghai 
branch was created—the year after the CA had failed to halt the merger of these posts, 
although we cannot conclusively link the two events. Certainly, he chaired this 
meeting in his official role, rather than in any role linked to the CA. He was not present 
at the Shanghai branches’ second AGM, and it seems, therefore, precluded from 
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Reports, 1889-98, CHAS/A/01, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
 
 
155 
 
membership by his official role. Despite this he did attend the dinner which followed 
that AGM, and which forms part of the series of dinners under discussion.  
It was the year before this, however, that his brother attended the CA’s London 
dinner. The reasoning behind his brother’s invitation was clear, and explicitly 
recorded. It was made by his personal friend Edmund Hornby, who wrote to the CA 
secretary  
 Dear Gundry…. 
I have asked ‘Lord Hannen’ to come as my guest as he takes an interest in 
Chinese matters seeing his youngest Brother is now Ch. Jus. & Con. 
General—which joining of functions, by the way, he wholly disapproves, 
as I do.106 
 
Lord Hannen was certainly qualified to hold an opinion on the matter beyond a family 
interest. He had spent a long career in probate, divorce and the admiralty divisions of 
the courts following his promotion to the Queen’s Bench, concurrently holding his 
position as the head of a ‘huge’ legal practice which focused upon insurance and 
mercantile law.107 Nor is it surprising that Edmund Hornby was in concurrence with 
the wider view of the CA. He had, as noted, been the first incumbent of the post of 
Chief Judge in Shanghai some years before and he believed it was a ‘great mistake’ 
when the same two posts had been merged in the Levant some years previously.108 
These two friends, members of the legal profession, were certainly in complete 
agreement on the matter and this was a view Lord Hannen was willing to espouse 
publically. 
Indeed, observing, to the laughter of the assembled guests, that this point ‘was a 
somewhat ticklish question’ he implored any of those present  
who had control over these matters, to bear in mind the difficulties which 
beset any man who had to occupy those two posts—(hear, hear)—and he 
trusted, therefore, that all to whom this subject was interesting would 
extend indulgence to the man who had to overcome those difficulties—
(cheers)—and assist him by their sympathy. He would only say from his 
knowledge of his character he was convinced nothing would be wanting 
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on the part of his brother to discharge the onerous duties which devolved 
upon him with justice and efficiency.109 
 
Two points of this speech are of particular interest. First, Hannen’s clear efforts to 
ensure the sympathy and support of the CA and its members for his brother’s situation. 
Secondly, and of greater importance, were Lord Hannen’s comments directed at the 
Foreign Office, when he stressed that those present ‘who had control over these 
matters’ would do well to understand the difficulties his brother was facing in fulfilling 
the post. It was likely no coincidence that present that very evening as a guest of the 
CA was Sir Thomas Sanderson, under-secretary for Foreign Affairs. Sanderson was 
an important figure in the Foreign Office, and although ultimately decision on Foreign 
Policy rested with the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, He, alongside Francis 
Bertie (the CA’s main Foreign Office contact), are regarded as having made a 
‘significant contribution to the foreign policy-making process’ between 1894 and 
1905. Indeed, Sanderson, it has been argued, ‘shaped policy to considerable degree, 
and certainly took charge of much of the day-to-day business of the Office.’110 
Certainly, he was a valuable guest for the CA to have invited on this occasion. 
In Lord Hannen, then, the CA had found—through the personal connections 
of Sir Edmund Hornby—a well-respected ally with a wealth of legal experience who 
supported their cause to separate these two posts. Through their annual dinner they 
had given him an opportunity to air these views to the relevant members of the British 
government. By reproduction of the speech in newspapers—although reporting of the 
CA dinner was somewhat limited, appearing only, it seems, in The London and China 
Telegraph—the case could also be given greater public prominence. 
Turning to the periphery, we find the CA’s involvement in the matter continued. 
Nicholas J. Hannen himself chaired the annual dinner of the Shanghai Branch, held at 
the Shanghai club, in 1894. He was seemingly unafraid to discuss the matter in stark 
terms, and in proposing the toast of continued prosperity to the Shanghai branch, he 
joked that  
It seems to me, gentlemen, ever since you have been in existence you have 
been finding fault with the British government and its officers. (laughter) 
You begin by saying that I ought not to be here in one of the capacities 
which I am. (laughter). That was the first thing you said, but you did not 
succeed. (Renewed laughter) But perhaps you will do us all some good. 
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You are very like the slave-driver who whacks us all indiscriminately; if 
we did our work there would be no necessity for you, the slave-driver with 
your whip. No doubt some of us want it very badly. All I can say is that 
notwithstanding this I wish you every success. I wish your whip may stir 
us up to do our duty properly and that it may fall on all backs—except my 
own. (Laughter and Cheers)111 
 
This was not the end of Hannen’s own involvement in the matter. When he returned 
to Britain in 1895, still holding the combined post, he was invited to the CA’s annual 
dinner. Called upon to propose the toast made to the officers of the Association, he 
was, he admitted, placed in an awkward position. To the assembled crowd he joked 
that it ‘was a little bit hard that he should have to propose the health of gentlemen who 
appeared to have an inveterate dislike to the position which he held. (Laughter and 
Cheers).’ However, he also noted that ‘Perhaps they did not feel any greater dislike 
[for the post] than he himself. But there he was, and there he had to remain.’112 It is 
clear that Hannen himself held no support for the combination of the posts, and it is 
certainly possible it was to the British government he was referring, in relation to the 
combination, when he talked of those who wanted the ‘whip’ of the CA ‘very badly.’ 
By inviting Hannen to these two dinners he was given occasion to air his views to both 
the Shanghai and London press, and on the second occasion, to the members of the 
Foreign Office and other government departments always invited to the CA’s dinners. 
The CA’s dinners, it seemed, could be of use not only as a vehicle to espouse their 
own views, but even as a channel for members of British government in China to do 
the same to their superiors in London. 
To draw the history of CA opposition to the combination of these two posts to 
a close, reference is required to one further dinner. Held in 1897 the honour of 
responding to the toast given to the guests was, on this occasion, given to George 
Jamieson. Jamieson (who would later serve as chairman, vice-chairman and president 
of the CA) was currently employed to fill the combined role of HM consul in Shanghai 
and Assistant Judge of HM Supreme Court, both roles one rank below those filled by 
Nicholas Hannen.113 In proposing the toast to which Jamieson would reply, 
Association member E.H. Pollard joked Jamieson had been ‘tarred with the same 
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brush’ as his ‘chief’ in Shanghai. When responding to the toast, and to the applause of 
the crowd, Jamieson was able to inform the gathering that ‘he believed he was not 
overstepping the bounds of official discretion in saying that steps were now in progress 
which would result in the separation of the two posts at Shanghai at no distant date.’114 
Indeed, a report commissioned by the Foreign Office had agreed that the two posts 
should again be separated earlier in the year, with The Times able to announce that the 
two posts had been separated in December of 1897.115 Nicholas Hannen continued to 
fill the post of Chief Justice, with the Association’s most recent guest, George 
Jamieson, taking up the role of Consul General in Shanghai.116 
Through a series of dinners, then, held in 1892, 1894, 1895 and 1897 the CA 
continued to press for the separation of these two posts. Though not done by pressing 
the Foreign Office through what might be considered more official channels, this 
instead took place through viewpoints presented to Foreign Office officials at the 
public gatherings that were the dinners of the CA.117  These dinners saw displeasure 
at the combination of the post expressed by both the man fulfilling the post and his 
brother, himself a well-respected legal practitioner. Furthermore, they had allowed the 
CA the chance to dine and renew links with Nicholas Hannen on his return to Britain 
on leave, and had allowed them the chance to forge new links with George Jamieson 
before his ascension to the post when the two were again split. 
While this was one prominent use of these dinners, it must also be remembered 
that the audience for the speeches given by prominent CA members did not simply 
consist of the official guests for the evening. Indeed, the majority of those present were 
already members of the CA. As such, the speeches made at these events must also be 
seen as efforts to spread the views of the speakers amongst the wider membership, and 
to persuade members, in order to achieve consensus on issues amongst the CA 
membership. A striking example of this can be found in 1906, when Charles Stewart 
Addis of the HSBC called for the members of the Association to focus upon fair 
dealing with Chinese partners and the Chinese populace, stating; 
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Say what you like, the old "Gunboat policy” as it was called, is as dead as 
the dodo, and should be decently interred, neatly ticketed and labelled for 
the benefit of the future historian in the limbo of extinct and half forgotten 
ideas. Only by doing as we would be done by is it possible to justify and 
maintain British ascendency in the Far East, and we are under an 
obligation to the late Governor of Hongkong, which I felt I must 
acknowledge, for giving timely and pointed emphasis to that cardinal 
truth. (Cheers).118 
 
Addis was one of the earliest British proponents of such a move, and despite his 
efforts, as we shall see later, it took some time before the CA would align with his 
views more broadly.119  
 
Dining prominent individuals, and the visit of Li Hongzhang 
Alongside the invitation of official guests to all dinners, a series of dinners were also 
held in honour of single, particularly prominent, individuals. Recorded in Table 3.1 
below, they took a similar format to annual dinners, with a series of toasts and speeches 
given, before the gathering retired for informal conversation. These dinners were, by  
their very nature, however, more political affairs, held with the main aim of allowing 
the CA to place their views on China and East Asia in front of these men and to give 
members an opportunity to meet these men on a personal basis. As such, they seem to 
have attracted less of the wider membership of the CA, who as noted elsewhere 
disliked overly political gatherings and instead preferred to attend the annual dinners. 
On these occasions, speeches were often of a highly political nature, and would on 
occasion be directly targeted at the guests. In 1906, for example, Thomas Jackson of 
the HSBC suggested to Duke T’sai Tze that the Chinese government would be best 
reformed along the lines of the government of India.120 Similarly, these events offered 
a key opportunity to inform departing Governors of Hongkong of the views of the CA. 
Often, these men would have had no experience of East Asia, having come from other 
colonial postings. An opportunity to outline the CA’s current view of how British 
interests would best progress in China, before the Governors had any chance to  
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119 Addis maintained wide contacts in intellectual and missionary circles, and believed not only that 
Western reform would be key in reshaping China, but also that the Western powers had responsibilities 
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Table 3.1: The individuals given China Association dinners in their honour 
 
Date Guest of Honour Further Information 
      
1896 
and 
1899 
Sir Claude MacDonald Claude MacDonald had previously had a career as a 
soldier and administrator, before receiving his first 
large post as minister of China in 1896. He would 
later become British ambassador to Japan.121 The 
first dinner was given prior to MacDonald’s 
departure to take up a new post of minister to 
China. No detailed record of the dinner exists as 
reporters were not admitted. 
 
1896 Li Hongzhang dinner given whilst the Chinese statesman was on a 
tour of Russia, Europe and America. Li was a noted 
moderniser in China, though his influence in the 
Chinese government was at an all-time low by this 
point.122 See below for a detailed discussion of this 
event. 
 
1898 Sir Henry Arthur Blake Blake had fifteen years of experience as a colonial 
Governor by this time, and would serve as 
Governor of Hongkong from 1898 to 1903.123 The 
dinner was given prior to Blake’s departure to take 
up this post. 
 
1906 Duke T’Sai Tze  dinner given to the duke and his entourage, who 
were in Europe to study Western methods of 
government124 
 
1907 Sir Frederick Lugard Lugard had an interesting career as a soldier, 
‘adventurer’, and East Africa Company employee, 
before becoming Governor of Nigeria and, later, 
Hongkong.125 The dinner was given prior to 
Lugard’s departure to take up the post. 
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1908 
 
 
 
Sir Robert Hart 
 
 
 
Hart headed the Foreign inspectorate of the Chinese 
Maritime Customs service, a major source of 
revenue for the Chinese government from 1863 
until 1907, when, refused retirement, he instead 
received a series of one year leaves. Although no 
longer directly at the head of the body, he was 
heavily involved in the decision of naming of his 
successor.126 
 
1920 His Excellency Chu Chi 
Chien 
H.E. Chu Chi Chien was a retired Chinese 
statesmen, who had served as premier of the 
Chinese government as well as Minister of 
Communications and Minister of the Interior.127 
The Dinner was given to Chien whilst he was on a 
tour of Britain to study the countries ‘municipal and 
industrial conditions.’128 The CA proclaimed 
themselves in ‘entire sympathy’ with Chu Chien’s 
aims of spreading ‘the knowledge of Chinese 
civilisation in this country and of western 
civilisation in China’.129 
 
1932 Sir Miles Lampson Lampson served for much of his career in East 
Asia, including postings in Tokyo and Peking, 
before becoming British Minister to China in 1926, 
a post he held until 1933.130 
 
1933 Alexander Cadogan Cadogan had a long background in working with 
the League of Nations. However, dismayed by the 
lack of success of the body he rejected suggestions 
he might become the League’s secretary general, 
and was instead pleased to be appointed to his new 
role at the British legation in China. He became 
ambassador in 1935 when the legation became an 
embassy, before returning to Britain in 1936.131 The 
dinner was given prior to Cadogan’s departure to 
take up the post. 
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formulate their own opinion from first-hand experience could, in theory, have been 
exceptionally valuable. 
A dinner given in 1896 to Chinese dignitary Li Hongzhang received particular 
prominence in the press, and allows us further insight into how these occasions 
proceeded and the opportunities they offered. Li Hongzhang was, in theory, not a 
natural ally for the CA to have sought. He was a noted proponent of the ‘self-
strengthening’ programme which sought to utilize western technology to improve the 
Chinese Empire, and was also one of the first Chinese officials to establish modern 
industries, including the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, the Kaiping 
Mining Company and the Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill, all founded in the 1870s.132 
These were designed as competitors to foreign firms, and in the long run intended to 
diminish the profitability of foreign business (and therefore foreign influence) in 
China by making it economically unviable.133 Yet the events of 1894/5 had largely 
negated such concerns. Defeated in the Sino-Japanese War, a scramble began to gain 
concessions and profit from a weakened China. Li had been personally involved in 
this defeat—commanding the forces he had seen modernized under the banner of self- 
strengthening—and with it came a drastic loss of power in the Chinese court. Despite 
these factors he remained China’s most experienced diplomat and was sent to Russia 
to secretly conclude a treaty for support against the other Western powers and Japan 
in the wars aftermath.134 It was as an extension of his travels to Russia that he visited 
Britain, and against the background of a scramble for concessions that the CA dined 
him. 
The CA were well aware of Li’s loss of status before his arrival in the country. 
Sir Edmund Hornby wrote to CA secretary R.S. Gundry, stating that 
Personally, I think you will be wasting your money on [dining] the clever 
old Humbug. As to touch his feelings—he has none—or if he has they lie 
so close at the bottom of breeches—packed that you cannot get at them. 
His day is over—and he will never again experience any real authority… 
Don’t waste a farthing on him and if he gorges himself and ‘busts up’ 
afterwards the world will say ‘the China Association poisoned him.’135 
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Despite these warnings, the CA progressed ahead with plans to dine Li. 
Although his arrival date coincided with the end of the London season and saw ‘many 
people leaving town’ the chairman concluded that alongside the Lord Mayors’ plans 
to host a reception and efforts by the London Chamber of Commerce, the CA should 
host a dinner in his honour at the Whitehall rooms. We may only speculate as to how 
the CA ensured their dinner would be included in Li’s itinerary, however that his entire 
stay in Britain was organised and overseen by the CA’s primary Foreign Office contact 
F.L. Bertie could, certainly, have been to the CA’s benefit here.136 Certainly, there was 
some communication between the CA and the Foreign Office prior to Li’s visit, with 
Bertie writing to secretary R.S. Gundry to request a ‘list of people interested in China’, 
perhaps to help construct Li’s wider itinerary, and to inform the CA of his date of 
arrival and title he would be using whilst in Britain.137 Regardless of the how the CA 
secured the chance to dine him, the chairman noted Li’s visit was ‘an event in our 
relations with China’ and so ‘[The Association] should not fall short of what had been 
done elsewhere.’ To this end the CA authorised a spend of £1-10-0 per head for the 
dinner, causing an ultimate loss of £94-6-6 in dining the 172 attendees.138  
The outlay, at least, seems to have produced considerable results, which are 
partially viewable below in Illustration 3.2. The London Daily News offered its 
opinion that ‘Seldom have more pains been taken to make the Whitehall rooms 
attractive. Beautiful clusters of growing plants—hydrangeas, yellow 
chrysanthemums, and sun flowers—were arranged at the font of the palms in the 
entrance hall.’ The menu was not recorded, although it was noted that ‘it was not a 
Chinese dinner: it was such a one as is customarily served at the Hotel Metropole.’139  
For those present, the chance for networking was not one which was missed. Arriving 
‘seated in his wheelchair, his excellency [Li] was conveyed along the corridor to the 
Victorian rooms, where many members of the Association and guests were presented 
to him. He beamed and bowed, gracious to all, and positively genial to some’ and, as 
The Glasgow Herald noted, before the dinner ‘through the medium of an interpreter,  
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Illustration 3.1: China Association dinner booklet, 1905, containing a menu, toast 
list, and seating plan for the evening  
source: Papers of Sir Charles Stewart Addis, SOAS Library, University of London, 
PP MS 14/011/303 
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Illustration 3.2: The China Association, dinner in honour of His Excellency, Li 
Hongzhang, Whitehall Rooms, Hotel Metropole, London, 7 August 1896140 
Source: China Association records, SOAS, London, CHAS/P/01 
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Mr Lo Teng Luh, a number of gentlemen conversed with him.’141 As the dinner 
progressed, Li ‘exchanged many thoughts with his right hand neighbour [his 
interpreter], and, through him, with the chairman and with Mr. Curzon.’142 Curzon 
was, as noted above, currently under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office, and, in 
his role as an MP, ‘chief foreign policy spokesman in the commons’ for the 
government, and his attendance and the opportunity this presented him for such 
conversation highlights the benefits even the British government could draw from 
their relationship with the CA. Chances for networking were not restricted to Curzon, 
however. Although Li was the principal guest ‘here and there a Chinese national 
costume’—worn by Li’s entourage—‘relieved the monotony of the conventional 
British evening dress.’143 These men were seated next to prominent CA members, 
‘Lord Li’ and ‘Mr. Li Ching-Sou’—Li Hongzhang’s sons—were seated next to 
William Keswick of Jardine Matheson and Alfred Dent of Dent Bros., and CA 
chairman and vice-chairman, respectively.144 Mr. K Tseng was seated next to Thomas 
Sutherland, head of the P&O, Mr Lin Y-You next to Ewen Cameron of the HSBC, 
and finally Mr Lien Fang next to R.S. Gundry, the CA’s secretary. Sir Halliday 
Macartney, who had for a number of years served as the secretary to the Chinese 
minister in London was similarly present, and seated within conversational distance 
of Keswick. Rumours that attributed a familial link between Macartney and Li—it was 
suggested his Chinese wife was a relation of the Chinese statesman—seem to have 
been, indeed, only rumours.145 
Nor was the opportunity missed for making grand statements directly to Li in 
this public arena. William Keswick insisted in his speech that ‘the most important 
matter to be urged upon China was the opening of all her rivers and navigable waters 
to steam navigation. Nothing would so influence prosperity as good means of 
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transport.’146 Such an opinion had been made clear in the CA’s reports of 1893/4, and 
1895/6 and was by this point a considerable aim of the Association.147 The personal 
benefit to Keswick of such a development—as head of Jardine Matheson, engaged in 
both trading and shipping—is not difficult to locate, and one can only assume this was 
something Li was well aware of. 
It seems that, overall, an enjoyable evening was had by (most) of those who 
attended. Li’s speech, given through his interpreter, was met with numerous cheers, 
and in closing Li remarked that ‘I sincerely wish you all happiness and prosperity, and 
trust that the China Association may grow in influence and may always be able to 
discuss international commerce from the broad point of view of both countries.’148 Li 
‘apparently enjoyed the surroundings, though, according to his usual custom, he could 
not be said to dine’ (Edmund Hornby’s earlier fear of Li gorging himself apparently 
not coming to pass).149 It was remarked upon in both the dinner report placed in the 
CA’s files and that of the London Daily News that Li found much amusement, too, in 
a joke made which alluded to censorship in China, at  which he ‘laughed heartily.’150 
Less enjoyment, it seems, was had by a member of Li’s entourage who, upon feeling 
sick, was offered champagne by a waiter which only served to make the problem 
worse.151 Overall, the evening was a success, and it seems the enjoyment was not even 
tempered by what the London Daily News described as  
A singular incident [which] occurred during the banquet. Accompanied by 
two ladies an elderly and well known banker who is staying at the hotel 
entered the banqueting hall, bent on seeing the distinguished Chinese 
statesmen. But this, of course, could not be permitted. The head waiter 
bade the intruders at once depart, and this they were prevailed upon to do, 
though with ruffled feathers.152 
 
Unfortunately, the CA’s records make no mention of this, and we are left in the dark 
as to the true identity, and motives, of this interloper. 
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Ultimately, we cannot prove that this dinner had any tangible outcomes, such 
is the nature of the records it left behind. However, what we can say is that those who 
attended were, at least, given the chance to speak to a prominent Chinese delegation 
to Britain in some manner and attempt to build networks. These benefits even extended 
to British government officials present, and for William Keswick the evening gave an 
opportunity to make direct representations to Li Hongzhang in public regarding 
matters that were key to his firm, Jardine Matheson.  On a wider level, dining Li was 
at least a grand gesture by the CA, and ensured that they were able to showcase their 
hospitality on the occasion of his visit.  
It is apt, here, to make one final point about these official dinners. The first of 
these was held, as noted in table 3.1, to host Claude MacDonald before he departed to 
take up a post as British minister to China. Such was the nature of the evening that 
reporters were not admitted, leaving us largely in the dark about what was discussed. 
Whether this was due to the overtly confidential and political nature of these 
discussions we can only speculate, however we do know from CA’s annual report for 
the year that the CA urged him consider the need for an extension to the Shanghai 
international settlement before his departure.153 This, ultimately, only serves to 
increase the frustration caused when investigating such events and their uses, with 
discussions hinted at as politically significant, but rarely clearly visible. 
Alongside these political manoeuvres undertaken at the formal dinners, it is 
important to emphasise that the other social functions held by the Association had a 
political side. As mentioned above luncheons later replaced the formal dinners of the 
Association, becoming the key CA tool for attempting to build personal links with 
officials and prominent men for political ends. By bringing together committee 
members who represented various British firms interested in East Asia with these 
officials the CA continued to possess the opportunity to outline their vision of the East 
Asian trade to those who held greater influence over the trade than they themselves.  
Though few records exist for the majority of these luncheons—discussions 
presumably being of a private and confidential nature—a luncheon given to five 
Chinese government members engaged on a ‘Goodwill Mission’ to Britain and the 
Chinese ambassador in 1943 gives some insight. The annual report of that year records 
that ‘speeches were exchanged, in which post-war trade and business in China formed 
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the main topics.’ Indeed, in these speeches the CA chairman outlined his pleasure—
though rather prematurely, as later developments would show—that the mission had 
eased his fears that the Chinese government might ‘adopt a policy of comparative 
isolation’ and reduce foreign trade following the war. Furthermore, the chairman 
pledged that those businessmen the CA represented would ‘fully recognise that those 
of us who return to live in China will live and carry on our business according to the 
law of China’, an important statement following the recent British surrender of 
extraterritoriality. The Chairman also insisted that he was keenly aware that British 
business must to do more to overcome its lack of knowledge of the Chinese language, 
in order to improve relations. In response, the Chinese ambassador praised the CA as 
‘an institution which had always played an important role in fostering trade relations 
between the two countries’ and outlined that ‘in his opinion it would still have a greater 
role to play in this respect in the future.’154 Similarly, although the content of the 
meeting itself is not recorded, at a 1947 luncheon given to the Governor of Hongkong 
‘the opportunity was taken to put before him the views of the committee with regard 
to the more important questions facing Hongkong.’155 
The receptions of the CA, too, may have served a political purpose, although 
this cannot be said for certain.  Although speeches were not given, official guests—as 
with the Association’s formal dinners—were invited to attend free of charge. Those 
invited in 1937 included the Foreign Secretary, Foreign Office representatives, the 
chief economic advisor to the British government and the Chinese Minister, alongside 
two Chinese Doctors, and the wives of all those mentioned.156 Again, this would allow 
the members who attended a potentially useful networking event through which to 
create links.  
However, whilst Chinese guests such as those noted above commonly attended 
later CA functions—and the wider membership had long accepted the need to hold 
dinners for visiting Chinese dignitaries due to the potential political and commercial 
benefits —the question of their admission to the CA’s dinners was one which caused 
considerable disagreement. Indeed, this was one of the few times the CA struggled in 
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tailoring the social functions of the Association to the twin goals of sociability and 
politics.  
 
Balancing politics and sociability: The admission of Chinese guests to social 
functions 
Asian guests were not a prominent feature of early CA social gatherings, unless the 
dinner was held specifically in their honour. Although the Vice-Governor of the Bank 
of Japan was present in 1904, he was invited by an individual member, rather than the 
committee.157 One Chinese guest—Wu Yen Lin—was also present at the annual 
dinner of 1906, but no further records exist to suggest this was repeated, or even 
considered, at least until 1924.158 At a meeting in December of that year—one month 
after that year’s annual dinner—the General Committee were asked by the chairman 
to consider whether individual members should be allowed to invite Chinese guests. 
The committee, after discussion ‘agreed that it would be undesirable to have Chinese 
at the Dinner and it was hoped therefore that members of the Association would refrain 
from inviting them.’159 Such invitations would not have been without precedent from 
the history of British involvement in China—as early as 1835 a St. Andrews dinner 
organised by William Jardine of Jardine Matheson & Co. saw an important Canton 
merchant invited, to help foster networks.160 In more recent memory British minister 
Sir John Jordan (later to be CA president) had invited prominent Chinese to the Kings 
Birthday celebrations held at the British Legation in Peking from 1911, and princesses 
of the Qing Court had been hosted to lunch at the Legation soon after the Boxer 
Uprising.161  It is interesting to note that at a luncheon in 1925 the CA seemingly had 
no problems with the invitation of Robert Ho-Tung, of Eurasian heritage, though his 
wealth and high social status in Hongkong presumably alleviated any worries, as, 
perhaps, would have the fact the gathering was a luncheon rather than a dinner.162 
By 1928 wider events again focused discussion on the matter. A Chinese 
nationalist movement, which had been growing for some time, had begun to expand 
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its reach and gained momentum after the events of 30 May 1925.163 During a protest 
over the killing of a Chinese worker by a Japanese foreman, British led police opened 
fire on the assembled crowd on Nanking Road, killing thirteen protestors and seriously 
wounding twenty, alongside numerous others injured.164 This incident provided great 
impetus to the Chinese nationalist and anti-foreign movements, which came to be 
known as the May Thirtieth Movement, and saw a number of boycotts of foreign goods 
between 1925 and 1937.165 In response to these events, British officials in China were 
forced to undertake a radical overhaul of their strategy. Efforts were made to rein in 
the power of the Shanghai Municipal Council, and realign control in the hands of an 
alliance of big business interests and the British government.166 As part of this, new 
personal social relations were to be formed with prominent Chinese by both British 
government employees, and the employees of key firms such as Swires. Indeed. G.W. 
Swire had personally taken the lead, and was a key backer of such proposals when 
they emerged and were discussed by the CA.167 Such moves to increase co-operation 
were highly important for large firms such as Swires, and other major CA backer 
Jardine Matheson. As owners of China Coast shipping firms, they could not risk a 
further deterioration in relations with Chinese elites as the majority of the goods they 
shipped were the goods of Chinese merchants.168 For the government, British minister 
Sir Miles Lampson lead the way in China, with his social gatherings that often 
involved drinking contests between British and Chinese guests.169 
Against this background the CA once again considered the question of inviting 
prominent Chinese guests to their annual dinners. Limited in the amount of Chinese 
guests they could invite by their London location they chose the best possible 
candidate—the Chinese ambassador.  The CA dinner represented perhaps the event 
with the most potential—at least in Britain—to display a new willingness to work with 
China through building social ties, and accepting prominent Chinese into British social 
circles. The admission of such Chinese guests to these dinners in this period would 
have been an important and deliberate public gesture by the CA and the firms and 
members it represented. 
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Despite these potential benefits the CA chairman noted the move would be 
problematic. There would have to be ‘restraint in the proceedings at the Dinner and 
more particularly restriction on the freedom of comments and criticisms in the 
speeches.’170 Furthermore, ‘it would be necessary to ask the Chinese representative 
himself to speak.’171 Despite this, he was in favour of the proposal. If they were to 
invite the Chinese Minister it would, he thought, be a decision ‘noted with pleasure by 
the Chinese, and possibly regarded as a gesture of friendly encouragement.’172 Yet 
after discussion, the Committee came to the same decision as they had four years 
before. Worried that the ‘character of the function would be greatly altered and the 
general freedom which had characterised it for so long, be much restricted’ the plan 
was rejected.173 The following year again saw the matter raised, though on this 
occasion it was adjourned for later consideration.174 
However the matter was not left to rest, somewhat unusually for the CA, which 
was normally quick to settle internal disputes. In 1931—the same year in which the 
CA changed its stance on the surrender of extraterritoriality and treaty privileges in 
China (discussed later in this chapter)—the matter came under further consideration. 
Unhappy that the matter had once again been brought to consideration, a Mr. Mackay 
stated his belief that the question had been settled two years ago and he remained of 
the same opinion: to invite the Chinese Ambassador would alter the whole character 
of the function, and for the worse. This view was resoundingly rebuffed by both 
Stanley H. Dodwell and G.W. Swire, eponymous heads of their own trading firms, 
former diplomat Sir Harry Fox and Association chairman Sidney F. Mayers 
(potentially representative of both Jardine Matheson and the HSBC through his role 
in the BCC).175 The Chairman, Mayers—who had a long history of pressing for co-
operation with Asian partners, aiming as early as 1912 to involve Japanese co-
operation in a BCC scheme—stated that, in fact, the ‘object in view’ was indeed to 
change the ‘complexion of the function.’ He believed that it was time to alter the 
‘quasi-political character of the dinner to a more social type of function’, with Stanley 
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Dodwell agreeing that ‘long speeches appeared to have grown into a custom, which, 
he believed, a large number of the ordinary members would be pleased to see 
discontinued.’ Both agreed that the Chinese minister should be invited in this case, a 
proposal carried after further discussion by a vote of twelve to five.176 
The decision fits consistently with the CA’s growing conscious effort to 
replicate moves being made by British business interests and the British government 
in China. By removing political speeches from the agenda, they could safely invite the 
Chinese minister and other Chinese guests without fear of offending them. 
Furthermore, a less formal function would allow greater chance of building true 
personal links with these men. In effect, this decision to on the surface de-politicise 
the dinner in fact allowed the occasions potential for political gain to increase. 
Alongside building new social links the CA dinners would offer a gesture to China as 
a whole that British business did indeed see Chinese as equals, and were willing to 
work alongside them on fair terms. This is perhaps summed up best by committee 
member H.G. Simms, who reflected that 
Times have changed and that it was desirable to review our attitude. From 
the trend of events it seemed that we were now to work with the Chinese, 
therefore let the Association show its willingness to co-operate by 
breaking with an old tradition and inviting the Chinese minister to the 
dinner.177 
 
Closing the discussion, G.W. Swire speculated that ‘the presence of the Chinese 
Minister at the dinner would be appreciated by the Chinese and in any case would be 
a beau geste’ and the matter was settled with the minority agreeing ‘at once’ to accept 
the will of the majority. 178 
Unfortunately, no reports survive of the annual dinners for 1931 and 1932, 
however, the Chinese Ambassador was present the following year. Given the honour 
of a toast, and requested to respond to the toast to the guests as a whole, His Excellency 
Guo Taiqi spoke at length upon the matter of Sino-British relationships, against the 
background of the Manchurian Crisis and the Japanese establishment of Manzhouguo, 
and closed his remarks by insisting that  
By associating me with the other guests and by asking me to return their 
thanks to-night you have made me feel that I am almost one of you—(hear, 
hear)—or that you are close to us. It is, indeed, a happy way, if I may say 
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so, of expressing the unity of purpose and the community of interest 
between the Governments and peoples of our two countries (Loud 
applause).179 
 
Although it had taken some time for the CA to adjust its social functions, and break 
with the traditions of the past, it did not require a long wait before the new direction 
adopted by the committee bore fruit. From this point onwards, the Chinese Minister 
was a frequent guest at the Association’s larger functions, as well as smaller luncheons 
held by the committee.180 
Emphasising the new shift in relations, the CA’s reception of 1936 saw a 
number of Chinese guests invited, a further improvement upon only hosting the 
current Chinese ambassador. At a function which was ‘against anyone remembering 
their officialdom’ the ambassador was soon reportedly ‘dancing with that gracefulness 
which, with the art of perfect speech making, he imbibed at Pennsylvania 
University.’181 Quickly, it seems, both the CA and the Chinese ambassador had 
adopted to new efforts to build social relations, and were at ease in one another’s 
company. Much envied by the ladies present, too, was the ‘black silk dress 
embroidered with large silver flowers, with short sleeves but high collar in Chinese 
style’ worn by Mrs. Sun, who the writer noted ‘always wears Chinese clothes and I 
am told that when at Ascot last week, she was the centre of all eyes.’182  
In a short time—only ten years—the CA had come some distance, from 
regarding Chinese guests as ‘undesirable’ to joining them in dancing and envying their 
fashions.  By doing so, the CA had made what efforts it could—though limited due to 
its London location—to build its own personal links with prominent Chinese, and fall 
in to line with the new wave of British policy encouraged after the May Thirtieth 
incident of 1925. 
Overall, the CA’s social gatherings were among the Association’s most 
successful activities not least because the gatherings were largely successful in 
balancing social with political elements. The Association continued to entertain for 
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political purposes throughout the period under consideration, whilst also retaining the 
popularity of the gatherings for those members interested predominantly in 
maintaining some form of sociability. Only over the question of admitting Chinese 
guests to the annual dinners was there any major disagreement over the form of the 
Association’s social events, and even this was eventually settled without great 
contention. Through the official guests invited, we also gain some of our first insights 
into the political pressure points chosen by the CA. How these evolved beyond the 
CA’s dinners to become potentially useful political tools, however, requires further 
investigation. 
 
The China Association as a political pressure group 
In order to best understand the other methods of imparting political pressure available 
to the CA, it is necessary to approach the question in two ways. Firstly, a brief outline 
will be given of the methods and pressure points (alternatively called access points) 
available through which the CA could hope to guide political policy and offer feedback 
regarding the commercial environment, and how the CA developed relationships with 
these (beyond the use of social events as discussed above).183 Following this 
exploration, a number case studies will be investigated to examine how these methods 
were applied practically, and to offer further insight into the operations of the CA and 
who directed its aims. Assessing the CA’s overall success in its political lobbying, as 
previously mentioned, is something not undertaken due to the constraints of this study. 
Firstly, we must return to the key pressure point outlined at the Association’s 
formation by founder Alfred Dent, the Foreign Office. The British government 
departments were not large in this period, and turned to other sources, especially at the 
periphery of British interests, for efficient means of gathering information, be they 
bankers, newspaper correspondents, academics or otherwise.184 Although this was not 
necessarily the case in China, this nonetheless ensured the government was open to 
receiving information through more informal networks, with business interests in the 
City of London noted as one key source.185 As such the CA, receiving despatches and 
telegrams through business contacts and its branch structure in Asia, offered a valuable 
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information channel.186 The CA wasted no time in ensuring the Foreign Office were 
aware of their existence, forwarding information received from Japan over treaty 
negotiations in 1890 to the Foreign Secretary, along with ‘a statement of the Objects, 
Rules and Regulations of the China Association’.187 From then on, correspondence 
was exchanged regularly, and officers of the CA were often received in person at the 
Foreign Office.188   
The creation of this link allowed the CA in London to establish a working 
relationship with the Foreign Office, and through it, a channel to offer their views to 
British officials in China. Although direct references from the British government to 
its value (or indeed, its lack of value) are limited, with such views not often recorded 
in Foreign Office files, glimpses can be seen. As early as 1896 British consul Byron 
Brenan undertook a tour to investigate war damage in areas of British settlement 
affected by the Sino-Japanese war at the suggestion of the CA.189 By 1905 Ernest 
Satow, then British Minister for China, and a man who held an ardent dislike for the 
CA, was forced to admit they held at least some influence, complaining that the CA 
was ‘frequently too much listened to’ allowing them to be successful, for example, in 
being ‘the prime movers to have troops landed in Shanghai in 1900.’190 Later efforts, 
such as those in 1923, for example, saw the CA suggest to the Foreign Office that 
railway police in China should be placed under European officers. The Foreign Office 
considered this a valuable suggestion, and forwarded this immediately to Peking.191 A 
mutual trust seems to have developed, evidenced, for example, by chairman S.F. 
Mayers, and President Sir George Macdonogh being invited to view, and offer their 
comments upon, a confidential draft treaty composed by the Foreign Office dealing 
with extraterritoriality in advance of it being signed in 1931—we will return to this 
later.192 As of 1939, and with conflict raging in East Asia, the Foreign Office was even 
prepared to allow the CA to utilise its channels of communication for commercial 
needs. A message, which the Foreign Office believed ‘to be in some commercial code’ 
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was sent from the acting consul-general in Tientsin to the CA London committee via 
the Foreign Office’s own telegram service. Unfortunately the CA archives hold no 
copies of a cypher, and so the message remains unintelligible. 193 The CA was proud 
of its closeness of their relationship with the Foreign Office, and assured members 
representations to the Foreign Office received the ‘greatest consideration’ and ‘utmost 
attention.’194 Contemporaries to the CA, the American Asiatic Association, similarly 
expressed the view that the relations between the CA and the Foreign Office were 
‘intimate and mutually advantageous in respect of the collection and diffusion of 
accurate information.’195 The above is certainly not intended to show CA influence 
over policy—this ultimately remains obscured— but even as only a minute sample of 
the correspondence and communications undertaken certainly evidences an active 
relationship between the two that gave the CA the chance to offer input as part of a 
wider policy community. 
The relationship between the CA and the Colonial Office was one used less 
often. In smaller matters a few snapshots suggest that the CA was again, as with the 
Foreign Office, invited to participate in policy discussions. When an informal meeting 
was called at short notice to discuss an Anglo-Japanese convention relating to trade 
marks in China, for example, CA representatives were invited to attend.196 
Furthermore, and as discussed in chapter four, the Colonial Office subscribed a small 
sum towards the running expenses of the CA’s school of Chinese. Ultimately, 
however, it seems the CA was largely excluded from the department’s policy 
discussion process on matters of importance. A decision was taken to return the port 
of Wei-hai-wei to China, for example, despite CA complaints.197  
Turning to other government departments we find more active relationships. 
During the First World War, for example, the Board of trade requested of the CA a 
short memorandum, no longer than seven paragraphs, outlining their view of the future 
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of British trade in China. Such was the importance attached to this opportunity by the 
CA that the meeting called to draft this document was, to this point in the Association’s 
history, the longest ever held.198 The Second World War saw the CA requested to 
provide the War Office with a list of British men who spoke good Chinese in order to 
aid the department, as well as offering ‘expert opinion upon the constitution of food-
parcels’ that were to be dispatched to East Asia from Australia.199 Alongside this the 
Ministry of Information also appealed to the CA for suggestions regarding sending 
propaganda to China in 1945.200 
Overall, these relationships between the CA and departments of the British 
government seem to have been profitable and often mutually so. Information of a 
confidential nature was exchanged on a regular basis, and the CA was made privy to 
items of importance not only as a matter of courtesy, but also to offer feedback to the 
departments. Such developments as these show how such a relationship between a 
voluntary association and a governmental department could develop, with the 
Association offering input and feedback through its role as an insider interest group.201 
This was one of the primary day to day functions of the CA, commenting on 
commercial minutiae to relevant government departments in order to make the voice 
of commerce heard. Whilst this may not have amounted to shaping the overarching 
direction of British policy in East Asia it offered the CA a voice which could seek to 
advise the British government and with which it might seek to gain concessions. At a 
more foundational level this illustrates how profoundly voluntary associations could 
intersect with, and potentially influence, civic and political life—and in doing so see 
the CA fulfil the role of a political pressure—or interest—group, whilst also 
maintaining a host of other functions.  
Alongside these collective relationships the CA held, it is also important to 
note that, primarily as a result of their long careers in China—and in some cases in the 
employment of the British government—individual members also had connections 
which could be of benefit to the CA as a whole. Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, for example, 
retained strong enough links from his career as a colonial administrator to be able to 
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inform the CA committee, confidentially, of the position of the Foreign Office, 
Colonial Office, and Admiralty regarding the return of Wei-hai-wei to China, and, as 
noted above, of pending Naval appointments to the China station.202 Similarly, later 
president Sir John Jordan retained a number of links from his career as a diplomat to 
prominent Chinese figures with whom he regularly met.203 And strikingly, the 1906 
dinner to Duke Tsai Tze saw Lord Fitzmaurice, the Parliamentary Undersecretary for 
Foreign Affairs, inform the assembled guests that much that he knew of China had 
been learned from the chairman of the CA, a result of the two having lived in the same 
town and occasionally journeying together to London.204 
The value of these personal connections and networks the CA had access to 
and could draw upon was on display during the renegotiation of British commercial 
treaties with China in the wake of the Boxer uprising. The renegotiation was to be 
handled by three men, two of whom were connected to the CA.205 The lead negotiator, 
Sir James Mackay, had long been a friend of prominent founding CA member Sir 
Thomas Sutherland.206 Meanwhile, assisting Mackay was Charles Dudgeon, former 
chairman of the CA’s Shanghai Branch, who later served for a number of years on the 
general committee in London, including two years as chairman.207 Notwithstanding 
Dudgeon’s later disagreements with the CA’s London committee, discussed in chapter 
two, by a combination of personal links and the prominence of their members in East 
Asia the CA was able to have men it knew well at this critical negotiation—a fact that 
made Sir Thomas Sutherland—though deeply unhappy about the Boxer uprising 
itself—cautiously optimistic for the future of British trade in China.208 
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While the types of connections we have now examined—both formal and 
personal, public and more private—were traceably utilised and useful, others, 
although available, were less regularly employed or even consciously avoided. This 
includes three in particular, namely (1) efforts made to gain representation in the 
House of Commons; (2) efforts made to build links to political parties and; (3) efforts 
made to educate the wider electorate 
From its inception, the CA attempted to maintain some representation in the 
House of Commons, either through members of the Association—with notable 
longstanding members including William Keswick, Thomas Sutherland, E.A. 
Sassoon, Gershom Stewart and H.W. Looker taking positions as MPs themselves—or 
through maintaining a relationship with an outside MP such as R.A. Yerburgh.209 
Compared to earlier efforts such as those of returnees linked to the East India 
Company, this was, however, a limited effort. At no point were more than three active 
members of the CA MP’s themselves, and the years 1924 and 1929 to 1955 saw the 
CA with no direct link in the Commons.210 While the establishment of a China Bloc 
in the Commons was celebrated in 1898, links with the body were not actively sought. 
A dinner proposed to be held purely to invite the Bloc as official guests was rejected 
in the same year.211 After 1929 the Association was dependent on MP John Wardlaw-
Milne as a contact, and any possible later connections to MPs after he lost his seat in 
1945 were not recorded.212 Still, by maintaining some links the CA retained the ability 
to have questions asked in the House, if they felt it necessary. More often than not, 
however, they believed they would be better served not asking questions except as a 
last resort. Having placed so much effort into building a friendly relationship with 
government departments, they seem to have had little desire to publicly embarrass 
them by questioning their decisions in the Commons.  
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A later movement saw the CA aim to forge relations with wider political 
parties. This began in 1946, with a luncheon at Chatham house between CA and 
Labour Party representatives followed by the CA secretary forwarding copies of CA 
bulletins to the Parliamentary Labour Party, for distribution amongst members 
interested in East Asia.213 By 1947 this relationship had been formalised, with the 
creation of a Far Eastern group in the Labour Party, who met with representatives of 
the CA.214 This is a clear indication of how the changing nature of the China trade 
forced the CA to evolve in order to retain connections which might lend influence. 
With the establishment of the PRC government in October 1949, the Foreign Office 
could do little. Links to the British labour party may have been seen as a potentially 
profitable new channel to exploit in Sino-British relations, even though such 
connections are typically regarded as unprofitable for pressure groups as they align 
the association with a single side of the political spectrum. Indeed, this seems to have 
been the case and in 1954, amidst the ‘Golden Years’ of the relationship between the 
British left and the PRC, the CA were in a position to entertain Mr. Atlee and Mr. 
Burke of the Labour Party to a luncheon to put forward their views on the current state 
of British trade with China and their opinions on how it might move forward.215 This 
meeting occurred shortly before Attlee, Burke and a delegation from the Labour party 
travelled to China at the invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai to visit the PRC, to see 
behind what has been called the ‘bamboo curtain.’216  There were limits to the links 
between the CA and the British left, however, and in 1954 the CA would also support 
the foundation of the official Sino-British Trade Council, rather than pursue links with 
the communist leaning British Council for the Promotion of International Trade.217 
Furthermore, the CA were aware that before the House of Commons could 
prove a useful tool to alter British policy in China, the electorate as a whole would 
have to be educated as to the current situation in East Asia, allowing British actions in 
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China to take a much more prominent position in the national interest.218 Although 
attempting to do this was considered on a number of occasions—most notably, as 
already discussed, when the Shanghai branch threatened revolt in 1905—it was one 
which attracted little attention from the CA. In 1899, a lecturing tour was rejected as 
financially impractical and beyond the scope of the Association, but also undesirable 
as they did not wish, again, to contradict the British government in public.219 
Moreover, in 1913, the decision was taken not to produce a journal together with the 
American Asiatic Association.220 Such a move was seen as problematic because it 
would likely have been limited in its readership, serving primarily to inform their own 
wider membership of their activities, as opposed to the wider public.221 The suggestion 
to do so seems to have, however, piqued the interest of the committee, and the 
Association did make a small effort inspired by this, with a circular published monthly 
in the London and China Telegraph outlining the recent efforts of the CA 
committee.222 The employment of E.M. Gull in 1925 as secretary has been suggested 
as a turning point for the CA in seeking greater publicity, but any change seems to 
have been minimal.223 An appeal for funding in 1927 from a Captain Pogson, who was 
intending to showcase a series of films in London espousing the benefits of the British 
presence in Chinese treaty ports, was rejected, and as noted below by 1932 the CA 
still prized its relationship with the Foreign Office over ‘publicity campaigns’.224  
It is, of course, possible, and worthy of consideration here that the CA did not 
seek to educate the general public because they believed that other bodies were already 
undertaking such work. The CA was certainly grateful when the China League offered 
to promote the CA’s goals during a lecturing tour in Lancashire in 1900.225 In 1907 
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the China Society, too, was founded in London ‘to acquire and diffuse a better 
knowledge of the Chinese people, their ancient and pacific civilization, their history 
and folklore, and their social and economic conditions, past and present.’226 Some 
crossover was certainly evident in the membership of the groups, although the names 
noted as the founders of the China Society, which include Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, 
Sir John Jordan, George Jamieson, Walter Hillier and Byron Brenan who are all 
mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, are all those of men with a background in the 
service of the British government in China. Merchants, it seems, had little interest in 
the body, indicative, likely, of the earlier noted conscious efforts of much of the British 
population in China before 1925 to remain as distant as possible from Chinese culture 
in order to reinforce ideas of racial separation and superiority.227 As of 1913 the China 
Society was gathering monthly to host lectures in London, and continued to do so for 
a substantial period of time.228 An exhibition of modern Chinese painting, held jointly 
‘under the auspices of the China Association and the China Society’, is one of the few 
examples of the CA ever moving into this sphere and lending its backing, and making 
an attempt to increase public awareness of China.229 An event of considerable size, it 
showcased some 230 paintings, with the catalogue containing prefaces by Chinese 
ambassador Guo Taiqi, as well as Liu Haisu and British Chinese art expert Laurence 
Binyon, and paved the way for an even larger and highly renowned exhibition of 
Chinese art later in the year.230 By 1947, however, the society was experiencing 
financial difficulties, and the CA secretary wrote to the committee suggesting the CA 
support the body in some way, potentially allowing the society to use the CA offices 
as a base of operations.231 This seems not to have occurred, but the following year the 
CA did offer support by attempting to make its members aware of, and encouraging 
their subscription to, the society.232 Although none of this evidence is conclusive in 
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proving the CA avoided such educational roles for this reason, it certainly seems the 
CA was at least happy to have other bodies undertaking work linked to China in the 
wider Associational scene, although these were few and far between. Ultimately, 
however, The CA concluded repeatedly that the British public cared little for the 
situation in China. Combined with their stance of not contradicting the British 
government in public, the CA thus consciously decided, early in its existence, that 
educating the wider electorate was not within its remit. This, too, may have contributed 
to merchants showing little interest in the China Society. 
It was also due to this reluctance to contradict the British government in public 
that the CA made little use of newspapers as an outlet for their views, except, as we 
shall see, as a last resort. This was despite the fact that the CA’s views could gain 
substantial traction in the press. When correspondence between the CA and the 
Foreign Office regarding the proposed 1894 treaty with Japan was made available for 
publication it was discussed in The Leeds Mercury, Morning Post, Standard, Dundee 
Courier and Cheshire Observer.233 Conscious of the value of their links to government 
departments, however, the CA were as likely to support the British government 
publically as criticise it, telegraphing Reuters, for example, to espouse their view in 
1898 that  
The China Association are fully conscious of the grave state of affairs in 
the far East, but they have no doubt her Majesty’s Government are quite 
alive to the magnitude of the British interests in China, both commercial 
and political, and they have every confidence that those interests will be 
protected.  
 
The telegram received a fair amount of publicity, and was reprinted or mentioned in 
the Glasgow Herald, Freeman’s Journal, Morning Post and Standard. 234  
Overall, the CA remained throughout the period under study of the opinion 
expressed by Cecil Clementi Smith in 1905 that ‘as long as Government is conducted 
in the form in which it is in the present time, more is to be got by friendly relations 
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with the Foreign Office than by attacking it in the public press.’235 Such a view 
continued, certainly, until at least 1932 when chairman S.F. Mayers reminded the 
committee that publicity was not an option due to ‘the difficulty of reconciling 
publicity campaigns with the close relations which had existed with the Foreign Office 
for many years. As things were, the Association was always able to consult with the 
Foreign Office at any time and to be informed of its views.’236 
Indicative of these approaches of the Association is their response to a single 
event of importance—the Boxer Uprising. As the situation developed the CA were 
unhappy with the actions and responses of the British government. As such they first 
sought to offer advice in private, for example that Viceroys in the Yangtze region 
should be given British government backing to defeat the Boxers, and protected from 
the reprisals of Peking should they do so. When the Foreign Office disagreed, the CA’s 
committee permitted R.A. Yerburgh to raise the matter in Parliament. When the 
Shanghai branch informed London that the conflict had become a civil war this was 
also communicated to the Foreign Office privately, with the CA choosing not to raise 
the matter in Parliament at all. Finally, the CA committee were deeply unenthusiastic 
about the appointment of Ernest Satow as British Minister in Peking at such a delicate 
time, with the chairman referring to Satow as ‘clever as a literary man and student; but 
in his official capacity… worse than useless.’ Secretary R.S. Gundry had attempted to 
place a paragraph to espouse this view in The Times (though this was rejected by the 
editor) but that seems to have been an individual decision. Collectively, the committee 
had decided that the press should only be used as a ‘last resort’ and instead the 
Chairman called on Sir Thomas Sanderson at the Foreign Office  (with the CA’s usual 
Foreign Office contact F.L. Bertie on holiday) to put forward the CA’s views.237 Even 
when unhappy with the conduct of the British government during a major crisis, the 
CA were unwilling to air their views in public, preferring instead a policy of 
negotiation and discussion with the relevant British government departments. 
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Directing political pressure: Metropole or periphery pulls? 
Although these examples document how the CA operated as a political pressure group, 
they do not reveal, beyond small glimpses, the direction of the policy the CA wished 
to pursue and from where in the Association the motivations to act originated. Notably, 
they leave us unaware of who was directing the CA, be this individuals, firms, or a 
collection of interests, something that must be known to understand the Association 
in the frame of a political pressure, or interest, group. To establish that we must instead 
focus on a series of short case studies highlighting the CA’s responses to a series of 
major questions and aims which appear prominently throughout the Association’s 
records. These records are often extensive: the annual report for 1909, for example, 
contains a 41-page summary of issues, plus a further 177 pages of correspondence and 
other supplements, making reference to some 22 matters related to China and East 
Asia. Of these 22 matters the CA actively pursued 15. Precluded from undertaking a 
complete appraisal here by constraints of the thesis, three key representative examples 
are selected here to serve as case studies. These are examples reflecting CA interests 
that drew the focus of the Association for substantial periods of time, and received 
much of its attention. One—opium trading, and its decline—related to expatriate 
business interests; another example—the development of Shanghai—was primarily a 
settler aim, and offers insight into how settler and expatriate concerns could align and 
the relative levels of influence these groups held in the CA; the final example—
extraterritoriality and its retention or surrender—affected both settler and expatriate 
interests and shows how the CA moved from a defensive position to one in line with 
British government efforts for progressive negotiation after 1925 to see 
extraterritoriality surrendered in due course. Let us consider the examples in turn. 
 
The China Association and the opium trade 
The first of these examples, the opium trade, was one in which the CA were, for much 
of their life, defined by their inactivity rather than their activity. The trade was, by its 
nature, one in which expatriate and multinational firms were concerned, shipping the 
drug from India to Shanghai. Yet while the main shippers of the drug—Sassoons—
were by this point a true multinational, headquartered in London with outposts 
throughout East Asia, they were not as influential as other CA backers whom we have 
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already discussed, such as the HSBC, Jardine Matheson, or Swires.238 Opium, then, 
provides a key window through which we can view the true hierarchy of power within 
the CA amongst expatriate firms. Opium also raised questions for the CA over how 
far it could, or should, become involved in a controversial moral question, and how 
best to protect the Association’s image while still supporting the needs of its members. 
British trade in China had been founded on the importation of opium, 
beginning with the First Opium War (1839-42), with the importation of the drug 
peaking the 1880s.239 Around this time cheaper Chinese grown opium had supplanted 
British and American imports, and by the time of the CA’s involvement the trade was 
in a state of further reduction given British agreements to reduce import levels as long 
as China halted home-grown production in effect.240  As such its current importance 
to many CA firms was not large. Some major CA backers such as the HSBC and 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China continued to hold an interest, lending to 
merchants to trade in opium, but as we shall see were happy to see the trade reduced 
as long as prices remained consistent. The P&O line, once major shippers of the drug, 
had diversified its interests by this time and did not mourn the demise of the trade, 
shipping only a small amount of opium by 1900.241 Other key backers such as Jardine 
Matheson had long since moved away from the opium trade, preferring to deal in less 
controversial business sectors.242 As such, much of the complaint over the matter came 
from CA member firm David Sassoon. Sassoon had been a late entrant to the trade, 
but by offering production credits to growers had come to dominate.243  Despite the 
Sassoon’s personal contacts (three family members were friends of King Edward VII) 
they also sought the help of the CA to argue for continuation of the trade.244 Yet they 
were a firm who held minor influence within the Association. Although they offered 
funding consistently, this was nowhere near the levels of those who wished the CA to 
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remain outside of the opium question. This saw the CA take a stance of supporting 
controlled reduction in the trade, in line with international agreements made in 1907 
to see the trade ended in 10 years, provided this was done with commitment and 
fairness by all those involved.245 Alongside this, the CA were keen to avoid engaging 
in moral questions regarding opium, and unwilling to risk damaging their reputation 
and image. 
An early involvement in 1902 is symptomatic of the CA’s attempts to remain 
aloof from this ongoing debate about the morality of the drug.246 When the Hongkong 
committee telegraphed London to protest against a newly imposed tax on opium, the 
London committee simply forwarded their complaints to the Foreign Office, making 
no comment themselves.247 It was not until 1907 that the London committee outlined 
their own position on the matter. In reaction to efforts by the Viceroy of Nanking 
attempting to create a monopoly of the trade, excluding foreign interests, the CA in 
London sent a memorandum to the Foreign Office outlining its opposition.248 The CA 
stressed, however, that their opposition was in response to the breaking of treaties, 
rather than any tacit support of the opium trade, insisting that they remained above the 
‘controversial’ moral aspect. Indeed, so cautious were the CA of avoiding a debate 
over morals that when a letter on the opium question was published by the China 
Missions Emergency Committee to which the CA took exception—believing it 
reflected badly on the image of the China trade as a whole—they refrained from 
complaint for fear that a ‘reply might invite rejoinder and controversy of the kind was 
quite useless.’249  
Indeed, the annual reports for the following years continue to present a picture 
of a restraint. The CA repeatedly outlined their support for agreements to see the India-
China opium trade slowly and consistently reduced. Although they still felt the need 
to become involved at what they perceived as Chinese transgressions by 1910, the CA 
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was of the view that the issue had much improved.250 The CA were confident from 
that reports from trusted British officials that Chinese cultivation of opium was 
decreasing, in line with imports, and saw this as a fair reduction and a commendable 
effort to end opium usage by all interested parties, an outcome they saw as important 
despite the damage this would cause to David Sassoon. 
In 1912, however, the CA’s position took a rapid turn. The new republican 
government of China took a more coercive approach to removing opium from China.  
Addicts were executed, owners of opium dens were beaten, and entire villages that 
refused to stop growing the drug were burned to the ground.251 More importantly from 
an economic perspective, the new government seized opium stocks before they could 
be sold. This broke agreements to see opium imports slowly phased out, and attracted 
a great deal of CA attention. They complained to the Foreign Office, arguing that the 
Chinese ‘motive is to secure a monopoly of supply to the native grower and a 
monopoly of taxation to themselves’ and suggested various solutions. The opium 
question took up 64 pages of the Association’s annual report appendix this year, 
comprising various correspondence between committees, firms and the Foreign 
Office, summaries of the ‘situation in the provinces’, and even a reproduction of the 
articles that relating to opium in the new penal code. A reproduction of a memorandum 
by R.S. Gundry—although made in his own name, rather than that of the CA—filled 
considerable space, and even dared defend the morality of the trade, insisting ‘self-
righteous’ critics were unaware that ‘the poppy was, as a matter of fact, grown in China 
a thousand years ago’, had been used for medicinal purposes for some time, and that, 
anyway, ‘Opium-smoking seems to have been introduced by way of Formosa, during 
the Dutch occupation of that island’ almost as though this removed any British guilt 
in the matter.252 
In searching for the reason for the sudden change in the CA’s stance, one 
motive stands out: with the republican government stopping sales of opium entirely, 
stocks would increase rapidly unless production was similarly reduced. When a CA 
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request to the Foreign Office that the Indian government halt exports was rejected, this 
became inevitable. With stocks building to such high levels, opium already purchased 
from India by merchants would be devalued. Not only would this harm merchants, but 
it would cause a serious loss for the banks who had lent them the capital to purchase 
the opium originally. Both the HSBC and Chartered Bank—key Association 
backers—endorsed a complaint to the Foreign Office on this matter, reprinted in the 
CA’s annual report.253 With large, sudden losses to major CA backers, as opposed to 
the steady reduction of the trade affecting a minority of CA member firms, the CA 
chose to act on a much greater scale. Thankfully for CA interests, 1912 saw the Indian 
government agree to reduce exports—and indeed the last opium shipped from India to 
China sailed from Bombay in February 1913.254 With a similar agreement from 
merchants not to flood the market once sales restarted, the investment of Far Eastern 
banks were safe, as British merchants in China slowly disposed of their stocks over 
the coming years at greatly inflated prices.255 With this outcome the CA allowed the 
matter to rest, although they continued to update members on the opium trade until 
1923. 
It is clear that the CA could easily be mobilised rapidly when the interests of 
major backers were threatened. This did not extend to smaller members, for whom 
they would not risk damaging their image, and in these cases they would only act when 
they were certain that their actions would be seen as a defence of treaties, rather than 
a moral judgement over the opium trade and its continuation. 
 
The China Association and Shanghai  
While concerns such as those discussed above provided key contexts to the activities 
of the CA because they affected their corporate members, we must also investigate 
two key occasions in which the interests of big business overlapped with those of other 
groups—notably, those groups from which the CA’s branches would draw their 
membership. First, this includes efforts relating to the Shanghai International 
Settlement; and secondly the CA’s response to British efforts to normalise relations 
with China after 1925. Before then, during the CA’s early life, settler and expatriate 
interests in China retained much greater potential to align. With Shanghai an outpost 
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for expatriate, multinational business, CA involvement with concerns relating to 
Shanghai is certainly not unexpected. Yet as we have seen by the threatened split in 
1905, the Association’s London and Shanghai committees were certainly formed by 
two distinct types of British migrants in China. Their competing interests saw a 
complex relationship develop between the CA in London and Shanghai. 
Some of the earliest CA involvement with Shanghai has already been 
discussed, in their protest at the combination of the posts of chief judge and consul 
general. 1896, also saw them urge upon new minister to China Claude Macdonald the 
need for extension to the Shanghai International Settlement, a representation made 
briefly in person before his departure.256 When both settler and expatriate interests 
were threatened by the Boxer uprising, the CA urged HM government to protect 
Shanghai, ‘the metropolis of foreign interests and the representative of foreign 
prestige.’257 1903 also saw the CA congratulate the SMC in the annual report for 
maintaining the right to try ‘native residents’ first at the mixed court.258 While 
supportive of Shanghai, however, these efforts did not greatly extend beyond pressing 
for the defence of the city and maintenance of the situation already extant. 
Of greater interest are the moves the CA made after 1905. As a result of the 
threatened split by the Shanghai branch, the chairmanship of the CA was handed to a 
series of representatives of the Shanghai firm Ilbert & Co. As noted in chapter two, 
they felt they could not achieve all of their goals, restricted as they were by the 
combined force of the HSBC and Jardine Matheson in the CA. Still, the CA’s activity 
for the following years suggests they at least made some headway in supporting their 
interests and moving the CA to become a group which pushed more aggressively for 
the extension of Shanghai.  
Indeed, the period between 1906 and 1913 saw a marked change not only in the 
policies the CA pursued, but also the methods used and the tone chosen to refer to 
Shanghai. In a long letter the CA wrote to the Foreign Office to outline their views on 
the current status on the settlement; 
Showing no desire to purify her own corrupt fiscal administration, [China] 
attempts to meddle with the one efficiently managed department in the 
Empire… Having neglected, during fifty years, to emulate the sanitary and 
police arrangements of the Foreign Settlement at Shanghai; neglecting still 
to give proof, by the simplest object lesson, of capacity for judicial and 
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municipal reform; failing to control the criminal classes who, attracted by 
the wealth and prosperity of Shanghai, cluster in the adjacent area under 
native jurisdiction…her [China’s] officials intrigue, jealously, against the 
superior administration which foreigners have created …259 
 
In response to these perceived failings, the CA became heavily involved in efforts for 
the expansion of the international settlement. 
In an attempt to gain British government backing the CA first focused on 
representing to the Foreign Office the current problems they saw with Chinese 
administration of neighbouring districts. In addition to those mentioned above, the CA 
noted clashes between Chinese and Municipal Police due to disputes over the 
boundaries of their jurisdiction and stressed that Chapei, an area they wished to see 
incorporated into the international settlement, was ‘largely inhabited by the lowest 
class of native, whose beggar hovels constitute a menace to the health of the portions 
of the settlements adjoining.’ Another district was described to the Foreign Office as 
‘the rendezvous of lawless characters—river thieves, salt smugglers, loafers, ruffians 
and pirates, whose crimes, including several murders, fill a large space in the 
municipal records; it is absolutely essential for the peace of the Settlements that the 
lawlessness of this district be suppressed.’ The only way to do this, the CA insisted, 
was to extend the International Settlement to their proposed new boundary—that of 
an already extant railway line. After consideration the Foreign Office informed the CA 
that ‘His Majesty’s Minister at Peking … addressed a Note to the Wai-wu-pu [the 
department of foreign affairs, or Zongli Yamen] asking for an extension up to the 
Shanghai-Nanking railway Line of the Shanghai International Settlement, on account 
of the insanitary condition of the Chinese suburb which now occupies that area.’ 
Despite persuading the Foreign Office to align with their view, however, little progress 
was made, nor could it be made, without the agreement of the Chinese government.260 
By 1910, the CA began to present new arguments. They informed the Foreign 
Office that the Chinese administration was now actively organising to obstruct the 
works of gas and water companies.261 Alongside this, they complained about the 
insanitary conditions of Chapei spreading, and with this the number of plague infested 
rats increasing. The Foreign Office agreed that these arguments were ‘more cogent’ 
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than before, and so chose to seek American co-operation to try and expedite the 
expansion. Ultimately, this too failed. 262 
The next CA steps saw the Shanghai branch approach American and German 
associations in order to seek and establish co-operation to achieve progress; this was 
done with the full backing of the London Committee. The CA representative in the 
House of Commons, Gershom Stewart, also asked a question in Parliament on the 
matter, a tactic that, as we have seen, was rarely used by the CA. Other moves, also 
out of character with, and more aggressive than the pre-1905 CA, saw a suggestion 
that Britain refuse to recognise the new Chinese Republic until an extension was 
agreed, and to simply retain control of Chapei after it had been occupied by a naval 
contingent deployed to protect Shanghai in 1913.263 Both were rejected by the Foreign 
Office. It took until 1915 before the CA could report success, with an agreement 
reached for the extension of the international settlement, on what the CA had to admit 
was ‘a liberal scale.’264  
In this period, before attempts were made to normalise Sino-British relations, 
the CA could pursue aggressive goals that harmed China’s sovereignty. Furthermore, 
it shows the CA were not acting purely in the interests of the metropole who were only 
interested in railway development, mining, and later, financial loans to China. They 
were acting to protect and enhance settler interests at the request of their Shanghai 
branch, and, importantly for our understanding of the Association, doing so most 
energetically in a short period after 1905 when control of the Association’s 
chairmanship was passed to representatives of a Shanghai, rather than a multinational, 
firm. For a period, at least, the CA was representative to some extents of all British 
China interests, and with this took a much more proactive stance, embracing wider 
methods and less reliant on co-operation with the Foreign Office.  This, however, was 
not something that could continue. Although they would oppose the increase of 
Chinese representation on the SMC after World War One, this was a minor aim, and 
ended in 1932—some four years after the SMC agreed to the election of its first 
Chinese councillors.265 Why this was so is made clear by the next case study, which 
explores and documents the Association’s aims changing to mirror the wider British 
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policy of normalisation of Sino-British relations after 1925, as well as a return to co-
operation with the Foreign Office and the British government. 
 
The China Association and extraterritoriality 
Indeed, in assessing who held control within the CA there is one key example that 
cannot be ignored—the proposed changes to the system of extraterritoriality under 
which British subjects in China lived. This system ensured that British subjects were 
not under control of Chinese law, and instead under British jurisdiction. This was one 
of the key pillars upon which the British settler presence and ‘informal empire’ rested 
in China.266 Reform of this system was to be led by co-operation between the British 
government and specifically chosen major firms and interests, including key CA 
members Swires and Jardine Matheson—we have already seen how the CA took the 
opportunity at social functions to express their support for such changes.267 The wider 
reaction of the CA to such plans is critical to understanding who was shaping the CA’s 
goals and direction, as well as informing us of how the British business community in 
London co-operated with the government’s aims.  
This reconfiguration of the British presence, and British interests, in China 
began following the events of 1925, when the impetus for reform was accelerated as 
a result of the May Thirtieth Movement. Before this, at the time of the Washington 
Conference of 1921, which ultimately recommended the system of extraterritoriality 
be re-examined, the CA in both Shanghai and London believed the system should 
remain in place, with their views being ‘fully expressed to the Foreign Office.’268 Over 
the course of the following years a similar view prevailed, with the current situation 
in China noted repeatedly as their reason for opposing negotiations on the matter. In a 
meeting at the Board of Trade, for example, in 1926, W.B. Kennet and Stanley H. 
Dodwell gave evidence on behalf of the CA, and lamented, amongst other problems 
‘illegal tolls extracted by the military, who were little better than brigands.’269 This 
stance mirrored, in spirit if not details, the official stance of the British government 
which acted pragmatically in the period, on one hand returning the concession at 
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Hankow—to the CA’s dismay—whilst also dispatching troops to China in the form of 
the Shanghai Defence Force and ensuring extraterritoriality would continue for larger 
enclaves such as Shanghai for the time being.270 More extreme voices who advocated 
a radical change to British policy, such as G.W. Swire, would have to wait to alter the 
CA’s view, although a slight alteration is perhaps evident in the response of the CA to 
a speech by Sir Frederick Whyte in 1928 when they agreed that China must be 
supported in its efforts to create a strong government.271 
For the CA, then, their stance on extraterritoriality did not alter immediately 
with the events of 30 May 1925, instead it took a more directly threatening event to 
trigger change. This came nearly five years later, when the CA were shocked—as were 
the British, French and American governments—to learn of a Chinese national 
government mandate proposing to abolish it immediately, on 1 January 1930, although 
the chosen date would pass without any action taken to back the announcement.272 A 
joint committee of CA and China Committee members was formed, and met on 4 
December 1929.273 It was agreed that it was, still, ‘impossible, at this juncture’ that 
extraterritoriality might be surrendered. A subtle change in the CA’s view was, 
however, apparent with the Association now ‘satisfied that when China’s laws were 
completed they would, as laws, be suitable for foreigners.’ A number of interim 
solutions were considered by the CA and China Committee, who decided to back a 
scheme that would have seen international courts appointed by The Hague try 
foreigners instead of allowing this to happen in Chinese courts.274 This response was 
outlined in a report forwarded to the Foreign Office and was followed by a meeting 
between the combined committee and Foreign Office representatives in December of 
1929.275 
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Unfortunately, what transpired at the meeting is not recorded. However, by the 
next AGM in March 1930 it is clear that the events of the previous year had acted as 
a catalyst to modify the CA’s views. The CA reported positively on ‘the British 
government’s ideas of a progressive solution’ and at the AGM chairman Stanley 
Dodwell noted that while the issues of extraterritoriality were ones full of ‘explosive 
elements’ that conciliation and negotiation were undoubtedly preferable to the state 
‘Six months ago [when] it looked as though the Chinese were advancing towards them 
literally with lighted torches in their hands.’276 Although it had taken something of a 
shock to see the CA’s view realigned, they were no longer averse to negotiation on the 
matter with the Chinese. For big business interests a rapid upheaval would be 
damaging. In this manner, they could postpone the inevitable and give themselves time 
to reposition.277 The relationship that the CA had spent considerable effort in 
developing with the Foreign Office even allowed CA firms a slight head start in 
altering their business methods. A first meeting was called in October 1930 in order 
to discuss early Foreign Office proposals to modify the system of extraterritoriality 
which had been ‘circulated to them [the CA].’ Although it was recognised that the 
Chinese would likely reject such early suggestions, the CA were nonetheless given an 
opportunity to comment on how they believed negotiations should develop, and the 
Foreign Office promised to summon an ‘extraterritoriality committee’ to discuss any 
further progress.278 A telegram from the Shanghai branch—suggesting negotiations be 
discontinued—was simply passed on to the Foreign Office with no comment from 
London, who believed that ‘the Shanghai community were in ignorance, when they 
sent the telegram, of the nature of the proposals that were being made.’279  
By January of 1931 the CA had become aware of Chinese counter proposals 
over the matter. Worried that they would place British companies under Chinese 
jurisdiction and that they would, essentially, affect ‘all existing arrangements’ relating 
to Shanghai, some panic seems to have ensued at the meeting. H.W. Looker insisted 
‘that the Association should leave the Foreign Office in no doubt in regard to its view 
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that the Chinese counter-proposals should not be agreed to.’280 Sir Harry Fox, 
however, formerly HM counsellor in Peking, lent his experience of time in 
government service and provided a moderating voice, ensuring the other committee 
members that ‘from what he knew of Sir Miles Lampson’, current British minister in 
China, discussions would continue to be in line with earlier British suggestions, and 
‘that it would be a mistake to take the proposals too seriously.’281 Ultimately a letter 
was sent outlining the Association’s view that the proposals were of ‘serious import’, 
but the CA expressing outright rejection was avoided. 282 
With negotiations over a draft treaty regarding extraterritoriality nearing 
completion the following year, CA chairman S.F. Mayers and president Sir George 
Macdonogh ‘were invited to an interview with Sir Victor Wellesley, Mr. C.W. Orde 
and Sir John Pratt’ of the Foreign Office on 1 June where they were given the 
‘opportunity of studying [the treaty’s] text.’283 A meeting ‘of such persons as could be 
rapidly invited’ was held the following day to gather the views of prominent CA 
members including Mr. Dodwell (of Dodwell & Co.), Mr Landale (Jardine Matheson) 
and Sir Newton Stabb (HSBC) who agreed to inform the Foreign Office of their 
support for the treaty, although they made it clear they ‘could not claim to express to 
corporate opinion of the CA.’284 The wider general committee were informed of the 
‘provisions of the draft treaty’ at a meeting held on 8 June, and these were placed on 
file at the CA’s offices for any other members to view.285  
Granted this privileged position, the CA began to espouse their support for the 
removal of extraterritoriality and their support for the British government’s position. 
At the AGM of 1931 a number of comments were made praising the increasing 
stability of the country. It fell to H.W. Looker to outline the CA’s stance over 
extraterritoriality. In the face of rising nationalism and the clamour it brought for the 
removal of extraterritorial rights, he advised members that 
When you find these conditions arising, your sanest policy is to endeavour 
as far as you can to swim with the stream, not against it. In my view the 
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Asian Society, 18, 3 (1931), pp.384-8. 
282 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 29 January 1931. 
283 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 8 June 1931, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, December 1929 – September 1937, CHAS/MCP/7. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid. 
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policy which Great Britain should adopt under present conditions is to 
endeavour as far as she can to secure goodwill and respect by meeting as 
far as possible these desires based on the spirit of nationalism which are 
being put forward.286 
 
Though this was hardly a great endorsement of the proposed changes, it certainly 
displayed a willingness, and awareness, that resistance was no longer the best option—
and it was certainly better than Looker’s proposed outright rejection of earlier 
proposals. China could no longer simply be subjugated by foreign interests, and co-
operation and reform were the stance with the CA thought British interests would be 
best preserved. It was in this spirit, too, that as we have seen, the CA altered their 
social functions to include Chinese guests. 
It is important to note, however, that the CA did not immediately sever all links 
and efforts to support Shanghai interests. It still maintained a committee in the city, 
and would represent Shanghai complaints when these were not seen as overzealous. 
As discussed previously 1933 saw the Association (at the direction of Swires) support 
the Shanghai branch’s claims that the District Court should remain under foreign 
administration as this was regarded as a matter that would not be inflammatory.287 
Despite this, the CA in London would never again support settler interests in the way 
it once had. We should, perhaps, not be surprised by this. As prospects for business 
decrease, as they did in the face of Chinese nationalism, networks often ‘turn inwards’ 
and look to become ‘shields’ for their members, in this case, key London and 
Hongkong based firms.288 Excluding settlers was necessary to conform to the will of 
the British government, and to hope to secure advantages in the future. 
Following 1930 A lull in negotiations and changes followed, as wider 
discussions over the matter of extraterritoriality lapsed.289 However, when the time 
came for the final surrender of extraterritorial rights in 1943, the CA were supportive 
of the move. Sending a letter to The Times in late 1942 to show their ‘appreciation’ of 
the new realities, they stated their agreement with the views of the papers’ Chungking 
correspondent that all ‘business men ask today is not the dubious help of the outworn 
                                                          
286 Annual report for 1930-31, appendix, available at Annual Reports, 1928-34, CHAS/A/09. 
287 E.M. Gull to G.W. Swire, 27 June 1933, Letters from E.M. Gull Secretary, London Director’s 
Political Correspondence, JSS/1/3/14/12, John Swire & Sons Ltd. Archive. 
288 Magee and Thompson, Empire and Globalisation: Networks of people, goods and capital in the 
British World, 1850-1914, p.238. 
289 The Thorburn Case, when a young Brit was killed by the Chinese military police, a change in 
government in Britain, and the wider Manchurian Crisis are all noted as reasons for the lull in 
negotiations, see Bickers, Out of China, pp.125-130. 
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safeguards of the past but the promise of equal treatment in the future.’290 As noted 
earlier, this view was similarly made clear to Chinese representatives in person at a 
1943 luncheon when the CA Chairman stated any future expatriates dispatched by CA 
firms would act and live ‘according to the law of China’.291 The CA, therefore, once 
again put the needs of expatriate big business first, and fully accepted and aligned 
itself with the British government’s stance. Key firms within the Association had 
espoused the value of such changes to the wider membership to ensure Metropole 
interests presented a coherent voice, and in return the CA was given early insight into 
private negotiations on the matter, remaining, as an insider interest, a group invited 
into policy discussion as part of a wider policy community. 
 
Conclusion 
We find, then, that the political endeavours of the CA largely conform to—and 
confirm—what we would have expected from the background already established of 
their individual and corporate members. Once again, conflict between metropole and 
periphery surfaced, and, like before, metropole interests remained dominant. 
Concessions were, again, made to ensure that the Association itself did not fracture, 
but control always rested, ultimately, with the large multinational firms of the London 
committee.  
Throughout the period under study the CA remained astute in their efforts to 
ensure the voices of these firms were heard by the British government—even if by the 
very nature of the methods employed, we are largely precluded from making a 
judgement on whether they were successful and held any sizeable influence. To create 
links they operated primarily as an insider interest group. Relationships were forged 
with permanent British government officials in Whitehall through the exchange of 
information and correspondence and, potentially, through social functions. These 
efforts eventually saw the CA given a role to play and co-opted into a wider alliance 
by the British government when the British presence in China was altered following 
the events of 1925. Their reluctance to use more public methods of applying pressure 
                                                          
290 For the original statement made by the Times’ correspondent see “Foreign Interests in China.” Times 
(London, England), 22 October 1942, p.5. For the CA’s support see “Relations with China.” Times 
(London, England), 2 November 1942, p.5. An outline of new regulations replacing extraterritoriality 
is to be found in the Annual report for 1942-3, pp.4-5, available at Annual Reports, 1942-53, 
CHAS/A/10A. 
291 Annual report for 1943, pp.11-14, available at Annual Reports, 1942-53, CHAS/A/10A. 
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was a conscious decision, and, perhaps, combined with the often hidden nature of the 
methods they did pursue, accounts for their relatively unstudied position in Sino-
British history.  
Indeed, the closest the CA came to public criticism of the British government 
was at their social functions. However criticism, even in this relatively closed setting, 
was rarely harsh. And by the latter half of the period under study, these functions were 
even actively promoting British government aims through the invitation of Chinese 
dignitaries, representing the efforts of the British returnee community to build personal 
relationships with Chinese partners as part of a wider re-organisation of the British 
presence in China. Official dinners given to prominent individuals further 
strengthened the political potential of these social occasions, not least, as we have 
seen, when dining Chinese dignitaries such as Li Hongzhang. 
It was somewhat of a paradox, then, that these social functions could not 
become overly political occasions, for fear of alienating the wider apolitical CA 
membership, in case this caused a drop in membership which would, in turn, have 
weakened the CA’s political voice. But once again, compromise was evident 
throughout, as the CA reconciled the needs of two groups of members and the 
overlapping political and social networks to which they chose to subscribe. The CA’s 
social events continued to provide enjoyable occasions for the wider CA membership, 
at least some of whom seem to have struggled with a ‘difficult return’ to Britain, one 
which we can now see was related to their specific experiences and tied to the image 
of the British population in Shanghai, and even China as a whole.  
The employment of social occasions to impart political pressure and build 
connections and networks for business purposes, however, remains a key point of 
importance in the study of the CA. It shows that they were aware that there were more 
ways to attempt to improve British trade with China than simply petitioning the British 
government through official channels. This desire to improve trade would also appear 
prominently in the final object of the CA to be discussed: its desire to provide charity, 
philanthropy and undertake benevolent acts (and as a development of this, educational 
schemes) related to China. This is the subject of the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 
BENEVOLENCE AND PHILANTHROPY 
 
Hungry and homeless, hundreds of thousands of Chinese families have no 
means of support from day to day. It is estimated that out of 182 millions 
in the war-affected areas at least 30 millions have fled their homes! The 
British ambassador in describing the situation says:- “I have myself seen 
sights which impel me to urge you to continue your efforts unabated… 
they are in constant need of help which only your fund can give.” Please 
enable this help to be carried on.1 
 
This was how a joint CA, Red Cross, and Conference of British Missionary Societies 
appeal placed in The Times in 1938 read. The CA, having enshrined in its fifth object 
To establish, undertake, superintend, administer and contribute to any 
charitable or benevolent fund from whence may be made donations or 
advances to deserving persons who may be or may have been engaged in 
the China trade, or connected within any person engaged therein, and to 
contribute or otherwise assist any charitable or benevolent institution or 
undertakings2 
 
had made clear its intention to play a charitable role alongside its commercial 
activities, and to enter into, and act within the wider matrix of, charitable organisations 
that were of such importance during the late Victorian era. But the CA’s interpretation 
as to what fell within charitable pursuits remained broad, also connecting them to trade 
matters.3  Consequently, the CA was able to pursue a diverse range of philanthropic 
schemes, the most prominent of which saw the establishment of a Chinese language 
school in London. Indeed, in combination, charity and education offered the members 
of the CA a chance to display what has been termed patrician benevolence, and with 
the wealth they had accumulated attempt to solve problems which were not addressed 
by the government, or indeed governments, of Britain and China, and the colonial 
authorities in Hongkong.4 This included the desire to alleviate the suffering caused by 
famine and war in China, whilst also supporting a wealth of schemes in Britain, 
including collections for destitute returnees or long running educational schemes. 
                                                          
1 "British Fund For The Relief Of Distress In China" Times (London, England) 14 December 1938 p.18. 
2  The China Association (established 1889) Objects, rules and regulations Jardine Matheson Archive, 
Papers of the China Association, MS JM/L6/4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Bueltmann and Macraild, ‘Globalizing St. George: English associations in the Anglo-World to the 
1930s’, p.88.  
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Other factors, too, likely influenced the CA to involve itself in the 
philanthropic tradition that was long developed in British society. While we have seen 
that the CA was located at the centre of the British Associational world due to its 
foundation at the Thatched House Tavern, it is important to note that it also resided at 
the centre of the British philanthropic world. The location of its earlier offices—on 
Leadenhall Street, and then Cannon Street—placed it in the heart of the City of 
London, which as of the late Victorian era could boast the highest concentration of 
charitable endowments in the whole of Britain.5 Some of these were long outdated 
funds, providing for sermons to celebrate the victory against the Spanish Armada, or 
more bizarrely, a fund ‘to buy faggots for burning heretics.’ But others, notably the 
£18,500 provided from city endowments for education, were potential influences and 
guiding examples for the CA’s own schemes.6 Similar encouragement may well have 
come from the powerful livery companies of the City. The findings of an 1880s 
commission saw that they were spending approximately £50,000 on education, to 
support schools linked to their trades, university exhibitions, and later, technical 
education.7 As time progressed the companies even moved to established scholarships 
and even their own chairs at universities, a feat, as we shall see, that the CA also 
accomplished, despite the philanthropic efforts of the wider population largely 
ignoring university education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.8 
Turning to the other geographical ‘home’ of the CA, East Asia, we find also that 
Scottish ethnic associations in the region  engaged in a lively manner with charitable 
and benevolent collections, although there was less requirement for this than in, for 
example, the United States.9 Indeed, providing charity was a key aim of many ethnic 
societies, and although the CA was not an ethnic society per se, it was perhaps the 
closest thing that existed for returnees who based their own identity on their time spent 
in China, and were in that sense a distinct group.10 From its earliest days the British 
community in China had seen itself as philanthropic, too, establishing hospitals, 
educational societies, funds for orphans and widows and a seamen’s hospital, all in 
                                                          
5 David Owen, English Philanthropy, 1660-1900 (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1964), p.276. 
6 Ibid., pp.276-279. 
7 Ibid., pp.285-7. 
8 Ibid., p.290, p.346 and chapter 13. 
9 Bueltmann, Clubbing Together, p.180. 
10 Bueltmann, Clubbing Together, pp.69-85 for an example of this in America amongst scots. For a 
wider range of British ethnic societies and their experience in Philadelphia see Sullivan ‘That Charity 
which begins at Home.’ 
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1830’s Canton as part of an effort to elevate their status, demonstrate that they were 
‘cultured people’, and characterise themselves as more than simply opium traders.11 
Returnees have also been noted to be charitable, both through institutions and 
individually. The Canada Club, though largely a dining club, undertook charitable 
collections and Scottish returnees have been noted as returning temporarily to 
establish hospitals for soldiers who had sojourned abroad and returned home 
wounded.12 
But where do the motivations that can inspire people to give to charity 
originate? In some cases, donations come from pure altruism.13 In others, those who 
donate are seeking prestige, especially when lists of donors are published. Indeed, a 
study by Harbaugh has shown that when donations are published in bands of value 
(e.g., £10-£20, £20-£50, £50-£100) the vast majority of donors give the smallest 
amount possible to place in their chosen band.14 This must be considered especially in 
those schemes during which the CA was backed to a large extent by corporate firms. 
For these, profits rather than conscience may have been a greater consideration—
something this chapter will examine—and so we must be cautious when determining 
their motives. The concept of ‘strategic’ giving or corporate philanthropy therefore 
becomes important, in which companies donate to schemes that will ensure a tangible 
return in the future. 
While these explanations offer suggestions as to why the CA would become 
involved in charitable and benevolent causes, it is also important to stress some of its 
strengths in this area. First, the CA was a uniquely placed organisational body. It 
contained members with considerable expertise in China and East Asia, themselves 
valuable assets for ascertaining if an appeal was worthy of support and would produce 
tangible benefit, either for those who required support or those who gave. Members 
based in East Asia could offer up to date knowledge on charitable causes, and offer 
first hand perspectives on appeals. Similarly, dissemination of appeals could be 
undertaken on a wide geographical basis due to the scale of the Association. When 
representing appeals in London, other strengths were evident. The body had sought to 
                                                          
11 Chen, Merchants of War and Peace, pp.15-16. 
12 Burke, ‘Canada in Britain’ p.192; Murdoch, ‘Children of the Diaspora: the ‘homecoming’ of the 
second-generation Scot’, p.60. 
13 Kidd, State, Society and the poor in Nineteenth-century England, p.69. 
14 William T. Harbaugh ‘What do donations buy?; A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warm 
glow’ Journal of Public Economics, 67, 2 (1998), pp.269-284. 
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improve trust between members from its very inception through social functions. By 
building social capital and networks the CA became a trusted organisation which 
members could donate to safe in the knowledge the money would be used 
appropriately for genuine appeals. 
Although these factors drew the CA into supporting charity, practical 
considerations were raised at a meeting held only two months after the Association’s 
foundation, and questions as to how the Association could realistically fund charitable 
causes were discussed. It was noted that although the Straits Association—a body the 
CA wished to emulate—had accumulated a ‘large charitable fund’ this had primarily 
been established by the acquisition of legacies from members over a lengthy period of 
time. That similar legacies may, at some point in the future, have been left to the CA 
was enough to see the committee agree to the retention of the object.15 However, 
recognition was also given to the fact that at this early stage in the development of the 
Association little could realistically be done.16 To this end, three rules were settled 
upon, confirming that charity would be dispensed at the ‘absolute discretion’ of the 
general committee, that the executive committee would have ‘full power’ to decide 
the direction of the Association’s charitable efforts, and that ‘the objects of the 
Association’s charity may be reduced or added to’ at any AGM or special general 
meeting.17 Despite holding a keen intention to support charitable causes, and 
occupying an advantageous position, the CA remained, at this early stage, realistic 
about their limitations.  
 
Individual pleas for assistance 
Before focusing on the large-scale efforts with which the CA were involved, let us 
first turn to examples of individual requests made to the Association and collections 
undertaken for individuals.  In many cases, these appeals came from those who had 
seen the sudden upheaval expatriate life could bring. But it is also notable that these 
individual calls were relatively few in number for much of the period under study. 
                                                          
15 This saw the inclusion of a form to bequeath legacies added to the CA’s rules and regulations at this 
date, although there is no record of the CA receiving funds in this manner. See Minutes of a meeting of 
the Executive Committee, 25 June 1889, Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committees, 
April 1889 – March 1897, CHAS/MCP/1, China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of 
London. 
16 Ibid. 
17 The China Association (established 1889) Objects, rules and regulations, Jardine Matheson Archive, 
Papers of the China Association, MS JM/L6/4. 
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This is likely attributable to the fact that, as has been argued for Far Eastern St. 
Andrews Associations, the CA membership was drawn from a relatively wealthy 
socioeconomic strata who rarely required charitable support.18  Although smaller 
undertakings than those discussed later, these individual appeals were important 
formative experiences that helped to define the response of the CA to later, larger, 
appeals.  
The first charitable request made of the CA came in 1890, when Association 
member W.S. Young appealed for support on behalf of Mr Brown, a ‘former partner 
in the old firm of Dent & Co. who had been ruined by unfortunate investments in 
Ceylon, and was now practically dependent.’19 The details of the case were further 
explained to the committee by Association founder, and current treasurer, Sir Alfred 
Dent. Despite this backing, the plea for assistance failed. Opposed by committee 
members S. Ezekiel and J.A. Maitland, the appeal was rejected on the grounds that 
assent in this matter would open the Association to numerous similar calls, which it 
was unable to meet owing to its currently unsound financial state.20 Though never 
officially enshrined in the Association’s rules and objects, from this point on grants to 
individuals were never made directly with Association funds, other than a single 
exception of a small sum.21 As feared, the finances of the Association were not in a fit 
state to give out charitable grants to individuals.22 In order to fulfil their aims of 
benevolence, the CA was forced to find a different approach. 
Alternate methods to generate charitable funds were, therefore, required upon 
the passing, in 1898, of the British administrator Sir Chaloner Alabaster, aged 59, who 
had been in the diplomatic service since the age of 16 and was a highly active and 
well-remembered member of the Shanghai community.23 A collection was undertaken 
                                                          
18 Bueltmann, Clubbing Together, p.184. 
19 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 15 April 1890, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committees, April 1889 – March 1897, CHAS/MCP/1. 
20 Ibid. 
21 This was given to T.V. Jeffrey, who received the small sum of £5 following his return to Britain 
during the Sino-Japanese war. See the Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 13 April 1938, 
Minutes of the General Committee, November 1937- December 1945, & Minutes of the Executive 
Committee, March 1943- December 1945, CHAS/MCP/8. 
22 This would change when the CA were given a sizeable grant to support returnees in 1946. However, 
this was not financed directly from their own funds. It is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
23 Paul French, The Old Shanghai A-Z, (Hongkong: Hongkong University Press, 2010), p.72 notes 
Alabaster’s status within the community. He was the Founder of Shanghai’s ‘Beefsteak Club’, a 
stalwart of the Shanghai Amateur Dramatic club (under his stage name Mr.—or when required Miss—
Chrysolite Gypsum), and regarded as instrumental in seeing Trinity Church turned into a cathedral. 
Finally, his penchant for smoking two cheroots at once was apparently also well known within the 
Shanghai community. 
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to provide for the wife and the children he had left behind, and by forwarding the 
appeal to the Shanghai branch, the total raised amounted to £486/-/- , of which £15 
was spent on a memorial tablet, leaving £119/5/6 to be given to his widow, along with 
four ‘Chinese railway bonds’ for the Children.24 It is a striking example of the small 
size of the China expatriate community, and the enduring links its members felt to the 
country, that nine years later one of these children, C. Grenville Alabaster, served for 
two years as the CA’s secretary before leaving to marry and practice at the Bar in 
Hongkong.25 Whether the job offer with the CA was made for charitable reasons, it is 
impossible to speculate. However, what will become apparent is that appealing to the 
Association’s wider membership (of both individuals and firms) would prove a highly 
successful tactic in later CA appeals, outlining the importance to view the Association 
not just as a distributor of charitable funds, but as a nexus for charitable appeals. 
Later, other methods were employed to help those who had been left in 
financial difficulties. When the widow of Sir Everard Fraser was left destitute in East 
Asia, the CA were more than willing to take up her case with the Foreign Office and 
request she receive either a special pension or payments. Sir Everard had served the 
British government in China for 42 years and the CA were unhappy that despite this 
service his widow was left destitute upon his death in 1922, and was forced to recall 
her two sons from education in Britain to take up posts in East Asia to support 
themselves.26 Similar support was forthcoming when the case of Mrs Satchwell Smith 
was referred by the Shanghai branch to London. In a case which was reported around 
the globe, Mrs Smith’s husband, Dr. Satchwell Smith, had been murdered in Nanking. 
Having rejected the $10,000 of compensation which had been offered by the Chinese 
authorities, looking for a larger payment, Mrs. Satchwell Smith had turned to the CA 
who agreed to take up the case and pressed the Foreign Office to address the matter 
                                                          
24 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 12 September 1900, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, April 1897 – May 1901, CHAS/MCP/2. 
25 See “Untitled” North China Herald (Shanghai, China), 20 February 1909, p.35 and 10 April 1909, 
p.11.  
26 For the actions taken by the CA see Circular no.303, 26 June 1922, Circulars No. 290-307, 
CHAS/MCP/28 China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. As recorded in a 
tribute from Shanghai, Sir Everard Fraser had spent ‘nearly all of his official life in China, from his 
arrival in March 1880 until his death in March 1922. See "Shanghai’s Tribute to Sir E. Fraser." Times 
(London, England) 25 March 1922 p.8.  
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officially with the Chinese authorities.27 Such appeals were likely made possible by 
the CA’s productive relationship with the Foreign Office, discussed in chapter three. 
The motivations behind supporting some cases, and declining it in others, 
however, seem to go deeper than simply practical considerations. After all, the 
Association could, too, have undertaken a collection to provide for the destitute Mr 
Brown. Ultimately, due to the limits of the recorded minutes of the CA, we may only 
speculate upon the reasons for their denial of support. Perhaps the committee had little 
sympathy for a man ruined by his own poor investments. Perhaps, too, they felt that 
as these occurred in Ceylon it was beyond the duty of the Association to intervene in 
this matter—perhaps a feeling compounded by the fact that a ‘Ceylon Association’ 
already existed.28 Conversely, in the case of the dependents of Sir Chaloner Alabaster, 
Everard Fraser and Dr Satchwell Smith they had been left to struggle financially 
through no fault of their own. All were members of the British community in China, 
too, rather than Ceylon. Certainly, concepts of the deserving and undeserving poor 
played a later role in determining whether the Association would support appeals and 
collections related to famines in China and they may also have been at work here.29 
Certainly, we must also view the collections for the families of Alabaster, and 
especially Fraser, in the framework of strategic philanthropy—a concept reflected in 
many of the CA’s larger collections. Consular salaries were a matter of considerable 
interest for the British commercial community in China. A good salary was required 
to attract top quality recruits into the service, and top quality recruits would, in turn, 
provide better prospects for commerce. Much to the annoyance of the British 
commercial community in China salaries had been considered comparatively low for 
a considerable period, impacted by the cost of official entertaining—met from 
                                                          
27 The Case was mentioned in Newspapers both in the East and the American Press. See for example 
“Outrages at Nanking” Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 28 March. “The Late Dr. L.S. Smith” The 
Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser (Singapore) 30 April 1927. “Harrowing Tales of 
Narrow Escapes from Nanking Riots Told by Refugees” The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. The response of 
the CA is recorded in the Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 22 December 1927, Minutes 
of the General Committee and Executive Committee, July 1922 – October 1929, CHAS/MCP/6. 
28 We may speculate that the Association saw Ceylon as it did Manila—beyond its scope politically, 
although welcoming returned expatriates from the country to join the Association for social reasons. 
Falling into this area of uncertainty may have led to this claim being denied. See the annual report for 
1889-90, unpaginated, available at Annual Reports, 1889-98, CHAS/A/01. Information on the Ceylon 
Association is scant, although its founding date is noted in Chris Cook, Sources in British Political 
History 1900-1951: Volume 1: A Guide to the Archives of Selected Organizations and Societies (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1975), p.107.  
29 Earlier ethnic associations readily made such distinctions, giving to those of ‘good character’ only 
and holding disdain for the ‘notorious’ ‘unworthy’ or ‘lazy.’ See, for example, Sullivan, ‘That Charity 
which begins at Home’, p.319 and pp.332-3. 
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salaries—the high cost of expatriate life, and the payment of UK income tax, only paid 
in China by British government employees.30 As early as 1853 a Mrs. Sullivan 
complained to the Foreign Office that, due to these expenses, her now departed 
husband had failed to provide her with an income upon which she could continue to 
live.31 Such a case was by no means unique. Widows of consular men received no 
ongoing payment, with salaries stopping abruptly upon death—something often closer 
than expected due to the ‘health hazards’ of China—and many were left to rely on  
‘whip rounds’ of the ‘open-handed’ treaty port communities.32 
Displeasure with these salaries—both for their human cost and their damage 
to commercial prospects—was prominently showcased by the CA, with their annual 
reports from 1916 to 1920 focusing heavily on the matter. A change in exchange rates 
had, in 1916, caused a ‘very serious reduction’ in the sterling worth of consular 
salaries, which were paid in Spanish dollars.33 Although by the 1920 annual report the 
CA could report an increase in consular pay, they still considered it to be ‘inadequate’ 
in respect of a ‘great rise of the cost of living’ in China.34 Fraser’s death in 1922 
therefore created not only the need for a collection, but also the opportunity to use this 
collection as evidence of the inadequacy of consular salaries, and bring this once again 
to the attention of the British government, now in a manner more emotive than simple 
direct criticism in correspondence.  
One final individual effort, worthy of note as it highlights a key benefit of the 
CA’s structure in dealing with such matters, came, to the CA’s surprise, from internal 
rather than external sources. In 1941 they became aware that the current secretary E.M. 
Gull was approaching retirement and had given 27 years of service in the employment 
of British interests in China.35 Despite this, the CA had failed to make any provision 
for a pension fund upon which he could retire. To resolve this Sir George Macdonogh 
placed requests with the major China firms and managed to ensure the creation of a 
                                                          
30 P.D Coates, The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 1843-1943 (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), p.88. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., pp.91-2 
33 Annual report for 1916-17, p.ix, available at Annual Reports, 1915-23, CHAS/A/07. 
34 Annual report for 1919-20, p.xi, available at Annual Reports, 1915-23, CHAS/A/07. 
35 His career included serving as secretary of the joint CA/Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, and then 
as the CA’s London Secretary. See Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 16 October 1941, 
Minutes of the General Committee, November 1937- December 1945, & Minutes of the Executive 
Committee, March 1943- December 1945, CHAS/MCP/8. Gull had also, as noted below, served in the 
First World War as an officer of the Chinese Labour Corps. He also authored numerous works on China.  
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fund which totalled over £3,000.36 That the Association alone, without the support of 
these firms could not have provided EM Gull with any sort of pension fund 
approaching this amount is clear from the Association’s financial records, which 
showed assets of £1,604 in this year.37  
The collection for E.M. Gull evidences one of the major strengths of the CA 
in terms of philanthropic and benevolent endeavours: as an association representative 
of all of the major China firms, those who subscribed would be well aware of the 
amounts subscribed by competitors. In practice this ensured that no single company 
would be forced to foot an unacceptable amount of the bill and that no company could 
not contribute without the others being aware of this. This concept—that the CA’s 
organisational structure ensured everyone gave fairly—countered what has been 
called the ‘free rider’ problem that is often inherent in corporate philanthropy.38 
Visibility and accountability, provided through the third party of the CA, ensured that 
all firms gave fairly, and saw their donation recorded. This would prove a key 
mechanism in the Association’s larger schemes. 
Viewed together, these efforts to provide support to individuals reveal notable 
patterns often repeated in the CA’s larger collections and schemes. Those left requiring 
assistance through no fault of their own, regardless of the nature of this assistance, 
were more likely to receive the support of the CA than others. More importantly, they 
highlight that the CA itself lacked the funds to offer a significant sum to individuals. 
Consequently, they certainly would be unable to offer large sums to larger 
philanthropic schemes and instead focused on using their ability to organise, and 
ensure that all linked members and firms contributed fairly, to help those who required 
assistance.  
 
The China Association as a benevolent network during famine and war  
Whereas the cases above focus upon help given to individuals, this was by no means 
the limit of the involvement of the CA with benevolent causes. As a prominent 
network through which information from China returned to Britain the CA inevitably 
                                                          
36 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 16 October 1941. Multinational firm Unilever 
refused to contribute, a decision symptomatic of a poor relationship with the CA at the time. This seems 
to be due to the Anglo-Dutch nature of the company, which made it reluctant to deal with the British 
focused CA. See Putten, Corporate Behaviour and Political Risk, p.238. 
37 Annual report for 1941-2, p.49, available at Annual Reports, 1935-42, CHAS/A/10. 
38 Porter and Kramer, ‘The Competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy’. 
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became involved in the collection and dissemination of both small and large scale 
humanitarian aid, most notably in times of famine and warfare in China. As the 
examples below show, the CA utilised similar methods to those learned from 
individual appeals prominently to do so. 
 
Famine 
Famine in China was the first major cause which saw the CA turn their attention 
eastwards, attempting to alleviate distress by collecting for, and organising, a number 
of significant funds. The history of famine relief in China in the period under 
consideration in this study is one that has received some attention, with works focusing 
on the China International Famine Relief Fund [CIFRF]—a joint Chinese and foreign 
institution—and others noting the importance of foreign intervention in alleviating the 
damage of famines and even operating proactively to attempt to improve Chinese 
infrastructure and reduce their occurrence.39 Focusing on larger trends, famine has 
historically been common in China—though perhaps not to the extent that some 
contemporaries believed—and this was exacerbated in the period under consideration 
by the failing infrastructure of the nineteenth century Qing Empire and the rise of 
warlordism.40 Transnational collections for Asian famines were long established by 
the time of the CA, too, with the first London based collection for Indian famine 
occurring in 1861, with an 1877 appeal drawing support from throughout the ‘British 
World.’41 
The CA’s first involvement with such a cause came with the occurrence of a 
famine in 1907, 14 years before the founding of the CIFRF. Acting alongside other 
groups, though collecting for a distinct CA-led fund, the Association utilised their role 
as a prominent hub of China connections in Britain to forward a ‘special appeal … to 
all members of the Association’ alongside the chairman approaching ‘a number of 
firms and individuals privately for subscriptions.’ Both of these efforts were said to 
have met with ‘very sympathetic support’, and in conjunction with a public appeal 
‘inserted in a number of the most influential London and Provincial newspapers’ the 
                                                          
39 See Nathan, A History of the China International Famine Relief Commission; Li, Fighting Famine in 
North China, pp.302-3. 
40 Nathan, A History of the China International Famine Relief Commission; Bickers, Out of China, p.76. 
41 G. Brewis ‘“Fill full the mouth of famine”: Voluntary action in Indian famine relief 1896-1901’ 
Modern Asian Studies, 44, 4 (2010), pp.894-6. 
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fund quickly reached a total of £2,700.42 Following further appeals to firms, businesses 
and individuals known to the CA as well as the support of various missionary societies 
linked with China when the fund closed some four months later the amount raised 
came to the ‘satisfactory’ total of £9,210.7.0.43 
This success seems to have seen the CA develop a good reputation as a 
charitable network, and a series of similar requests for help followed. But they also 
show that the Association was not always willing to respond so positively and offer 
insight into why the CA could choose to refuse to take part in such collections. When 
1912, 1920-21 and 1925 saw appeals made to the CA to spearhead appeals for Famine 
relief in China, two of these were rejected outright, and one resulted in only minor 
involvement. In 1912, the Association cited a lack of corroborative information on the 
crisis from its own sources—specifically its branch in Shanghai—and the 
impossibility of verifying that the funds would be used appropriately as the reasons 
for its rejection.44 Eight years later, in 1920, the CA accepted a position on the 
committee of a similar appeal, though they did not raise donations independently.45 
The following year the CA espoused the belief that ‘depression in trade and over-
taxation’ would make a successful appeal unlikely in the face of an earthquake and 
resultant famine, and further that ‘in such wide-spread areas it is doubtful if the money 
subscribed ever reached a tithe of those for whom it as intended’.46 Finally, the appeal 
of 1925 saw the Association caution against a collection, worried that funds raised 
would be ‘squandered’ by Chinese recipients, with the committee also agreeing that 
little support for the appeal would be forthcoming until there was first strong evidence 
of China moving to resolve internal problems and help itself.47 
These philanthropic activities document a highly critical approach towards 
appeals for humanitarian relief by the CA. In the case of the 1907 fund, the CA moved 
                                                          
42 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 19 February 1907, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, December 1906 – November 1910, CHAS/MCP/4. The advert 
itself noted that ‘It is estimated that something like 10,000,000 people are affected; many of them are 
actually starving, and must be fed daily if they are to escape death’. See “Classified Ad 7 -- No Title.” 
The Manchester Guardian (Manchester, England), 16 February 1907. 
43 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 4 June 1907, Minutes of the General Committee and 
Executive Committee, December 1906 – November 1910, CHAS/MCP/4. 
44 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 16 January 1912, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, January 1911 – April 1922, CHAS/MCP/5. 
45 Annual report for 1920-21, p.viii, available at Annual Reports, 1915-23, CHAS/A/07. 
46 Annual report for 1920-21, p.x, available at Annual Reports, 1915-23, CHAS/A/07. 
47 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 17 February 1925, Minutes of the General 
Committee and Executive Committee, July 1922 – October 1929, CHAS/MCP/6. 
 
 
212 
 
rapidly to exert all the influence it could muster. Yet in 1912, 1920 and 1925, the 
Association proved wary, and even cautioned against the idea of fundraising. 
Predominantly, the CA’s decisions were based on two factors. First, China was not 
seen as deserving of help: a country split following the 1911 revolution and locked in 
the grip of competing warlords, bandits and secret societies was one the CA was not 
prepared to help until it restored some stability.48  
Such a lack of stability and internal strife caused another, more practical 
problem. Against this background the CA struggled to identify both the source of 
appeals, and the supposed recipients of funds, as trustworthy. For the CA, an 
association which depended on the creation of social capital and trust between its 
members to further its own aims, forwarding an appeal for donations which later could 
have turned out to be false, or see funds poorly spent, would have been extremely 
damaging. When it came to collecting for appeals, they were therefore understandably 
cautious.  
Ultimately, while the 1907 collection again emphasises the strength of the CA 
as an organisational body, well-versed and efficient in heading appeals, later rejections 
show they were tempered by caution and wary of appeals they could not verify the 
legitimacy of. The CA were also wary of raising for funds which they could not control 
the distribution of, an experience that would prove formative for the methods they 
chose to apply in their reaction to the appeals related to the second Sino-Japanese war, 
discussed later.  
 
The China Association and the First World War 
First, however, we must turn to the CA’s response to earlier conflicts, notably the First 
World War. As a British Association, the CA maintained a patriotic identity 
throughout its lifetime and a joined a host of other bodies who mobilized to support 
the war effort.49 Of these, several are notable as they seem to have been undertaken 
purely for patriotic reasons, rather than due to any links to East Asia. An appeal for 
                                                          
48 For a general overview see James E. Sheridan ‘The warlord era: politics and militarism under the 
Peking government, 1916-28’ in J.K. Fairbank (ed.), The Cambridge History of China Vol 12; 
Republican China, 1912-1949, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
49 In this vein, the CA joined a huge number of other patriotic bodies who mobilized charitable efforts 
to support the First World War. Around 18,000 new charities were created, a 50% increase on the 
number in existence pre-war. Total collections came to between £100m and £150m. This in itself built 
upon earlier efforts, including the Lloyd’s Patriotic Fund, founded in 1803 by the Lloyd’s insurance 
market. P.G. Grant, Philanthropy and Voluntary Action in the First World War: Mobilizing Charity 
(Routledge, 2014), pp.4-9. 
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donations to the Red Cross saw the Annual Dinner for the year cancelled and it was 
requested that members instead subscribed their dinner fee to the fund. Later, the call 
was forwarded to Eastern banks and insurance companies.50 Another appeal to 
members for a collection for the troops fighting in Europe saw £200 raised by the CA 
London Branch. £25 was given to the Chambers of Commerce ‘Newspapers for the 
fleet’ fund with the remaining amount spent, at the suggestion of the war office, on 
900 lbs. of tobacco and 270,000 cigarettes for the troops.51 These collections evidence 
the patriotic fervour of the Association which had always identified as purely British, 
and saw itself as a defender of British interests in East Asia. Indeed, a rare example of 
the CA utilising its own funds came when full pay was granted, for the period of his 
absence, to employee P.G. Lambert when he departed with his regiment for France in 
1914.52 Lambert had served as assistant secretary of the CA for nine years, and was 
sadly killed on 21 March 1918, leading his men in his role as second lieutenant of the 
25th Northumberland Fusiliers.53  
Whilst these collections focused purely upon the War in Britain and Europe it 
was inevitable due to the nature of the Association that others undertaken would be 
geographically linked to China and East Asia. A collection by the Shanghai branch 
and other Shanghai-based Associations in August 1914 raised some £450, Tls 10,000 
and $5,660 for the Prince of Wales fund for the relief of distress caused by the War.54 
The largest undertaking by the CA was, however, to help repatriate men from East 
Asia who wished to fight in Europe. 
This effort, beginning in October 1914, saw a collection of over £4,000 made 
by the CA’s Shanghai branch to assist with the cost of passage to Britain of those men 
resident in East Asia who wished to fight for their country.55 On 16 October this 
                                                          
50 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 12 October 1915, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, January 1911 – April 1922, CHAS/MCP/5. 
51 H.C. Wilcox to the Committee, 29 October 1914, Circulars Vol. XI, 164-184, January – November 
1914, CHAS/MCP/19 China Association Collection, SOAS Library, University of London. 
52 H.C. Wilcox to the Committee, undated, Circulars Vol. XI, 164-184, January – November 1914, 
CHAS/MCP/19. 
53 Annual report for 1917-18, p.x, available at Annual Reports, 1915-23, CHAS/A/07. In 1920 a CA 
employee, Mrs Lambert, received a £50 P.A. pay rise, although whether this was a relation, or even the 
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7 December 1920, Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committee, January 1911 – April 
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54 Shanghai Branch to London, 24 September 1914, Circulars Vol. XI, 164-184, January – November 
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culminated in the sailing of the ‘S.S. Suwa Maru’ which departed carrying 110 men 
who intended to enlist, 108 of whom had been helped financially to some extent by 
the CA’s collection. Smaller contingents of 30 and 27 men departed, again with CA 
help, over the coming two months.56 This continued for the next six months, and by 
their own reckoning the Shanghai branch of the Association had helped over 350 men 
return to Britain by June 1915.57 
Upon their arrival in Britain the CA’s London Committee took over the welfare 
of the soldiers, promising to render ‘all possible assistance to these men’, and 
subsequent efforts were made to both ameliorate the conditions of those on the front 
lines, as well as those wounded in service.58 Clothing was given by contributors in 
Shanghai, returned to London by the British Women’s Work Association, and then 
distributed to troops by a committee in London under the management of Mrs. 
Townsend, acting as an extension of the CA.59 Wounded troops were also supported, 
and in 1916 the Shanghai Branch Volunteer sub-committee widened its aims, to 
administer a fund for those who had been wounded in the war.60 Corporal Lever, 
R.F.A., upon his return to Shanghai after being invalided by gas poisoning in 1917 
noted these various efforts were much appreciated by all Shanghai residents still 
fighting in Europe.61 A final charitable subscription relating to the war began in 
Shanghai in 1919, when, instead of subscribing to a fund for a public celebration upon 
the return of the Shanghai Volunteers, the CA Shanghai Branch instead subscribed to 
a fund which would be directly distributed to the returning men.62  
While this material assistance saw the troops given passage home and support 
during the conflict, the CA also assisted them through the use of its political contacts 
and wider networks which, while not necessarily charitable acts, formed an important 
                                                          
56 A great deal of material relating to the organisation of these contingents is to be found throughout 
Circulars Vol. XII, 185-200, November 1914 – January 1915, CHAS/MCP/20 and Circulars Vol. XIII, 
201-215, January 1915 – March 1916, CHAS/MCP/21. 
57 China Association to the War Office, 12 June 1915, Circulars Vol. XIII, 201-215, January 1915 – 
March 1916, CHAS/MCP/21. 
58 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 5 January 1915, Minutes of the General Committee 
and Executive Committee, January 1911 – April 1922, CHAS/MCP/5. 
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part of their efforts. Some, although not all, of the returnees reported their details to 
the London committee, who, in turn, used their contacts to gather information about 
the men whilst they fought in Europe, returning this information to Shanghai, likely 
to benefit friends and family who remained in East Asia.63 The CA in London also 
acted as a mediator between the troops and government departments. In some cases, 
this took the form of representing an individual, such as one returnee who was rejected 
for service by army doctors. The CA felt, however, that as a veteran of the South 
African War the man was of use to the war effort and contacted the authorities to 
suggest he might be found a post instructing new recruits.64 More often this mediation 
took the form of representing the body of men as a whole. These representations 
ranged from enquiring with the War Office as to the availability of return passages 
following the end of conflict and regarding particular organizational points linked to 
demobilization—including collaboration with the Department of Overseas Trade to 
secure early release for ‘soldiers whose services are urgently required for the re-
establishment of British commerce abroad’—to writing directly to the Prime Minister 
when a resolution made in Parliament in 1919 failed to mention troops who had 
returned to fight from overseas countries.65 These undertakings were especially 
praised by the United Services Association in Shanghai, who wrote to thank the CA 
for their ‘timely intervention with the War Office and other authorities’, bodies 
individual soldiers would have struggled to deal with. 66  
It is worthwhile here to recap an unexpected consequence of the CA helping 
to link Shanghai with the conflict in Europe that we have already noted.  In the 
immediate pre-war years, Eurasians were a generally socially excluded group in 
Shanghai, and this extended to their barring from the local branch of the CA. Having 
served their country, however, the Shanghai branch of the Association made moves to 
permit their membership—although this change was not replicated in London.67  
                                                          
63 Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 5 January 1915. 
64 Volunteers, 19 February 1915, Circulars Vol. XIII, 201-215, January 1915 – March 1916, 
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65 War Office to China Association, 24 June 1915, Circulars Vol. XIII, 201-215, January 1915 – March 
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Whereas these appeals had been made to benefit British citizens and were 
encouraged by the Association’s patriotism others also supported Chinese citizens. 
The most notable of these was the appeal made by the London Committee in 1917 to 
provide for the entertainment of the members of the Chinese Labour Corps. Recruited 
in China, and brought to Europe, they served the British and French governments and 
performed non front line tasks for the allied forces.68 95,000 Chinese were recruited 
by the British government alone, and some 140,000 came to Europe in total. Such was 
their impact that the commander of the second group of men to arrive—later CA 
Secretary Edward Manico Gull—described their emigration (although he exaggerated 
for propaganda reasons) as one that would take its place as ‘one of the most important 
aspects of the Great European War,’ and modern scholars have regarded the 
contribution to the war effort as greater than that of any single British colony.69 
The recreation of these men was delegated to the Y.M.C.A. who in 1917 
appealed to the CA to arrange a collection for huts to be used for entertainment 
purposes.70 Originally, the appeal met with hostility from the Shanghai and Hongkong 
branches of the Association, who felt that if it were admitted that the British 
government could not provide basic recreation facilities for the Chinese labourers it 
had employed, Sino-British relations and British prestige would be damaged.71 The 
London Committee, however, decided to press ahead with a collection after 
ascertaining this was approved of by both the War Office and by the British authorities 
in Peking.72 £10,000 was quickly raised, with several firms subscribing the required 
amount to build their own entertainment huts.73 These efforts were a great success, 
with the entertainment provided including film shows and performances from touring 
Y.M.C.A. concert parties.74 When the work of the Chinese labour corps halted in 1920 
                                                          
68 Michael Summerskill, China on the Western Front: Britain’s Chinese Work Force in the First World 
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73 Circular no.247, 18 January 1918, Circulars Vol. XVI, 245-260, September 1917 – February 1919, 
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the Chinese Y.M.C.A. in France wrote to express their sincere gratitude for the 
collections undertaken by the CA.75  
The gesture was, however, not driven by purely benevolent intentions, and the 
potential benefits derived by the firms that donated were clear. Each hut funded was 
to be emblazoned with the name of their firm in both Chinese and English to evidence 
their donation and it seems, hopefully, increase goodwill from the Chinese labourers 
towards these firms alongside their general image. Although there is debate over exact 
figures, these labourers possessed a considerable level of literacy, something 
contributed to by wider YMCA programmes to improve the education of the men 
which taught both Chinese and English to those who came to France illiterate. 76  This 
ensured that a good number of the men could read the names of their benefactors, 
making sure this effort at improving the image of the companies did not go to waste—
and we may speculate that even the illiterate amongst them could have, in the spirit of 
curiosity, asked their more learned compatriots to decipher the names on the huts for 
them. Whether the gesture stood a chance of success when considered against the 
terms the men were signed up to work under—ten hours a day, for seven days a week, 
and unable to leave their camps for fear of their socializing with French citizens 
damaging images of racial superiority—is, however, questionable.77 
From their response to the problems created by the First World War, it is 
possible to identify many of the key features that allowed the CA to engage with 
charitable causes and collections, and also the form these took. As with collections for 
individuals, the CA’s unique position and connections meant they were the one of few 
bodies who could fulfil the role they undertook supporting both British and Chinese 
members of the allied forces. This wealth of networks and connections, combined with 
the management experience of committee members, meant they could react quickly to 
calls for support from great distances and be involved at all levels, from organising 
collections to liaising with the British government. Indeed, in undertaking to support 
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both the contingents of men who returned from East Asia to fight and the Chinese 
Labour Corps., the Association helped to support two major contributions to the War 
effort linked to China. 
 
Times of high crisis: from 1937 to c.1955 
The lessons learned by the CA in responding to both the First World War and earlier 
famine appeals would prove to be essential formative experiences when the British 
situation in China saw unexpected, rapid deterioration. In September 1937 this 
occurred against the background of the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese War. 
Conditions around Peking and throughout China deteriorated dramatically, with 
Shanghai alone receiving an estimated one million refugees.78  Appeals for support 
were received from the CA Tientsin Branch and the combined CA branch and 
Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai. When these were followed by a direct appeal 
from HM Embassy in Peking and the Foreign Office that the CA might help to ‘obtain 
funds from some of the philanthropic British visitors or former residents or from those 
who have some connexion with North China’ secretary E.M. Gull wrote to remind 
members of the general committee that ‘one of the objects of the Association definitely 
provides for assistance to “any charitable or benevolent institution or undertakings”’ 
and argued that ‘the very fact the Association is “The China Association” places it in 
a position in which it may be expected to take the lead’ in the appeal.79 The Association 
began by placing a letter in The Times, signed by a wide array of influential persons.80 
Alongside this, the CA formed a sub-committee to manage the matter and made a 
request to the British Ambassador in China and the Governor of Hongkong to assume 
the positions of President and Vice-President of the distribution sub-committee. 
Finally, two further CA suggestions were enacted. First, the appeal was widened to 
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ensure that it would provide relief to British subjects in distress, alongside Chinese 
subjects, and secondly, a communication was sent to the Shanghai branch of the CA, 
in order that the branch structure of the organisation could furnish information 
regarding any collections or actions that were underway in China itself.81 
Unlike earlier failed appeals for help linked to famine, the CA showed very 
strong commitment to the fund. By October the President and Vice-President of the 
distribution committee requested by the CA had agreed to serve, and the fund had been 
joined by the British Red Cross Society and the Conference of British Missionary 
Societies. Happy that the call had originated from a known source, and able to ensure 
any funds raised would be distributed through reliable figures in East Asia to both 
British and Chinese subjects, the Association pressed onwards with their involvement. 
The fund was originally administered through the offices of the CA and by the CA 
secretary until at the insistence of the Mayor of London a separate, independent, office 
to control the fund was created. At the same time the collection was reconstituted as a 
Lord Mayors fund under the name ‘The British Fund for the Relief of Distress in 
China.’ The administrative reorganisation was a disappointment to the CA, who were 
keen to oversee the fund and felt that an independent office was an unnecessary 
administrative cost. The Mayor’s decision stood, however, and an executive 
committee representing the three involved bodies was placed in charge of the fund. By 
October of 1937 it totalled £64,000, with £15,000 cash, £9,000 worth of medical 
supplies and £2,000 of clothing sent to China.82  
Although no longer in direct control of the fund, the Association continued to 
play an organisational role and donations continued to be given. By December of 1937 
the fund totalled £79,300.83 CA involvement continued, though updates become 
sporadic, and the fund stood at £282,123 by the time of the 1940 annual report.84 
Control seems to have only ended when it was merged with several other bodies to 
form the United Aid to China Fund in 1942.85 
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Independent of this larger collection the CA also contributed to several other 
schemes to help those who had been affected by the conflict. A scheme to help 
internees was given 100 guineas in 1945, and the CA attempted to use their influence 
to increase government help for this group.86 In the same year, and in one of the more 
striking individual donations by an Association member, the use of a house was gifted, 
rent free, by Mr. Marden to any returned internees who were unable to afford 
accommodation themselves.87 Finally, in 1946 the CA undertook to raise funds for the 
foundation of a hostel to provide affordable accommodation for those who had 
returned from East Asia as a result of the conflict, eventually contributing £1,400 to 
the scheme.88 
From these responses it is possible to note several important details about the 
CA’s responses to charitable endeavours. Firstly, as with earlier appeals to collect for 
the relief of famines, they were much more likely to become involved in fund raising 
activities if they could ascertain that aid collected would be efficiently and reliably 
distributed. For the CA, this meant direct control of the administration if possible, and 
at least the involvement of senior British figures they trusted or knew either personally 
or through their network of contacts. Secondly, the CA’s request that British subjects 
benefit from the fund suggests they were more likely to help their own countrymen, 
for whom they would perhaps have had greater empathy—behaving in a manner akin 
to ethnic associations.89 On a wider level the outbreak of War and the exceptional 
circumstances this brought seems to have been a catalyst not just for the CA and its 
members to give, but also the wider public who contributed to the fund. 
While the surrender of Japan in 1945 marked the end of the war in China it 
was not the end of charitable appeals and undertakings related to the conflict. Many 
British subjects in East Asia had been left destitute by the war, or else found their jobs 
to have disappeared with the British surrender of extraterritoriality in 1943. The British 
government alone committed itself to ex gratia payments of £1.5m and a £70,000 per 
year pension plan to support those who had been employed by various British 
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Municipal Councils in China, but this still left many in need of support. Small business 
owners, settlers who ran taverns or shops, for example, could not easily uproot 
themselves and follow the exodus of British multinationals from Shanghai to 
Hongkong.90 The CA was recognised as one of the bodies best placed to help deal with 
their repatriation and subsequent re-settlement in Britain and was granted £10,000 to 
do so. Funding came largely from the closing Far Eastern Relief Fund but also in part 
from the CA’s hostel scheme which broken even as a financial concern and was thus 
able to return the original £1,400 the CA donation.91 
In line with its usual methods the CA delegated a sub-committee to administer 
the fund which, originally, supported ‘a considerable number of former British 
residents of China ’who had been interned and were left unable ‘to take up the threads 
of their life out [In China] again.’ It was noted that many of these returnees had been 
reduced to living in ‘institutions run by the Ministry of Health or by charitable 
organisations’ or were ‘supported by grants from the Assistance Board.’ The method 
the CA employed was to provide ‘one or two grants’ to recent returnees ‘to help them 
find their feet’ plus the gift of ‘small “presents” of £10 to £25 at Christmas time.’92 
Although this was, as the CA’s secretary noted, not able to support the lifestyle these 
returnees had been used to, it was nonetheless valuable support as he informed the 
British Association of Malaysia and Singapore; 
I, unhappily, have day to day contact with a number of these people. They 
are in the position that in November, they have to decide whether to buy 
another hundredweight of coal to keep warm, or the new pair of shoes 
which the Woman has been desperately needing for some time.93 
 
Alongside monetary help CA connected firms were also contacted to seek 
employment for returnees, as in the case of a Captain Bidwell who had left China in 
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1938 and served in the Royal Navy during the war. Ineligible for help through the 
relief committee as he was not an internee, the CA secretary instead appealed to Sir 
John Masson of John Swire and Sons, hoping to find the man a job related to cargo 
inspection.94 
The method of small donations continued until 1951, when it was envisaged 
that the British government’s disposal of Japanese assets in the United Kingdom 
would pay for the permanent upkeep of those still struggling. However when the 
disposal actually resulted in each former internee receiving a £15 lump sum, regardless 
of requirement and much to the CA’s surprise, an alternative solution was required. 
This manifested in a decision to provide small repeated payments, similar to a pension, 
to those who were too old or sick to work.95 The fund was reconstituted in 1953 as a 
trust named ‘The China Association Benevolent Fund’ which was able to support the 
remaining poverty stricken returnees for an estimated seven to ten years.96   
Such had been the success of the CA in administering this scheme that when 
£20,000 was returned to Britain from the ‘British Community Interests’ fund in China 
during 1953—to protect the fund from the Chinese government—that the CA sub-
committee for Charity was entrusted, too, with the role of distributing this money to 
those deserving.97 By 1954 there were still some 32 returnees receiving periodical 
grants, totalling £972.98 This number increased steadily, likely due to the continued 
PRC efforts to close China to foreign firms and citizens, so that, by 1957, the 
Association was helping to support some 40 returnees. With the fund exhausted further 
grants were then made from the China Community fund, on a year by year basis, which 
allowed continued provision to returnees to be made until at least 1967. 99 With ex-
employees of the Shanghai Municipal council finding their fixed pensions of ever 
decreasing value and the British government unwilling to provide any increase, instead 
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laying such responsibilities at the door of the PRC, the importance of funds such as 
that of the CA continued for longer than they likely envisioned. 100 
That the CA was entrusted with the distribution of such considerable funds 
serves to underscore, from their early involvement with the 1907 China Famine 
appeal, that they had come to be seen and relied upon as an efficient organizational 
body when it came to the collection and distribution of charity. Using their unique 
network of contacts and influence, they became the only body with the sufficient 
knowledge to lead such undertakings. It is also notable that the acquisition of these 
funds finally allowed the CA to complete a goal it had held from its very inception 57 
years before: having a solid bank of funds from which charity could be dispensed, 
although it is probable this occurred through circumstances they could not have 
foreseen, nor that they would have wished for. 
 
The China Association, education and philanthropy 
Alongside this history of efforts to provide funds for the large scale relief of suffering 
and to help individuals, either directly or by acting as a fundraising and organisational 
intermediary, the CA’s benevolence also extended into backing philanthropic 
schemes, supporting plans to produce long term solutions to educational problems in 
both Britain and China. Indeed, the CA’s efforts to provide education in London would 
mark one of the pinnacles of the Association’s achievements. By assessing these 
efforts it is possible to gain a great deal of insight into the reasoning of a body such as 
the CA with regards to its philanthropic efforts, as well as greater understanding of the 
strengths and limitations of voluntary associations and philanthropy as a whole. 
Educational schemes are often ones in which philanthropic bodies are active. 
Beginning in Britain with a substantial history of schools in pre-industrial England 
being provided for the poor by charity, ‘founded by philanthropy, either from 
charitable impulse or ulterior motive,’ the late 16th and early 17th century also saw 
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substantial boosts provided to University education by private donations.101 As we 
have already seen, too, the City of London was a hub for charitable funding of 
educational schemes, backed to a large extent by the largest of the livery companies. 
The CA entered into this well established realm with a great deal of enthusiasm, and, 
on occasion, provided the financial backing to reinforce this.   
 
Appeals for educational schemes in China 
The first appeals to note were actually a series of appeals, all linked to the foundation 
of the University of Hongkong. They highlight from where in the CA support for such 
appeals emerged, and define their preferred methods for doing do. Furthermore, the 
historical record of one of these appeals shows that appraising whether voluntary 
associations gave to—or deserved to receive credit for—appeals can be a difficult 
undertaking, and one which must be carefully approached. 
The CA’s relationship with the University began in 1909. To support plans to 
found the University, Dr. Cantlie, a man with a long relationship to medicine in the 
colony, was seeking backing (from British donors) to establish a College of Medicine 
in Hongkong.102 Although a suggestion that each member of the CA pledge a 
subscription of £1 five years was dismissed as impractical, enthusiasm for the scheme 
amongst the committee of the Association was impressive. With German and French 
schemes to found Universities in Tsingtao and Indo-China respectively underway, 
members worried that the lack of a similar scheme for Hongkong would harm British 
prestige. Consequently, the committee decided to offer their backing not only to the 
College of Medicine that Cantile had proposed, but to the wider scheme to establish a 
university. The Colonial government had agreed to provide a site for the University, 
and Hongkong resident Mr. Mody had pledged approximately £29,000 to provide the 
necessary buildings. Still, this left a required endowment of an estimated £110,000.103  
Attempting to make use of their position as a network hub, an appeal was made 
to both the Association membership and 27 Chambers of Commerce, including that of 
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Manchester. The CA also sought to reach the public by placing appeals in 16 London 
and provincial newspapers, stressing their opinion that  
The University would enhance the standing of the colony and would prove 
of inestimable advantage to Chinese whether residents in the Empire itself, 
in Hongkong, in the Straits Settlements, or in Indo-China, by providing 
facilities for the acquisition of Western learning practically at their doors, 
while it is hoped that the training would dispose students to remember 
sympathetically in after life the associations and teachers connected with 
their education gained in a British colony.104 
 
The outcome of these efforts, however, was disappointing.  The amount raised 
originally stood at ‘only £380’ donated by members of the CA. The wider appeals had 
produced only one reply—and ‘that a refusal’. Later donations saw the amount raised 
increase only to a total of £665.105 Whilst this amount was far below what the CA had 
hoped to raise, the Association’s annual report for the year painted a very different 
picture.  
In communicating the outcome of the appeal to their members, the CA noted 
that although not subscribed directly from the funds of the CA ‘certain members of 
the Association and their friends’ had subscribed £40,000, suggesting these donations 
should, in fact, be seen as a wider CA contribution.106 In Mellor’s The University of 
Hongkong: An Informal History the collection of the £40,000 is noted as the 
achievement of J.H. Scott, in his joint role as President of the CA and leading member 
of John Swire and Sons.107 In actual fact, the donation totalled £40,665, with £665 of 
this from the CA appeal. The remaining £40,000 came from John Swire and Sons 
(£30,000), the Swire owned Taikoo Sugar Refining Co. (£5,000), and the Swire linked 
Ocean Steamship Company (£5,000).108 Quite simply, the donation can only be seen 
as made by John Swire and Sons and was made at least partially to repair the public 
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image of the company which was facing a boycott after one of their ticket collectors 
had been accused of kicking an elderly Chinese passenger to death.109  
In later works the history of this donation was to alter again. In Frank Welsh’s 
A History of Hongkong a passage detailing the foundation of the University attributes 
the £40,000 donation to Butterfield and Swire and frames it as a less than munificent 
gesture which proved ‘enough to have the boycott called off.’ Welsh also states, 
however, that this ‘handsome donation… was matched by an equal gift from the China 
Association.’110 More contemporary reports seem to have felt similarly, with the Far 
Eastern Review noting that the CA ‘warmly supported’ the scheme.111 The CA, then, 
simply through its association with the collection and, later, confusion on behalf of the 
author, have gained credit for a large donation they certainly did not make, and unlike 
the Swire Group, are recorded as making this donation with no negative connotations.  
Regardless of whether CA members believed the donation could be attributed 
to the association or not, that those who appealed on behalf of the Hongkong 
University scheme felt differently became evident four years later. Again an appeal 
for funds for Hongkong University was submitted, this time focusing specifically upon 
the Department for Engineering. Referring to the earlier appeal, the representatives of 
Hongkong University noted the donation previously given by the CA was small, and 
they urged that the Association might this time contribute a substantial amount along 
the lines of a £500 subscription for five years.  Despite this, the cause only found ten 
subscribers amongst the whole of the CA, and although this did contain donations of 
£100 from Sir Thomas Jackson and George Dodwell, the chairman was left to ‘deplore 
the slow response’ to the appeal.112  
Importantly, these appeals highlight the disagreement that could occur when 
taking credit for charitable appeals. The CA often drew large amounts of the funds it 
received for such appeals from big businesses who, on occasion, preferred to take 
direct credit rather than appear as part of the CA. As discussed above, mechanisms 
behind the giving of charity are numerous, and it has been noted that some give to 
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increase personal prestige.113 This would rely on either self-publicising that a donation 
had been made, or, more probably, through the inclusion of the donor’s name in a 
published report of the charity or Association to whom they had donated. In this case, 
a donation recorded as being from ‘the China Association’ would be of little benefit. 
It is with a sense of irony that we must note that the donation has in fact been 
remembered by some as a joint CA and Swire Group undertaking, despite the Swire 
Group’s best efforts. 
Yet the enthusiasm of the committee and more prominent members of the CA 
for university education in China shows the scheme held some interest and promise 
beyond an opportunity to avoid a boycott. For those members still actively involved 
in the China Trade it offered a chance to improve Sino-British relations, and create a 
new generation of the Chinese workforce with Western technical skills, and they were 
prepared to bankroll the correct type of scheme to a significant extent. Contributions 
to educational schemes are, after all, potentially cost-effective for corporations, and 
have been noted as potentially ‘a far less expensive way to strengthen a local base of 
advanced skills than developing training in-house.’114 In this vein, alongside the 
donation from the Swire Group, key CA member firms Jardine Matheson and the 
HSBC donated $25,000HK and $50,000HK to the scheme, respectively (around 
£1920 and £3840).115 It was simply their prerogative that they chose not to do so under 
the banner of the CA. 
Outside of these members and firms of the inner circles of the Association, 
however, the response was small at best, and often simply non-existent. For the 
average member of the Association these schemes offered no tangible benefit. No 
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longer directly involved in the China trade, they seem to have had no desire to donate 
to schemes which would not affect them. Furthermore, in the Associational world of 
late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century Britain, calls for subscriptions to support 
any number of schemes would likely have been made upon members. Now connected 
to China in many cases only by their attendance at the Annual Dinner of the CA a 
donation to a more relevant, or local, scheme with any spare income would perhaps 
be more probable.  
Indeed, the difficulty the CA found in achieving a consistent response to 
charitable appeals is highlighted by two earlier calls made of the Association for 
support, both of which were tied to religious schemes. The first of these was made by 
the Reverend Timothy Richard at the 1897 Annual General Meeting, who, acting in 
his capacity as secretary for the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General 
Knowledge, made a general call for funding to further the spread of western 
knowledge in China.116 Rev. Timothy Richard had spent, by this point of his life, some 
28 years as a missionary in China.117 His experiences led him to conclude that China 
was an ailing power, crippled by its philosophy and customs, and open to attack from 
would be aggressors. But ‘if the nation were liberated from the bonds of ignorance and 
harmful custom, and were to receive the light of education – scientific industrial and 
religious – it might become one of the most powerful nations on earth.’118 The Society 
which he represented held similar views, and was keen that the knowledge it 
disseminated would not only improve the ‘moral and spiritual’ development of the 
Chinese people, but also their ‘material social [and] intellectual’ development.119 
Richard stressed the success of previous efforts to teach Western knowledge in China 
by focusing on a Morrison school founded by British merchants in Hongkong, and the 
achievements of its premier student, the merchant Tong King-Sing. This education 
had allowed Tong to speak English ‘like a Briton’ and, in his role as the Shanghai, or 
‘chief’, comprador of Jardine Matheson he took on a wide variety of roles. 
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Significantly he was the first manager of their shipping agency as Jardines diversified 
their business, helped with the firms insurance business, guaranteed the solvency of 
the firms Chinese constituents, and provided the firm with the majority of its opium 
intelligence. He further supervised Jardines other compradors, and in these roles acted 
entrepreneurially for the firm, rather than as a mere go-between with Chinese 
interests.120   He was well regarded personally by the foreign community in Tientsin, 
and was praised by the Rev. Richard as the man who had ‘started the first mines, 
railways and telegraphs in China.’121 Following the conclusion of his plea, the Rev. 
Richard was thanked for his ‘interesting remarks’ and there the matter rested. 
Ultimately, the CA did not choose to support Richards’ calls as a combined 
body. This is in itself is unsurprising, as the CA did not possess a solid enough 
financial base to make large donations from its own funds at this time. Whether 
individual donations were forthcoming at this meeting is not noted, however no 
member of the CA present at the meeting continued to donate beyond this specific 
occasion.122 A total lack of donations presents more of a conundrum, as a society 
which aimed to modernise China would seem to be largely in concurrence with the 
CA, who believed Chinese modernisation would open the interior of the country to 
trade, through railway construction and the opening of interior rivers to steamships. 
Indeed, the society in its own report rued that merchants had ‘began to subscribe well’ 
when the society had originally formed, but ‘not seeing immediate results’ had ‘got 
faint-hearted’ and withdrawn their support. With a likely outcome that ‘merchants 
would be among the chief reapers’ of the society’s work, they hoped they might 
‘become the chief sowers, too’.123 We might wonder if the CA—and even the wider 
business community—were aware of the reverend’s views, later revealed in a book by 
Lady Hosie, that although he believed that problems such as famine came to Chinese 
provinces ‘for lack of railways to bring food from elsewhere’ he also believed that the 
railways should ‘be handed back to full Chinese control at the end of ten years’, hardly 
an enthralling prospect for business interests.124 
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Regardless of what the CA knew of Richards’ views that they continued to be 
wary of similar appeals is made evident by another approach made only a few years 
later. Again made following the conclusion of the Annual General Meeting, 1899 saw 
an appeal placed in front of the assembled members by the Reverend Gilbert Reid. 
Having established an ‘International institute in Peking’ with the aim of encouraging 
both education and the founding of friendly social relations between Chinese and 
foreign elites, Reid was now in the process of seeking donations to continue the 
project. Three months in China had seen £3,000 raised, and eight months in the U.S.A 
had achieved donations of £6,000. However, eight months in the United Kingdom had 
seen a meagre return of only £250.125 It seems, then, that despite the number of 
returned expatriates from China present in Britain, and the mercantile links which 
existed between the two countries, charitable donations to encourage education with a 
religious foundation in China were not readily forthcoming. 
Potentially, this religious element of these appeals was the key factor behind 
the lack of support. Missionaries and the representatives of big business had a poor 
relationship in China, with business blaming missionary groups for being one of the 
root causes of Chinese nationalism, a huge obstruction to trade. Expatriates were also 
disdainful of missionaries for damaging the British image in China, by travelling 
second class or wearing Chinese dress. Missionaries, on their part, were often shocked 
and disgusted by the morals displayed by the rest of the British population resident in 
China, especially Shanghai.126 Whereas the CA and its members were sure Hongkong 
University would undertake the kind of technical education merchants wished to see 
implemented, there was no guarantee these societies would provide tuition of this sort. 
Such motivations, centring on the control of charitable schemes, seem to have been at 
play not only in the response of the CA to famine in China, but also in other 
educational schemes discussed later. If the CA could not be sure the scheme would 
benefit them, through either their own direct control or the involvement of a trusted 
third party, they were much less likely to give. 
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The Education of Chinese students in Britain 
The CA was not only concerned with education in China, however, but also with 
appeals to encourage education of Chinese students in the United Kingdom. As with 
the enthusiasm shown by the committee for the founding of British universities in 
China, these schemes were set against the background of the international struggle for 
power and prestige in China. Concerned that the influence of Germany, Japan and the 
USA was growing due to the number of Chinese students studying in these countries, 
the CA sought to lend its backing to schemes to encourage similar developments in 
the United Kingdom.  
The matter was originally raised in China by Sir John Jordan, HM Minister for 
Peking, in 1907, with CA involvement in the project occurring at the suggestion of Sir 
Walter Hillier.127 Hillier had served for many years in the British Consular service in 
China and Korea, and was intrinsically linked to schemes of education. He himself 
was a Chinese scholar, and was at this time serving as the first professor of Colloquial 
Chinese at Kings College—a chair which the CA played no small part in founding, 
and which is discussed in greater depth below.128 At his request a memorandum was 
circulated amongst the members of the Association asking for assistance. A committee 
was formed called the ‘Chinese Education Committee’ and though not directly under 
the aegis of the CA, remained very much a linked body.129 Alongside members such 
as the professors of Chinese from Oxford and Cambridge, the principal of Kings 
College and the secretary to the Chinese Legation, the CA was represented by member 
and past president and Cecil Clementi Smith, current president R.S. Gundry and 
Walter Hillier himself.   Correspondence was conducted through the offices of the CA, 
resulting finally in the production of a printed statement encouraging Chinese students 
to study in the United Kingdom. Prospective students were provided with a list of 
tutors, families and boarding establishments willing to receive them, as well as 
institutions prepared to offer them places. Provision of homes during vacation time 
could also be secured, and arrangements made that ‘Chinese Youths will be met on 
arrival in England and duly placed in such schools or institutions as their parents may 
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wish them to join.’130 This information was then distributed in China via the branches 
of the CA with all costs undertaken also paid for from the funds of the CA.131 The CA 
continued to be involved following this, and became an intermediary to deal with 
companies in Shanghai who had applied to be agents for the students.132 
Despite these efforts, by 1920 Britain was still struggling to attract Chinese 
students in comparison to other world powers.133 To this end, the CA revived their 
interest and sought to back the ‘first practical scheme’ that had been presented to 
encourage Chinese students to study in the United Kingdom and afford them ‘facilities 
… at least equal to those offered in America and elsewhere.’134 The scheme sought a 
portion of the Boxer Indemnity to provide funds, and the CA agreed to lend its 
influence with the Foreign Office, alongside placing appeals in the press and preparing 
a delegation to approach the treasury. Progress, however, was slow. Still, and despite 
the CA becoming doubtful of any success after two years of inaction, in 1923 the 
Foreign Office approached the CA, and requested they put forward a proposal and 
information regarding the workings of the scheme.135 
It was to take another eight years, until 1931, before a scheme finally came to 
fruition, this time under the auspices of a joint CA and FBI scheme. Funded by the 
Universities’ China Committee—itself funded using a portion of the Boxer 
indemnity—a scheme was set up to encourage technical students from China to study 
in Britain. Under the scheme a £500 Per annum grant was used to fund the studies of 
8 Chinese technical students, all of whom received a reduced rate of passage to 
England (a gift of involved steamship companies), though only half received a living 
allowance from the fund.136 The first Chinese students to benefit from this fund arrived 
in Britain and, in early 1934, and took up positions at engineering firms in Luton, 
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Manchester, Birmingham and Newcastle.137 The importance the CA attached to the 
success of these students is made clear from an appeal made to Association members 
to help ‘expand and systemize the entertainment of Chinese, more particularly Chinese 
students’ while they were in the United Kingdom, which received a good response 
from members willing to help in this matter.138 As part of these efforts, a call for 
donations was made to members to provide donations towards the establishment of 
‘China House’, which was to be maintained as a gathering point for Chinese students 
to allow them to meet with their compatriots for social reasons. The CA had hoped to 
raise enough funds to purchase a Chinese altar table for the scheme, and although some 
donations were received it seems the scheme fell short of its target—likely, a call to 
provide donations for furnishings was too niche even for members of the CA.139 The 
Second World War, unfortunately, disrupted this scheme, by which point 58 students 
had undertaken an education in Britain. Some 16 remained in the country, and unable 
to obtain passage home due to the conflict, were offered temporary employment in 
Britain to ‘contribute… to our war effort.’140  
To understand the interest the CA had in these schemes, we must revisit briefly 
the key aims of the Association. One of these had long been maintaining British 
predominance in China, and as noted by the CA, provision for Chinese foreign 
students was an area in which Britain trailed far behind America. Indeed, it is clear 
that efforts undertaken by the CA in matters relating to education emulated closely 
those of the USA, which had for some time been utilising its portion of the Boxer 
indemnity to fund Chinese education, both in the USA and through the foundation of 
a University in China.141 Furthermore, by emulating such schemes the CA would not 
be required to provide funding itself, something the Association often hesitated in 
doing for schemes that were not under its direct control.  
Alongside this, the scheme also provided an opportunity for the establishment 
of direct personal relations with Chinese students. As well as the appeal to CA 
members to help entertain these students, official social engagements were also 
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organized. Periodic reunion dinners were held for the students whilst they studied in 
Britain, which were also attended by members of the CA. Costs were covered by each 
member paying for his own ticket and that of a student.142 To ensure that links 
continued with those students that had returned to China, an ‘FBI Returned Students 
Association’ was formed in Shanghai.143 As noted in chapter three, the establishment 
of personal relations with Chinese partners had become an increasingly important aim 
of British business interests in China, and this scheme offered the potential to see this 
extended through the creation of new contacts, which in the long run sought to protect 
British trade interests in China by promoting ‘cultural diplomacy objectives’.144 
Despite this, these schemes, overall, were only of limited success. In part, this 
was down to the source of funding chosen. The British portion of the Boxer indemnity 
was only allocated after a long period of deliberation by the British government, 
leading to torturously slow progress, and the amount ultimately granted by the China 
Universities Committee to the joint CA and FBI scheme was small. Although the 
scheme was relatively long lived, continuing from the first arrival of students in 1934 
until at least 1949, it attracted far fewer students than similar American efforts which 
saw 5,700 students study in the country between 1925 and 1931.145 However, the 
scheme did bring Chinese students to Britain, to learn the types of modern technical 
skills that British Businesses, hoping to modernise China, would require. To what 
level we can view the scheme as benevolent—funded by Chinese finance, albeit the 
Boxer indemnity, to run a scheme that ultimately aimed to stunt the spread of Chinese 
nationalism and retain British primacy in trade—is questionable; the scheme is 
perhaps best viewed as part of the CA’s wider commercial and political goals, though 
it falls in this section of the thesis, ultimately, due to its educational nature. In doing 
so, however, it highlights how the CA’s primary object to encourage trade permeated 
many of its other schemes and developments. 
Although this scheme was limited in scope, it again also clearly shows that it 
was a specific group within the CA—committee men and member firms—who were 
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the motivation behind such educational endeavours. And it was this group who were 
the driving force behind the longest running scheme—educational or otherwise—that 
the CA developed. Originating within the CA and funded solely by the body and its 
members, it focused upon providing Chinese language education in Britain. The 
history and outcome of this commitment goes some way to challenging the view that 
has been espoused that ‘learning Chinese was probably restricted to missionaries, 
scholars, government officials and a few eccentrics until World War II.’146   
 
The China Association’s School of Practical Chinese and the foundation of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies 
At the 1901 annual dinner of the CA, Mr. Byron Brenan, recently returned to Britain 
after 30 years of government service in East Asia, undertook a reminiscence of the 
type that so often came to dominate these occasions.147 A former consul of HM 
government, he recalled a journey from his base of employment early in his career to 
the seat of the Chinese government in Peking, accompanied by an anonymous CA 
member present that evening. In the ‘days before the railway’ the journey of around 
80 miles necessitated an overnight stop at the ‘half-way house.’148 Having failed to 
engage a translator before departure, it became necessary that ‘one who had learned 
Chinese at home’—the anonymous companion—‘volunteered to translate.’ After a 
protracted struggle to request a breakfast for the next morning, the hapless translator 
‘was reduced to drawing a Chicken on the wall of the house.’ Despite these efforts, 
Brenan recalled to the amusement of the assembled guests, ‘Next morning no breakfast 
could be obtained until he had drawn underneath [the chicken] the representation of 
the egg that was wanted.’149 Although this anecdote was entertaining to the assembled 
guests at the dinner it nonetheless hinted at serious problems. If a member of the 
British government service could not order breakfast in Chinese, he certainly could 
not discuss anything of importance, except through a translator.  
While men of the consular service might remedy this position as their careers 
continued, as Brenan certainly did, for commercial employees the situation was even 
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worse.150  Whilst this status quo continued, chances of conducting business in person 
with Chinese remained severely limited. Improved personal relations with Chinese 
employees or partners were also very unlikely whilst direct communication was 
impossible. This ultimately meant continued reliance on Compradors—sometimes 
simply Chinese middlemen, sometimes entrepreneurs, managers, and very much 
partners of British firms—who by their very role, regardless of its size, reduced profits 
and had in several recorded cases simply absconded with funds given to them to 
conduct business deals.151 Indeed, a memorandum issued by the CA on the need for 
language tuition made reference to a report produced by F.S.A. Bourne of the consular 
service and reprinted by the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce which stated the belief 
that compradors ‘certainly made [at least] as much’ profit as British firms on imports 
into China. Furthermore, the report stated Bourne’s belief that these compradors and 
‘the likin officials in Canton’ were choosing to ‘combine against the British merchants 
and the Chinese consumer, and [doing] remarkably well.’ Unable to speak Chinese, 
Bourne argued, British merchants were left ‘absolutely in the dark about all this.’152 
Regardless of the accuracy of Bourne’s suspicions of collusion, for British 
business in China it was becoming clear that business relationships and procedures 
had to change. Equally, however, it quickly became apparent that there was no pool 
of employees with knowledge of the Chinese language upon which to draw. 
Particularly striking is the case of HSBC employee Guy Hillier, who was elevated to 
the position of manager in its Peking branch at least in part due to his exceptional 
command of the Chinese language. The Peking branch of the bank was key due to its 
position at the seat of the Chinese government, with whom the HSBC were in the 
process of negotiating large loans to fund railways and other modernisation projects. 
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The scarcity of men like Hillier, with a good command of the Chinese language, is 
highlighted by the events of 1896. In that year, Hillier tendered his resignation on 
account of his failing sight, but the HSBC refused to accept his offer. With a total loss 
of sight occurring in 1907, Hillier became known as ‘the blind banker of Peking’ and 
testament to his personal strength continued to work ‘indefatigably.’153 Ultimately he 
had no other option, as no one with a command of the language good enough to carry 
out negotiations with Chinese officials in person could be found to replace him. 
Despite his loss of sight he held the post until his death in 1924, following 39 years of 
service at the HSBC’s Peking branch, remembered by contemporaries as ‘the most 
remarkable of the by no means few remarkable men who have served the bank.’154   
Traditionally, such a lack of language skills had not been seen as a major 
problem. With British interests confined to a few treaty ports translators could be 
found when required, or middlemen employed. But in Peking, and when dealing 
directly with the Chinese government, this was not an option. Nor would it be an 
option if, as the CA hoped, the interior of China could be opened to British business 
interests as they too backed the railway development that seemed poised, at the turn 
of the century, to make this a reality.155 
Such problems, however, are largely absent from the historical record. Recent 
work by Ian Brown even argues that ‘colonial administrators’ and ‘commercial men’ 
had, by the early twentieth century, long had their Asian and African language tuition 
needs met by such institutions as University College and Kings College, London, 
which in 1836 and 1846 respectively founded chairs of Chinese.156 Brown, however, 
fails to account for the forms of language taught by these institutions, and perhaps 
overestimates the standard of tuition provided. The chairs were often unfilled, founded 
as a condition that came with of a sizeable bequest of Chinese works and allowed to 
lapse when original incumbents left the post, or filled by men of questionable talents 
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or whose aims offered little help to commerce.157 As late as 1890, for example, the 
incumbent of the Chair of Chinese at University College, London, remarked that 
although the modern Chinese language was ‘colloquially intelligible’ the professor 
instead chose to focus upon the study of ‘classical’ Chinese—something of little use 
as modern Chinese was the variant required for the majority of businessmen and 
colonial administrators.158 And when a chair of Chinese had been established at 
Cambridge in 1886, the incumbent professor in 1888 had stressed to prospective 
students that although he could provide ‘hints’ his best advice to applicants—should 
there be any—was that they should ‘make their way to China with all speed’ if they 
wished to succeed in learning the language.159 This was, of course, an option for 
some—most notably government employees—with student interpreters trained at the 
legation in Peking.160 Ultimately the first occupant chair of Chinese at Cambridge—
CA founding member Thomas Wade—did not teach any students at all before his 
death in 1895.161 Even his successor, Herbert Giles, as late as 1909, found that he only 
had ‘one student at Cambridge who really wished to learn the language for its own 
sake’ rather than being forced to do so for career needs, and further found that funding 
would not stretch to a native assistant to support tuition.162 
Compared to efforts in France, which had seen the French School of Oriental 
studies curriculum designed specifically to meet the needs of commerce in the late 
1880’s, a lack of concerted effort in Britain was seen to be jeopardising British 
commercial predominance in China.163 This built on wider French efforts, which had 
seen them ‘prosecuting their researches [into the Chinese language] with diligence and 
success’ from at least the early eighteenth century.164 Similarly, in the USA, and 
perhaps spurred on by the high numbers of Chinese migrants it had received, Yale 
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University opened a Chinese language seminar as early as 1876. The seminars 
founder, Samuel Wells Williams hoped 
That the study of Chinese will receive more attention than it has done… 
The merchant and the traveller, as well as the philologist and missionary, 
should attend to it… we hazard little in saying, that had this been done, 
most of the ill-will between foreigners and natives… would have been 
avoided.165 
 
By 1914, six more US universities offered Chinese seminars, and by 1930, 60 Chinese 
language courses were available in the country.166 Nor were British concerns limited 
to commerce, or to China, as declinist discourses began to appear on a wide scale.167 
A Royal Commission of 1884 on technical instruction had warned that ‘Our industrial 
Empire is vigorously attacked all over the world. We find that our most formidable 
assailants are the best educated peoples.’168 
It was against this background of international competition, but also due to a 
lack of interest from universities, that F.S.A. Bourne suggested, in his report, that ‘the 
work [to improve trade] must be done by rich firms or corporations able to wait and 
train in the Chinese spoken language and mercantile customs, youths selected in 
England for their business capacity.’169 First published in 1888, his calls were not 
responded to until 1897, the year after Guy Hillier had tendered his resignation to the 
HSBC, although whether this was linked or simply a coincidence remains a mystery. 
Chairman of the CA William Keswick in this year notified members that a scheme 
was being formulated for ‘teaching young fellows Chinese before they went East’ 
under the ‘aegis of some scholastic institution—possibly the London University.’ 
Specifically, Keswick noted the wider fears of the CA and British commercial 
community that British predominance in China was being undermined by innovative 
moves of other European Powers. It was envisaged that the school curriculum would 
focus upon offering education in practical, rather than the classical form, of the 
Chinese language. Keswick assured members that this would be achieved by the use 
                                                          
165 Ying Li ‘History of Chinese Language Education and the Development of Textbooks in the United 
States’ Chinese America: History and Perspectives (January, 2015), p.76. 
166 Li ‘History of Chinese Language Education’ p.76. 
167 For an introduction to British ‘Declinism’ and its recurrence as Historical theory, which first 
developed seriously in response to American and German competition in the 1880’s, see Jim 
Tomlinson, ‘Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism’ as a Recurrent Theme in British History in the Long Twentieth 
Century’, Twentieth Century British History, 20, 2 (2009), pp.227-51. 
168 Quoted in Lawson and Silver, A Social History of Education in England, p.346. 
169 Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce, 1896-7, p.150. 
 
 
240 
 
of ‘efficient Chinese teachers—not relics of the past, but active men’ brought directly 
from China to lead the scheme.170 
Two years later, the school became operational, and, in 1899, a memorandum 
was sent to the Foreign Office and upon an expression of full backing for the scheme 
Mr George Brown, formerly of HM’s consular service, was dispatched to China to 
secure the services of two teachers. Funding of £500 per annum had been guaranteed 
for five years by 13 members and member firms of the CA, shown in table 4.1, 
alongside a lump sum of £600 donated by prominent Association member R.S. 
Gundry.171 Also notable is the source of the large donation, of £100 P.A., from the 
HSBC who had so recently struggled, and ultimately failed, to find an able 
replacement for Guy Hillier. Upon Mr Brown’s return, teaching commenced in rented 
rooms. Applications for the school were ‘numerous’, and by late 1900 some 12 
students were enrolled.172 Reports of the school’s foundation were widespread, 
appearing in newspapers in Aberdeen, Glasgow, Leeds, Sheffield, Leicester and 
London.173  
These donations offer the first insight into why the CA was well placed to lead 
the scheme. In order to be a success, the scheme required substantial funding, and a 
single firm providing this for an in-house language school may not have seen a viable 
return upon their investment. By bringing together a series of firms through the CA, 
through which they had by this point a solid history of co-operation, the scheme was 
rendered cost effective, and ensured that should it prove a failure no single firm would 
lose an uncomfortable amount. By sharing these costs—as was done when providing 
a pension for CA members—and ensuring donations were made public, the firms also 
ensured that all competitors who wished to utilise this language tuition scheme had 
contributed in some format. As mentioned above, such cooperation is key when 
attempting to remove the possibility of ‘free-riders’ hijacking the philanthropic 
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Table 4.1: Original subscribers to the China Association School of Practical Chinese 
source: China Association, annual report 1900 
 
Subscribers to the C.A. teaching scheme 
Amount subscribed per annum 
(£.s.d.) 
    
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 100.0.0 
Messrs. John Swire & Sons 50.0.0 
Messrs. Jardine Matheson & Co. 50.0.0 
Messrs. Ilbert & Co. 50.0.0 
The Pekin Syndicate 50.0.0 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China 50.0.0 
R.A. Yerburgh, Esq. M.P. 50.0.0 
H. Harrison, Esq. 50.0.0 
Sir Alfred Dent 10.10.0 
W.S. Young Esq. 10.0.0 
Messrs. Reiss Bros. 10.0.0 
George Cawston, Esq. 10.0.0 
Messrs. Dodwell & Co. 5.0.0 
    
Total Yearly Subscription £495.10.- 
 
 
donations of another company for their own personal gain.174 Had a single firm created 
a language school, this could feasibly further proved problematic in two ways. First, 
other companies could have sent students to the school exploiting the benevolent 
gesture of the firm. Secondly, the employees they had trained would have become 
valuable assets and had another firm offered them better terms of employment this 
could have destroyed the inter-firm trust and co-operation the CA desired. Both of 
these would have damaged the social capital all of the firms involved in the CA had 
previously accrued. Control of the school was also shared when placing it under CA 
leadership, further ensuring that the curriculum would not unfairly favour one firms 
needs over another. All of these reasons offer potential explanations as to why a co-
operative scheme under a third party was more appealing to the CA membership firms 
than undertaking such a move alone. 
The next challenge following foundation was to secure legitimacy and a 
permanent base of operations. A series of delays caused setbacks, with the CA 
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unwilling to grant total control to Kings College, the school’s proposed home, 
mirroring concerns over control exhibited in charitable collections.175 Why Kings 
College was chosen, we can only speculate, but a combination of its location—close 
to the City of London—a dislike of old establishments such as Cambridge and Oxford, 
from which Owen has argued those who had built new commercial fortunes felt 
socially excluded, and even the need of Kings College to raise funding to secure its 
own existence may have played a part.176 Eventually, negotiations saw a satisfactory 
conclusion reached and on 22 June 1904, Kings College announced the amalgamation 
of the Practical School of Chinese with its own department of Chinese. A 
professorship of documentary and colloquial Chinese, to serve concurrently with the 
current professor of Literary Chinese was founded and Sir Walter Hillier, former 
diplomat, CA member, and Chinese scholar was appointed to the new role.177 Hillier 
held this position until his retirement in 1908, though his influence continued, with his 
textbook remaining the key introductory text for students until at least 1910.178 A 
decision was also taken to overhaul the school management, and to place it under the 
control of a new committee headed by J.H. Gwyther of the Chartered Bank.179  
Hopes for the school were high at this juncture. Charles Addis of the HSBC 
wrote to Shanghai branch manager Ewen Cameron to espouse its value. He thought it 
valuable to have men who could interpret, and ‘more important, who are capable of 
checking the interpretation of others’, recalling earlier fears of untrustworthy 
compradors. These needs would be compounded, he noted, as the bank tried to extend 
into the interior of China. Addis also stressed that the new appointment of Walter 
Hillier had risen his hopes. He noted of the previous Kings College professor that 
Douglas’s interests were almost entirely classical and it is doubtful if he 
could have taught commercial Chinese even if he tried. That is all changed 
now. The present teacher, Sir Walter Hillier, is a thoroughly practical man 
and, after a full discussion of the subject with him, any doubt I entertained 
as to the practicability of combining Chinese and Banking have been 
largely removed.180 
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Indeed, Addis believed Hillier’s skill to be a key reason for encouraging study in 
London rather than China, with his ‘exceptional teaching ability… compared with that 
of the ordinary Chinese pundit’ improving students chances of success. Furthermore, 
he believed the classes would allow the identification of employees with no natural 
talent for languages, and therefore no hope of acquiring Chinese language skills, 
without the costs of sending them to China.181  
 
Incorporation of the School 
By 1908, the school itself had become well established. It had proved a ‘success from 
its commencement’ and ‘had done great good’ working in a role alongside the chair 
of classical Chinese at Kings College. Yet the dispute over control had caused 
reluctance on the part of the backers of the scheme to provide a proper endowment 
fund, instead choosing to fund the chair by yearly subscriptions. With the retirement 
of the incumbent professor of Classical Chinese, however, an opportunity emerged to 
combine the two posts. The new combined chair was to remain primarily focused upon 
the teaching of practical Chinese, and was to be ensured of continued long term 
funding by the creation of an endowment fund placed under an incorporated company, 
to avoid problems upon the death of trustees. As such, 1909 saw the incorporation 
under the companies act of ‘The China Association’s Incorporated School of Practical 
Chinese.’182 Such endowments, it seems, were in vogue at this time, with Cambridge 
University creating a chair of German language in the same year, its first backed by 
an endowment provided by a business firm—in that case, the banking house of J. 
Henry Schroder & Co.183 
A list of the original subscribers show that not only were senior members of 
China firms prepared to back the school with substantial sums, but that many of the 
premier firms involved in the China trade remained willing to co-operate to ensure the 
continuation of the school. The donations themselves, and their sources, are outlined 
in table. 4.2. Privileges to nominate students for free, or reduced fees, were granted to  
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182 Annual General Meeting, 1908, Minutes of the General Committee and Executive Committee, 
December 1906 – November 1910, CHAS/MCP/4. 
183 Owen, English Philanthropy, p.353. 
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Table 4.2: Contributions to the China Association School of Chinese Endowment 
Fund 
source: annual report of the China Association, 1909 
 
Contributors to the CA school endowment fund Contribution  
    
W. Keswick (Representing Jardine Matheson) Shares to the Value of £4,000 
Taikoo Sugar (Subsidiary of Swires) £1,000 
The HSBC £1,000 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China £1,000 
R.S. Gundry £850 
John Swire and Sons £550 
H. Harrison (Chairman of the Blackburn Chamber of 
Commerce) 184  
£100 
Mrs Gamwell 185 £50 
Previous School fund Surplus £600 
Yearly Subscriptions (total) 186 £100 p.a. 
    
Total Endowment Fund £9150 (plus £100 p.a) 
 
the most generous donors.187 Further amounts contributed in the form of yearly 
subscriptions were used to cover the immediate running costs of the school. In total  
                                                          
184 Teaching of Chinese.” Morning Post (London, England), 8 July 1899.  
185 Investigation into the exact sources of funding highlights the problems that can be inherit in 
determining who exactly donated. Two separate documents show the list of those who had ‘promised’ 
to give funds in March of 1909—The first in the Minutes of the first meeting of the committee of 
management, 23 March 1909, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 
– 1955, CHAS/SI/03—and the final list of subscriptions advertised in The Times in October and 
reprinted in the annual report for 1909, appendix p.117, available at Annual Reports, 1906-10, 
CHAS/A/05. In the first, JH Scott (of John Swire and Sons) was to have subscribed £1650. However, 
his name is completely absent from the final list. Instead, his donation is made in the name of John 
Swire and Sons (£550), the Taikoo Sugar Refining Co. (A Swire owned concern, £1,000) and 
potentially Mrs Gamwell (Mr Gamwell was a founding member of the China Association, and a partner 
of Swire and Sons, see Hook, A Guide to the Papers of John Swire and Sons Limited . 
186 Yearly subscriptions were provided by [unreadable] (£50 P.A.), Cawston & co. (£10 P.A.), Gilman 
and Co (£10 P.A.), Reiss Bros (£10 P.A.), Dodwell and Co., (£10 P.A.) and Sir Alfred Dent (£10 P.A.), 
see the Minutes of the first meeting of the committee of management, 23 March 1909, China 
Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03. 
187 G. Jamieson, Hon. Secretary to W. Keswick, 18 November 1909, China Association’s School of 
Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03, China Association Collection, SOAS 
Library, University of London, notes W. Keswick was granted the right to nominate 5 pupils for free 
tuition, and 5 for tuition at reduces fees, a right that was continue for not only his life, but was to pass 
to his son Henry Keswick for the duration of his life too. The Minutes of the first meeting of the 
committee of management, 23 March 1909, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese 
Endowment Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03 note that other Banks and firms which contributed £1000 
were entitled to nominate one student for free, and another at a reduced fee. 
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this provided the school with an impressive endowment fund of around £9000, with a 
further £100 provided yearly by subscriptions.  
By this point in its history, many of the major China firms of the period were 
involved in the scheme, as were two major East Asian banks. A sum of £30 per annum 
was soon donated to the running costs of the school by the Colonial Office, which 
although of small size is notable as the Colonial Office typically did not support such 
schemes, instead preferring employees to receive tuition directly once overseas.188  
 
The Foundation of the School of Oriental Studies 
The final major stage in the development of the CA School of Practical Chinese came 
with the integration of the school as part of the wider scheme to create an academic 
School of Oriental Studies [SOS] in London. This government scheme was set against 
a background of changing opinions regarding the provision of education. The 1902 
education act had, for the first time, provided state funding for secondary education, 
and local education authorities had been established with substantial powers, to act ‘as 
partners in worthwhile voluntary initiatives.’189 Similarly, the British government had 
now reached the conclusion that had been reached by the CA, the Blackburn Chamber 
of Commerce Report, and The Times some years before, that without a concerted effort 
to improve language skills, British predominance in the East, and therefore the British 
Empire, was at stake.190  
This realisation resulted in the production of the Reay Report, which was the 
outcome of an inquiry in 1909 to ‘consider the organisation of oriental studies in 
London.’ What was found was not promising. The report could only agree that, as had 
been pointed out in a 1906 memorial to Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman,  
There is no properly organised School providing instruction in Oriental 
languages. The efficient teaching which is given is due to the efforts of 
scattered colleges and societies, whose finances are heavily burdened by 
other charges, with the result that in almost every case the teachers, whose 
merits are generally recognised, are inadequately paid, and hence are 
unable to give more than a small portion of their time to the teaching of 
their subjects. The number of students who avail themselves of the existing 
                                                          
188 Report of the Committee of Management for 1909-10, China Association’s School of Practical 
Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03. For the preference of the Colonial Office see 
Brown, The School of Oriental and African Studies, p.9 and pp.31-2. 
189 Lawrence Goldman, Dons and Workers: Oxford and Adult Education since 1850 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), p.114; Owen, English Philanthropy, pp.273-5. 
190 Brown, The School of Oriental and African Studies, pp.7-12. 
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facilities is very limited and would be largely increased if due recognition 
were given to these studies.191 
 
Further testimony in the report would stress the need of tuition to improve commercial 
prospects, and was given by both William Keswick and C.S. Addis of the CA. Both, 
of course, could look for inspiration to the CA’s Chinese language school.192 Indeed, 
of the ‘colleges and societies’ supporting earlier schemes, the CA scheme seems to 
have been the standout example. Contemporary articles rated it as the only department 
which could boast self-sufficiency through an endowment fund.193 Later, when the 
SOS scheme later sought to receive backing from a Mansion House fund it was 
suggested that if the new school could be placed upon the foundations of both the 
endowment fund provided for the CA’s School of Practical Chinese and also its 
reputation as a successful centre for teaching the Chinese language, there would be a 
greater chance of success.194 Figures provided within the Reay Report attest to this 
clearly. Walter Hillier earned a salary of £211.16.4. for his work in 1906-7 as professor 
of the CA school, and the native assistant at the school some £144.0.0. No professor 
teaching another oriental language at Kings College received more than £109.15.4., 
and at none at University College, London, received a salary greater than £110.0.0.195 
Student numbers are similarly striking. Although Hebrew studies received 62 students 
at Kings College, Chinese was comfortably second with 30 enrolled. Arabic, Persian, 
Turkish, Modern Greek, Russian, Japanese, Malay, Hausa, Swahili and Zulu classes 
received only 11 students combined. University College had 32 language students, but 
these were spread across departments of Sanskrit, Hebrew, Tibetan, Arabic, Persian, 
Hindustani, Bengali, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Maratha and Burmese.196 Returning to Ian 
Brown’s recent work, we find the involvement of the CA, and wider Chinese firms 
behind it, again, largely missed. Indeed, Brown only makes reference to CA 
representatives attending one meeting about the foundation of the school, and notes 
China-related firms the HSBC, John Swire and Sons, the Chartered Bank of India and 
                                                          
191 Treasury Committee on the Organisation of Oriental Studies in London, Report of the Committee 
appointed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury to consider the Organisation of 
Oriental Studies in London (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1909), p.2 (hereafter referred to 
as The Reay Report). 
192  Ibid.,p.14, for Addis memorandum on the matter see p.44. 
193 ‘London School of Oriental Studies’ Journal of the African Society, 13, 52 (1914), p.423. 
194  Ibid. 
195 One lecturer in the Oriental department of University College was paid £200.0.0, but this was to 
teach the History of India. For this and all other figures see The Reay Report, pp.65-6.  
196 Ibid. 
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China and Alfred Holt and Company providing a ‘modest’ contribution to an appeal 
for funds, not noting their contribution through earlier schemes.197  
The SOS scheme was first brought to the attention of the CA general 
committee in 1914, the chairman noting that a committee had been founded in the City 
of London to raise funds to this end, and had requested the backing of the CA.198 After 
being assured that the teaching of colloquial Mandarin Chinese would ‘always be 
carried on as an essential branch of study’ and that a place on the Governing board of 
the SOS would be reserved for an elected member of the CA, the move was approved 
by the CA General Committee. On 31 December 1916, the CA school of Practical 
Chinese ceased teaching at Kings College, and relocated to the newly formed SOS.  
Following this relocation, little altered immediately. School staff remained the 
same, and commercial students formed the majority of attendees, as noted below. 
However as time progressed the influence of the CA within SOS decreased. Why 
exactly this was the case is unclear, but a number of developments are suggestive of 
at least some of the potential reasons. Changes in the curriculum of the school and the 
types of student attending—both of which will be discussed later—suggest the SOS 
developed to become a much wider body than the CA envisaged, and a much larger 
body than they could attempt to influence. It began to pursue a wider academic base 
of study, leaving the aims of commercial firms behind. On a more practical note, over 
time the endowment fund of the CA became devalued. This led to decreased funding, 
and perhaps with it decreased influence. 
By the 1930s the CA had become clearly separated from the School.  A loss of 
interest was typified by the events of a meeting of 1932. When questioned by the CA 
secretary what teaching was provided with the funds they donated, the representative 
of the CA on the SOS board of Governance admitted he did not know. He did not 
observe any classes as he could not speak Chinese. The representative reminded the 
CA committee that he was simply elected to this post, and had little interest in the 
school. Previously, he added, the CA had been represented by Mr. Byron Brenan and 
George Jamieson, Chinese scholars who were much more likely to oversee the 
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198Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee, 17 February 1914, Minutes of the General 
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248 
 
proceedings of the school, and understand what was being taught.199 A meeting was 
held in 1935 to debate whether the current professor, Sir Reginald Johnston was fit for 
purpose, showing continued concern over how the CA’s financial support was 
spent.200 But by 1941 a stark reminder of the lack of CA influence came when the 
efforts of the CA to place a member on the board of Governors were met with 
confusion from the SOAS, who, unfamiliar with the promises made to the CA at the 
inception of the body, failed to invite a CA representative to serve.201 The same year 
the annual report of the school told CA members that the school was now simply a 
department of the wider SOAS Far Eastern Department.202 By 1946 had the CA 
realised that their contributions to SOAS had been marginalised by the recent increases 
in funding to the institution, and although the CA continued to provide funding of 
£250 P.A. until 1951 by this point commercial attendance at the school had ceased 
with the closure of China to foreign business firms, and the details included in the 
annual report of the CA were limited to scant information on attendance numbers and 
financial details of the still extant endowment fund.203 
A final effort to ensure the usefulness of the endowment came in 1952, with 
the grant to the SOAS stopped and alternative arrangements investigated.204 Of several 
suggestions, the CA chose to create a scholarship post at the SOAS using the fund, 
which continued until 1965, and was awarded to students studying practical 
Chinese.205 By 1966 the financial return provided by the endowment fund was no 
                                                          
199 Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the China Association’s Incorporated School of Practical Chinese, 
17 February 1932, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 – 1955, 
CHAS/SI/03. 
200 Robert A. Bickers, ‘“Coolie Work”: Sir Reginald Johnston at the School of Oriental Studies, 1931-
1937’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, 5, 3 (1995), p.395. 
201 Annual meeting of the China Association’s Incorporated School of Practical Chinese, 27 May 1941, 
China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03. The 
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longer sufficient to provide for this purpose, and although 1967 saw a bursary of £99 
provided the scheme was, by this point, a shadow of its former self.206 
 
School curriculum 
Our first insight into teaching at the school comes with incorporation of the School 
and the combination of the chairs of practical and classical Chinese at Kings College. 
Training for commercial students was well provisioned. Students were helped by the 
professor through a study of The Chinese language and How to Learn it: A manual 
for Beginners, a textbook penned by Sir Walter Hillier. This text promised to give the 
reader enough understanding of the Chinese language to ‘make his ordinary wants 
known’ with an hour of practice per day for six months.207 This was followed by a 
weekly translation exercise from English into Chinese, and an optional, though well 
attended, conversation class. Due to the status of the professorship as a combined chair 
of Chinese it was also necessary to provide more advanced tuition. Hirth’s 
documentary Chinese was studied, alongside sections of Chinese classics including 
the Great Learning and Constant Mean, whilst under the Assistant professor classes 
involved a study of the novel The Fortunate Union.208  
Although tuition was comprehensive at this point this combination of chairs 
was to mark the start of a protracted struggle to continue the teaching of practical 
Chinese in what became an increasingly academic setting. This is not to say, however, 
that efforts to do so did not continue. Occasional lecturers were employed to teach 
dialects of particular importance to commercial interests, including provision in 
Cantonese to support banking interests.209 Intensive courses were trialled, including 
one purely for employees of BAT in 1928—taught, at an early stage of his career, by 
prominent Chinese novelist and dramatist Lao She—and one for two students in 
1936.210 Though these showed promising results, they did not become a permanent 
                                                          
206 For the amounts granted by the scholarship see annual reports from 1955-67, available at Annual 
Reports, 1953-57, CHAS/A/11; Annual Reports, 1957-62, CHAS/A/12; Annual Report 1962-3, 63-4, 
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207 Walter Hillier, The Chinese Language and How to Learn It: A Manual For Beginners (Sixth Edition, 
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208 Annual Report for 1912, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 
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209 Annual Report for 1928, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 
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feature. A commercial certificate showing proficiency in Chinese was introduced, to 
give students a clear goal to work towards, and even in 1946, at the very end of British 
commercial involvement in China, a new course to teach practical Chinese, including 
a course on Chinese law, was introduced—though it attracted no interest. Ultimately, 
these innovations were sporadic, and uncoordinated, and no long-term plan existed to 
develop the teaching of basic Chinese for commercial purposes.211 
As education for commercial purposes began to struggle the academic side of 
the school started to flourish. 1927 saw, for the first time, two Chinese students reading 
for a PhD and another towards an arts degree.212 The following year five students were 
working towards University degrees, with a further four engaged in literary study, 
while, in 1930, there was dedicated study by students in Chinese History, Religion and 
Philosophy.213 By 1933, attendees included a PhD student from Vienna writing on the 
early culture of China, and others taking courses in Chinese History, T’ang dynasty 
poetry, and advanced classical Chinese—although elementary Chinese did remain on 
the curriculum.214 It was in this year that numbers of educational students tied those 
of commercial students for the first time, before exceeding them in 1936, as seen in 
Figure 4.1.215 
The report of 1935 presents a stark picture of the struggles over direction the 
school was facing. As these academic achievements grew, it seems a conscious 
decision was taken to reduce provision for commercial students, despite the success 
of four BAT employees who had achieved excellent progress. Tuition in basic Chinese 
was no longer to be provided by the incumbent professor. Instead, it was provided by 
a senior student with the aid of a gramophone course, voiced by Lao She, and a two 
                                                          
211Annual report for 1929, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 – 
1955, CHAS/SI/03; Annual report for 1946, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese 
Endowment Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03. 
212 Annual report for 1927, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 – 
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213 Annual report for 1928, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 – 
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Endowment Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03. 
214 Annual report for 1932-3, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment Fund, 1908 
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volume handbook.216 This could hardly have been the level of tuition the CA would 
have expected when creating a substantial endowment fund some years previously.217  
 
School attendance 
A more detailed analysis of attendance figures emphasises these wider changes. As 
shown in Figure 4.1, from a starting point of 12 pupils in 1900, attendance numbers 
had grown to 40 by 1914. As we have seen in the Reay Report of 1909, these figures 
were far higher than any other contemporary language chair in London other than 
Hebrew.218 The First World War, however, reduced this figure. Numbers were halved 
to 20 in 1915, as 14 of the students ‘promptly responded to the call of King and 
Country, and joined his majesty’s forces.’ 1923 saw a highpoint of 72 students, though 
numbers decreased slightly in the following years. This decrease was attributed in the 
annual report of 1926 to ‘reasons which can easily be understood’. Likely this referred 
to the damage to trade caused by continued warlordism, conflicts in China and by the 
anti-foreign May Thirtieth Movement of 1925.219 The 1930’s saw a continued 
decrease in attendance, with numbers not once exceeding 37, a drop attributed by the 
CA to trade depression. A small increase is evident in the 1940’s, including a 
considerable spike during World War two.  
However, these figures must be subjected to a more nuanced appraisal to gain 
a full picture. For the CA, the primary aim of the school was to teach practical, 
colloquial Chinese to employees of firms and banks involved in the China trade. As 
shown in Figure.4.2 students attending whilst employed by Far Eastern businesses 
were indeed the most common at the school for more than half of the years for which 
records are extant. Whilst this is clearly promising, it does not necessarily mean the 
school was an unmitigated success. Attendance of business students was particularly 
susceptible to wider events in Chinese history. Their numbers reduced during the First 
World War, unrest of the 1920’s, Sino-Japanese war, and the Second World War and 
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Figure 4.1: School of Chinese, overall student numbers and numbers of students 
sent by Far Eastern businesses 
source: Annual reports, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment 
Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03 
  
Communist revolution, which saw the complete withdrawal of business students from 
the school. Indeed, the annual reports note that 1945 and 1946 saw the attendance of 
no business students at all. A spike of business students after 1925 may well be 
symptomatic of the aim of China firms to encourage greater personal co-operation 
with Chinese partners in the wake of the May Thirtieth movement, in contrast to the 
original fall in student numbers this caused, but this increase in students had faded by 
1930. 
Overall, this pattern fits well when viewed in concert with the changes evident 
in the curriculum. As wider events in China made it a less commercially attractive 
proposition, business interest in the school decreased. No longer able to exert such a 
high level of influence due to decreased funding, and with fewer business students 
attending, the curriculum seems to have moved to become more academically focused 
as evidenced by the rise in students studying purely for educational reasons shown in 
Figure 4.2. From promising beginnings, the CA gradually lost control of the initiative 
it had founded, losing influence over the direction of teaching long before this was 
recognised in the annual report of 1940. Despite these problems, business attendees 
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Figure 4.2: Respective percentages of business, missionary and educational students 
of the School of Chinese 
source: Annual reports, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment 
Fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03 
 
 
 
were predominant for long periods of the CA’s involvement with the scheme. And as 
we have seen, education in practical Chinese for commercial purposes was provided, 
if perhaps not to the level the CA wished. Ultimately, this leaves one final question to 
be asked of the CA School of Practical Chinese—did business students obtain a good 
knowledge of practical Chinese before their departure to China? 
 
Student achievement 
Early results were promising, and as mentioned upon the move to incorporation, great 
emphasis was placed upon the success of the school. In 1905 the incumbent teacher 
Walter Hillier praised the achievement and zeal of students, further noting that in his 
own view several students ‘connected with banks and business firms in China’ had 
left for East Asia with ‘a knowledge that they have found to stand them in good 
stead.’220 By the time of the Reay Report of 1909, which ultimately led to the founding 
of the SOS, Hillier was regarded as the only teacher in the country to have achieved 
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consistent success in teaching the language.221 Problems, however, were easily visible 
and a repeated observation following the widening of the school with the foundation 
of the SOS was that commercial students achieved generally poorer results than their 
counterparts. Often this was attributed to the timing of classes available to these 
students. Taking place after the finish of the working day, commercial students were 
reported to be tired, damaging their ability to learn effectively, displaying a lack of 
effort that led them to be considered a ‘nuisance’ by staff.222 Furthermore, these time 
constraints negatively affected lecturers, who found it difficult to hold enough classes 
to suit the varied working hours of the employees of all of the major firms involved in 
the China trade.223 Others suggested that the ‘haphazard’ nature in which Chinese 
lecturers were selected lead to a poor quality of recruit, often ‘unable to control’ the 
men from banks and businesses who attended on an evening.224 Proposed resolutions 
to standardise the time given to employees between the major China firms came to 
nothing, however, and nor did a more radical proposal to businesses to allow 
employees to attend classes during morning working hours.225 The introduction of a 
commercial certificate in Chinese proficiency produced increased standards by 
providing a solid goal for pupils to work towards, and intensive courses showed 
promise when they were trialled. But largely, commercial students continued to study 
part time, on an evening, and saw mixed results. Contemporary accounts, too, suggest 
that the school had made little headway, even amongst the employees of the school’s 
largest financial backers. Writing in a history of Jardine Matheson, John Keswick 
noted that upon arrival in Shanghai in 1929 he enquired at the Jardines office about 
learning the language. He received a response that it was ‘a good idea—none of us 
do—but a good idea.’226 His enthusiasm would, perhaps, have pleased his grandfather 
William who began the scheme and donated £4,000 to endow the school, but the lack 
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of effort amongst the other Jardine Matheson employees in Shanghai likely would not 
have.227 This disappointment for the CA would no doubt have been exacerbated by the 
success seen by other students. Missionaries who studied at the school found the level 
of tuition excellent and comparable to that available in China itself, whilst the success 
of the academic side of the school is proven by Gilchrist scholarships attained by 
several graduating students.228  
The view that the scheme had some potential is compounded by attempting to 
provide a brief insight into those who passed examinations in 1909. As of this year, 
British minister John Jordan noted—much as at the start of our study of British efforts 
to improve the learning of the Chinese language—that ‘Even the Hongkong Bank has 
still only one man—Hillier—who is competent to transact business with a Chinese 
official.’229 With pupils at the school split into five divisions by the examiner the future 
seemed brighter, as students ranging from those engaged in advanced work to 
beginners all passed ‘relatively severe’ examinations. By investigating records of 
foreign residents on the China Coast it can be ascertained that of 14 students, 9 went 
on to hold positions in China for Far Eastern firms within the next 11 years.230 Of 
these, six held positions working for the HSBC, one for the Chartered Bank of India, 
Australia and China, and two for the Asiatic Petroleum Company.  Certainly, it seems 
that during the earlier years of the school’s existence, firms which took advantage of 
the scheme could expect to see some reward. It is important to note that several of 
these students may also have had departure plans, or even careers in China, altered or 
cut short due to the First World War. 
Yet the school cannot be seen as anything other than a disappointment for the 
CA. Though tuition for commercial students was made available, it was increasingly 
marginalised, and seems to have been largely unsuccessful, except for the earliest 
                                                          
227 Maggie Keswick ‘ The Jardine Family’ in Maggie Keswick (ed.) The Thistle and the Jade: A 
Celebration of 150 years of Jardine, Matheson & Co. (London: Octopus books ltd., 1982), pp.262-3. 
228 Annual report for 1915, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment fund, 1908 – 
1955, CHAS/SI/03; Annual report for 1931, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese 
Endowment fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03. 
229 Edwards, British Diplomacy and Finance in China, p.124. 
230 In total, 16 students were examined in 1909. The two discounted from this number include one 
female student who was examined, however female residents of the China Coast are not recorded 
consistently in the directories utilised. Similarly, a military officer who presented for examination 
would not appear in the China directories. Of the three students who do not appear in the China 
directories, one may appear under different initials, though this cannot be proven. For Full details see 
Appendix C, and the Annual report for 1909, China Association’s School of Practical Chinese 
Endowment fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03. 
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years of the school’s existence. One redeeming feature for those who backed the 
scheme was elucidated by Charles Addis when he noted that even students who failed 
at the school had benefited in a small way, as had the firms who sent them for tuition. 
After all, the school at least stopped these students wasting several years in China, and 
saved their firms the substantial sum it would have cost to do so, by discerning which 
had little talent for languages and halting what would have been the pointless process 
of dispatching them to China. Two such students may well have been M.B. Oliver and 
L.T.R. Rickford, from the examination group of 1909. Although Oliver scored a 
respectable 68 per cent in his examination, Rickford was comfortably bottom of the 
class with 29 per cent. Neither, ultimately, had careers in China, and were instead 
dispatched by the Chartered Bank to Singapore, a British colony where their language 
shortcomings may not have been so acutely felt.231 
However, to view the overall outcome of the scheme negatively would be to 
do a disservice to the wider impact it had. Primarily, this must be seen in the 
contribution of the school to the establishment of SOAS. Even in the timespan of this 
study, the wider legacy the CA left through the foundation of a teaching centre for 
practical Chinese was evident. Although the Second World War coincided with the 
final decrease in business students, it created renewed demand from military sources. 
Of the 103 students at the school in 1945, 82 were active service men. With an almost 
complete dearth of students in 1941, the incumbent professor and his assistant moved 
temporarily to Birmingham to teach basic Chinese to the 40 men of a volunteer 
ambulance unit which was preparing to embark for China. By the time the unit 
departed, several were proficient in basic Chinese characters, and one was able to give 
a speech in Chinese upon embarkation. 232 
Regardless of the school’s final successes or failures, it nonetheless offers us 
fascinating insight into how a voluntary body such as the CA could act as a focal point 
through which large competing firms could co-operate to produce a sizeable 
educational scheme. The use of the CA as an intermediary ensured, while the scheme 
remained under their control, that all firms were able to benefit and that none would 
                                                          
231 See Appendix C. Though few in Singapore spoke English as a first language (1.8% of the population 
as of 1957) it was, nonetheless, the language used for ‘official purposes’ and many were able to speak 
it ‘to some extent.’ See David Deterding, Singapore English (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
2007), p.85.  
232 Annual Report for 1941, The China Association’s School of Practical Chinese Endowment fund, 
1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03; Annual Report for 1945, The China Association’s School of Practical 
Chinese Endowment fund, 1908 – 1955, CHAS/SI/03. 
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be able to exploit the donations of others. It also offers us the knowledge that, while 
the Victorian record regarding philanthropy for ‘the advancement of good learning’ 
has been described as ‘less than dazzling’ that at least in the specific area of Chinese 
language tuition, serious efforts were made by the CA and its supporters.233 That many 
modern foreign language departments of Universities are now offering targeted 
courses for business and commercial learners to attempt to combat declining student 
numbers suggest that the CA’s school was based on a sound theory and basis—if not 
implemented as well as might have been hoped.234 
 
Conclusion 
When the CA was founded, it is likely that its leaders and members were unsure what 
form their charitable and benevolent endeavours would look like. It certainly appears 
that in their intention to emulate the Straits Association, and from some of their early 
efforts, that they hoped to become something reminiscent of other bodies, such as 
ethnic associations, providing charity to individuals linked to China who had fallen on 
hard times. Because of the relatively elite position of those in the CA’s sphere, 
however—returnees would, by their very nature, have to have some wealth in order to 
afford return passage, and those still resident in China also generally fell into the more 
affluent group—this did not develop beyond a few isolated causes. When conditions 
altered, and the number of British returnees from China increased as internees returned 
following World War Two, and more were displaced by the establishment of the PRC, 
the CA proved successful in supporting these displaced migrants.  
Yet, as was made clear by the CA holding a substantial fund of its own for the 
first time in helping these ex-internees, a lack of resources was evident for much of 
the period under study. This led the CA explore methods in which this could be 
circumvented in order for the Association to retain their original commitments to 
charity. To this end the CA developed to become an organisational nexus through 
which charity could operate. It proved successful in promoting appeals, and discerning 
the viability or trustworthiness of appeals, by utilising its position and contacts 
developed as a transnational network.  In this vein it helped both British and Chinese 
                                                          
233 Owen, English Philanthropy, p.371. 
234 Glenn Fulcher, ‘The Commercialisation of Language Provision at University’ in J. Charles Anderson 
(ed.), The politics of Language Education: Individuals and Institutions (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 
2009), p.128. 
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interests, and drew donations most prominently from the firms who operated under 
the CA’s wider banner. It was through these donations that the CA once again made 
certain that it would act to promote, first and foremost, British trade in China by 
ensuring that firms gave strategically to attempt to boost not only their own corporate 
image, but the image of the whole of the British presence in China. With hindsight, 
we can see that the CA’s efforts had little chance of countering the rising tide of 
Chinese nationalism, but they were nonetheless significant undertakings. 
It was this position as an organisational nexus through which competing firms 
could co-operate that also saw the CA become involved in pursuing philanthropic 
schemes for education. Understanding these schemes goes some way to expanding on 
recent work on the foundation of SOAS, which missed the CA’s achievement. From 
an unofficial School of Chinese, the CA’s program came to be an endowed chair for 
teaching modern Chinese, and, by the founding of SOAS, the most prominent example 
of Asian language teaching in Britain. It is of some disappointment, and it can only 
have been to the detriment of the British trade in China, that from these promising 
beginnings Chinese language tuition for commercial ends never fully developed, 
before being effectively rendered useless by the rise of the PRC and the closure of 
China to foreign firms. 
Once again, we are left with the image of the CA as an association which was 
wide ranging, and was always aware of the need for compromise. As the most 
prominent representative of China linked businesses and British return migrants from 
China in London, they continued to balance the needs of both commerce and 
individuals in their charitable collections. But as their involvement with education 
shows, the promotion of commerce and trade always remained their key aim, even if 
another was more visible, and was directed by the corporate members whose names 
have surfaced repeatedly throughout this thesis—the HSBC, Chartered Bank, Jardine 
Matheson and Swires. Once again, too, we are left with the conclusion that the wider 
CA membership cared little for such schemes, and this finally cements the view that, 
beside a core group who remained active in business, returned expatriates retained few 
links to networks which would have allowed them to keep contact with what had been 
their host society, China.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
During the 65 years covered in this study (and more beyond), the CA offered an 
important organisational anchor for a number of diverse networks that stretched from 
London to China and in reverse. Concurrently, the Association was a nexus for the 
discussion of British China policy between the companies and firms located at the 
heart of the imperial metropole. As a representative of these firms, the CA would then 
provide a coherent voice for the commercial community, which at times sought to 
influence policy, and later aimed to align metropole interests with policy, as diplomacy 
in China became normalised after 1925. Still the Association never lost sight of its 
wider functions and remained a prominent gathering point for returnees, continuing to 
provide a social space for these men for the whole of the period under consideration, 
with the exception of the period during the two world wars. Alongside this charity and 
philanthropy were pursued for most of the period, effectively anchoring the CA in 
London’s associational world—one in which philanthropic endeavours were an 
important element. Ultimately, then, at the most basic level the CA was successful in 
putting in place the right associational structures that enabled it to purse these activities 
over an extended period of time. But our conclusions must go further than simply 
assessing whether the CA was a success in terms of its own goals. In particular, the 
CA offers us much greater insight into the development of return migrant voluntary 
associations and how their activities extend beyond their immediate community and 
civil society operations into the political sphere.  
The first major conclusion of this work is one which does not conflict with 
current historiography, but certainly adds nuance and depth. British government 
policy, was, as is largely the current consensus, directed to fit metropole needs and 
ignored the presence of settlers based at the periphery. This study, however, shows 
that even a network such as the CA, which set up to give a voice to the whole British 
commercial community—and maintained the pretence of doing so throughout its 
lifetime—gave scant consideration to the needs and requests of periphery interests. 
Despite this, the CA considered its periphery branches, most notably Shanghai, to be 
of great importance—size, for any political pressure group, does bring influence—and 
a branch structure brought further benefits, including a valuable information source. 
Transnational communication networks have long since been viewed as important in 
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shaping networks and maintaining Empire more broadly—from imperial press 
systems to personal correspondence that crossed vast distances—but the 
communication between metropole and periphery enabled by associational structures 
adds another valuable layer and the CA facilitated its provision. Important though that 
layer was in establishing direct information-sharing routes, the CA did not always 
consider what it received from China important enough to act upon. Often, as we have 
seen, Shanghai was given superficial concessions to maintain and sustain the direct 
link to the CA in London, but was rarely able to exert any real power. The oligarchy 
that became prevalent in the CA was, therefore, in essence the mechanism by which 
periphery interests were denied a voice in London. 
It was in denying periphery interests a voice after 1925 that the CA came to 
find a valuable new role with their co-option by the British government into the new 
process of normalisation of relations with China. The Association were given the 
chance to offer input on the proposed surrender of extraterritoriality, for example, and 
in return for the privilege began to espouse the idea in a positive light to their corporate 
membership which extended by the time to 56 china linked firms.1 Similarly, key 
members of the CA contemporary to this period, including for instance G.W. Swire, 
found the CA a useful vehicle to drive the implementation of other key aspects of 
British policy, particularly the founding of new social relations with prominent 
Chinese. Providing the largest consistent China-oriented social gatherings in the 
capital, the CA was a natural location for the establishment—and public display—of 
these links by metropole interests, and was successful in doing both. 
In light of these activities this thesis has highlighted too, however, what is a 
central problem in associational history: the fact that the full reach of activities and 
networks that associations like the CA facilitated often remains hidden. While annual 
dinners in themselves were recorded, for example, conversations held and the scope 
of connections they enabled were not. Although this thesis utilised a range of 
approaches and sources to offset this concern they can only go so far for it was, of 
course, in the very interest of the CA that dinners provided informal networking 
opportunities away from the public eye, particularly with respect to connections 
facilitated with politicians. Still it is through the examination of the series of dinners 
this thesis has shown how the semi-private sphere of CA dinners enabled issues to be 
                                                          
1 See the annual report for 1929-30, p.xxxi , available at Annual Reports, 1928-34, CHAS/A/09. 
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presented to diplomats and civil servants who managed the British presence in China. 
But as we have seen through the Shanghai branch complaints of 1905 which sought to 
alter the Association’s methods for attaining influence, and by speakers at dinners 
often reminding members of the CA’s close relationship with the Foreign Office and 
other government departments, it seems these links were not even readily visible to 
those outside of the Association’s inner workings. Despite such occasional tensions, 
this thesis has shown that resultant calls for extension in its political methods were 
prominently rejected throughout. The CA sought, from its inception, to be an insider 
interest group, which used the influence and status of some of its individual members 
and member firms to create connections with departments of the British government.   
Though the CA forged such links, it remained, as this thesis must too, tempered 
by realism. The CA was aware that it could, at best, win small concessions and 
occasionally gain the ability to suggest policy to the British government. The trade 
with China in the period under consideration held nowhere near the importance it had 
in previous decades, and the government were not prepared to undertake any radical 
manoeuvres as a result. It must be noted, of course, that this was not without its worth. 
Although it has been impossible to note every occasion upon which the CA conversed 
with government, keeping the British government informed of the minutiae of the 
commercial environment in China was something the CA undertook with a ready 
appetite—only a partial copy, for example, of the most important correspondence 
between the CA and the British government ran to 54 pages in 1912.2 Whether the 
methods of other return migrant associations differed would be an important further 
investigation to provide comparative context, as would investigating whether this 
altered depending on patterns of settlement in the ‘origin’ destination of these 
returnees. Would a return migrant association comprised of displaced settlers, for 
example, create a pressure group which was ultimately lower status, denied 
connections with the government, and become an outsider interest group? The failure 
of returned settlers from China following the rise of the PRC to have their pension 
needs met by the British government and their resultant dependency on the CA 
certainly hints that this may be so. 
But as this thesis has demonstrated, the CA was never solely a political 
pressure group that the earlier study by Pelcovits made it out to be. Indeed, it expanded 
                                                          
2 Annual report for 1911-12, appendix, available at Annual Reports, 1910-15, CHAS/A/06. 
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greatly beyond that narrow frame, and was never intended to be confined to political 
lobbying in the first place. Outside of the specific experience of Sino-British politics, 
the CA, therefore, offers a much broader range of insights into the structure, aims, 
objects and operations of a return migrant voluntary association. The first key 
conclusion specific to this is that it was the nature of the CA—due to expatriate 
economic dominance in China and the simple fact that expatriates are sojourners—
that it was essentially a returned expatriate association as opposed to a return migrant 
association. Added to this, the Association retained the membership patterns common 
to other voluntary associations of the period, excluding women and other outsiders, in 
the case of the CA due to its geographical links Eurasians, Asians, and other 
nationalities at varying times. With this individual, and British, expatriate presence, 
too, came the presence of the firms these men held links to, multinationals drawn from 
the backgrounds of trade, shipping and finance, even if not all members retained such 
active business links. 
For the individual members the CA provided a number of benefits. It offered 
an invaluable social sphere, where they could renew acquaintances from East Asia, 
and even create new contacts, networks, and social capital amongst themselves. One 
of the perhaps more surprising conclusions from this investigation is quite how 
important these members felt these occasions to be—and that the idea of a difficult 
return even extended to these supposedly elite members of the British migrant 
presence. As the thesis has noted, they socialised sporadically otherwise, and enjoyed 
the CA dinners and later receptions which were, for many, the main social event of 
the calendar year. Even those resident in London developed a particular attachment to 
the Thatched House Club which became an early meeting point for Association 
members—the club would even send a wreath to the funeral of first association 
chairman William Keswick.3 Investigations of the CA’s social functions have also 
helped to enlighten some of the specifics of this difficult return for China returnees, 
and suggest it may well have been, if not a global phenomenon, one that was certainly 
shaped by an individual’s experience of a specific location. Alongside this, although 
less prominent as many members were relatively well off, was the safety net that the 
CA provided, through the utilisation of networks to direct support, be this through 
collections, seeking employment for returnees, or directing larger charitable funds. In 
                                                          
3 “Obituary.” Times (London, England), 11 March 1912, p.11. 
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this combination of activities, we might view the CA as, although a return migrant 
association at its heart, something akin to an ethnic association—though with the 
shared experience at its heart not ethnicity, but the adopted identity of the China British 
expatriate. Like ethnic associations, providing sociability and a support network was 
key for the CA, offering a chance to retain their common identity, shaped by their 
experience of East Asia. 
What makes the CA distinct in the matrix of associational life, however, is not 
so much its individual membership, but rather how it enabled corporate interests to 
shape its operations and activities. For corporate members, the CA offered ways to 
circumvent the lack of British government will to undertake a more radical policy in 
China. One way the CA saw to counter these increasing difficulties was through the 
dissemination of charity. While charity given to individuals was often purely driven 
by benevolent consideration, and while this was also true of some of the CA’s larger-
scale collections, many of its most prominent efforts were clear strategic undertakings. 
From reactionary efforts to avoid boycotts, to proactive efforts to improve the 
corporate image of companies and the whole British trade, they gave often, and in 
many cases on a large scale to charitable schemes. The CA became a valuable entity 
in the process for such collections. It provided a body through which the British trade 
community could donate under a single banner for the general good of what we might 
describe as British prestige, while also ensuring that all firms gave fairly in relation to 
their own stature, and by removing the free rider problem. In combination, this sought 
to improve the image of the British in China. The CA’s responses to charitable appeals 
also highlight the difficulties of ensuring the reliability of appeals over large distances, 
even with the wealth of connections they possessed. They further suggest that without 
direct control—or the involvement of a trusted third party in East Asia—such appeals 
were much less likely to succeed. Later collections also suggest that the best response 
was to be found when British, as well as Chinese, subjects were the aim of the 
collections. 
But it was through philanthropic enterprises that the CA established what is 
perhaps its most enduring legacy. While other sources readily identified that the 
British presence in China was suffering due to a lack of language skills, the CA proved 
itself to be the only body who could boast a significant enough network of contacts to 
gather the funding necessary to establish a practical solution to this problem. Bringing 
together the most prominent British firms involved in the China trade they provided a 
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consistent, solid financial backing to establish the first practical source of Chinese 
language tuition in Britain. Although the CA did not retain control of the scheme, and 
did not see the benefit they had hoped from it, it nonetheless evolved to become a key 
foundational part of SOAS. In the end both such philanthropic endeavours and charity 
provisions were not just a result of immediate practical needs, however, but rather also 
of a wider sense of patrician benevolence—a duty to give back—that many CA 
members shared and this was certainly encapsulated with the SOAS scheme, as it 
provided tuition to British troops in times of war, and continues to this day, housing 
within it the archives of the CA itself.  
Ultimately, when we view the CA we must consider all of these undertakings 
holistically. That the CA could pursue all the activities it pursued, was, of course, made 
possible by its fundamental organisation and structure; highlighting the importance of 
overlapping networks—business, political, charitable, sociable and transnational—as 
mechanisms underpinning voluntary associations. None would have operated as 
effectively in isolation of the others, and the CA proved a valuable nexus in connecting 
them. Whether other return migrant associations utilised this position to such a full 
extent provides further scope for research, and a comparative study of other 
associations would allow the position of the CA to be located with more accuracy, and 
to assess its uniqueness or otherwise. 
This array of networks and the extent to which the disparate sections of the CA 
membership utilized them also allows us some broader insight into returned 
expatriates, specifically assessing the links they retained to their host society, China, 
following their return. For much of the wider membership, it is clear they had allowed 
almost all links to China to lapse. They did not contribute to charitable or educational 
schemes, and cared little for politics. They only remained linked to the country 
superficially, through the social network of the CA—itself one step removed from 
China. Yet for those who still had business and economic links to China, the CA 
offered a valuable array of networks—political, charitable and sociable, as well as the 
transnational network of the branch structure—to ensure they could pursue their 
business aims in China through a diverse array of actions. In a broader sense, too, this 
reminds us that for returnees, the process of returning varied greatly. For the elite, it 
could in fact mark the start of the highest point of their careers, managing a 
transnational or multinational business from London. For those lower down the ladder 
it was an end, be it of their career as a whole, or of their continuing links to China. It 
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is a testament to the CA that it managed to provide, with at least some success, for 
such a wide array of needs and roles, being, as it remained throughout the period of 
this study, the premier China linked return migrant association extant in Britain. 
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Appendix A: The China Association’s founding members 
 
Listed below are the original members of the CA. As complete main employment 
history as possible is given, alongside a short biography outlining any further 
information, including roles they held as directors of other Far Eastern linked 
companies. Due to incomplete records date ranges for particular employment roles are 
on occasion fragmentary, and are only to be taken as snapshots, rather than complete 
histories.  
Any other active links to China these men held (primarily business based) at 
the time of the foundation of the CA are also noted. 
Data is taken, unless noted, from a series of China Directories, Hong lists and 
Lists of Land renters in Shanghai, available online at 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/history/customs/ancestors/directories.html (last accessed 29 
October 2018) and the national library of Singapore, available online at 
http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/printheritage (last accessed 29 October 2018). 
 
Adams, F.C.     
 1865 - Tea Inspector, Reiss and Co., Foochow 
 1867 - Manager, Reiss and Co., Hongkong (Praya) 
 
Adamson, William R.    
 1854 - Clerk, McEwan & Co., Singapore1 
1856—59 - Merchant, self-employed, Shanghai (Absent 1859) 
1859—60 - Assistant, Borneo Co., Singapore 
 1861—62 - Merchant, A&Co. Shanghai 
 1863—65 - Manager, Borneo Co., Ltd, Hongkong2 
 1867 - Merchant, Adamson & Co., Foochow 
 1869—71 - Partner, Gilfillan Wood & Co., Singapore3 
 1876—92 - Merchant, Gilfillan Wood & Co., Singapore (Absent 1879-92) 
 1908 - Managing Director, Gilfillan Wood & Co. London4 
                                                          
1 Wright (ed.), Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya, pp.674-5. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ding ‘Sino-British Mercantile Relations in Singapore’s Entrepot Trade 1870-1915’, pp.252-3. 
4 Wright, (ed.), Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya, pp.674-5. 
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William R. Adamson began his career in East Asia in Singapore, as a clerk for 
McEwan and co. in 1854.5 This was followed with a period as a self-employed 
merchant, with a short interregnum as a manager for the Borneo Co. in Hongkong.6 
He became a partner in the firm Gilfillan Wood & Co. from 1870, and the firm would 
later be styled Adamson, Gilfillan & Co.7 He was active as late as 1908 as managing 
director. Alongside these roles he served as a director for the P&O, and served as 
chairman of the Straits Settlements Association. He was a member of the Singapore 
Municipal Council, served on a Colonial Office commission into the currency of the 
Straits Settlements, and held a reputation as a light comedian of some note.8 
 
Anderson, Robert      
 1867—68 - Clerk, Jardine Matheson & Co., Kiukang 
 1872 - Agent, Jardine Matheson & Co., Kiukang 
 1874 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong 
 1876—67 - Merchant, R. Anderson & Co., Kiukang (absent) 
 1879 - Merchant, R. Anderson & Co., Kiukang and Hankow 
 1882 - Merchant, R. Anderson & Co., Kiukang and Shanghai 
 1884 - Merchant, R. Anderson & Co., Shanghai (absent) 
 
As of 1902, Robert Anderson & Co., continued in Shanghai. However, Robert 
Anderson is not listed as actively involved in the business. Whether Anderson had 
removed his capital is, unfortunately, impossible to ascertain. 
 
Barnes, Frederick Dallas    
 1861—62 - Assistant, P&O, Hongkong / Singapore9 
 1864 - Assistant, P&O, Singapore 
 1872—74 - Agent, P&O, Shanghai 
 1895 - Managing Directory, P&O, London10 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “Obituary.” Times (London, England), 1 December 1899, p.9. 
10 “Banks.” Times (London, England), 6 April 1895, p.4. 
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Barnes is last recorded in China in 1874, after which he retired in Britain for several 
years. He returned, however, to the P&O shortly after.11 By 1895 he had risen to the 
rank of senior managing director in London and sat, in this capacity, on the London 
committee of the HSBC, the role he held at the inception of the CA.12 He was praised 
for helping Thomas Sutherland implement the changes that made the P&O preeminent 
in East Asian shipping, and he also held a directorship of the BCC.13  
 
Batt, E.W.      
 1862—68 - Clerk, Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai 
 1872—77 Merchant, Geo. Barnet & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1877) 
 
Batt seems to have retained a personal interest in the trade between Britain and China, 
evidenced through his membership of the CA and his attendance, as late as 1897, to a 
lecture on the matter given by George Jamieson.14 However, there is no evidence he 
continued to hold business interests in China by the inception of the CA. 
 
Beazley, Henry.       
 1865—67 - Clerk, Birley, Worthington & Co., Shanghai 
 1868 - Clerk, Birley, Worthington & Co, Hankow 
 1872—79 - Merchant, Beazley, Paget & Co., Hankow 
 
By 1882 the business had ceased to be listed in directories, indicating the withdrawal 
of Beazley’s capital. He was, alongside this role, chairman of the chamber of 
commerce for Hankow in 1873. 
 
Blackwell, R. 
 1872—73 - Clerk, Russell & Co., Praya Central, Hongkong 
1874 - Clerk, Russell & Co., Hermitage, Caine Road, Hongkong 
1876—79 - Clerk, Russell & Co., Praya, Hongkong 
                                                          
11 “Obituary.” Times (London, England), 1 December 1899, p.9. 
12 “Insurance Companies.” Times (London, England), 24 September 1898, p.13. Harcourt, ‘Black Gold: 
P&O and the Opium Trade, 1847-1914’, p.66. 
13 “Obituary.” Times (London, England), 1 December 1899, p.9.  
14 “China and British Trade.” Times (London, England), 11 November 1897, p.8.  
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Bottomley, C.D. 
 1865 - Clerk, A. Scott & Co., Hongkong 
 1867 - Broker, Hongkong 
 1868—72 - Broker & Auctioneer, Hongkong 
 1873 - Broker, Gough Street, Hongkong 
 1874 - Broker, Shanghai 
 1876—77 - Clerk, Douglas Lapraik & Co., Hongkong 
 1879—89 - Merchant, Douglas Lapraik & Co., Hongkong 
 
Bottomley also served for at least five years a HSBC director in Hongkong.15 
 
Bowen, Rt. Hon. Sir George F. (GCMG) 
 1882—85 - Governor of Hongkong 
 
Bowen had a long career in the colonial service, his earliest post of Governor being 
that of Queensland in 1859. He also served roles in New Zealand and Mauritius, before 
arriving in 1882 to take up the post of Governor of Hongkong. He retired from the 
post in 1885, and colonial service in 1887, on account of his health.16 He served as the 
first chairman of the CA—although at that time, the role was akin to what would later 
be the CA presidency, providing a figurehead rather than actively participating at 
committee meetings. 
 
Brand, John 
 1872—76 - Clerk, Brand Bros. & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1874) 
 1877 - Merchant, Brand Bros. & Co., Shanghai 
 
On leaving Brand Bros., & Co. in Shanghai, Brand was admitted in 1878 as a partner 
of Messrs. Robert Brand & Co. of Union Court, Old Broad Street, London.17 Whether 
he was active in this role by the time of the CA’s foundation cannot, unfortunately, be 
ascertained. 
                                                          
15 Date range established using the North China Herald (Shanghai, China), issues bookending his time 
on the court of directors are dated 12 September 1884, p.24 and 05 March 1889, p.1. 
16 Joyce, R.B., ‘Bowen, Sir George Ferguson (1821-1899)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 
3. 
17 “Money Market and City Intelligence.” Times (London, England), 3 June 1878, p.9.  
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Buxton, Alfred (M.D.) 
 No information available 
 
Caffin, Edward 
 No information available 
 
Cameron, Ewen 
 1867 - Accountant, Bank of Hindustan, China & Japan, Hongkong 
 1868 - Clerk, HSBC, Hongkong 
 1874—90 - Manager, HSBC, Shanghai18 
 
At the date of Cameron joining the CA, it is unclear whether he was still resident in 
China, or had returned to Britain. Regardless, he was still active for the HSBC at this 
point, as a manager of the London Office.19 
 
Carter, J.F.  
 1859—68 - Silk Broker, Shanghai 
 
Carter was also recorded as a partner in firm Carter &Co. for a single year, 1865, and 
was recorded on a list of Shanghai land renters in 1864. 
 
Cheyne, A. 
 1873—79 - Clerk, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong 
 
Coghill, J.S.G. 
1862—68 - M.D., Surgeon, Shanghai 
Coghill also served as the Shanghai Municipal medical officer in 1868. He was part 
of an investigation into the workings of a Shanghai hospital in the same year, and was 
apparently a ‘well-known local doctor’20 
 
                                                          
18 “Sir Ewen Cameron.” Times (London, England), 11 December 1908, p.13.  
19 Ibid. 
20Kerrie L. Macpherson, A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-
1893 (Hongkong, Oxford, New Yok: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.175, p.187 and p.224. 
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Coxon, Atwell 
 1865—82 - Bill and Bullion Broker, Hongkong 
 1882 - Consul for Belgium, Hongkong 
 
Coxon was appointed captain of the Hongkong Volunteer regiment in 1864.21 Coxon 
also received the medal of the order of St. Gregory for his services to the Church in 
Hongkong.22 
 
Cull, James 
 1864 - renting land, Shanghai 
 1865—67 - partner - Shaw Bros. & Co., Shanghai 
 
Darling, D.A. 
 1872 - Agent, Brown & Co., Formosa 
 1873—74 - Tea inspector and Agent, Brown & Co., Tamsui 
 1876—79 - Merchant, Brown & Co., Amoy 
 1882 - resident in Shanghai 
 1884 - Barlow & Co., Shanghai 
 1888 - Merchant, Barlow & Co., Shanghai 
 
Deacon, Albert 
 1859 - Merchant, Canton 
 1861 - Merchant, D& Co., Macao 
 1862 - Acting British Consular Agent, Macao 
Deacon was, as of 1875, running the British based business E&A Deacons. In 1875 
he also became a director on the London Committee of the HSBC, a post he held as 
of the founding of the CA.23  
 
 
                                                          
21Dennys, The Treaty Ports of China and Japan, p.101. 
22 See catalogue of the Norfolk Record Office, NEV 8/5, 590 x 1, Copy of a petition to the pope for 
Atwell Coxon to be honoured, 1875, (available online at  
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/cc692bc2-c80c-4722-aaad-fea7bd61deb1, last 
accessed 27 October 2017). 
23 “Money Market and City Intelligence.” Times (London, England), 11 November 1875, p.6.  “Public 
Appointments” Times (London, England), 6 Jul 1889, p.15.  
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Dent, Sir Alfred (K.C.M.G) 
 1864 - arrival in China24 
 1867 - clerk, Shanghai 
 1872 - Merchant, A.Dent & Co., Shanghai 
 
Somewhat of a short career for the founder and long running vice—chairman of the 
CA, it is perhaps not representative of his wider impact on East Asia. He restored the 
Dent firm following its failure in the 1860’s, before moving on to play a large role in 
the founding of the British North Borneo Company.25 He returned to London, and ran 
a city based mercantile firm and was, alongside this, a director for the Chartered 
Bank.26 
 
Dent, Herbert F. 
 1873—79 - Silk Inspector, Birley & Co., Canton 
 1882 - Merchant, Canton 
 1888—89 - Commission Agent, Herbert Dent & Co., Canton 
 
Dent was still recorded as resident in China as of the foundation of the CA, and 
potentially represents a corresponding member of the Association. 
 
Dewhurst, G.B. 
 No information available 
 
Dickinson, Chas 
 1861 - Merchant, Wilkinson & Co., Hongkong 
 
Duncanson, E.F. 
 1859 - Merchant, Shanghai 
 1861—68 - Merchant, Gibb, Livingstone & Co., Shanghai 
 1864 - Renting land in Shanghai 
                                                          
24 Law, ‘Dent family (per. c.1820–1927)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
25 Law, ‘Dent family (per. c.1820–1927)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.; Owen Rutter, 
British North Borneo: an account of its history, resources, and native tribes (London: Constable & Co. 
Ltd, 1922), pp.169-78. 
26 Law, ‘Dent family (per. c.1820–1927)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.  
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Duncanson spent a relatively short period in China. However, he remained linked to 
the trade long after his return. As of 1894 he was still an active member of London 
firm T.A. Gibb & Co (likely the London end of Gibb, Livingstone and Co.) and sat on 
the London committee of the HSBC.27 Alongside this, Duncanson was also a board 
member of the P&O.28 
 
Ede, N.J. 
 1865—67 - Clerk, Dent & Co., Hongkong 
 1871—97 - Secretary, Union Insurance Society of Canton, Hongkong 
 
Ede was still resident in China at the formation of the CA, either joining as a 
corresponding member, or whilst on home leave. Leading the Union Insurance Society 
of Canton for 26 years, he ‘transformed’ the Union’s business model and instituted 
considerable reforms to management and improvements in accounting.29 
 
Elias, Ellis 
1861 - Clerk, Barnet & Co., Shanghai 
1862 - Clerk, Barnet & Co., Yokohama 
1867 - Clerk, Barnet & Co., Kagawa 
1872—77 - Merchant, G. Barnet & Co., Shanghai (Absent) 
Ellis’ return to London by 1873 is substantiated by a Police report in The Times, where 
he was involved in a minor claim in court regarding a dispute with a taxi driver.30 By 
1881 he was employed by the Lion Insurance Co. in London.31 By 1905 he was still 
employed by the company, now the Yorkshire Insurance, as part of the London 
board.32 Whether the company had operations in China at the founding of the CA is 
unclear, however they operated a Hongkong agency by 1902.33 
 
 
                                                          
27 “Banks” Times (London, England), 26 Sep 1894, p.11.  
28  Harcourt, ‘Black Gold: P&O and the Opium Trade, 1847-1914’, p.27. 
29 Fen and Rao, Enriching Lives: a history of insurance in Hongkong, 1841-2010, pp.22-3; Union 
Insurance Society of Canton, A Brief Historical Record of the Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd. 
30 “Police..” Times (London, England), 11 February 1873, p.11.  
31 “Railway and Other Companies.” Times (London, England), 5 May 1881, p.7 
32 “The Money Market.” Times (London, England), 15 April 1904, p.11.  
33 Aviva, Our History: Lion Insurance Company (available online at https://heritage.aviva.com/our-
history/companies/l/lion-insurance-company/, last accessed 26 October 2017). 
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Endicott, William 
1859—67 - Commander, Receiving Ship Ann Welsh, Woosung Bar, Shanghai 
 1864 - renting land in Shanghai 
 
Somewhat of a divergence from the average CA member, Endicott was listed as 
Commander of the Receiving Ship Ann Welsh. In practical terms this meant he was 
in charge of a floating hulk ‘receiving ship’ housing opium stocks offshore prior to 
their distribution, predominantly for the firm Augustine Heard & Co.34 He retired to 
London, and joined the CA despite his American nationality prohibiting this.35 
 
Ezekiel, Solomon 
 1865 - Partner, D. Sassoon & Co., Shanghai 
 1867 - Clerk, D. Sassoon & Co., Hongkong 
 1872—73 - Merchant, E.D. Sassoon & Co., Hongkong 
 
Solomon remained linked to the Sassoon family firms following his return to Britain, 
and was a signatory for D. Sassoons in London as of 1892.36 
 
Ford, Colin MacKenzie 
 1872 - Assistant, British Consulate, Canton 
 1873—74 - Assistant, British Consulate, and post office agent, Swatow  
 1876 - Assistant, British Consulate, Canton 
 1877 - Inspector, British Consulate, Hankow 
 1879 - Acting accountant, British legation, Peking 
 1882 - Acting consul, British Consulate, Pakhoi 
 1884 - 1st Assistant, HBM’s Consul, Shanghai 
 1888 - British vice Consul, Foochow 
 1889 - Acting British consul general, Seoul 
 
 
                                                          
34 Lockwood, Augustine Heard and Company, pp.28-30 ;John Heard, an account of his life and the 
history of Augustine Heard and Co, p.64 and p.182. 
35 Entry for J.B. Endicott at Old Hong Kong, available online at https://gwulo.com/node/32346 (last 
accessed 6 November 2018). 
36 “The Money Market.” Times (London, England), 01 January 1892, p.9.  
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Gamman, Edwin 
 1874 - Clerk, Aug. Heard & Co., Foochow 
1884—89 - Merchant, Edwin Gamman and Co., Shanghai and Hankow 
 
Gamwell, Frederick R. 
 1859 - Clerk, Shanghai 
 1861—74 - Silk Broker, Shanghai 
 1864 - Renting land, Shanghai 
 
Gamwell would later become a partner in John Swire and Sons, London, a role he 
likely held at the formation of the CA.37 Certainly, he was one of five London partners 
in the business by 1893 and has been described a John Swires’ ‘right-hand man in 
London’.38 
 
Gearing, J.G.W.  
 1868—72 - Clerk, A.E. Salter, Chinkiang 
 1873—77 - Merchant / Commission agent, A.E. Salter, Chinkiang 
 1879—82 - Merchant, Gearing & Co., Chinkiang 
 1882 - Vice Consul for the Netherlands, Chinkiang 
 
 
Gibb, George 
 1845—47 - Canton 
 
 
Gilfillan, S. 
1855 - Assistant, McEwen & Co., Singapore 
1859—65 - Manager, Borneo Co., Singapore 
1866—67 - Manager, Borneo Co., Singapore (absent) 
1868—71 - Partner, Gilfillan Wood & Co., Europe, London 
1879 - Merchant, Gilfillan Wood & Co., Singapore 
                                                          
37 Hook, A Guide to the Papers of John Swire and Sons Limited, introduction. 
38 Hugh Cortazzi, Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, volume 4 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), p.427 note 17. 
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 1882—89 - Merchant, Gilfillan Wood & Co., Singapore (absent) 
 
Gilfillan began as an assistant in McEwen & Co., Singapore, before taking on a role 
as manager in Singapore for the Borneo Co. He returned to London which in the 
employ of the Borneo Co., when he seems to have launched the European end of the 
business which carried his name. He remained an active partner in the firm until at 
least 1904.39 
 
Gilman, Ellis 
 1865 - Clerk, Gilman & Co., Shanghai 
 
Grant, Cardross 
 1872—73, Clerk, Bradley & Co., Swatow 
 1874—76, Merchant, Bradley & Co., Swatow 
 1882 - Clerk, Hudson & Co., Yokohama 
 
Grant retained an interest in China, as evidenced by his helping to preside over a 
speech giving in 1905 in England by Sun Yat Sen.40 He does not seem, however, to 
have retained any active commercial links.  
 
Grant, Chas. Lyall 
 1862 - Merchant, Grant & Co., Tientsin 
 1865—68 - Tea inspector, W.R. Adamson & Co., Foochow 
 1872 - Merchant, Adamson, Bell & Co., Foochow 
 1873—74 - Merchant, Adamson, Bell & Co., Shanghai 
 1876—88 - Merchant, Adamson, Bell & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1879—88) 
Grant remained active in the firm of Adamson, Bell & Co. for some time despite his 
residence in Britain. He was still active following the foundation of the CA, when in 
1892 he was summoned to court in relation to a case regarding the debts of the firm.41 
 
                                                          
39 “The Money Market.” Times (London, England), 01 November 1904, p.13.  
40 Patrick Anderson, The Lost Book of Sun Yatsen and Edwin Collins (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), 
p.247. 
41 “Queens Bench Division.” Times (London, England), 04 February 1892, p.13.  
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Gundry, R.S. 
 1865—77 - Editor, North China Daily News, Shanghai 
 
Gundry, the first secretary of the CA, was a journalist during his career in China. He 
was later an author, penning a number of works on the country.  
 
Gwyther, John Howard 
 1859 - Chartered Mercantile Bank, Singapore42 
 1860 - Sub-agent, Chartered Bank of India and China, Singapore 
 1862 - Manager, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Shanghai 
 1864 - Renting land, Shanghai 
 1867 - Bill and Bullion Broker, Shanghai 
 1868 - Chartered Mercantile Bank, Shanghai43 
 
Gwyther returned from East Asia in 1869, and rose through the ranks of the Chartered 
Mercantile Bank in London to be manager (1871—92), director (1887—1904) and 
chairman (1896—1904).44 For further information, see the brief biography in Realms 
of Silver: One Hundred Years of Banking in the East by Compton Mackenzie.45 
 
Hanbury, Thomas 
 1853 - Shanghai46 
 1856 - Merchant, Hanbury & Co., Shanghai 
 1861—1873 - Merchant, Bower, Hanbury & Co., Shanghai (absent 1868) 
 1864 - Renting land in Shanghai 
 
Hanbury arrived in Shanghai in 1853, and had sold off his business interests by 1871.47 
He was, alongside his mercantile activities, the largest owner of land in Shanghai.48 
                                                          
42 Bostock ‘Gwyther, John Howard (1835–1921)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 MacKenzie, Realms of Silver: One Hundred Years of Banking in the East, p.155. 
46 McConnell, Anita, ‘Hanbury, Sir Thomas (1832–1907)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, May 2009 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/54055, last accessed 26 
October 2017). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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As of 1890, his investments totalled some 1,462 properties in the city.49 A keen 
botanist, he later moved to Italy and invested internationally.50 He retained a wider 
interest in China as a member of the bi-metallic league as of 1894, also penning letters 
to The Times on China in 1898 and 1902.51 
 
Hannen, Nicholas John 
 1872—74 - Acting Assistant Judge, Yokohama 
 1876—77 - Barrister at Law, Shanghai 
 1879 - Barrister at Law and British Crown Advocate, Shanghai 
 1882 - Acting Chief Judge, HBM’s Supreme Court, Shanghai 
 1888 - Judge, HBM’s Court, Yokohama 
 1889 - Judge, HBM’s Court, Yokohama (Absent) 
 
Hannen joined the CA whilst home on leave in 1889. He would later hold the 
combined post of HBM’s chief judge and consul general in Shanghai, a combination 
of posts the CA would argue against. 
 
Harrison, George 
 1862 - Assistant accountant, Oriental Bank, Hongkong 
 1865 - Assistant accountant, Oriental Bank, Shanghai 
 1865—76 - Absent from directories 
 1876—77 - Manager, Oriental Bank, Hongkong 
 
 
Hart, John William 
 1865—67 - Clerk, D. Muirhead, Shanghai 
 1868 - Engineer, D. Muirhead, Shanghai 
 1873 - Architect and Civil Engineer, Hiogo  
 1873—82 - Absent from directories 
                                                          
49 Alasdair Moore, La Mortola: in the footsteps of Thomas Hanbury, chapter seven. 
50 Further detail likely lies in the Thomas Hanbury Papers, held privately. Enquires should be made to 
the national archives, see Catalogue: Thomas Hanbury Papers (available online at  
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/N13668778, last accessed 6 June 2018). 
51 “The Money Market.” Times (London, England), 14 April 1894, p.13 “The Riots at Shanghai.” Times 
(London, England), 26 August 1898, p.10. “The China War Indemnity.” Times (London, England), 21 
May 1902, p.7.  
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 1882—84 - Engineer in Chief, Waterworks Co., Shanghai 
 
Hart was a noted architect in China, erecting some of the first concrete structures in 
the country as part of the Shanghai Waterworks.52 He had returned to Britain by the 
foundation of the CA, and gave a paper on the waterworks to the institute of civil 
engineers.53 His later investments in engineering were in North America, as part of the 
Elkhorn Mining Company, Ltd., rather than China.54  
 
Harvey, Alex, S 
 1867 - Student Interpreter, Peking 
 1872 - Assistant, British consulate, Newchang 
 1873 - Acting Consul, British consulate, Newchang 
 1874 - Vice Consul for Britain and Denmark, Newchang 
 1876 - British Assistant Vice Consul and Post office agent, Hoihow 
 
Harwood, H.G. 
 1884—88, Solicitor, R.E. Wainewright, Shanghai 
 
Harwood was returned to London and still active as a solicitor by 1888.55 His London 
business was dissolved in 1901.56  
 
Harwood, W.R. 
 1873 - Solicitor, Harwood and Wainewright, Shanghai 
 1874 - Solicitor, Harwood and Wainewright, Shanghai (Absent) 
 
Haslam, Robert H. 
 1872—73 - Tea Inspector, J. Silverlock & Co., Foochow 
 1874—79 - Merchant, J. Silverlock & Co., Foochow 
                                                          
52 Jeffery W. Cody, Exporting American Architecture, 1870-2000 (London and New York: Routledge, 
2005), p.40. 
53 John William Hart ‘Shanghai Water-Works’ Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, 100 (1890), pp.217-245. 
54 “Banks.” Times (London, England), 4 December 1894, p.15. Clark C. Spence, British Investments 
and the American Mining Frontier, 1860-1901 (1958, London and New York: Routledge, reprinted, 
2000), p.48. 
55 “In Re Arthur Bird.” Times (London, England), 26 Sep 1888, p.3.  
56 “Partnerships Dissolved.” Times (London, England), 5 January 1901, p.10. 
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Hatton, Eldred 
 1882 - Clerk, Gibb, Livingstone & Co., Shanghai 
 
Hayter, Owen Edward 
 1862 - Dept. Assistant Com. General, Commissariat Dept., Hongkong 
 1865 - Dept. Assistant Com. General, Commissariat Dept., Shanghai 
 
Hayter remained active in the China trade after this short career in the east, forming a 
London based import business with his brother which continued until 1909.57 
 
Hayter, Henry Goodenough 
 1888—89 - Clerk, Wilkinson & Co., Shanghai 
 
Hayter ran a London based China import firm with his brother until 1909, see above. 
 
Higson, T.B. 
 1867 - Clerk, W. Hargreaves, Shanghai 
 1872—73 - Merchant, Dickinson & Co., Shanghai 
 
Holliday, J. 
 1845 - And family, Hongkong (Absent) 
 1856 - Merchant, Holliday, Wise & Co., Shanghai 
 1859 - Merchant, Holliday, Wise & Co., Shanghai (Absent) 
1861—67 - Merchant, Holliday, Wise & Co., Hongkong (Absent, 1861, 1867) 
 
Hornby, Sir Edmund Grimani 
1865—76 - Chief Judge, HBM’s Supreme Court for China and Japan, 
Shanghai 
 
Hornby’s time in China and Japan is recounted in his autobiography.58 He had served 
in Constantinople, originally to oversee a loan made by Britain to Turkey, but was 
                                                          
57 The London Gazette (London, England) 26 November 1909. 
58 Hornby, Sir Edmund Hornby: An Autobiography. 
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most prominent as judge of the Supreme Court.59 Following his return he joined an 
unspecified city livery company in 1879.60 
 
Howell, William G. 
 1859 - Merchant, Shanghai (Absent) 
 1861—67 - Merchant, Barnet & Co., Shanghai 
 1864 - Renting Land in Shanghai 
 
Ilbert, A., 
 1865—67 - Clerk, Newbury, Elliot & Co., Shanghai 
 1868 - Broker and commission merchant, Shanghai 
 1872—74 - Merchant, Ilbert & Co., Shanghai 
 1876—84 - Merchant, Ilbert & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1876-7, 1884) 
 
Likely the founder of Ilbert and Co., of whom later head C.J. Dudgeon would play a 
large role in the CA, he seems to have been uninvolved in the business by 1889 when 
the CA was founded. 
 
Irving, John Bell, 
 1874 - Jardine Matheson Insurance offices, Hongkong 
 1876 - Clerk, Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai 
 1877—82 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1882) 
 1888—89 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong 
 
Irving was a partner in Jardine Matheson, still active in the business as of the founding 
of the CA.61 He was an unofficial member of the legislative council of Hongkong.62 
 
Iveson, Egbert 
 1867—74 - Merchant, Bower, Hanbury & Co., Shanghai 
 1876—88 - Merchant, Iveson & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1882—4) 
                                                          
59 Ibid., p.94. 
60 “City Companies and Fagot Votes.” Times (London, England), 19 March 1879, p.14. 
61 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.264. 
62 Chan Lau Kit-Ching, China Britain and Hongkong 1895-1945 (Hongkong: The Chinese University 
Press, 1990), p.6. 
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Iveson is recorded as absent in 1892, suggesting his capital was still invested in the 
business despite his own return to Britain 
 
Jackson, Thomas 
 1866 - Agra Bank employee63 
 1867 - Clerk, HSBC, Hongkong 
 1868 - Accountant, HSBC, Shanghai 
 1872—76 - Manager, HSBC, Yokohama (Absent 1874) 
 1877 - Acting chief manager, HSBC, Hongkong 
 1879—89 - Chief Manager, HSBC, Hongkong (Absent 1889) 
 
Jackson joined the CA on this last period of absence. He would remain as chief 
manager of the HSBC in Hongkong until 1902, and helped to found the CA’s 
Hongkong branch, serving as its first chairman.64 
 
Jackson, William 
 1859 - Accountant, Mercantile Bank, Shanghai 
 1862—73 - Manager, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Shanghai (Absent 1865) 
 1874 - Manager, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Hongkong 
 
 
Jardine, Sir Robert (Bart) 
 1845 - Arrives in Hongkong65 
 1859 - Merchant, Hongkong 
 1861 - Merchant, Hongkong (Absent) 
 
                                                          
63 Frank H. H. King, ‘Jackson, Sir Thomas, first baronet (1841–1915)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/48903, last 
accessed 26 October 2017). 
64 King, ‘Jackson, Sir Thomas, first baronet (1841–1915)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography; 
Annual Report for 1893-4, available at Annual Reports, 1889-98, CHAS/A/01. 
65 Richard J. Grace, ‘Jardine, Sir Robert, first baronet (1825–1905)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34159, last 
accessed 26 October 2017); Reid, ‘The Steel Frame’, p.31. 
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Jardine was a key character in the foundation of Jardine Matheson. He retired early, 
although he left his capital in the business, and delegated the day to day running of the 
firm to William Keswick.66 
 
Johnstone, Alex R. 
 1859 - Merchant, Amoy 
 1861—67 - Merchant, Tait & Co., Amoy 
 1865—67 - Acting Vice Consul for France, Amoy 
 
Jukes, M.P. 
 1861—72 - Clerk, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong (Absent 1867) 
 
On his return to Britain, Jukes became the London agent for the Jardine Matheson 
linked Union Insurance Society of Canton, a post he held until his retirement in 1899.67 
 
Kaye, William 
 1865—68 - Manager, Chartered Bank, Hongkong 
 1872—73 - Manager, Chartered Bank, Shanghai 
 1874 - Manager, Chartered Bank, Hongkong 
 
Kaye returned to Britain and served as sub manager for the HSBC in London in 1882.68 
He is no longer listed as working for any China linked firmed by the foundation of the 
CA.   
 
Keswick, William 
 1859 - Clerk, Shanghai 
 1861 - Clerk, Japan 
 1862 - Clerk, Kanagawa 
 1864 - Renting land in Shanghai 
 1865—67 - Partner / Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai 
                                                          
66 Grace, ‘Jardine, Sir Robert, first baronet (1825–1905)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
67 “The Money Market.” Times (London, England), 29 December 1899, p.11.  
68 The Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan, the Philippines & C., 1882 (Hongkong, 1882). 
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1868—89 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong (Absent 1873—74 
and 1882—89) 
 1872—79 - Acting consul, Italy and Hawaii 
 
Keswick was the first chairman of the CA, and held the role until 1905. He was the 
key figure behind Jardine Matheson in this period, second only in name to Robert 
Jardine, but effectively running the company from London.69 
 
Kidner, William 
 1868—74 - Architect, Shanghai 
 1876—79 - Architect, Kidner & Cory, Shanghai (Absent) 
 
Kidner was an architect of some repute in China. He helped to build Shanghai’s Holy 
Trinity church and also designed the buildings of the HSBC and Mercantile Banks in 
Shanghai.70 By 1889, when the CA was founded, he was an architect for the British 
North Borneo Company, the concern of CA founder Alfred Dent.71 
 
Kilby, E. Flint 
 1874 - Clerk, Hudson, Malcom & Co., Yokohama 
 1876—77 - Clerk, Hudson & Co., Yokohama 
 1882 - Clerk, Hudson & Co., Hiogo 
 1888—89 - Merchant, Flint Kilby & Co., Yokohama 
Kilby returned to London around the date of the creation of the CA. He continued to 
run the London end of Flint Kilby & Co., known as Brent & Co., until at least 1896.72 
In 1888 he had been the highest ranking Mason in Yokohama. 
 
Lang, William 
 1867 - Clerk, Yokohama 
 1872—88 - Merchant, Butterfield and Swire, Shanghai 
 
                                                          
69 Reid, ‘The Steel Frame’, pp.37-8. 
70 William Kidner: Basic Biographical Details (available online at 
http://www.scottisharchitects.org.uk/architect_full.php?id=201759, last accessed 26 October 2017). 
71 Ibid. 
72 The London Gazette (London, England) 1 January 1897. 
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Lang was a partner in Butterfield and Swire, retiring in 1888.73 
 
Lapraik, John S. 
 1859—62 - Clerk, Hongkong 
1865—89 - Partner / Merchant, D. Lapraik & Co., Hongkong (Absent 1872—
77 and 1882—89) 
 
Lapraik was active in the D. Lapraik firm until his death in 1893. The firm itself held 
interests in shipping, developing from its earlier basis as a watchmakers.74 
 
Lemann, William 
 1859 - Clerk, Foochow 
 1861 - Clerk, Gilman & Co., Hongkong 
 1862 - Clerk, Gilman & Co., Foochow 
 1865—67 - Partner / Merchant, Gilman & Co., Shanghai 
 1868—72 - Merchant, Gilman & Co., Hongkong 
 1873—74 - Merchant, Gilman & Co., Foochow 
 
Lester, Henry E. 
 1867 - Clerk, F.H. Knevit & Co., Shanghai 
 1868 - Surveyor, China Fire Insurance Co., Shanghai 
 1872—73 - Builder and contractor, Shanghai 
 1874—89 - Architect, Shanghai 
 
Lester was, it seems, something of a philanthropist. He founded an institute of medical 
research in Shanghai (of which early footage of its workings survives) and a 
scholarship, still extant, and distributed under the care of John Swire & Sons.75 
 
                                                          
73 Hook, A Guide to the Papers of John Swire and Sons Limited, introduction. 
74 Ian Ruxton, The Correspondence of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Japan, 1895-1900 Volume 
4 (Ian Ruxton, Kysuhu Institute of Technology, 2014), p.141 note 2; Wright, (ed.), Twentieth Century 
Impressions of Hong-Kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of China, p.207. 
75 Henry Lester institute of Medical Research, Shanghai reel two (available online at 
https://archive.org/details/HenryLesterinstituteofmedicalresearch2-wellcome, last accessed 26 October 
2017); Henry Lester Trust Ltd. (available online at https://www.postgraduatestudentships.co.uk/study-
or-funding/prof-doctorates/henry-lester-trust, last accessed 26 October 2017). 
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Lewis, George 
 1865 - Nagasaki 
 1867—68 - Merchant, Rainbow, Lewis & Co., 
1872—79 - Commission Agent, Ship and General Broker, Morris & Lewis, 
Shanghai 
 1882 - Ship Broker, Lewis & Hopkins, Shanghai 
 1884 - Shanghai 
 
Lucas, Clement 
 1861—63 - Clerk, Bain, Tate & Co., Shanghai 
 1867—68 - Merchant, Bain, Tate & Co., Shanghai 
 1873—77 - Merchant, Bain & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1876) 
 1879 - Assistant, Brown, Jones & Co., Hongkong 
 1882 - Merchant, Lucas & Co., Shanghai 
 
MacAndrew, J. 
 1848—50 - Mercantile Assistant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong 
 1859—62 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong 
 
MacAndrew remained active in the China trade following his return to Britain.76 He 
remained a partner in the firm of Matheson and Co. from at least 1870 to 1886, but 
was no longer a partner by 1900.77 As late as 1902 he was involved in London in the 
running of the Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., a Jardine Matheson subsidiary.78 
 
 Maccall, Edward 
 1867—68 - Manager, Chartered Bank, Shanghai 
 1872—73 - Manager, Agra Bank, Shanghai  
 
Maccall was resident in London at the founding of the CA, marrying Eliza Margaret 
in Notting Hill in that same year.79 
                                                          
76 “At the half-yearly General Meeting.” Times (London, England), 19 January 1882, p.13. “Public 
Companies.” Times (London, England), 12 November 1887, p.13.  
77 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.264. 
78 “Railways and Other Companies.” Times (London, England), 24 March 1902, p.5. 
79 “Marriages.” Times (London, England), 9 September 1899, p.1.  
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MacEwen, Alexander Palmer 
 1872—79 - Clerk, Holliday, Wise & Co., Hongkong 
 1888 - Merchant, Holliday Wise & Co., Hongkong 
 
MacEwen was, as of the founding of the CA, listed as a merchant for Holliday, Wise 
& Co., resident in Manchester. He was also an unofficial member of the Hongkong 
legislative council in 1887.80 
 
Maitland, J.A. 
 1859 - Clerk, Shanghai 
 1862 - Clerk, Thorne Bros. & Co., Shanghai 
 1864 - Renting land in Shanghai 
 1865 - Partner, Throne Bros. & Co., Shanghai 
 1867 - Clerk, Thorne Bros. & CO., Shanghai 
 1868—76 - Merchant, Thorne Bros. & Co., Shanghai 
 1877—89 - Merchant, Maitland & Co., Shanghai (Absent) 
 
Maitland returned to Britain, but remained involved in Maitland & Co., presumably 
running the London end of the business. He was also a director for the China Shippers 
Mutual Steam Navigation Company in 1882 and continued his involvement until at 
least 1890, and involved with both the British North Borneo Company and the 
Mercantile Bank of India in 1898 and 1912 respectively.81 
 
Manger, A.T 
 1867—74 - Clerk, Douglas Lapraik & Co., Hongkong (Absent 1873) 
 1876—82 - Merchant, Douglas Lapraik & Co., Hongkong 
 
 
                                                          
80 “From the London Gazette, Tuesday, December 13.” Times (London, England), 14 December 1887, 
p.11.  
81 “The List of Application for shares will Close on or before Friday.” Times (London, England), 02 
December 1882, p.14. “Railways and Other Companies.” Times (London, England), 07 April 1891, 
p.11. “Railways and Other Companies.” Times (London, England), 27 Jul 1898, p.13. “Mercantile Bank 
of India (Limited).” Times (London, England), 03 April 1912, p.20.  
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Markes, C.R. 
 No information available 
 
McIver, Alex 
 1872—82 - Superintendent, P&O, Hongkong 
 
McLean, David 
 1862 - Sub accountant / acting manager, Oriental Bank, Hongkong82 
 1864 - Acting manager, Oriental Bank, Shanghai83 
 1875—73 - Manager, HSBC, Shanghai84 
 
McLean had served as the first manager of the HSBC Shanghai Branch. 85On his return 
to London McLean became the manager of the London Branch of the HSBC. He left 
this role in 1889, the year the CA was founded, but did not sever all links with the 
bank and continued to serve on the London consulting committee until 1893. Frank H. 
H. King considers Mclean to have been ‘one of the most important overseas bankers 
of his generation.’86 
 
Middleton, W.N. 
 1865 - Clerk, Gilman & Co., Hongkong 
 1867 - Broker and Auctioneer, Hongkong 
 1872—76 - Share Broker / Broker, Anton & Middleton, Hongkong 
 
Mullins, T.L. 
 1863 - Sub-agent, Chartered Bank, Batavia87 
 
As of 1889 when the CA was founded, Mullins was the London manager of the 
Queensland National Bank.88 
 
                                                          
82 King, ‘McLean, David (1833–1908)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Collis, Wayfoong: The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, p.24. 
86 Ibid. 
87 MacKenzie, Realms of Silver: One Hundred Years of Banking in the East, p.119. 
88 “Charities & C.” Times (London, England), 01 May 1888, p.13.  
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Myburgh, P.A. 
 1865—68 - Barrister at Law, Shanghai 
 
Myburgh continued to practice law until at least 1885.89 Although there is no 
suggestion he dealt with China related cases, his position in the CA, and his position 
on its committee, was possibly due to a combination of his sojourn in China and his 
current position as active in the legal community. 
 
Nelson, Horatio Harrington 
 1867—68 - Clerk, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Shanghai 
 1872 - Acting accountant, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Shanghai 
 1874 - Acting agent, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Foochow 
 1876—79 - Manager, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Hongkong 
 
Parr, Richard B. 
 1865 - Manager, Alfred Wilkinson & Co., Hongkong 
 1867 - Clerk, Alfred Wilkinson & Co., Hongkong 
 1872—82 - Merchant, Tilson, Hermann & Co., Manila 
 1872—74 - Acting Consul for Germany, Manila 
 
Pollard, Edward H. 
 1848 - Clerk to chief justice, Supreme Court, Hongkong 
 1850 - Articled clerk, Hongkong 
 1861—74 - Barrister & Notary Public, Hongkong (Absent 1872—4) 
 
Pook, Chas. 
No information is available regarding Chas Pook, however, he may have been 
linked to the firm of John Pook and Co., who were the London agents for the 
Shanghai Municipal Council, although at a later date than the CA’s 
foundation.90 
 
                                                          
89 “Queens Bench Division.” Times (London, England), 01 December 1885, p.15.  
90  Shanghai Municipal Council. Report for the Year 1902 and Budget for the Year 1903, p.30 (available 
online at http://www.bnasie.org/BN/Periodiques?ID=64, last accessed 6 June 2018). 
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Provand, Andrew Dryburgh, (M.P.) 
 1865—67 - Merchant / Partner, Provand & Daly, Shanghai 
 1868 - Auctioneer, Alex Davis, Shanghai 
1872—82 - Merchant, A. Provand & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1876 and 1879—
82) 
 
Provand remained an active Manchester merchant until at least 1889.91 He was an MP 
from 1886—1900, and contributed in the house regarding China on a number of 
occasions, though did not represent the CA when he did so.92 
 
Pugh, William 
 1865 - Tea inspector, Gilman & Co, Shanghai 
 1867 - Clerk, Gilman & Co., Shanghai 
 1868 - Clerk, Gilman & Co., Kiukang 
 1872—73 - Merchant, Pugh & Co., Hankow 
 1873 - Chairman, Hankow Municipal Council 
 1874—77 - Merchant, Evans, Pugh & Co., Hankow 
 1879—89 - Merchant, Evans, Pugh & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1884—89) 
 
 
Reid, David 
 1864 - Renting land in Shanghai 
 1865 - Merchant, Shanghai (Absent) 
 1867—73 - Merchant, Reid & Co., Shanghai 
 1874—77 - Merchant, Reid, Evans & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1877) 
 
The firm Reid, Evans and Co. continued to trade using Reid’s name in Shanghai until 
at least 1892. There is no indication of his continued involvement with the firm in 
directories, however, and it seems likely he had withdrawn his capital. 
                                                          
91 ‘Provand, Andrew Dryburgh’, Who Was Who, A & C Black, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing 
plc, 1920–2016; online edn, Oxford University Press, 2014 ; online edn, April 2014 
(http://www.ukwhoswho.com/view/article/oupww/whowaswho/U190100, last accessed 26 October 
2017). 
92  See Contributions in Hansard (available online at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/people/mr-
andrew-provand-1/, last accessed 26 October 2017). 
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Rennie, Sir Richard 
 1879—82 - Judge, HBM’s Court, Yokohama (Absent 1882) 
1884—89 - Chief Justice, HBM’s Supreme Court for China and Japan, 
Shanghai (Absent 1889) 
 
Schmidt, W. 
 1861—62 - Clerk, Fletcher & Co., Hongkong 
 1865 - Partner, Fletcher & Co., Hongkong 
 1867 - Clerk, Giles & Co., Amoy 
 1868 - Clerk, Gundry & Co., Shanghai 
 1872—74 - Secretary, China & Japan Marine Insurance Co., Shanghai 
 
Sentence, W.V. 
 1879 - Clerk, W. Forrester & Co., Shanghai 
 1882 - Merchant, Shanghai 
 1884 - White & Welch’s, Shanghai 
 1887 - Trading tea, Shanghai93 
 1888—89 - Merchant, Shanghai 
 
Spence, W.D. 
 1872—77 - British Consular Assistant, Shanghai 
 1879 - Acting Registrar of Shipping, British Consulate, Shanghai 
 
Strachan, W.M. 
 1861—62 - Clerk, A. Cushny, Shanghai 
1867—82 - Merchant, Strachan and Thomas, Yokohama (Absent 1872—73 
and 1882) 
 1888—89 - Merchant, Strachan & Co., Kobe (Absent) 
 
By 1892 Strachan was still active in his own eponymous business, and is listed as 
running the London end of the concern in the directory for that year. 
 
                                                          
93 “From the London Gazette, Friday, May 20.” Times (London, England), 21 May 1887, p.15.  
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Sutherland, Thomas (M.P.) 
 1859 - Clerk, P&O, Hongkong 
 1861 - Chief Clerk, P&O, Hongkong 
 1865—67 - Superintendent, P&O, Hongkong (Absent 1867) 
 
Sutherland left China permanently in 1868. Returning to London, he rose to be 
chairman and managing director of the P&O in 1881. He exercised a firm grip on the 
company, remaining in charge until he found a viable successor, in 1914, in Lord 
Inchcape.94 
 
Swire, John L. Samuel 
 1866—67 - Shanghai 
 
John Swire spent less than a year in East Asia to extend his British business into the 
great mercantile house that bore his name. After founding Butterfield and Swire, he 
returned to run the London portion of the business, John Swire & Sons. Butterfield 
and Swire remained the closely linked Eastern part of the firm.95 He made four further 
visits to East Asia to ensure the company was functioning well during his lifetime.96 
 
Talbot-Hassell, John Gordon 
 1867—74 - Clerk, Birley & Co., Hongkong 
 1876—82 - Merchant, Birley & Co., Hongkong 
 
Talbot-Hassell died in 1925.97 His time in Hongkong was punctuated by at least one 
home leave, in 1875, upon which his father gave him the painting The Northern Whale 
Fishery; the Swan and Isabella as a gift.98 
 
 
                                                          
94 Harcourt, ‘Sutherland, Sir Thomas (1834–1922)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
95 Hook, A Guide to the Papers of John Swire and Sons Limited, introduction. 
96 Robert Bickers, ‘Swire, John Samuel (1825–1898)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/39475, last accessed 26 
October 2017). 
97 “Deaths.” Times (London, England), 3 November 1925, p.1.  
98 Sale 7261: Exploration and Travel with the Polar Sale Including the Amundsen Collection (available 
online at http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/Lot/john-ward-of-hull-1798-1849-the-4784296-
details.aspx, last accessed 26 October 2017). 
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Thin, George (M.D.) 
 1867—72 - M.D. and Physician, Shanghai 
Thin remained an active doctor on his return from East Asia. He published on taking 
healthy summer holidays at sea in 1890, and was the surgeon general for Cornwall in 
1892.99 
 
Thomas, D.H. 
 1876—79 - Clerk, Adamson, Bell & Co., Foochow 
 
Turnbull, William A. 
 1867—72 - Clerk, Birley, W & Co., Shanghai 
 1873—77 - Merchant, Birley, W & Co., Shanghai 
 1882—89 - Merchant, Turnbull, Howie & Co., Shanghai (Absent) 
 
Turnbull continued to be listed as absent following his return, suggesting he continued 
to have his capital placed in the eponymous company. 
 
Wade, Sir Thomas 
 1843 - Interpreter, Hongkong Garrison100 
 1845 - Interpreter, Hongkong Court101 
 1850 - Assistant Chinese Secretary, Hongkong 
 1859 - Chinese Secretary, Hongkong 
 1861 - Chinese Secretary, British Embassy, Shanghai 
 1862 - Chinese Secretary, British Legation, Peking 
 1865 - British Charge d’affairs, Peking 
 1867—68 - Chinese Secretary, British Legation, Peking 
 1872—73 - British Minister Plenipotentiary, Peking 
 1874 - British Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, Peking 
 1877—82 - British Minister Plenipotentiary, Peking 
 
                                                          
99 “Shipping.” Times (London, England), 2 Jul. 1890, p.2. “Banquet at the Mansion-House.” Times 
(London, England), 24 March 1892, p.6. 
100 Ven, ‘Wade, Sir Thomas Francis (1818–1895)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
101 Ibid. 
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Following his return Wade remained linked to China, becoming professor of Chinese 
at Cambridge, although he taught no students. He is perhaps best known for 
developing the Wade-Giles system of translation from Chinese, a standard for over a 
century.102 
 
Watmore, Robert 
 1859 - Clerk, Shanghai 
 1861 - Clerk, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong 
 1865 - Clerk, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hankow 
 
Webb, Edward 
 1862—74 - Clerk, Russell & Co., Shanghai 
 
Returning to England, Webb became a director for the Mortgage and agency company 
of Ceylon.103 
 
Whittall, Jas. 
 1847 - Canton 
 1850 - Mercantile Assistant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Canton 
 1859 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong 
 1861—62 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai 
 1865 - Partner, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong 
 1867 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai 
 1868—74 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Hongkong (Absent 1868) 
 1874 - Acting Consul for Hawaii 
 
Whittall left Hongkong in 1875, and founded his own company, J. Whittall & Co., 
ending his partnership in Jardine Matheson and Co., that lasted from 1858—76.104 
This new company was a primarily London and Ceylon based concern, which was still 
                                                          
102 Ibid. 
103 “The Mortgage and Agency Company of.” Times (London, England), 18 November 1879, p.13. 
104 G.B. Endacott, A Biographical Sketch-book of Early Hongkong (Hongkong: Hongkong University 
Press, 2005), p.161; Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.264. 
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extant as of at least 1903.105 He was also recorded in 1888 and 1889 directories as a 
director of the Chartered Bank in London. 
 
Whitall, Edward 
 1863 — Jardine Matheson & Co., Japan106 
1867—74 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai 
 1876 - Merchant, Jardine Matheson & Co., Yokohama 
 
Whitall was a partner in Jardine Matheson from 1864—75.107 He had been involved 
in negotiations over silk production in Japan for Jardine Matheson as early as 1863, 
though in an unspecified role.108 
 
Wilson, G.B. 
 1879 - Acting Accountant, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Shanghai 
 1882 - Accountant, Chartered Mercantile Bank, Shanghai 
 
Wood, H.W. 
 1853—55 - Assistant, Syme & Co., Singapore 
 1858—59 - Assistant, Borneo Co., Singapore 
 1868 - Partner, Gilfillan, Wood & Co., Singapore 
 1869—71 - Partner, Gilfillan, Wood & Co., (absent) 
1874 - Gilfillan, Wood & Co., Singapore 
 1876—77 - Gilfillan, Wood & Co., Europe 
1879 - Merchant, Gilfillan, Wood & Co., Singapore (Absent) 
1888—89 - Merchant, Gilfillan Wood & Co., Singapore and Penang (Absent) 
 
Youd, F.M. 
 1865 - Clerk, W.R. Adamson & Co., Foochow 
 1867—68 - Clerk, W.R. Adamson & Co., Shanghai 
                                                          
105 Arnold Wright (ed.), Twentieth Century Impressions of Ceylon: Its History, People, Commerce, 
Industries and Resources (London: Lloyds, 1907), p.429; “Miscellaneous Companies.” Times (London, 
England), 17 April 1891, p.15.  
106 Debin Ma, Textiles in the Pacific, 1500-1900 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p.197 
107 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.264. 
108 Ma, Textiles in the Pacific, 1500-1900, p.197. 
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 1872 - Tea inspector, W.R. Adamson & Co., Shanghai 
 1873 - Merchant, W.R. Adamson & Co., Shanghai (Absent) 
 1874—89 - Merchant, Adamson, Bell & Co., Shanghai (Absent 1884—89) 
 
Youd had been a partner as early as 1870, and presumably remained so when 
Adamson, Bell & Co., was brought to court over unpaid debts, a case in which fellow 
CA founder C.L. Grant gave evidence.109   
 
Young W.S. 
 1865—68 - Clerk, Jarvis, Thorburn & Co., Yokohama 
 1872—73 - Clerk, Gilman & Co., Hongkong 
 1874—77 - Merchant, Gilman & Co., Foochow 
 1876—77 - Danish Consul, Foochow 
 1879—89 - Merchant, Gilman & Co., Hongkong (Absent 1889) 
 
Young was still recorded as absent from the firm as of 1892, suggesting his continued 
involvement. 
 
Zimmern, Alfred 
 1868 - Manager, Reiss & Co., Hongkong 
 1872—73 - Merchant, Reiss & Co., Shanghai 
 
Zimmern became a partner in the firm Reiss Bros. at an unspecified date, and gave 
testimony to a commission on shipping rings in this role in 1909. Reiss Bros. were a 
large shipper of cotton goods to China, and perhaps the British end of the firm Reiss 
& Co.110 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109 “Queens Bench Division.” Times (London, England), 4 February 1892, p.13.  
110 Falkus, The Blue Funnel Legend, p.127. 
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Appendix B: Key China firms 
Listed below are a number of firms or business groups which either gave the CA 
substantial financial support, had representatives hold officer’s posts within the 
Association, or later retained a permanent seat on the Association’s general 
committee. This is by no means a comprehensive list, and is intended simply to give 
the reader some idea of the types of firms who backed the CA most prominently, or 
who are mentioned consistently throughout the Thesis. 
Largely, the information below is drawn from either company histories, or a 
select few histories of wider British trade in East Asia. The intention has been to keep 
the information below concise, and relevant to the Thesis, rather than to produce an 
exhaustive history of these firms. 
 
British multinational firms: 
These firms are those involved in trade, shipping and financing not only in China, but 
around the Globe, from bases in Britain or China.  
 
 Jardine Matheson Group 
The Jardine Matheson Group was originally formed of two companies, Jardine 
Matheson & Co., based in China and founded in 1832, and Matheson & Co., London 
based and formed in 1848.1 The two had a considerable overlap in partners and 
directors, before Matheson & Co. was bought out by Jardine Matheson in 1912.2 The 
Jardine Matheson group began, as so many China based firms, by importing opium 
from India.3 Soon after, however, they diversified. Recent work has shown the role 
they played in facilitating the movement of Chinese labourers in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, and as early as the 1830’s, the steamer Jardine had arrived in the 
East, marking their move into shipping, with involvement in Insurance agencies 
coming in the same decade.4 
Opium was no longer traded after Sassoons cornered the market in 1872, and 
this move saw their position as a leading China coast firm consolidated as they moved 
from opium traders with some ‘general trading, shipping and financial activities’ into 
                                                          
1 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.264 lists the directors and partners of the firms. 
2 Reid, ‘The Steel Frame’, p43; Jones, Merchants to multinationals, p.57. 
3 Bickers, The Scramble for China, pp.30-1. 
4 Neal, Jardine Matheson and Chinese Migration in the British Empire, 1833-1853; Keswick (ed.), The 
Thistle and the Jade, p.257. 
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a ‘diversified conglomerate’ with multinational investments.5 In China this saw the 
establishment of silk filatures in Shanghai, which were followed later by a series of 
cotton mills under the Ewo (and later King Yik and Yangtzepoo) names, and sugar 
refining facilities in Hongkong.6 Of greater importance, however, were moves into 
financial services. The Ewo bank was established in Peking in 1870, and followed 
later by Jardine Matheson’s most notable later move in China as they founded, jointly 
with the HSBC, the BCC for development of railway concessions in China in 1898.7 
Outside China, the firm invested heavily in mining in Spain, California, Russia and 
South Africa, banking in Iran, and an oil company in Peru.8 
 
 Swire Group 
The second great East Asian firm after Jardine Matheson, the Swire group was a 
relative latecomer to the trade. They began operations in 1866, as Butterfield and 
Swire in East Asia, adding to the already established John Swire and Sons in London, 
and filling the void left by the collapse of Dent’s in the same year.9 This Butterfield 
and Swire partnership was largely based on textile shipments from Yorkshire to 
Shanghai.10 Unlike Jardine Matheson, Swires quickly moved away from all trade, and 
became a firm concerned mostly with Shipping. They began by acting as agents for 
Alfred Holt & Co’s. Ocean Steamship Company, which the Swire-owned China 
Navigation company would act as a feeder for on the China Coast.11 Before long Swire 
became a larger shipping concern than Jardine Matheson.12 
Alongside this, they diversified in a similar manner to Jardine Matheson. This 
began with the development of manufacturing concerns in sugar under the Taikoo 
name.13 Later, the Taikoo name was also applied to a Dockyard and Engineering 
                                                          
5 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.258; Jones, Merchants to multinationals, p.57. 
6 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, pp.258-60; Connel, The applicability of resource-based 
theory to the interpretation of strategic management in Jardine Matheson, p.83. 
7 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.258-9; Connel, The applicability of resource-based theory 
to the interpretation of strategic management in Jardine Matheson, p.83. 
8 Jones, Merchants to multinationals, p.57. 
9 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.258. 
10 Hook, A Guide to the Papers of John Swire and Sons Limited, introduction. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Jones, Merchants to multinationals, pp. 72-3. 
13 Jones, Merchants to multinationals, pp. 72-3; See also Crisswell, The Taipans: Hongkongs Merchant 
Princes, chapter ten. 
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Company (founded 1901) and the Taikoo Chinese Navigation Company (registered 
1930).14 Like Jardine Matheson, Swires also held a number of insurance interests.15 
 
 Dodwells 
Dodwells began as a Shanghai trading and shipping firm in 1858. They were 
reconstituted first as Adamson Bell and Co., in 1867, and then Dodwells in the late 
1880’s when George Benjamin Dodwell took over the falling firm. It was 
reconstructed as a London based multinational in 1899, and developed trade and 
shipping links with East Asia and North America. Later these would develop into 
manufacturing businesses, exporting canned salmon from Vancouver, for example, or 
into direct investment in tea and coconut plantations.16 
 
 Sassoon 
Sassoons are a less known group, of whom little history exists, and as a relatively 
minor firm appear less in the thesis than those above. D. Sassoon are the main focus 
here, rather than the other family firm, E.D. Sassoon. D. Sassoon, by offering credits 
to opium growers, had become by far the largest traders of Indian opium to China by 
the late nineteenth century.17 Contemporary sources, however, attest that they dealt on 
a wider scale than this, importing Indian cotton and holding, though on a smaller scale 
than others, agencies for shipping firms (the Apcar line) and insurance (Norwich Fire 
Insurance Co.) as well as shares in the HSBC and many other prominent Hongkong 
based firms.18 A brief history of the Sassoon family itself can be found in Crisswell’s 
The Taipans.19 
 
British trading / manufacturing firms 
These firms were less influential, and dealt often only as traders between China and 
Britain, or as producers of goods in China for export. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Hook, A Guide to the Papers of John Swire and Sons Limited, introduction. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Jones, Merchants to multinationals, p.58. 
17 Meyer, ‘Baghdadi Jewish Merchants in Shanghai and the Opium Trade’. 
18 Wright, (ed.), Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-Kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of 
China, p.224. 
19 Colin N. Crisswell, The Taipans: Hongkongs Merchant Princes, chapter eight. 
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 Ilbert and Co 
As with many smaller Shanghai based firms, little is known about Ilbert and Co. 
Potentially, this is symptomatic of a wider problem is studying the history of British 
businesses based in Shanghai, as records were likely lost during either the Sino-
Japanese war and subsequent occupation of Shanghai, or during the later PRC 
takeover. 
As of 1904—the time at which Ilbert and Co are most important to this study—
the firm were general managers of the Laou Kung Mow Cotton Spinning Company, 
and held a number of small insurance agencies. They held links to sugar and rubber 
planting in the Malay states, but seem not to have had any direct investment there 
themselves. Alongside this, they were general importers, selling to Chinese partners 
on indent terms.20 
 
British financial services 
These financial services provided the funding necessary for the expansion of British 
interests in China, be it by providing loans to allow mercantile firms to operate, or by 
providing loans to the Chinese government itself. 
 
 HSBC 
The HSBC was, by the time of the foundation of the CA, well established as the 
leading financier in East Asia. Founded by CA founding member Thomas Sutherland 
in 1865, all major Far Eastern mercantile firms (with the exception of Jardine 
Matheson) subscribed capital.21 The corporation experienced great growth in the 
following years under the command of another CA founder, Sir Thomas Jackson.22 
The bank’s main importance to this thesis is twofold. Firstly, through its 
already mentioned co-operation with Jardine Matheson in founding the BCC to 
provide finance and expertise to develop railway concessions in China. Secondly, the 
HSBC gained great prominence for its work in providing large loans to the Chinese 
government in an attempt to modernise the country. These began as purely British 
efforts, but later included international co-operation through international banking 
                                                          
20 Wright, (ed.), Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-Kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of 
China, p.608. 
21 Maurice Collis, Wayfoong: The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, pp.22-4. 
22 See appendix A. 
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consortiums, led by Sir Charles Stewart Addis.23 Cain and Hopkins have argued that 
such financial investment in China largely came to dictate British policy foreign policy 
towards the country.24 A number of histories focusing purely on the HSBC, often 
commissioned by the bank, are available to the interested reader.25 
 
 Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China 
A smaller concern than the HSBC, the Chartered Bank was the older of the two 
institutions. The bank was founded in 1852, and its Royal Charter granted the 
following year.26 A branch was founded in Shanghai in 1858, and business focused on 
lending to those involved in the opium trade, or in import and export of cotton.27  
Entering our period of interest, the 1870’s found the bank in some trouble, entering 
the decade with no dividends being paid and shares quoted below issue price. J.H. 
Gwyther, later a fixture on CA committees, took charge at this time, and went some 
way to restoring the banks fortunes.28 
Although successful, it was regarded as something of a second rate institution, 
never quite up to the standards of the HSBC—and with this excluded from much of 
the British finance provided to the Chinese government that would come to mark the 
period around the turn of the Century, and catapult the HSBC to predominance.29 It 
would later be involved in foreign exchange, co-operating with the Chinese founded 
Shanghai Bank.30 
 
British shipping firms 
These firms—unlike the multinational traders mentioned above—were purely 
providers of shipping services, though no less influential for this. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Edwards, British Diplomacy and Finance in China. 
24 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism:1688-2000. 
25 For example, Frank H.H. King, The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 
Vol 1-4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987-91); Kynaston, The Lion Wakes. 
26 Mackenzie, Realms of Silver: One Hundred Years of Banking in the East, p.5 and p.20. 
27 Zhaojin Ji, A History of Modern Shanghai Banking: The Rise and Decline of China’s Finance 
Capitalism (New York :M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p.43. 
28 Ibid., pp.157-160. 
29 Edwards, British Diplomacy and Finance in China, pp.26-7, pp.95-6, p.167 and p.172. 
30 Ji, A History of Modern Shanghai Banking, p.120. 
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 The P&O 
The history of the P&O Company, as relevant to this study, is limited. It had been 
founded upon mail contracts, and later carried a substantial amount of opium.31 As 
discussed in the main body of this work, they were, by the time of the CA’s foundation 
and later involvement in the opium question, a general shipper in East Asia, having 
reduced their reliance upon opium.32 The firm was run somewhat autocratically by CA 
member Thomas Sutherland until 1914, when it was merged with the Inchcape Group, 
though keeping its separate identity.33  
Further information for the interested reader is to be found in Harcourt’s study 
Flagships of Imperialism, but as the preface to the work notes, this does not cover the 
history of the P&O beyond 1867, although it had originally intended to do so.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Freda Harcourt, Flagships of Imperialism: The P&O Company and the politics of empire from its 
origins to 1867 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), introduction 
32 Harcourt, ‘Black Gold: P&O and the Opium Trade, 1847-1914’, p.83. 
33 Harcourt, ‘Sutherland, Sir Thomas (1834–1922)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
34 Harcourt, Flagships of Imperialism, preface. 
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Appendix C: Students examined at the China Association School of Chinese, 1909 
Listed below are employment histories for graduates of the CA school of Chinese for 
the year 1909. Histories are drawn from the Chronicle and Directory for China for the 
years 1912, 1917 and 1920 available online at 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/history/customs/ancestors/directories.html (last accessed 29 
October 2018). 
 
Forbes, D.B. 
 1912 - Agent, HSBC, Bangkok 
 1917 - Agent, HSBC, Canton 
 
Hitchcock, L.H. 
 1912 - Assistant, HSBC, Hankow 
 
MacKenzie, G.L. 
 1912 - Assistant, HSBC, Tientsin 
 
Macrae, M. 
 1912 - Assistant, HSBC, Shanghai 
 1917 - Assistant, Guthrie & Co., Shanghai 
 1920 - Assistant, Brinkmann & Co., Shanghai 
 
Moore, J.R. 
 1917 - Installation manager, Asiatic Petroleum Co., Kewkiang 
 
Oliver, M.B. 
 1912 - Sub accountant, Chartered Bank, Singapore 
 1917 - Sub-agent, Chartered Bank, Singapore 
 
Parke, W. 
 1912—17 - Assistant, HSBC, Peking 
 1920 - Assistant, HSBC, Shanghai 
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Rickford, L.T.R. 
 1912 - Sub accountant, Chartered Bank, Singapore 
 
Shaw, R.A. 
 1912 - Assistant, HSBC, Yokohama 
 
Shipway, G.W. 
 1920 - Assistant, Asiatic Petroleum Co., Chunking 
 
Thomas, W. 
 1912—17 - Sub accountant, Chartered Bank, Tientsin
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Appendix D: List of chairmen and vice chairmen 
Below are lists of the CA Chairmen and Vice Chairmen, alongside the dates they held 
the posts, and the interests they most likely represented. Where the source of this 
information is not present in the text, or in the annual reports for the years in which 
these men held these posts, a reference is provided. 
 
Chairmen 
 
William Keswick - Jardine Matheson Group (Jardine Matheson & Co.) 
1889-1890 and 1892-1905 
 
Alfred Dent - Dent Brothers & Co. 
1891-2 
 
J.H. Scott - Swire Group 
 1906-7 
 
Charles Dudgeon - Ilbert & Co. 
 1907-9 
 
F. Anderson - Ilbert & Co. 
 1910-11 and 1914-20 
 
George Jamieson - Jardine Matheson Group / HSBC (BCC) 
 1911-1913 
 
David Landale - Jardine Matheson Group (Jardine Matheson & Co.) 
 1921-23 
 
L.N. Leefe - Jardine Matheson Group  
 1924-27 
 
Stanley H. Dodwell - Dodwell & Co. 
 1928-30 
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S.F. Mayers - Jardine Matheson Group / HSBC (BCC) 
 1931-33 
 
D.G.M. Bernard - Jardine Matheson Group (Matheson & Co.) 
 1934-36 
 
George Warren Swire - Swire Group (John Swire & Sons) 
 1937-39
 
Brigadier General C.R. Woodroffe - Pekin Syndicate 
 1940-42 
 
W.B. Kennet - Morris, Ward-Jones, Kennet & Co. 
 1943-45 
 
W.J. Keswick - Jardine Matheson Group (Matheson & Co.) 
 1946-50 
 
J.K. Swire - Swire Group (John Swire & Sons) 
 1951-54 
 
Sir Arthur Morse - HSBC (recently retired) 1 
 1955 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Though retired from his position within the management of the bank in 1953, Morse was still 
instrumental as the ‘‘permanent’ chairman of [the] consultative committee’ in London. See Frank H. 
H. King, ‘Morse, Sir Arthur (1892–1967)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004 (http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/50275, last accessed 27 October 
2017). 
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Vice-Chairmen 
 
Alfred Dent - Dent Brothers & Co. 
 1892-1906  
 
George Jamieson - Jardine Matheson Group / HSBC (BCC) 
 1907-1910 
 
D.C. Rutherford - Collins & Co.2 
 1911-1913 and 1920-23 
 
Robert H. Hill - Bradley & Co. 3 
 1914 
 
Charles Henderson Ross - Jardine Matheson4 
 1916-1919 
 
Sir Gershom Stewart - Ex M.P. 
 1924 
 
Stanley H. Dodwell - Dodwell & Co. 
 1925-27 
 
H.W. Looker - M.P. 
 1928-29 
 
S.F. Mayers - Jardine Matheson Group / HSBC (BCC) 
 1930 
                                                          
2  The Directory & Chronicle for China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, 
Sian, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippines, &c for the year 1910 (Hongkong: Daily Press Office, 
1910), p.762. 
3  The Directory & Chronicle for China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, 
Siam, Netherlands India,, Borneo, the Philippines & C., with which are incorporated “The China 
Directory” and “The Hongkong Directory and hong list for the Far East, for the year 1912 (Hongkong: 
Daily Press Office, 1912), p.1081. 
4 Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade, p.265. 
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D.G.M. Bernard - Jardine Matheson Group (Matheson & Co.) 
 1931-33 
 
W.B. Kennet - Morris, Ward-Jones, Kennet & Co. 
 1934-36 
 
A.W. Burkill - A.R. Burkill & Sons, Ltd. (Shanghai) 
 1937-39 
 
George Warren Swire - Swire Group (John Swire & Sons) 
 1940-44 
 
W.J. Keswick - Jardine Matheson Group (Matheson & Co.) 
 1945 
 
G.E. Mitchell - CA Secretary  
 1946-52 
 
W.R. Cockburn - Chartered Bank 
 1953-54 
 
J.K. Swire - Swire Group (John Swire and Sons) 
 1955 
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